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Abstract 
International criminal courts do not operate to the exclusion of national 
legal orders, but co-exist with them. The present thesis provides an in-depth 
analysis of the above relationship. By examining the concepts of primacy and 
complementarity on the basis of which the ad hoc international criminal 
Tribunals and the permanent International Criminal Court seize jurisdiction, 
the foundations of the interface are explored. As effectiveness is a key concept 
to international criminal justice, the relationship between international criminal 
courts and national legal systems is tested, by examining the co-operation 
regimes envisaged in the Statutes of both the Tribunals and the ICC, as well as 
the problems that arise in practice. Moreover, the way the UN Security Council 
affects State interplay with international criminal justice institutions is crucial 
for a holistic understanding of the limitations of the interaction. The final part 
of the thesis focuses on national incorporation efforts and provides a detailed 
analysis of implementing legislation of a number of key States with a view to 
discerning some common approaches and highlighting problem areas. The 
present thesis argues that despite the different constitutional bases of the 
Tribunals and the ICC, similar questions of interface with national courts arise 
and the challenges presented could be better tackled by aiming for a 
"functional or workable interaction". 
Overall, the originality of this thesis lies in its analytical approach. By 
scrutinising a number of crucial aspects of the relationship between 
international criminal courts and national legal orders an overview of the 
research question posed is achieved. Moreover, the examination of the legal 
ii 
principles and their practical application is complemented by a comprehensive 
discussion of national implementing legislation which has not previously been 
attempted in a similar manner. 
iii 
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Introduction 
Chapter One 
The Inter-relationship between National and International 
Jurisdictions: Raising the Issues 
In the evolving international criminal justice system, where national 
and international judicial orders co-exist, issues of interaction arise. The 
possibility of both national and international courts operating simultaneously 
might create tensions on various levels. The present thesis focuses mainly on 
this issue. This inter-relationship in the field of international criminal law is the 
main theme this dissertation explores. 
The main research hypothesis involves the manner of interaction 
between the international criminal justice system and national legal orders. It is 
not a question of judicial taxonomy as no classification between the two is 
intended l . Rather, the main aim of this work is to observe the interplay 
between national and international criminal jurisdictions through the prism of 
international law. Guided by the principles enshrined in the Statutes of the ad 
hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the aim is to 
highlight some of the problems of this interaction, compare and contrast the 
solutions adopted for the ad hoc Tribunals from those for the permanent Court, 
and whilst providing some insight into the system, suggest possible solutions 
as to how it could be strengthened. 
There are two equally valid approaches to the above research question: 
an international law approach, and a criminal law approach. This study adopts 
the former. The same study would have taken a totally different angle and 
1 For a piece of work which examines questions of competing jurisdictions at the international 
level, see Shany, (2003). 
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could have had different results had it bep:n conducted by a domestic criminal 
lawyer, who is not as sympathetic to the idea of international crimes being tried 
at an international level, nor wishes to kl go of what has traditionally been a 
domestic prerogative. 
Whilst acknowledging that international criminal justice is a wider 
concept than the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC, for the purposes of the present 
thesis, a very restrictive definition of international criminal justice is adopted. 
This piece of work focuses almost exclusively on the Tribunals and the ICC 
through an examination of the relevant principles and their practical 
application, by both States and institutions. Conceivably similar issues arise 
with regard to the Sierra Leone Special Court, and also, albeit to a lesser 
extent, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals. When referring to 
international crimes, again, the approach is a similar one: for, the term 
international crimes is here restricted to crimes falling within the jurisdiction of 
the above-mentioned Tribunals and Court only, and covers war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide and with regard to the ICC, aggression. Mindful of 
the sensitivities of various States regarding the use of the term "national" 
courts, or even "domestic" and "municipal" courts, these terms are used 
interchangeably throughout the thesis, in order to describe the relationship 
between national and international legal orders2• 
These qualifications do not, hopefully, constitute restrictions on the 
validity of the thesis. The question of inter-relationship between national and 
international jurisdictions is not examined in the abstract, but the concepts 
2 See amendment ofICTY and ICTR RPE in January 1995 and June 1997 respectively of Rules 
8, 9, 10, 12 and 13 to remove any reference to "national" courts and the discnssions 
surrounding "municipal" or "domestic" courts, which led to the adoption of the rather 
incontrovertible "courts of any State". 
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chosen here are examined in detail from both conceptual and the practical 
angles, to better illustrate this interplay. 
1. Models oflnter-relationship between Domestic aad International Spheres 
In general, the envisioned functioning of international judicial bodies 
evinces little concern on how the operation of international processes may 
interact with local processes. In the field of international criminal law, 
however, due to the wider intersection between the two levels, this is an issue 
which merits greater exploration. Several possibilities may be foreseen to deal 
with this interaction. 
Undoubtedly, although both systems may be capable of having 
jurisdiction, they could be kept completely separate. In that sense, the national 
is completely "insulated" from the international, and vice versa, and no 
interaction whatsoever is achieved. Although this would guarantee that each 
system would maintain its integrity and distinct character, it would also mean 
that the limitations on it would be greater. This segregation would impede the 
transformation and adaptation of either or both systems with the view to 
creating a flexible unity, able to address common problems and to find widely 
acceptable solutions. 
A second option would be to endow one system with primacy over the 
other. This does not necessarily mean that the international should be vested 
with primacy over the national. Conceivably, control could be left solely with 
the national jurisdiction. Primacy has the advantage that, although it permits 
interaction of the two systems, ultimately only one system prevails over the 
3 
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other and unifonnity is achieved. However, this is largely p0ssible when the 
international system is bestowed with primacy, due to the f a ~ t t that the mere 
existence of a number of national judicial systems with many d.isparities among 
them, would mean that in giving them primacy unifonnity would be difficult to 
achieve. 
Finally, another approach could be to encourage better interaction of 
both national and international systems with defined rules of competence over 
specific cases. This cross-fertilisation would lead to the improvement of both 
national and international systems through the exchange of ideas and working 
patterns. To what extent this is likely to be achieved in the field of international 
criminal law and the ICC in particular, is a question which will be addressed in 
the chapters that follow. 
2. Treatment ofthe Issue in Other Systems 
Interaction between national and international jurisdictions is not an 
issue which arises solely in the field of international criminal law. It occurs in 
almost all adjudicative bodies that deliver judgments at a level different from 
the national. 
In order to put the inter-relationship between international criminal law 
and domestic jurisdictions in perspective, it is worth examining the various 
types of interaction in other systems so as to draw useful analogies, if any, 
before proceeding with an examination of the interface in international criminal 
law itself. 
4 
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Some interaction between national and international legal orcip.rs is 
present in several systems regardless of the degree of integration. For instance, 
the issue arises equally in the case of the European Union which is considered 
to have achieved a high degree of integration, as well as systems such as the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, where integration is not really an 
lssue. 
Moreover, should a role for national jurisdictions be envisaged, this is 
made clear in the international instrument governing the operation of the 
adjudicative body. Although a minimum degree of interface for the 
enforcement of judgments is needed in any case, there is usually no mention of 
inter-relationship since the action of the international body is kept separate 
from the national. In international criminal law however, the interaction 
between national and international levels is sought for almost every step of the 
judicial process. 
Before looking succinctly at some of these international adjudicative 
bodies and their relationship with national jurisdictions, it is important to stress 
that in international criminal law the individual plays an important part in the 
proceedings. This is the main achievement of Human Rights law. However, the 
differences between international criminal law and the Human Rights system 
are easily discernible3. The individual does not have locus standi before the 
international criminal Tribunals and the Court but appears primarily as 
defendant. Mention should be made also to the limited right of victims to 
appear before the ICC, which does not, however, change the status of 
3 See Mumford (1999), 170, who maintains that "[ w ]hile civil rights violations are deplorable, 
only the most egregious that are designated as such rise to the level of the "most serious crimes 
of international concern"", quoting also US Ambassador Scheffer noting that "This [the ICC] 
is not a human rights court; it is an international criminal court". 
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individuals. Victims may not directly bring a case in their individual capacity 
against the alleged perpetrator(s) but are enabled only to make representations 
ill order for the Court to determine potential reparations to victims4. In 
addition, international criminal law would in any case be dissimilar to other 
systems, due to its "criminal" nature. And this issue alone has its own bearing 
on the inter-relationship with domestic jurisdictions. For, this criminal aspect 
dictates different approaches when compared to the civil cases, for instance, in 
the type of penalties to be imposed, or even in the way justice is administered 
so as to accommodate the particular needs of a case. 
The examination of the issue of inter-relationship in other adjudicative 
bodies will be limited to the issues of access to those bodies and the question of 
enforcement of judgments5• These two areas are generally indicative of 
whether interaction between the national and the international levels is 
envisaged. Where appropriate, other aspects will also be examined briefly. 
2.1 The International Court of Justice 
Turning to specific institutions, it is only fair to begin with the 
International Court of Justice6. The differences from international criminal law 
are twofold. First, with respect to ratione personae it is important to mention 
that only States may appear before the World Coure. Second, in order to 
identify the interaction of the ICJ and UN Member States, the action requested 
4 For the role of victims in ICC proceedings see Article 75 ICC Statute. See also lorda and 
Hemptinne, in Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones (2002), 1387. 
5 Although in certain cases this issue arises also with regard to applicable law. 
6 For the ICJ see inter alia, Bowett, (1997); Muller, Raic, and Thuranszky, (1997); Lowe and 
fitzmaurice (1996); Rosenne, (1995); Singh, (1989); Damrosch, (1987); Fitzmaurice, (1986). 
See ICJ Statute, Article 34(1); See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case PCIJ Rep. Ser. 
A No.2 (1924). 
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by States ff)llowing a finding of the Court should be examined. In general, the 
IC] does not require active co-operation of States in terms of assistance 
provided by States in order for the World Court to be able to deliver a 
judgment. This is not the same in international criminal law, where State co-
operation is needed in every stage of the proceedings. In most cases, the IeJ 
will make a finding on a particular case, which is of course final and binding 
and must be complied with by the States involved in the dispute8• In most 
cases, this finding, however, does not entail the taking of positive action on 
behalf of a State. Active co-operation in terms of positive action is more likely 
to be requested by States when the IC] indicates provisional measures9, in 
cases involving reparation/restitution and usually in cases of delimitation of 
maritime or land frontiers. The system though resembles the international 
criminal justice system with regard to the failure on behalf of a State to 
perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment. The other party 
may then have recourse to the Security Council (SC) which may adopt 
recommendations or binding decisions pertaining to the enforcement of the 
judgment10. This is also the case in both the ad hoc Tribunals and only 
exceptionally in the ICC, where the SC is asked to monitor the enforcement of 
co-operation requests 11. 
8 Article 94(1) UN Charter. 
9 Article 41 (1) ibid. 
\0 Article 94(2) ibid. To date, the se's judgment-enforcement powers have never been used. 
II See infra chapter 3. 
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2.2 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
Moving to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 12, under the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, it exercises compulsory 
jurisdiction over all States parties to UNCLOS in relation to certain types of 
disputesl3 . This function of ITLOS is not identical to the ad hoc Tribunals in 
the sense that although it enjoys some sort of primacy as the said Tribunals 
d0 14, the ITLOS nevertheless enjoys exclusive jurisdiction with regard to a 
particular set of disputes. Moreover, the jurisdiction of ITLOS ratione 
personae potentially extends beyond States, to include private parties (at least 
in the context of disputes over the seabed)IS. Coming to the inter-relationship 
between the ITLOS regime and national jurisdictions regarding the 
enforcement of its judgments, although they are binding upon the parties and 
must be complied withl6, the UNCLOS does not explicitly provide for an 
enforcement mechanism. However, the decisions of the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber of the Tribunal are enforceable in the territories of the States parties 
in the same manner as judgments or orders of the highest court of that State 
partyl7. This enforcement mechanism brings this aspect of the system closer to 
international criminal law. 
12 See generally, Eiriksson, (2000); Rosenne, (2000), 443; Noyes, (1998), 109; Mensah, (1998), 
527; Rosenne, (1995), 806. 
13 Article 287(1),(4) ITLOS Statute 
14 See infra chapter 2. 
IS Article 20(1) ibid. 
16 Article 296(1) UNCLOS; Article 33(1) ITLOS Statute. 
17 A . I 
rtlC e 39 ITLOS Statute. 
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2.3 The World Trade Organisation 
Another system worthy of examination is the dispute settlement system 
of the World Trade Organisation l8 • The WTO is characterised by the oxymoron 
that, although individuals are, in fact, the principal actors of the system, they 
are barred from the operation of the Organisation. In fact not only do they not 
have locus standi before the Panels and Appellate Body of the WTO, they are 
not even allowed to attend those proceedings since they are confidential and 
closed to the public. This is indicative of the fact that the administration of 
international economic law was perceived in a traditional public international 
law way involving only States. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
refers only to the members of the WTO whose members are only States. This 
does not mean that individuals are completely excluded from the disputes. 
They are involved in two main ways: first at the pre-litigation stage of the 
proceedings and second by means of direct applicability of WTO law l9 in the 
national legal orders. 
At the pre-litigation stage WTO members have internal procedures for 
private legal persons, mainly companies, to invoke a means of diplomatic 
protection where a Member of the Organisation utilises the DSU against 
another member to protect the trade interests of its nationals2o. The monitoring 
of implementation of those reports is discharged by the Dispute Settlement 
18 For the WTO see inter alia, Jackson, (1997); Qureshi, (1999); Hilf, and Petersmann (eds.), 
(1993); Jackson, and Sykes, (1997); Cottier, and Schefer, (1998), 83; Jackson, (1992), 310. 
19 Including the decisions by the panels and Appellate Body. 
20 Indicatively on the two main players of the system the relevant internal instruments are: for 
the EC: Council Regulation (EC) 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down the Community 
procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the 
Community's rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the 
auspices of the World Trade Organization (the Trade Barriers Regulation) and for the United 
States: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 
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Body (DSB), which supervises the com!"liance of the losing party with the 
recommendations of the report21 , In case C'f failure to comply, negotiations can 
be initiated by the complaining party ~ o r r payment of mutually acceptable 
compensation and if no agreement is reached, authorisation of the DSB for the 
imposition of temporary trade sanctions against the recalcitrant party may be 
sought22, The said formulation resembles the enforcement mechanism assigned 
by the ICC Statute to the Assembly of States Parties to the Statute23 , 
This process takes place because the major participants to the system 
opted not to accord direct effect to the WTO Agreements24, Accordingly, a 
company that is, for example, the subject of a WTO-inconsistent trade barrier 
cannot argue before national courts that the barrier at stake violates any of the 
annexed WTO Agreements and cannot request review of the illegality of the 
measure25 , The same thesis applies also in the presence of a Panel! Appellate 
Body ruling confirming the violation26, 
2.4 The International Centre for Settlement ofInvestment Disputes 
Another institution, is the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (lCSID)27, Under the ICSID Convention28 there is a 
facility, through the establishment of ad hoc conciliation commissions and 
21 Article 21 DSU, 
22 Art' 1 23 IC e 22(2),(6) and (8) ibid. 
Infra chapter 3. 
24 For the EC: see Council Decision 94/800/EC. For the United States: see the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act of 8 December 1994. See also Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] 
ECR 1-8395 para. 43. 
2S Ibid. at para. 47. Subject to the Nakajima's exceptions. Case C-69/89 Nakajima v. Council 
P999] ECR 1-2069. 
6 Case C-I04/97P, Atlanta v. European Community [1999], ECR 1 -6983, paras. 19-20. 
27 Hereinafter ICSID. For a comprehensive list of sources see 
http://www.worldbank.orglicsidlpubslbibliogr/part2.htm 
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arbitral tribunals, for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes 
between contracting States and individuals and companies that qualify as 
nationals of other contracting States29. It may be t(lat ICSID has jurisdiction 
over natural persons, however, those have to fall under the conditions 
enshrined in its Convention. This could be taken as a significant difference 
between the right to standing of the individual in the ICSID mechanism and the 
emerging international criminal justice system. A further difference has to do 
with the enforcement of awards rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention. 
Recourse to conciliation and arbitration under the said Convention is entirely 
voluntary; in fact, no contracting State or national of such State is obliged to 
resort to such conciliation or arbitration without having explicitly consented. 
Consequently, the parties are bound to abide by the award. Interestingly, all 
contracting States regardless of whether they are parties or not to the dispute 
are asked to recognise the awards rendered following the Convention as 
binding and to enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed thereby, as if it were 
the final judgment ofa court in that State30, which is akin to the ITLOS system. 
2.5 The European Union 
The question of inter-relationship arises also within the framework of 
the European Union law31 • In the European Union the choice taken by the 
participants to the system, infused with a strong dose of judicial activism by the 
28 See Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159. 
29 See Article 25(1) ibid. 
30 See Article 54( 1) ibid. 
31 See generally Craig, and de Burca (2003); Arnull, Dashwood, Ross, and Wyatt, (2000); 
Weatherill, and Beaumont, (1999); Hartley, (1998). 
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European Court of Justice, is that national and Community l ~ w w will interact. 
The first level of interaction is the enforcement of Community law in the 
national legal order, and the second, is the judicial protection afforded to 
individuals before the Community courts. 
As to the former, individuals can achieve the enforcement of 
Community law before national courts as long as it is directly effective32• At 
the level of enforcement of Community law, if a national court of whichever 
rank33 finds that Community law is in conflict with national law, even of 
constitutional nature3\ it should recognise the supremacy of Community law 
and set aside the conflicting national law35. In addition, if a Member State 
violates Community law and this causes individuals to suffer damages, the 
State is liable to pay compensation36. Generally, Member States are obliged to 
do their utmost to assist the effective implementation of Community law. This 
is an obligation stemming from Article 10 of the EC Treaty and applies across 
the range of the European Community competences. Accordingly, in 
enforcement proceedings against a Member State brought by the Commission 
under Article 226 EC Treaty not only will national authorities take all the 
necessary measures to comply with the decision of the Court of Justice,37 but 
national courts are also entitled to draw all the appropriate inferences with 
32 C ase 26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
33 Case 106177 Amminstrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 
34 Case 11170 lnternationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fUr 
Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
35 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
36 For example, in case of non transposition of a directive, see Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 
Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy [1991] ECR 1-5357. 
37 Article 228( 1) EC Treaty. 
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regard to cases pending before them38. As to decisions by the European Court 
of Justice imposing a pecuniary obligation39 those will be enforced h the 
national legal orders in accordance with national procedural rules4o. 
As to the latter, individuals can have locus standi before the 
Community courts under the conditions set out in Articles 230(4) and 232(3). 
In addition, individuals can ask for compensation before the Community 
Courts for extra-contractual liability of the Community in accordance with 
Article 288(2) EC. Another instance of interaction is the possibility given to 
national courts, when a question of Community law arises in proceedings 
before them, to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in 
accordance with Article 234 of the EC Treaty. The ruling will form part of an 
interlocutory process in the national proceedings and, in order to achieve 
uniformity, the interpretation of Community law given by the Court of Justice 
will be binding on the national court. 
2.6 Human Rights Courts 
Having examined the position in European Law, it remains to see how 
the human rights system interacts with national jurisdictions. In that respect, 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC)41 established to monitor compliance with 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) should be 
examined. Ratione personae the HRC may receive communications relating to 
38 Accord direct effect to the Community law provisions as in Joined Cases 314-316/81 and 
83/82 Procureur de fa Repub/ique v. Waterkeyn [1982] ECR 4337 or grant compensation in 
accordance to the Francovich principle, supra n. 36. 
39 Case C-387/97 Commission v. Greece, [2000] ECR 1-5047. 
40 Articles 244 and 256 EC Treaty. 
41 See generally, McGoldrick, (1994); Gandhi, (1998). 
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states parties that have accepted the jurisdiction of the Committee and under 
the Optional Protocol, individual communications are allowed42• However, the 
individual bringing a claim should be subject to the jurisdiction of the State 
complained against and should claim to be victim of a human rights violation 
under the ICCPR43 . The views of the Committee are not binding and thus not 
enforceable against States44• 
Coming to the European Court of Human Rights, access to the Court is 
open to State parties to the Convention45 . The Court is open to individuals, 
NGOs and groups of individuals who may bring a claim against a State 
provided that they claim to be victims of violations46• Regarding the 
enforcement of the judgments it should be noted that they are binding upon the 
States parties and their execution is subject to supervision by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council ofEurope47 • 
Moving to the equivalent system of the Organisation of American 
States, it is to be noted that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR)48 and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission are entrusted 
with adjudicating human rights violations under the 1969 American 
Convention of Human Rights49. Individuals may bring claims before the 
Commission5o, but not before the Court5!. The Commission issues a report and 
when there is a breach of the Declaration, the Convention or any other 
42 A . I 
rtIc e 41(1) ICCPR and Article 1 of the Optional Protocol. 
43 Articles I, 2, Optional Protocol. 
44 Note however that according to Rule 95 of the Rules of Procedure, the HRC appoints a 
special rapporteur for follow-up to determine measures taken by states parties to give effect to 
the Committee's views. 
45 See Article 33, EeHR. See generally, Harris, O'Boyle, and Warbrick, (1995); Jacobs, and 
White, (1996); Van Dijk, and Van Hoof, (1998); Janis, and Kay, (1990). 
46 Article 34 ibid. 
47 Article 46(1), (2) ibid. 
48 See generally, Davidson, (1997). 
49 See 9 ILM (1970), p. 673. 
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instrument, it issues also a number of recommendations52. The reports are not 
formally binding and they cannot therefore be enforced. The IACHR has held, 
however, that States parties to the American Convention have the obligation to 
make every effort to apply the recommendations of a protection organ such as 
the Commission53 . On the other hand, States parties must comply with the 
judgments of the IACHR54• In the case where the Court awards damages 
against a State party, this part is enforceable in accordance with the procedures 
governing the execution of judgments against the State in question55• A quite 
similar system is envisaged also for the African Court on Human and People's 
3. Some Tentative Conclusions 
Following a brief introduction on how national and international orders 
interact in other systems, it is important to note that few similarities exist 
between these systems and the emerging international criminal justice system. 
As a general point, it could be said that the degree and intensity in which this 
inter-relationship occurs is very much dependent on each particular system and 
there is no pattern to be followed, due to the differing characteristics of the 
systems in question. 
50 Article 44 ibid. 
51 Article 61 ibid. 
52 Articles 50(1) ibid.; Article 46(2) of the Commissions' Regulations. DS . S ee Loayza Tomayo Case, Senes C No. 33, 17 September 1997, para. 80. 
4 Article 68(1), ibid. supra n. 49. 
55 Article 68(2), ibid. 
56 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Establishment of 
an African Court of Human and People's Rights of June 1998 entered into force on 25 January 
2004. http://www.unwire.orglUNWire/20040128/449_12499.asp 
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Accordingly, the role envisioned for the individual differs significantly 
among the adjudicative organs. From no locus standi before the IC] and the 
WTO, to a limited role for private parties in the ITLOS and to strict 
preconditions for the appearance of individuals before the EU, ICSID and 
Human Rights Courts, international criminal law is different yet again. For, the 
individual is the centre of the focus although the main players are States and 
the Security Council. There is only one role envisaged for the individual in 
international criminal law and that is the role of the defendant. Arguably, this 
finds no equivalent in the systems examined above and dictates a different 
approach in international criminal law. 
Turning to the enforcement of judgments and the assistance it provides 
to the better understanding of the inter-relationship between national and 
international systems, it should be noted that some similarities with 
international criminal law exist. None of those systems however can provide a 
formula for the operation of the international criminal justice. For instance, 
although the ICJ mechanism to tackle the failure to co-operate resembles the 
equivalent mechanism of the ad hoc Tribunals and, to an extent, the ICC, it has 
never been used in practice. Moreover, the sanctions likely to be imposed by 
the DSB although akin to those in the ICC regime, differ significantly in their 
application. For, the former deals with non-compliance in a civil context, 
whereas the latter involves criminal responsibility. 
In sum, it is usually the case that the international body will make a 
finding, reach a judgment and the States will have to comply, or take steps in a 
civil context which mayor may not be so problematic. However, in 
international criminal law, not only is it the criminal nature of the proceedings 
16 
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which makes it different, but also, the fact that in the said field national 
contribution is a precondition to the successful operation of both the 
international criminal Tribunals and the ICC. 
4. Structure ofthe Thesis 
Having established in this introductory chapter that the main issue to be 
addressed is the relationship between national and international jurisdictions in 
international criminal law in the context of the Tribunals and the ICC, the 
second chapter of this work contains, in Part One, an examination of the rise 
and fall of the Tribunals' primacy. Primacy's function, successes and 
challenges are within the scope of this chapter. Part Two examines the 
complementary nature of the permanent International Criminal Court. The 
second chapter therefore explores questions of jurisdiction. It is of fundamental 
significance to regulate which of the two systems, the national or the 
international, takes precedence in the adjudication of international crimes and 
how these systems interact with each other. 
Co-operation with both the Tribunals and the ICC is discussed in 
chapter three. In order for any regime to work properly, co-operation among its 
main players is of particular significance. Co-operation is not so problematic 
when a State has sole jurisdiction to deal with a case. When, however, an 
international institution seizes jurisdiction in lieu of a State, issues of co-
operation arise, mainly because enforcement without involvement of State 
agencies is difficult, if not unattainable. 
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The penultimate chapter looks into the role the SC plays in the 
interaction between States and international criminal justice institutions. This 
role differs according to the institutions and the stage of SC's intervention and 
affects State interaction with the Tribunals and the ICC. 
The final chapter explores the contribution of States to the relationship 
between national and international legal orders through the enactment of 
national implementing legislation. It focuses on the implementation efforts of 
some key States and aims to highlight common approaches and problem areas. 
The thesis argues that despite the difference in establishment, 
jurisdictional principles and co-operation regimes between the Tribunals and 
the ICC, the main problems for effectiveness are the same. States, in all cases, 
play an important role and it is up to them to strengthen their relationship with 
international criminal courts within the constraints of the regime provided in 
the relevant Statutes. Ultimately, a model of "functional or workable 
interaction" is put forward as a framework for the relationship between 
international criminal courts and national legal orders. 
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Chapter Two 
Primacy's Odyssey: Is Complementarity an Ithaca for 
International Criminal Justice? 
Concurrent jurisdiction involves two different le,'els which compete with 
each other. Asserting jurisdiction is an important aspect of this relationship 
and, as seen already, the principles to achieve this vary from system to system. 
International criminal law benefits from concurrent jurisdiction. The principle 
chosen for the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda differs, 
however, from the one adopted for the permanent International Criminal Court. 
The Tribunals have been premised on primacy over national courts, whereas 
the ICC operates on the basis of complementarity. These two concepts 
represent the two extremes. The first part of this chapter is devoted to primacy, 
and the second explores complementarity. 
Part One: Primacy: Emphasis on the International Level 
Primacy denotes prevalence. It is intended to resolve any conflicts 
arising as a result of concurrent jurisdiction in favour of one level, to the 
exclusion of the other. In international criminal law, primacy means that 
competing jurisdiction between international Tribunals and national courts is 
resolved in favour of the former. International Tribunals, therefore, have 
priority over domestic courts. 
Primacy has transformed over the years. Its origins will be sought at the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals but the real focus will be on the 
ICTY and the ICTR. Yet again, primacy has changed to respond to different 
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needs that arose during the operation of these two Tribunals. Post the 
establishment of the ICC, primacy has been used to regulate t ~ e e relationship 
between Internationalised Courts and national courts. H o w e v e ~ ' , , as it will be 
seen, this is a very different type of primacy when compared to the Hague and 
Rwanda Tribunals. 
The aim of this part is to trace the evolution of primacy through the 
institutions it has been applied to and to analyse its function and utility. Also, 
with a view to the future, a critical evaluation of the concept and its possible 
application to future institutions will be attempted. 
1. Concurrent Jurisdiction and Primacy 
The creation of the Tribunals was by no means intended to deprive national 
courts of their obligation to prosecute alleged culprits. As the Secretary 
General emphasised in his Report, "[ ... ] national courts should be encouraged 
to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with their national laws and 
procedures"l. In fact, the Tribunal will only intervene and take over from 
national proceedings whenever this serves the interests of justice2• 
It is not feasible to try each and every offender before international 
tribunals. Among the cases that arise, a selection, therefore, would have to be 
made so as to choose the most important -in terms of substance, difficulty, 
I See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704, Corr.l and Add. 1, para. 64. See also the then Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia - The 
International Tribunal. National Courts and Concurrent Jurisdiction: A Guide to Applicable 
International Law, National Legislation and its Relation 10 International Human Rights 
Standards iv (May 1995); Report of the Commission of the French Jurists who were entrusted 
to study the creation of a criminal Tribunal for the adjudication of the crimes committed in the 
territory of the Former Yugoslavia and was reproduced as a document of the Security Council, 
10 February 1993, S/25266, paras 134-136, 33-34 cited in Pellet, (1994), 38. 
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legal issues. This jurisdictional hierarchy that the two international Tribunals 
enjoy should be viewed as a discretionary power to try cases at first instance 
rather than review cases tried before "lower" national courts. A State may 
investigate and prosecute an alleged criminal when there is no reason to 
question the thoroughness and promptness of the investigation as well as the 
competence, independence and impartiality of a national court established by 
law3• Whether the international Tribunal is going to exercise jurisdiction or not 
is for the Prosecutor to decide, based on the factual and legal issues raised by 
each particular case. 
2. The Advantages of Primacy 
Uniformity is undoubtedly the most important advantage of primacy. 
By submitting all States to the same process i.e. one adjudicative body at a 
single level, uniformity of the legal process is ensured. Since there is only one 
institution dealing with a particular case, the risk of conflicting decisions is 
minimised. Although the Tribunals are not bound to follow their own 
jurisprudence, it is more likely, however, that they will take similar approaches 
to similar cases, unlike national courts in different States. Convergence at the 
international level between the different families of laws with regard to a 
particular issue is also likely to occur when a single forum deals with similar 
cases. 
2 See ICTY's First Annual Report, 29 August 1994, A/49/342-S/1994/1007, paras. 20, 87-89. 
3 Note however in this respect the Tribunals' jurisdiction by virtue of Articles 10 and 9 of the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively, whereby they are empowered to "review" cases already 
tried in national courts, for reasons explicitly stated in the Statutes. See infra, part two. 
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This particular function of primacy is of great significance, since it 
suhjects all States to the same treatment. It does not, on its face, discriminate 
against any State4 and therefore the application of double standards is 
prcc1uded5. 
One essential aspect of primacy is the concomitant obligation of States 
to co-operate with the international Tribunals in investigations, arrests and 
prosecutions. This obligation stems from the coercive nature of the Tribunals. 
Primacy is a principle conferring jurisdiction to these Tribunals. The effects of 
this conferment can only be appreciated through co-operation, which gives 
meaning to the principle. Co-operation is, in principle, better achieved through 
primacy6. 
In addition, pnmacy impacts upon vanous aspects of the criminal 
process. One of the main concerns in general, is the concept of fairness in the 
course of adjudication. It may well be that national courts observe issues of 
fairness, but one way of ensuring that the international interest in fair 
prosecution is materialised is by recognising the primacy of international 
Tribunals 7• The minimum standards of justice and impartial adjudication will 
be met in cases with great international concern in the course of proceedings 
before international tribunals, rather than before national courts8. 
4 Brown, (1998), 408; Bassiouni, (1997), 60. 
S This is not to say that a different principle, such as complementarity, will necessarily entail 
the application of different standards for differing cases but at least the way the principle is 
perceived and the criteria applied to give purpose to its meaning, indicate that such a concern 
can be plausibly raised. 
6 Whether this argument is verified in practice, is a question which merits greater attention. See 
infra chapter 3. 
7 Brown, ibid. supra. n. 4, 389. 
8 This was also the view taken by the Commission of Experts on Rwanda. In its preliminary 
report to the Security Council, they strongly recommended the creation of an international 
criminal tribunal for Rwanda based on its conclusion that prosecutions for serious crimes 
committed during the armed conflict would be better undertaken by an international tribunal 
rather than national court because an international tribunal would best meet the objectives of 
independence, objectivity and impartiality. See Preliminary Report of the Independent 
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P r i m ~ c y y has potentially an impact on domestic courts. By exemplifying 
how international crimes should be dealt with, States may well be influenced in 
the manner of adjudication of such crimes before their own courts. This may be 
primarily achieved through the enactment of implementing legislation. 
Concurrent jurisdiction based on primacy does not preclude States from taking 
an interest in a particular case as the Tribunals may only deal with a handful of 
cases. 
3. The Transformation of Primacy 
3.1. (1945): Pseudo-primacy 
To trace the origins of primacy, a brief examination of the concept in 
the two international military tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo is a good 
starting point. Arguably, evidence of some form of adjudication of 
international crimes might be traced to earlier times9, the origins of 
international criminal justice, as perceived today though, should be located at 
Nuremberg. 
Both Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs were created in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. The allies lO, in an attempt to deal with the atrocities that 
had occurred, established an entity that was capable of trying perpetrators of 
the most serious crimes II. However, this very creation of the two Tribunals and 
Commission of Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 
(1994) at 28-29, UN Doc. S/199411125 (1994). 
9 See inter alia Bassiouni, ibid. supra n. 4. 
10 i.e. France, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
II FollOwing the seizure of Germany on the 5th of June 1945, the four allies took over the 
administrative, judicial and legislative powers. Accordingly, apart from the London Charter of 
8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 279,284. 
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the fact that they were applying "victors' justice,,12, is crucial to the appraisal 
of their function. 
The jurisdictional basis of the Nuremberg Tribunal can be found in the 
power possessed by the Allies as de facto territorial rulers of a defeated 
Germany! 3. This has been rationalised as a type of universal jurisdiction 
exercised by the international communityl4. There is also the view that the 
Nuremberg trial derived its legal sanction from the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission which represented the "quasi-totality of civilised states at the 
time,,15. The fact that nineteen nations!6 subscribed to the London Agreement, 
is, according to the same view, adequate to confer an international character to 
the tribunal17. Similar arguments would apply to the Tokyo IMT as well. 
However, according to the most convincing view, the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals were not truly "international"! 8. Hans-Heinrich lescheck 
maintained that the IMT was not international because the substantial and 
procedural preconditions needed for the establishment of such a court had not 
been metl9. He further points to the fact that the administrative, legislative and 
judicial powers were conferred on the four allies, and due to the establishment 
12 The IMTs represented only a segment of the world community: the victors. This was 
~ c c e p t e d d by the Nuremberg Tribunal itself when it was stated that the four signatory powers to 
Its Charter "have done together what anyone of them might have done singly", Trial of the 
Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November ff45-1 o.ctober 1946, Nuremberg 1947, vol. 1,218. 
Clark, In McCormack, and Simpson, (1997), 172. 
14 Simons, in Ginsburgs, and Kudriavtsev, (1990), 41-45. Moreover, in its first interim report, 
the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, SC Res. 
780, UN SCOR, 47th Sess. 1992, UN Doc. S/INF/48 (1992) stated as follows: "States may 
choose to combine their jurisdictions under the universality principle and vest this combined 
jurisdiction in an international tribunal. The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal may be 
said to have derived its jurisdiction from such a combination of national jurisdiction of the 
States parties to the London Agreement setting up that Tribunal" UN Doc. S/25274 at 20. 
IS Woetzel, (1960), 55. 
16 These included all member-states ofUNWCC with the exception of China and Canada. 
17 Ibid., 56. 
18 0 stendorf, and ter Veen, (1985), 35. 
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of the IMT by the Control Council Law, this was certainly not a Gennan 
national court. Therefore, according to Jescheck, the IMT could only be 
considered as an occupational adJudicative body20. 
Moreover, Georg Schwarzenberger, held that the international character 
of both IMTs was fonnal rather than substantive. The international element 
derived, according to his view, from the fact that they "rested on a consensual 
international basis,,21. In substance though, they were "joint tribunals of the 
powers that created these ad hoc institutions,,22. 
The detennination of IMTs' nature23 is important for the discussion of 
primacy. Should they have an international character, the principle according to 
which they exercised jurisdiction over domestic proceedings should be 
examined. It is not possible to establish a type of primacy because the situation 
in the defeated Gennany and in Japan in the aftennath of World War II, meant 
that there was no forum for challenging the proceedings before the IMTs, and 
there was not even a domestic mechanism that would deal with the 
adjudication of cases concerning the atrocities committed in the war. This was 
the result of the exclusivity on which the IMTs were premised, which signified 
that no other court could claim jurisdiction24• Indeed, as soon as Gennany and 
19 Jescheck, (1952), 289. It should be noted though that he does not mention which are these 
criteria that are lacking. It might therefore accepted that those criteria could be traced in 
f o e ~ e r a ~ ~ i ~ t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . .
Junshsch betrachtet hei13t das ( ... ), da13 [das Gesetz] als Besatzungsrecht gedacht war und 
~ l s s soIches Geltung haben sollte". Ibid., 293,295. 
Schwarzenberger, (1968), 471. 
22 Ibid.; See also Roling, (1961), 356 where it is stated that the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals 
were "multi-national tribunals, but not international tribunals in the strict sense". 
23 For a thorough analysis of the IMT's nature see Ahlbrecht, in Hasse, MOller, and Schneider, 
(2001),365. 
24 First ICTY Annual Report, ibid. supra n. 2, para. 20: "The Numberg Tribunal was set up to 
act in lieu of State courts to try those major war criminals whose offences had "no particular 
geographical location"; it left to State courts the task of following up its proceedings, in that 
these courts were to bring to justice minor criminals and members of the organisations found 
criminal by the Niimberg Tribunal. Along similar lines, the Tokyo Tribunal was designed to 
substitute for any national criminal court". 
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also Japan were able to prosecute their own criminals they did so. After World 
War II, Germany tried and convicted a large number of criminals and has 
continued to do so in the 90' S25 and beyond. 
However, the lessons learned from the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals 
are of some merit. It became clear for the first time that the Military Tribunals, 
although with exclusivity, i.e no other court having jurisdiction, were capable 
of replacing national courts in adjudicating cases which traditionally fell within 
the jurisdiction of a State. This notion of exclusivity, although akin to primacy, 
cannot be considered as its exact counterpart. Any discussion of the IMTs' 
version of primacy over national proceedings has therefore limited significance 
for the modem notion of primacy. 
3.2. (1993): Real Primacy 
The first institution which enjoys full primacy over national courts is 
the ICTY, followed a year later by the ICTR. The Tribunals were created by 
SC Resolutions in 1993 and 1994 respectively, to deal with atrocities 
committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda26• 
An examination of their Statutes shows that the Tribunals have 
concurrent jurisdiction with national courts27; however, the Tribunals enjoy 
primacy over them. Article 9(2) of the Statute of the ICTY clearly states that 
"The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts [ ... ] .. 28. 
Similarly, the Statute of the ICTR in its Article 8(2) reiterates the principle by 
2S Marschlik, in McCormack, and Simpson, ibid. supra n. 13, 74. 
26 For their creation see infra chapter 4. 
27 Article 9[8]( 1): "The International Tribunal and national courts shall have concurrent 
jurisdiction [ ... ]". 
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reproducing mutatis mutandis the corresponding provision contained in the 
ICTY Statute. 
There is, however, a slight difference in wording in the two Statutes: 
The ICTR Statute recognises its "primacy over the national courts of all 
States,,29, whereas the ICTY provision is somewhat weaker and grants 
"primacy over national courts". This phrasal divergence should not be taken as 
indicative of a different and, in a sense, wider scope of primacy. The Tribunals' 
primacy is general, it involves each and every Member State and is binding due 
to their creation by Chapter VII Resolutions. Had the Security Council 
intended that primacy involved only the Yugoslav and Rwandan courts, it 
would have made it clear in the wording of the relevant Statute Articles. It has 
been suggested that the change of wording is indicative perhaps that in the year 
elapsed between the creation of the second of the two Tribunals, there was a 
wider consensus over primacy, which made it possible for a bolder assertion of 
what primacy really entails30• Given the identical legal basis of the Tribunals, it 
is possible that it simply represents better drafting. Nevertheless, apart from 
some statements by States on the issue, which have not been relied upon in the 
operation of the Tribunals' primacy, is rather doubtful that this slight difference 
in wording has led to differing approaches and results3) • 
28 Emphasis added. 
29 Emphasis added. 
30 Brown, ibid. supra n. 4, 402. Cf. EI Zeidy, (2002), 887 who maintains that the stronger 
language is the result of a particular crisis before the SC. However, this argument is not very 
convincing, as a crisis referred to would have led to a weaker as opposed to a stronger primacy. 
31 Uganda challenged the primacy of the ICTR over its domestic courts with regard to crimes 
committed in "neighbouring States" like Uganda, as follows: "While the Government of 
Uganda supports the establishment of a tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda, at the request of the 
Rwandese Government, the Ugandan Government considers that its judicial system has 
primary and supreme jurisdiction and competence over any crimes committed on Ugandan 
territory by its citizens or non-citizens, at any particular time". Letter Dated 31 October 1994 
From the Charge d' Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations 
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3.2.1 Reasons behind the Adoption of Primacy 
Three broad categories of reasons may have influenced the choice of 
primacy for the Tribunals. First, their creation by means of SC Resolutions and 
not by an international treaty. Second, the internal situation in the Balkans and 
Rwanda which involved distrust of the judicial system in the former 
Yugoslavia and amounted to severe disruption of the judicial system in 
Rwanda. And thirdly, it is the ad hoc nature of the Tribunals which perhaps 
encouraged the present choice. 
Establishing a Tribunal by a binding SC Resolution, has an impact on 
the choice of its jurisdictional basis. The advantages of using Chapter VII for 
the Tribunals' creation are mainly that it is the quickest way of establishment 
and most importantly their decisions are binding on each and every State32 • 
This makes it easier for the SC to choose principles such as the one of primacy. 
On the international plane, the most common way of entering 
international obligations is by an international treaty. In fact, this was also the 
view held by the UN SG with regard to the creation of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal33. Indeed, the treaty option has significant advantages over any other 
option34. The text is carefully examined and detailed provisions are usually 
adopted. Nevertheless, when peace and security are at stake, there is virtually 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1994/1230 (1994). See also 
~ K ' s s .statement, infra 3.2.2. . 
ArtIcles 2(6) and 2S of UN Charter. On the debate about whether Article 2S can bmd non-
;;-tember States see Vitzthum, in Simma (2002), 140. 
SO Report, ibid. supra n. 1, at 6. 
34 In fact despite their positive vote for SC Res. 827, Brazil and China, in the process of 
explaining their votes, expressed a preference for the establishment of an international criminal 
tribunal by means of a treaty. See UN SCOR, 48 th Sess., 3217 mtg., UN Doc. SIPV.3217 
(1993). 
28 
Primacy & Complementarity 
no time for a treaty to be negotiated, its text to be adopted, ratified and pnter 
into force. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the States directly concerned 
and whose participation is vital to the effectiveness of the Tribunal, will 
eventually become parties to the treaty35. Had the treaty approach !lad' been 
taken, it is doubtful that primacy would have been chosen. The fact that the 
situation in the Balkans and Rwanda demanded immediate action by the 
international community might be considered crucial regarding the choice of 
primacy. As no negotiations took place, considerations of sovereignty were by-
passed. The decision to confer jurisdictional primacy to the Tribunals was 
made by SC members and was in a way "imposed" on the rest of the 
international community. It was deemed that both the Yugoslav and Rwandan 
courts were not willing and able to deal with the alleged crimes. A mechanism 
had to be devised to transfer jurisdiction from the national level to the 
international. As a result, the Tribunals were vested with jurisdictional 
primacy. 
Finally, it is also the ad hoc character of the Tribunals which facilitated 
the approach taken. The choice of primacy was perhaps encouraged by the 
limited territorial and temporal basis of the two Tribunals. Knowing that the 
Tribunals were not going to be permanent, States were prepared to accept their 
primacy. A cynic might say that SC members opted for primacy as they were 
certain that their jurisdictional reach would not involve themselves. Had a 
Tribunal been created now, it would almost certainly not have been premised 
on primacy. Evidence of that can be found in the establishment of the ICC and 
Internationalised Courts. The former adopts a different concept, whereas the 
latter are based on a limited notion ofprimacy. 
35 M . d oms, an Scharf, (1995),40. 
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The choice of primacy was undoubtedly a product of its time. It 
represents a conscious choice of the SC to deal with the situation in the 
Balkans and Rwanda and was thought to be the only way the goals of 
international criminal justice could be attained at the time. Hence, the use of 
primacy as a principle for international adjudication was a umque 
phenomenon, inextricably linked with the two Tribunals. 
3.2.2 Statements by Members of the Security Council Intended to Restrict 
Primacy .. 
Immediately after the approval of the ICTY Statute by the SC, four out 
of the five Permanent Members of the Council made statements purporting to 
limit the Tribunal's primacY6. 
Identifying the legal significance of these statements is crucial because of 
their potential impact on primacy's application. These statements came from 
Permanent Members of the SC which also have the power to veto its 
Resolutions37. From a legal perspective, statements made by SC members, 
albeit its Permanent Members, are not legally binding. The way decisions are 
made at the SC is laid down in Article 27 of the UN Charter. These statements 
do not fall in this category. In addition, a SC Resolution is not an international 
treaty for the interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties to apply38. The statements are not legally binding in that sense. The 
36 For a lengthy discussion of the statements, see Brown ibid. supra n. 4, 398-403; see also id., 
in Bassiouni, (1999), "International Criminal Law", 507-509. 
37 Article 27 UN Charter. 
38 See Article 31(1) VCLT , 81LM (1969),679; See generally Wood, (1998), 73 et seq. 
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most important effect these statements might have is to preclude primacy from 
becoming part of customary law39. 
The UN obliges its Members to accept and carry out decisions taken 
under Chapter VII of the Charter4o. There is, however, no provision in the 
Charter that could give some evidence of how statements made by SC 
Members after the adoption of a Resolution should be treated. These Members 
could have, in case of disagreement, threatened to veto the Resolution 
establishing the Tribunal, attempted to modify the Tribunal's Statute before 
this was adopted, abstained, or in fact, vetoed its adoption. That they did not do 
so indicates either that they did not consider it important enough so as to 
attempt to amend the relative provision, or that they thought they would 
achieve the same goal by simply making these statements. How should Article 
9 of the ICTY Statute be interpreted then? Do these statements provide an 
interpretation of the Statute, and if so, should it be accepted that they amount to 
an amendment of the Statute? The impact of the question is nevertheless 
limited by the fact that not all statements focus on the same issue and most 
importantly, those that do, differ in their content. Whereas both Mr. Merimee41 
and Mrs. Albright42 held that ICTY's primacy is limited to the situations 
described by Article 10(2), the statement by Sir Hannay43, distinguishes 
39 Lambert-Abdelgawad (2004) 429 40 " . 
Article 25 UN Charter. 
41 The representative of France: "Thirdly, we believe that, pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 2, 
the tribunal may intervene at any stage of the procedure and assert its primacy, including from 
the stage of investigation where appropriate, in the situations covered under Article 10, 
paragraph 2". See provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and 
Seventeenth Meeting, UN Doc. SIPV.3217 (1993), at 11. 
42 Of the US stated: "Thirdly, it is understood that primacy of the International Tribunal 
referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9 only refers to the situations described in Article 10". Id. 
at 16. 
43 Representing the UK: "Articles 9 and 10 of the Statute deal with the relationship between the 
International Tribunal and national courts. In our view, the primacy of the Tribunal, referred to 
in Article 9, paragraph 2, relates primarily to the courts in the territory of the former 
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between the courts in the territory of the fonner Yugoslavia and elsewhere. 
From a different perspective, Mr. Vorontsov44 speaks of the duty a State has to 
consider the request for deferral by the Tribunal seriously, but he seems to 
suggest that there is a possibility to refuse the execution of a deferral request, if 
justified. It would have been more interesting to see what the approach would 
be, had the statements been focused on the very same issue and a common 
view had been taken to that end45• 
The Tribunal has not expressed its position on the matter. When these 
statements were put forward by the defendant in the Tadic Case, the ICTY 
simply refused to state its views: "The Trial Chamber takes no position on the 
interpretation of these statements nor upon their possible legal effect,,46. 
Nonetheless, the Tribunal has maintained, albeit on a different occasion, that in 
appropriate cases it will consider such statements by SC members as 
"authoritative interpretations", if undisputed when made before the Council47 • 
The statements referred to in this latter instance did not relate to primacy, but 
such an interpretation by analogy should not be precluded. 
Y u ~ o s l a v i a : : elsewhere it will only be in the kinds of exceptional circumstances outlined in 
~ r t l ~ l e e 10, paragraph 2, that primacy should be applicable". Id. at 18-19. 
Fmally, Mr. Vorontsov, representing the Russian Federation maintained that: "As we 
understand it, the provisions of Article 9, paragraph 2, denote the duty of a State to give very 
s e r i o ~ s s consideration to a request by the Tribunal to refer to it a case that is being considered in 
a national court. But this is not a duty automatically to refer the proceedings to the Tribunal on 
such a matter. A refusal to refer the case naturally has to be justified. We take it that this 
provision will be reflected in the rules of procedure and the rules of evidence of the Tribunal". 
/d. at 46. 
45 See for instance the position taken by IFOR (later SFOR) in Bosnia. Although it is arguable 
whether there was an obligation placed on IFOR to arrest suspected war criminals, NATO 
(whose member States participated) contested this obligation and for some time, did not in 
practice take active steps to those ends. See infra chapter 3. 
46 Prosecutor v. radii: Case. Decision on Defence Motion on the Principle of non bis in idem. 
14 November 1995, (IT-94-1-T), 33. The ICTY went on to state that "under no conceivable 
interpretation of these declarations is there even a hint that deferral of a case to this 
International Tribunal could violate the principle of non his in idem. [ ... J", id. 
47 Both the Trial and the Appeals Chamber II in the radii: Case have been dealt with the issue. 
See Prosecutor v. radii:, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction,2 October 1995, (IT-94-1-AR72), para. 88; See also the radii: final Judgment of7 
May 1997, (IT -94-1-T), para. 631. 
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The importance of these statements, is not so much their legal 
significance, but rather in their pY'actical and political impact. Powerful States 
may influence the effectiveness of international instruments. Should the key 
powers not endorse "full" primacy, it is likely that they would reject a request 
for deferral which fell within the scope of their interpretation. Thus, unless the 
State in question has changed its position in the years elapsed between the 
making of the statement and the actual operation of the Tribunal, it is doubtful 
that a broad, unqualified primacy, such as the one intended in the Statute, 
would be accepted. Primacy has certainly changed over the years, but it is 
questionable that this change may be attributed to the impact of the above SC 
Statements. Rather, its transfonnation is a response to different needs. 
3.2.3 The Three Phases of Primacy 
Phase One: Doctrinal Primacy 
The theoretical underpinnings of primacy can be found in the separate 
Opinion of Judge Sidhwa, in the Tadii: Case48• In paragraph 83 of his opinion 
he justified the granting of primacy as follows: 
"At the root of primacy is a demand for justice at the international level by 
all States and constitutes the first step towards implementation of 
international judicial competence. The rule enhances the role of the 
Prosecutor in giving him a right to move for transfer of competence and to 
the International Tribunal the option whether to exercise its discretion to 
secure competence for itself. The rule obliges States to accede to and accept 
requests for deferral on the ground of suspension of their sovereign rights to 
48 Prosecutor v. radie, Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, (IT-94-1-AR72). 
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try the accused themselves and compels States to accept the fact that certain 
domestic crimes are really international in character and endanger 
international peace and that such international crimes should be tried by an 
international tribunal, that being an appropriate and competent legal body 
duly established for this purpose by law. The rule cuts national borders to 
bring to justice persons guilty of serious international crimes, as they 
concern all States and require to be dealt with for the benefit of all civilized 
nations. Last but not least, the rule recognizes the right to all nations to 
ensure the prevention of such violations by establishing international 
criminal tribunals appropriately empowered to deal with these matters, or 
else international crimes would be dealt with as ordinary crimes and the 
guilty would not be adequately punished". 
This quotation contains an important definition of primacy. Judge 
Sidhwa's opinion, although not part of the actual judgment in Tadic, is 
indicative of the way the judges perceived, at least at the early stages of the 
Tribunals' function, the concept of primacy. The Judge's first point is that 
primacy is founded on the demand for justice at the international level. This is 
further explained, later in the quotation. He moves on to say that primacy 
"constitutes the first step towards implementation of international judicial 
competence". Presumably, it is only the first step because the notion of 
primacy contains a general obligation, the materialisation of which is left to 
States. Implicit in this statement is that implementation is better achieved 
through primacy. 
Primacy has, according to Judge Sidhwa, a threefold effect: on the 
Prosecutor, the Tribunal itself, and finally on States. The language used to 
describe primacy's function is crucial and indicates its mandatory effect. 
Primacy "enhances" the role of the Prosecutor and "obliges" States. The 
Prosecutor has therefore a right to request transfer of competence to the 
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Tribunal, when this serves the interests of justice. The Tribunal on the other 
hand, is given the option to establish competence, and mayor may not assert 
jurisdiction. The effect of primacy is most noticeable, however, on States, to 
whom the Judge dedicates most of this paragraph. Accordingly, a State must 
"accede to and accept requests for deferral". This is a reminder of the 
obligation to comply with Tribunal requests. Establishing the obligation is the 
first step towards acknowledging the importance of international crimes. And 
there are international crimes which, according to the view put forward here, 
endanger international peace. This statement may be interpreted as an attempt 
to justify the creation of the ad hoc Tribunals by the SC in response to a threat 
or breach of the peace. In a sense, this also reflects perhaps the recent trend in 
international law which favours the establishment of international criminal 
tribunals. And this is for the benefit of "civilised nations". Ironically, bringing 
people to justice is not beneficial to civilised nations only, but to all nations. 
Distinguishing between "civilised" and "unci viii sed" nations is not perhaps 
agreeable anyway, and is certainly anachronistic. The preventive application of 
international criminal law, which this time belongs to "aU" nations, is 
discussed in the penultimate point of Judge Sidhwa's quotation. This is coupled 
with a warning that unless tribunals are international, these international crimes 
will be treated as ordinary crimes and the accused will not be adequately 
punished49• The last part of his description of primacy implies that adjudication 
at the national level does not provide the same treatment for the CUlprits, in 
terms at least of punishment of the gUilty. This, in tum, seems to involve 
considerations of fair trial but still the adjective "adequate" is, if not misused, 
at least problematic. What seems like an unqualified assertion, is formulated as 
49 S 1" ee app lcatlon of ne bis in idem principle infra part two. 
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a sweeping statement. Nevertheless, it disregards the possibility that some 
States are, in fact, able to try the accused of heinous crimes al1d they do so 
properly. In any case, even if seen in light of the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia at the time, it still goes against the principle of concurrent 
jurisdiction established firmly in the Statute50. 
From this definition of primacy it is clear that much is invested on this 
concept, as it is perceived in an unqualified way, and with no room for 
limitations by States51 • 
On a different occasion, the Appeals Chamber in rejecting the arguments 
put forward by Tadic proclaimed the legitimacy of primacy in the ICTY and 
stated that: 
"Indeed, when an international tribunal such as the present one is created, it 
must be endowed with primacy over national courts. Otherwise, human 
nature being what it is, there would be a perennial danger of international 
crimes being characterised as 'ordinary crimes' ( ... ] or proceedings being 
'designed to shield the accused', or cases not being diligently 
prosecuted( ... ]. Ifnot effectively countered by the principle of primacy, any 
of those stratagems might be used to defeat the very purpose of the creation 
of an international criminal jurisdiction, to the benefit of the very people 
whom it has been designed to prosecute. 
The principle of primacy of this International Tribunal over national courts 
must be affirmed; the more so since it is confined within the strict limits of 
Articles 9 and 10 of the Statute and Rules of Procedure of the International 
Tribunal"s2. 
so Article 9(1). 
SI In the same direction see Prosecutor v. Tadi/:, Decision on the Defence Motion on 
Jurisdiction, 10 August 1995, (IT -94-1-T), where in para. 41 it was observed that concurrent 
jurisdiction without the granting of primacy to the Tribunal would, in effect, allow the accused 
"to select the forum of his choice, contrary to the principles relating to coercive criminal 
jurisdiction". Cf. statements made by four permanent members before the SC immediately 
after the adoption of the SC Res. which created the ICTY, supra 3.2.2. 
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The above statement although not so detailed as the one by Jlldge 
Sidhwa, constitutes a valuable contribution to the comprehension of the 
concept. It is stressed that an international Tribunal "must" be endowed with 
primacy over national courts. And this view is supported fervently, as 
evidenced from the choice of language. The ICTY judges acknowledge that 
primacy helps fulfil the purposes of international justice. Along the same lines 
as Judge Sidhwa, they point to the fact that should an international Tribunal not 
be premised on jurisdictional primacy there is a permanent danger that 
international crimes are dealt with as ordinary crimes and the requirements of 
fairness and impartiality of the trial are not met53• They further claim that the 
entire purpose of the creation of the Tribunal might be vanquished otherwise. 
Portrayed in a rather philosophical manner, this danger is attributed by the 
Appeals Chamber to "human nature being what it is". 
In affirming ICTY's primacy, emphasis is placed on its limitations by the 
Statute and the relevant Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). This 
statement almost appeals for a wider, unlimited primacy, whereas in essence, 
the one found in the Statute and the RPE is already unrestricted. The language 
in the Statute is broad and attaches no conditions to primacy. Moreover, the 
RPE are drafted by the judges themselves, who would be reluctant to 
unnecessarily limit the ambit of their operation. 
This approach is one more example of the way primacy was conceived. 
And this is linked to the advantages primacy has in practice. Whether the 
doctrinal approach presented here is in line with the application of the principle 
52 Prosecutor v. Tadii:, Appeal, ibid. supra n. 47, paras. 58-59. 
53 The language used here is reminiscent of jurisdiction based on complementarity. 
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In practice should be examined through the operation of the two ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
Phase Two: Operational Primacy - Deferral 
The most visible result of granting primacy to the Tribunals can be 
found in deferral. At any stage of the proceedings the international Tribunal 
may order national courts to defer to its competence and release a suspect to its 
custody for trial. A State, even though it has both custody and concurrent 
jurisdiction to try the perpetrator of an international crime, is required to yield 
its jurisdiction to the Tribunal upon a formal request to that effect54. 
Undoubtedly, deferral is loaded with great political charge55 as it 
impinges upon State sovereignty and removes from domestic jurisdiction 
crimes that have traditionally been dealt with exclusively before national 
courts. It has been suggested that the use of the term "request" in Article 9(2) 
of the Statute, implies that deferral is not legally obligatory, and that Article 29 
of the Statute which stipulates the obligation of States to co-operate with the 
Tribunal, does not apply to that respect56• Such an approach should not be 
accepted since it would undermine the very notion of primacy57. 
54 This means that the prosecutor may formally request a Trial Chamber to order a State to 
defer to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and forward the results of its inquiries. Moreover, the 
investigations in such a case are transferred to the Tribunal and the alleged criminals are 
~ r o s e c u t e d d solely before it. 
S Bassiouni, and Manikas, (1995), 319, observed that: "Of all the provisions of the Statute, 
those concerning deferral are likely to have the most political significance. They also have the 
~ r e a t e s t t potential for protracted legal and political manoeuvres". 
6 See Weckel, (1993), 258-259; note also the statement by the representative of the Russian 
Federation, supra 3.2.2. 
57 Indeed the Tribunal has endorsed a strong view in relation to deferral. See radii: Case, ibid. 
supra n. 52. 
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In order to understand deferral, an examination of the framework for its 
application is essential. The process of deferral is elaborated in the RPE which 
provide, in essence, for the way primacy works in practice58. Rule 9 RPE sets 
the requirements for making a deferral request for both the ICTY and the 
ICTR. Although most of the provisions of the RPE for both the Tribunals are 
identical, this is not the case with Rule 959• The ICTY Rule will therefore be 
examined first. 
Rule 9(i) and (ii)6o draws from the principle of non his in idem 61 and 
more specifically, the exception to it, which allows the Tribunal to try an 
accused already tried before domestic courts. The function of deferral however, 
is not simply to reiterate Article 10. Rather, this seeming duplication may be 
explained by the fact that the interests of the ICTY are to avoid a crime being 
characterised as an ordinary crime62, and to prevent sham trials. Rule 9 applies 
to a different stage of proceedings than Article 10. The former aims to prevent 
a sham trial from taking place, whereas the latter, in essence, reverses one that 
has already occurred. 
Rule 9 does not simply reiterate the wording of Article 10, and is 
significantly broader that that. Under Rule 9(iii) deferral may also be requested 
S8 A.s the SG stated in his Report "the details of how the primacy will be asserted shall be set 
~ u t t 10 the rules of procedure and evidence of the Tribunal". See ibid. supra n. 33. 
Rule 9 ICTY RPE reads: "Where it appears to the Prosecutor that in any such investigations 
o.r criminal proceedings instituted in the courts of any State: 
(1) the act being investigated or which is the subject of those proceedings is characterized 
as an ordinary crime; 
(ii) there is a lack of impartiality or independence, or the investigations or proceedings are 
designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case is 
not diligently prosecuted; or 
(iii) what is in issue is closely related to, or otherwise involves, significant factual or legal 
questions which may have implications for investigations or prosecutions before the 
Tribunal, 
the Prosecutor may propose to the Trial Chamber designated by the President that a formal 
request be made that such court defer to the competence of the Tribunal". 
60 Ibid. 
61 See infra section 1.10. 
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when "what is in issue is closely related to, or otherwise involves, significant 
factual or legal questions which may have implications for investigations or 
prosecutions before the Tribunal". According to one view, Rule 9(iii) is ultra 
vires because it was inserted by the judges to reflect the statements made by the 
Permanent Members mentioned above63 . Provided that the statements are not 
binding, it is hard to see the validity of this argument. Arguably, there is scope 
for a rather expansive interpretation of the above provision. The first deferral 
request, for instance, in Tadii: did not involve Rule 9(i) and (ii) since the 
proceedings underway in Germany could not possibly be taken to fall under 
either of the above64, it can only be considered that the deferral request was as 
a matter of fact, made under (iii). Tadic was clearly not the type of criminal 
these Tribunals were meant to try, but was unfortunate enough to be the first 
accused the ICTY got hold of 
Although prosecutorial discretion is an important aspect of every 
court65, deferrals requested with regard to cases arising in FYROM66 took 
prosecutorial discretion to its limits. The Prosecutor requested deferral of five 
investigations and initially also of "all current and future investigations and 
prosecutions." She later modified her application and asked the Chamber to 
insert a "clause" in its decision, by virtue of which the authorities in FYROM 
would be obliged to inform the Prosecutor about findings in their future 
investigations. In particular, she requested that this clause oblige FYROM "to 
comply with any declaration of primacy by the Prosecutor in the absence of a 
: ~ ~ See also doctrinal primacy supra. 
Jones, and Powles, (2003), 368. 
64 On the German proceedings re Tadic see, Griesbaum in Fischer, and Uider, (1999), 130-132; 
Roggemann, (2002), 50 et. seq. 
65 The closest the ICTY came into asserting it is in Prosecutor v. De/alic, Mucic, De/ic and 
Landio case, 20 February 2001, (IT -96-21-A), para. 611. 
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formal request for deferral to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by the 
Chamber,,67. The RPE stipulate that it is for the Trial Chamber to be seized of a 
proposal for deferral68. Should it appear to the Trial Chamber, seized of a 
proposal for deferral, that the requirements of the previous Rule are satisfied, 
the results of the investigation and a copy of the court's record and the 
judgment if delivered are forwarded to the Tribunal69• In the Re Macedonia 
Cases, the Trial Chamber declined the Prosecutor's request noting that it would 
appear "inappropriate [ ... ] to request the deferral of all current and future 
investigations and prosecutions, notwithstanding their potential seriousness 
[ ... ] or the status of the alleged perpetrators, to the competence of the 
Tribunal,,7o. The ICTY in other words rejected the prosecutorial attempt to 
secure a greater degree of control over deferrals. The case reiterated the 
authority of the Trial Chamber "to decide and finally issue a formal request 
[for deferral] to the State concemed,,71. It also highlighted the significance that 
the most important cases only be tried before the Tribunal as, arguably, a carte 
blanche on deferrals might lead to cases that are not suitable being tried in the 
Hague. 
66 Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Deferral and Motion for Order to the Former 
~ u g o s . l ~ v v RepUblic of Macedonia, 4 October 2002, (IT -02-55-MISC.6). 
JudICIal Supplement 37 3 
68 ' • 
See Rule 10(A). In practice, the issue arose with regard to the need for the Chamber to be 
"seised of a proposal of deferral". See De/alii: et aI., Decision Regarding Preliminary Motion 
to the Prosecutor by the Accused Zdravko Mucic Requesting Deferral, 30 September 1996, 
(IT-96-21-T), where it was held that the Trial Chamber had to be seized by the Prosecutor 
before it could issue a request for deferral. It further maintained that it is not within the 
authority of the Trial Chamber to order the Prosecutor to submit to it a proposal for deferral. 
(para. 2 of the decision). This is in line with the Decision in the Dukic Case, Decision on 
Preliminary Motions of the Accused, 26 April 1996, (IT-96-20-T), paras. 6-8. 
69 Rule 10(B). According to Rule 10(C), in order to ensure the impartiality of the deferral 
procedure, subsequent proceedings are held before another Trial Chamber and not before the 
one that has requested the deferral. 
7o D ·· h h eClSlon on t e Prosecutor's Request for Deferral and Motion for Order 10 1 e Former 
fugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ibid. supra n. 66, para. 51. 
t Ibid. para. 53. 
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The preconditions for deferrals, in Article 8(2) of the ICTR Statute, 
may be found in Rule 9, which differs from its ICTY counterpart. Rule 9 is 
broader for the ICTR. For deferral to be requested, it suffices that the crimes 
are the subject of a prosecutorial investigation, or should be the subject of such 
an investigation, or are the subject of a Tribunal's indictment72• In the ICTY, 
the preconditions for deferral are more closely defined. Although the criteria of 
the exception to the non bis in idem are not reiterated in the ICTR RPE, 9(ii)(a) 
should not preclude similar application, particularly if, despite the seriousness 
of offences, the courts of States do not recognise this in their proceedings. No 
reference is made though to characterisation of a crime as ordinary before 
national courts, but (a), (b) and (c) are only indicative, as evidenced from the 
wording of 9(ii)73. Another difference with Rule 9(i) ICTY, which refers 
explicitly to investigations and court proceedings, is that 9(ii)(a) ICTR, does 
not mention both explicitly. Does that mean that its application is limited to 
court proceedings only? Although such an interpretation may not be precluded, 
reference to the chapeau of Rule 9 suggests that both investigations and court 
proceedings would probably be accepted. Moreover, in 9(ii)(b), the importance 
placed on prosecuting those mostly responsible for the genocide in Rwanda is 
evident. Although implicit in 9(iii) of the ICTY RPE, all aspects of ICTR Rule 
9 are focused towards this approach. 
72 Rule 9(i), (ii) and (iii) ICTR RPE respectively. 
73 Rule 9 ICTR RPE reads: "Where it appears to the Prosecutor that crimes which are subject 
of investigations or criminal proceedings instituted in the courts of any State: 
(i) Are subject of an investigation by the Prosecutor; 
(ii) Should be the subject of an investigation by the Prosecutor considering, inter alia: 
(a) The seriousness of the offences; 
(b) The status of the accused at the time of the alleged offences; 
(c) The general importance of the legal questions involved in the case; 
(iii) Are the subject of an indictment in the Tribunal, 
the Prosecutor may apply to the Trial Chamber designated by the President to issue a formal 
request that such court defer to the competence of the Tribunal". 
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Once the conditions set out in Rule 9 are satisfied, a fonnal request for 
deferral is issued by the Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 10. Accordingly, all 
relevant infonnation is forwarded to the Tribunal. Moreover, section (c) of 
Rule 10 enshrines the obligation of the State to which the fonnal request for 
deferral is addressed to comply without undue delay in accordance with Article 
28 of the Statute. 
Furthennore, issues of compliance for both Tribunals are dealt with in 
the identical Rule 11 which provides for a very reasonable sixty-day time limit 
for a State to comply with a deferral request, and referral to the SC in case of 
non-compliance is explicitly provided for. 
The process of deferral is fonnulated in an authoritative manner. No 
input is envisaged from the State to which deferral is addressed. This might be 
explained by the fact that deferral is the principal means of establishing the 
Tribunals' primacy. This was very important for the Tribunals' operation, at 
least in the beginning. However, the passivity imposed on States does not assist 
the wider process of interaction between the national and international orders. 
In deferral, and in primacy generally, the main actor is the Tribunal, whereas 
the State does not possess any powers of influencing the process. However, as 
seen in the recent Macedonia cases, the right to request deferral is not 
unlimited; primacy is therefore submitted to certain checks and balances, 
which should involve an examination of the appropriateness of the forum. In 
that sense, a realisation of the desirability of restricting deferral requests to 
those instances that would be beneficial for the process is a step in the right 
direction. 
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Phase Three: Pragmatic Primacy 
In the recent phase of the Tribunals' operation, which, according to 
their completion strategy74 should reach the end of their lives within the next 
few years, primacy is changing yet again. There is a shift from deferral to the 
Tribunals' jurisdiction to referraes of cases to national courts. The procedure 
for this is enshrined in Rule Ilbis of the RPE which regulates the issue of 
suspension of indictment in case of proceedings before national courts76. The 
rationale for domestic referrals should not be traced in the empowerment of 
national proceedings, but rather in the pressing need for completion of the 
Tribunals' work, which are rather costly for the entire UN system77• 
Strengthening national jurisdictions should have been at the forefront of 
the Tribunals' work7s. This did not happen in a systematic way79. Ten years 
after the atrocities ended in much of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, however, the 
process of "relocating cases"so is underway. There have been two main stages 
before the application of Rule Ilbis. First, the "Outreach Programme"SI, 
established by Judge McDonald in 1997 and then, the "Rules of the Road"s2, 
74 • 
See SC Prestdential Statement S/PRST/2002/2l; SC Res. 1503, 28 August 2003, 
~ I R E S / 1 5 0 3 3 (2003); SC Res. 1534,26 March 2004, SlRES/1534 (2004). 
Note the use of the term "referral" when compared with SC referral with regard to the ICC. 
See infra chapter 4. 
76 Rule 1 Ibis was introduced for the first time in the lih RPE Revision of 20 October and 12 
November 1997 and was subsequently amended to include the criteria for a domestic referral. 
77 Zacklin, (2004), 543, reporting that the Tribunals take up approximately 10% of the overall 
UN budget. The ICTY's budget for 2004-5 is $271,854,600 (source: www.uD.org/icty), 
whereas the ICTR budge amounts to $177, 739,400 (source: www.ictr.org). 
78 SC Res. 955 for instance, stresses in its preamble that there is a need "to strengthen the 
courts and judicial system of Rwanda, having regard in particular to the necessity for those 
courts to deal with large numbers of suspects". 
79 Tolbert, (2002), 8,12. 
80 See speech by Judge Jorda, 27 November 2001, JDIP.I.S./641-e where he outlines the 
advantages of this process. 
81 For an analysis see Vohrah, and Cina, in May et al. (2001),547. 
82 The parties to the Dayton Agreement agreed in Rome on 18 February 1996 that "persons 
other than those already indicted by the Tribunal may be arrested and detained for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law only pursuant to a previously issued order. warrant 
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which although arguably not hugely successful83, paved the way for the 
adoption of Article 1 Ibis. According to this Rule, cases pertaining to low-mid-
level indictees may be referred back to the national courts of the State in wLose 
territory the crime was committed, or where the accused was arrested or, 
following a very recent amendment of the RPE, a State which has jurisdiction 
and is willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case84. The exact 
application and effectiveness of the Rule remains to be seen. Some problems 
are already discernible however85. At the time of writing, a request by the 
Prosecutor under Rule 11 bis is before a Trial Chamber of the ICTY to decide 
the first ever referral86, and it is clear that the ICTR will follow87. 
Decoupling Rule 1 Ibis from the particular realities of its application, it 
represents another change in primacy's role. Judge Jorda maintains that "the 
ICTY has exercised both primary and complementary jurisdiction,,88. In this 
final stage of the Tribunals' operation, the Tribunal's primacy has certainly 
of indictment that had been reviewed and deemed consistent with international legal standards 
by the Tribunal", Sixth Annual I CTY Report, Al54/ 18 7 -Sf 1999/846, para. 13 5. 
83 Tolbert, ibid. supra n. 79, 14-15. 
84 Rule Ilbis(A). Sending a person back to the country where he/she was arrested which might 
differ from the territory of where the crime was committed might be criticised as giving the 
wrong message. Ifone of primacy's purposes is to empower national jurisdictions, particularly 
where the locus commissi delicti, then this is not necessarily clear from this provision. Instead, 
it is evidence of a decentralised enforcement of international jurisdiction, which is still 
agreeable. The amendment of the RPE on the 28 th of July 2004 added the final possibility of 
deferring to any State, which significantly broadens its application. 
85 Del Ponte, (2004), 519 where she mentions problems with domestic legislation, in terms of 
admissibility of evidence and protection of witnesses, for instance. Also, with regard to 
transfers to Rwanda, the possibility that the person might face the death penalty, is of concern. 
See para. 38 of Letter by ICTR President, ibid. infra n. 87. 
86 Prosecutor v. Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norae, Request by the Prosecutor under Rule I Ibis, 2 
September 2004, (IT-04078-PT). President Meron appointed three judges "to constitute a Trial 
Chamber for the purpose of determining whether this case shall be referred to the authorities of 
Croatia", Press Release CCIP.I.S.l891-e 8 September 2004. 
87 Letter dated 30 April 2004 from the' President of the ICTR to the SC, S/2004/341, 3 May 
2004, outlining the Tribunal's completion strategy, paras. 36-39. Note, however, that in 
Prosecutor v. Bernard Ntuahaga, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw the 
Indictment in Ntuahaga, 18 March 1999, (98-40-T), the ICTR effectively referred the case to 
national courts, by withdrawing the indictment with the view to encouraging Belgium to try the 
accused, which due to a technicality was not able to be transferred there and faced extradition 
to Rwanda. 
88 Jorda, (2004), 582. He recognises however that the discretion lies with the Tribunal. 
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taken a different angle owing to 11 bis. An expression of this is deferring back 
to national courts. When these courts are able to deal with the cases effectively, 
then it is only to the benefit of the process to have the cases before them. This 
shift from the Tribunals' hegemony to national proceedings is complemented 
also by other domestic initiatives such as War Crimes Chamber within the 
State Court of BiH89, and to an extent, even the community-based Gacaca 
proceedings in Rwanda90• 
Referring cases to national courts should have been the emphasis from 
the beginning and should not be celebrated as a success at this stage, simply 
because of a realisation of the limited success the Tribunals have had in 
shifting a large number of cases. The use of this other primacy now, the 
primacy that involves national courts more, proves that the concept is flexible 
and has adapted yet again to the changing needs of a "mature" Tribunal. 
Primacy has proven to be a dynamic concept. 
4. Primacy's Demise 
Primacy has dominated the scene in the Tribunals, and has changed 
over the years. Ironically, primacy's evolution has grown to resemble the 
restrictions envisaged by the SC Permanent Members when they made their 
statements at its original inception. Although these statements do not seem to 
have influenced the operation of the Tribunals' primacy, they have had an 
89 See SC Res. 1503 (2003), para. 5; SC Res. 1534 (2004), para. 10. See Mundis, Gaynor 
(2004), 696; For a comprehensive analysis of the exit strategy, see Bohlander, (2003), 59 et 
seq. 
90 Scherrer, (1997), 4; Burke-White, (2002), 54-60; Daly (2002),355. 
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impact on primacy's use for institutions that followed the establishment of the 
ad hoc Tribunals. The ICC has adopted complementarity which will be the 
focus of the second part of this chapter, whereas the Sierra Leone Special Court 
(SLSC) which will not be examined in this stud/I, although premised on 
primacy, differs greatly from the Tribunals. According to Article 8 of its 
Statute, the SLSC "shall have primacy over the national courts of Sierra 
Leone". 
So what has Judge Sidhwa's legacy been? Instead of a full-strength 
primacy needed to build the first truly international criminal justice institution, 
primacy has been replaced by a conditional primacy of the ICC, and a more 
targeted primacy of the SLSC. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the 
Tribunal's primacy is the realisation that serious crimes such as these falling 
under the jurisdiction of the Tribunals and the Court may be tried by an 
international forum when certain conditions are met. In that sense, primacy has 
played a very important role, which led to a more refined principle, that of 
complementarity. 
9( See generally, Cryer, (2001), 435; FrutH, (2000), 857; McDonald, (2002). 121; Schocken 
(2002), 436. 
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Part Two: Complemenhrity 
The Meaning of Complementarity 
Complementarity constitutes a key concept in the ICC regime92 • It is vital 
for the function of the Court and was one of many thorny problems facing 
those designing this permanent institution. 
Complementarity defines the relationship between the ICC and national 
courts and determines the forum that should have jurisdiction in a particular 
case: It is generally accepted that it is the product of a compromise which 
emerged in the negotiations for the ICC. This compromise serves a delicate 
balance between the competing interests of State sovereignty and judicial 
independence93 • Finding a widely acceptable solution on the problematic issue 
of jurisdiction was a problem in the negotiations94• Complementarity therefore 
is among those concepts without which the ICC would not have materialised. 
In the very essence of complementarity lies the fact that the ICC is not 
intended to replace or displace national courts when these are functioning 
properll5. Some States have well-functioning judiciaries; some however do 
not
96
. The ICC is meant to act as an effective complement and will not replace 
92 The ICC was the result of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
A/Conf.l38/9, 1998,37 lLM (1998),999. The Court was formally established on the 1 SI of July 
2002. 
93 See Bachrach, (1999), 40; See also Pejic, (1998), 311. Arguably, the protection the ICC will 
~ r o v i d e e will compensate for the relinquishment of whatever sovereign rights. On this particular 
Issue see Bhattacharyya, (1996), 75; See also Brand (1995), 1696, 1697. 
94 F erencz, (1998),227. 
95 Crawford, (1995), 410; Bleich, (1997), 1; See also the then LCHR, Establishing an 
International Criminal Court; Major Unresolved Issues in the Draft Statute, International 
Criminal Court Briefing Series Vol. I, No.1 (/998), 10, available at 
gopher://igc.apc.orgiOO/orgs/icc/ngodocs/rome/lchr_issues.598; As Bassiouni puts it, 
"complementarity requires deferral to capable national systems", Bassiouni, Brower, 
Grossman, Orentlicher, Rosenberg, Scheffer, and Williams, (1998), 1396. 
9bD 
unoff, and Trachtman, (1999), 405. 
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effective national courts. The St?tute's goal is to establish a judicial "safety 
net" in place for those cases where, due to a national court system that is 
unwilling or unable, the investigation of serious international crimes is not 
possible97 • In other words, the ICC will provide, in those cases, an alternative 
forum for the termination of impunity98 and will, in fact, supplement99 the 
domestic proceedings. 
Complementarity introduces a new regime on the international scene, 
by ensuring that both national and international proceedings co-exist and that 
adjudication takes place at the level most competent to deal with a case. 
Concurrent Jurisdiction and Compiementarity 
Concurrent jurisdiction entails two different forms when it comes to the 
Court. First, the ICC's relationship with national jurisdictions and second, with 
the ad hoc Tribunals. Of the two, concurrent jurisdiction between the ICC and 
national courts is more problematic. 
It has been suggested that complementarity is contrary to the concept of 
concurrent jurisdiction and arguably this is in opposition to the original ILC 
conception \00. 
In the process of the Rome Statute negotiations, it was agreed that 
"parallel" procedures between national courts and the ICC should be avoided 
97 Brown, (1999), 878. 
98 F owler,1. 
99 For the supplemental role of the ICC see Crawford, ibid. supra n. 95 ,415. 
)00 Wexler, in Bassiouni, (1999), 659. 
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to the maximum extent possible101 ; in that 8ense, complementarity is closer to 
the concept of concurrent jurisdiction 102. 
This is true, as complementarity guarantees that both jurisdictions may 
be involved. In contrast to primacy, where the ICTY and the ICTR establish 
their jurisdictional superiority, when necessary, the ICC leaves the adjudication 
of a case to the national courts and will intervene only in exceptional cases. 
Concurrent jurisdiction, raises similar problems for both the ad hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC, and it could be therefore argued that, at first, the 
solutions chosen appear to be similarlO3. 
Indeed, both regimes involve the national and the international levels. 
However, the interaction between the national and the international levels in 
the case of the ad hoc Tribunals is not as noticeable as it is expected to be with 
the ICC. The ad hoc Tribunals have primacy which is manifested through the 
process of deferral. Deferral might or might not involve national court input, 
depending on the reason for which deferral is sought. The level of interaction 
between national and international proceedings therefore varies. 
Nevertheless, in order for the ICC to be seised of jurisdiction, the case 
must necessarily pass through the domestic forum 104. Thus, there is a more 
"direct" concurrent jurisdiction in the latter case, which is mainly due to 
complementarity. 
101 See Report of the 1996 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
C ~ i m i n a l l Court. Volume I, GA. 51 st Sess. Supp. No. 22. A/51/22. 1996. at 38-39. 
10 Ibid. at 37. 
103 Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices - Part 
I; Defming the Crimes and Permissible Defences and Initiating a Prosecution. 11-12. 
104 Except of course in those instances where the State fails to act, where the ICC will be seised 
of jurisdiction by virtue of the "inaction scenario". See infra section 5.3. fn. 173 in particular. 
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Contrary to a widely accepted view lO5, compleP1entarity does not in fact 
signify complete primacy of national courts. It is a sui .?;eneris principle, which 
allows national courts to deal with a case first 1 06. If :hey fail in this role, the 
ICC may step in and be seised of jurisdiction. The ICC, being the final arbiter 
of its own jurisdiction 107, will decide on whether a case is admissible before it, 
provided that the domestic courts of a State are shown to be genuinely 
unwilling or unable to deal with a case. National courts are not granted primacy 
as the ICC is given the power to determine when national courts are unwilling 
or unable to fulfil their role. 
Regarding the second form of concurrent jurisdiction, namely between 
the ICC and the ad hoc Tribunals, problems may occur only in respect of the 
ICTY whose jurisdiction is not limited ratione temporis lOs, and includes crimes 
committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia after the 1 st of January 
1991 109• This means that the ICTY can deal with crimes falling under its 
jurisdiction beyond the time-span of the Bosnian warllO. In the hypothetical 
case that crimes falling under the jurisdiction of both the ICTY and the ICC are 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and the successor States 
have become parties to the Rome Statute, a potential "conflict" might then 
arise. On the one hand, the ICTY will have primacy to investigate and 
prosecute the said crimes whereas on the other, for the ICC to be seised of 
\05 Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003, 4 
available at: http://www.icc-cpi.intlotp/policy.php; See Bachrach, (1998), 158; See also id., 
(1999). 40; Kritz, (1996), 145; Arsanjani, (1999), 26; Bleich, (1997), "Cooperation with 
National Systems" 3; Brown, (1998), 424, especially fn 203,204. 
106 Morris, in Shelton (2000), 195, calls the Court's conditional primacy, a "vestigial form of 
fcrimacy" . 
07 See infra. 5.4. 
108 This is not the case for the ICrR though whose jurisdiction is limited according to Article 7 
of its Statute to the crimes committed during the "period beginning on 1 January 1994 and 
ending on 31 December 1994" 
109 • 
Article 8 of the ICTY's Statute. 
51 
Primacy & Complementarity 
jurisdiction the complementarity test must be met. The same issue could also 
arise with regard to any other ad hoc criminal Tribunal or Special Court that 
may exist at one time, with comparable jurisdiction. The question then posed is 
which of the two institutions would have jurisdiction in the first place, so as to 
subsequently determine the position of national courts. 
There is no provision in the ICC Statute regarding the resolution of 
such a conflict. It has been argued by analogy to the rule that speciality prevails 
over generality, that the specialised Tribunal derogates from the competence of 
a broader international jurisdiction III. However, this solution is not necessarily 
accurate. Pro secutori al discretion might provide a better solution to the 
conflict, in terms of not asserting jurisdiction even though the preconditions for 
jurisdiction are met, when the case is dealt with appropriately by either the 
State party or the ad hoc Tribunal I 12 • 
Identifying Complementarity's Content through Analogous Concepts 
Unless a certain expertise m physics is possessed, where it is a 
prevalent concept, complementarity did not mean much to lawyers before the 
ICC negotiations. However, despite its importance, complementarity remains 
undefined 113. In fact, no mention of the term "complementarity" can be found 
in the Statute, which stipulates that the prospective ICC is meant to be 
110 See for instance the Kosovo crisis and ICTY's investigations of criminal responsibility for 
crimes committed in the context of ethnic cleansing. 
111 Trifterer in Triffterer (1999),64. 
112 See also Bohlander in Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones (2002), 689, who maintains however that 
"the ICTY could demand the ICC or its Prosecutor not to entertain the case any further, and 
take charge of the case under its own jurisdiction". This argument, based on the coercive 
powers the SC exercises over UN members fails to address the question whether the ICC is 
bound as an institution by Article 103 of the Charter. 
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"complementary" to national criminal jurisdictions 1 14. The term has its o r i ~ i n s s
in the French term "complementarit6". However, this is not indicative of its 
content 1 15. In order to understand its meaning, it would be helpful to exar,Jine 
analogous concepts in regional and other systems such as the principlt: of 
subsidiarity in European Law and the European Convention of Human Rights, 
the operation of the federal States and the human rights system in general. 
In the field of European Law, subsidiarity is the closest concept, even 
though this principle does not refer to jurisdiction and it recognises moreover, a 
hierarchy, of which European Law is superiorl16. One of the functions of the 
principle of subsidiarity in EC Law is that the Community takes action only if 
the objectives of the action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can be better achieved by the Community l17. Subsidiarity emerged 
as a political concept to satisfy concerns raised by certain Member States. In 
the process of European integration, it has taken up much significance. In this 
respect, the analogy to the concept of complementarity in international criminal 
law is of some merit since, as in European Law, the ICC will take action if the 
national jurisdictions are not sufficient to try an accused, presuming then that 
the ICC is the better forum. It is difficult to see how complementarity differs 
from subsidiarity. Unlike subsidiarity though, complementarity applies to all 
cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Court when certain preconditions are 
met and is not limited in terms of specific competence allotted to it. 
113 See Association of American Law Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court, 
(1999),248; Bachrach, (1999). 158. 
114 See the Preamble and Article 1 of the Rome Statute. 
liS B . . ( 9 asslOum, 1 97) 397. II/) , 
Article 5 EC Treaty. 
117 For the principle of subsidiarity in European Law see generally Craig, and De Burca, 
(2003), 132-138; See also Toth, (1992). 1079. 
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In the European Human Rights System, the principle of subsidiarity 
laid down therein could be another possible source in order to understand the 
principle of complementarityl18. Although no reference to subsidiarity is made 
in the European Convention on Human Rights 119 this does not mean that it has 
no application in its framework. The Convention is "in no way intended to take 
the place of national human-rights provisions and machinery", but the 
fundamental freedoms enshrined therein were "clearly designed to add a 
supplementary and ultimate remedy to those safeguards which the internal law 
of the Convention States afford to the individual,,12o. This is in a way akin to 
complementarity since the ICC will not replace the national courts of a State 
but will be an effective complement without constituting the ultimate remedy 
available to the individual. 
Another possible source of comparison may come from an examination 
of federal-type Statesl21 . The interplay between the constituent states and the 
central federal state in this type of constitutional structure may be helpful for 
approaching complementarity in international criminal law. In order for a valid 
analogy to take place, the discussion should be focused on the federal judicial 
system. And more specifically, on the inter-relationship between the courts of 
each state and the federal court l22. It may be argued that there is no common 
ground on jurisdiction since there is generally a separation and division of 
118 For the European System see generally Harris, O'Boyle, and Warbrick. (1995); For the 
f l ~ i n c i p l e e of subsidiarity see, ibid., 9-11. 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, ETS 5 as amended by Protocol No 11 (ETS No 155). 
120 Petzold, in MacDonald, Matscher, and Petzold. (1993), 43. 
121 The federal form is used by many nations in the world, including USA, Canada, Australia, 
India, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Nigeria, Venezuela, for example. For the similarities 
and differences among the federal systems see generally Jackson, and Tushnet, (1999), chapter 
VIII. 
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powers 123. Tpp' federal court may, should certain conditions be met, be seised 
of jurisdiction when it is deemed necessary and is specifically provided for in 
the constitution itself or in a law l24• However, although this might suggest that 
the approach taken is akin to the principle of complementarity, it should be 
noted though that the relationship between the national courts of a State and the 
ICC differs substantially from the analogous relationship in federal States. And 
this has to do with the fact that in the latter case, the formulation entails only 
one level i.e. jurisdiction within the same State, whereas in the former it 
involves two different levels, the national and the international. More 
importantly, the federal court has supremacy over the courts of the constituent 
states. This is not the case with the ICC. The intention is that the ICC is truly 
complementary and would normally not review decisions delivered at the 
national level125• Hence, the operation of the federal system can only provide 
limited assistance towards the comprehension of the principle of 
complementarity. This could derive from the fact that jurisdiction on the 
federal court is conferred only if certain conditions, provided by law, are met 
and not arbitrarily, which is also the case for the ICC. 
An analogy to complementarity may also be found in the international 
human rights system and the different options provided to victims of human 
rights violations. Protection can be sought in different frameworks 126. 
122 In the American system this would be the federal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the 
Courts of the individual states. In the German system reference should be made to the inter-
relationship between the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the courts of the Lander. 
123 S c . . 
ee, lor mstance, on Amencan Law, Tribe, (1998), 18. 
124 Nowak, and Rotunda, (1995), chapter 2, 21 et. seq.; Isensee, and Kirchhof, (1987), part 
four, chapter V., 665 et seq. 
125 With the exception of course of the strictly defined cases in which exception to the principle 
of ne bis in idem may occur. 
126 For example in the Human Rights Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the different Committees established by the various 
international Conventions etc. 
55 
Primacy & Complementarity 
However, it should be noted that the different possibilities for protection 
available, are not complementary either to each other or to national courts and 
thus no analogy may be drawn between the human rights system and 
international criminal justice. Nevertheless, an examination of the 
preconditions that need to be met might be of assistance. For the purpose of 
this study, only one, the requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies, will 
be briefly examined127. As this constitutes a necessary precondition for the 
admissibility of a case, it is in a sense comparable to complementarity. The 
same rule underlies international criminal law as well, and is manifested in 
complementarity. The exhaustion of local remedies rule can be comparable to 
the "unavailable" and "ineffective,,128 criteria needed by the complementarity 
principle since conferral of jurisdiction to the international court is made 
conditional on those two criteria. 
There is no exact equivalent in other regional or international systems that 
would assist in the comprehension of the meaning of complementarity. The 
analogies are helpful in understanding how similar concepts operate in other 
systems, and may be of assistance in the practical application of the 
complementarity principle. 
127 Article 26 of the ECHR ibid. supra n. 119 reads: "The Commission may only deal with the 
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised 
rules of international law ... "; see also Article 46(1)(a) of the IACHR 91LM (1970),673, which 
for the admissibility of the petition or communication requires "that the remedies under 
domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized 
principles of international law"; also in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 21 
ILM (1982),59, by virtue of Article 56 communications received by the Commission shall be 
considered if they "are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this 
f 2 ~ o c e d u r e e is u n d ~ l y y p r o l o n g . e d ' ~ . .
For the analYSIS of the cntena see infra. 
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Reasons behind the Adoption of Complementarity and the Abandonment of 
Primacy 
The choice of c o m p l e m e n t a r i ~ y y should not be seen as an evaluation of the 
merits of national proceedings and certainly not because the drafters realised 
primacy's problems129• Complementarity is perceived as the maximum that 
could be achieved in the negotiations130• Moreover, the choice of 
complementarity might be rationalised on the different constitutional basis for 
the ICC. The fact that the permanent Court was created by a treaty and not by 
means of a Chapter VII Resolution is crucial for the choice of the principle on 
which its jurisdiction is based. Creating a new Court by a treaty signifies that 
the consent of the States participating in the negotiations must be achieved. In 
the absence of a SC prerogative to "impose" its choices through binding 
Resolutions, a commonly acceptable solution is often very difficult to reach. 
Accordingly, complementarity replaced primacy13l. 
When dealing with questions of the establishment of a new institution, 
considerations of sovereignty come into play l32. The pertinent question of State 
sovereignty and its relationship to the jurisdiction of the permanent 
129 Morris, (1997), 362-365. 
130 Commenting on the merit of complementarity, the delegate of Austria at an oral interview 
made on August 6, 1997, pointed out that "complementarity constitutes a guiding spirit" and 
the delegate of Ireland concluded "complementarity might not be the strongest grounds for the 
Court to rest on, but it might be the best", cited in Bachrach, ibid. supra n. 105, 169, fn. 102-
103. 
131 This however contradicts the view held by the ICTY in the course of the radii: case which 
maintained that "[ ... ]when international tribunal is created it must be endowed with primacy 
over national courts". See ibid. supra n. 52. ' 
132 McKeon, (1997), 535; See also generally, Cassese, in Cassese, and Delmas-Marty, "Crimes 
internationaux", (2002), 13 and Kirsch, ibid., 31. 
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international criminal court was one nf the main obstacles to its 
establishment 133. 
State sovereignty is one of the most fundamental attributes of the law of 
nations in a community whose primary a c t ~ r s s are States l34. However, in the 
recent years, the concept of sovereignty has changed. Economic development, 
technological evolution, new international concerns such as those relevant to 
the environment, the increased international concern for human rights, and 
most recently terrorism, signify the continuing development of the once rigidly 
defined concept of sovereignty135. States have accepted cessions of 
sovereigntyl36, the most prominent example being membership of international 
organisations 1 37. Sovereignty is no longer absolute 138 -if it ever was, but it 
remains strong139• 
Although States continue to play the leading role in the international arena, 
it is no longer the case that they are "the only true actors,,140 in international 
law. The individual has acquired some locus standi on the international 
scene
141
, a prominent example being in the field of international criminal law, 
albeit only as defendant. Traditionally, criminal jurisdiction has been a 
133 Pejic, (1997), 860; Rebane, (1996), 1664; Pickard, (1995), 439; Cavicchia, (1992), 223; 
Simpson, (1999), 134. See also the relevant discussions in the course of the Preparatory 
COmmittee. Namely, see the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, GA 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, Al50/22 (1995), paras. 29-51; 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
Volume I (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and august 1996) 
and Volume II (Compilation of Proposals), GA 51 st Sess. Supp. No. 22 Al51122 (1996), paras. 
153-178. 
134 Brownlie, (2003), 287. 
135 Grossman, and Bradlow, (1993). 11, 14, 16-18; and Jamison, (1995), 431. 
136 There is the view (Bassiouni) whereby "by limiting its sovereignty, a State proves that it is 
sovereign". See Bassiouni, and Nanda, (1973), 17. 
137 See generally, Sands, and Klein (2001),533. 
138 Nagan, (1995), 142; see also Juss, (1994), 225. 
139 B' I ner y, (1963). 46-49; See also Brand, (1995), 1695. 
140 This position can be found in the first edition of Oppenheim, (1905-1906). 
141 As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has observed, (1950), 463, international law has displaced the 
States as the sole subjects of international law and has moved towards the individual human 
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reserved domain (domaine reservee) for the national sphere and no 
international organisation could supersede this notion. The exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction within the limits of public international law fell within the 
unfettered prerogatives of the sovereign State142 . 
States are generally reluctant to give up their sovereignty in favour of an 
international tribunal although arguably the sovereign rights forfeited are 
regained by the protection the international instruments provide143 . In the field 
of international criminal law, the creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals was the first step towards a penetration of the veil of soverei gnty 1 44 • 
However, unlike the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, where the limits of their 
mandate made it possible for them to rely on jurisdictional primacy, the 
community of sovereign States did not display a similar willingness to accept 
such a restriction of national competence with regard to the ICC. 
The permanent nature of the new court meant that States wished to 
maintain the sovereign prerogative of bringing perpetrators of the alleged 
crimes to trial according to the legal basis of criminal jurisdiction145, and 
submit them to the jurisdiction of the ICC only in exceptional case146s. 
Linked to this is the importance attributed to State consent. Many States, 
with the US being the most fervent supporter of this view147, were deeply 
rights by bringing the "individual human being in the very center of the constitution of the 
world". 
142 See Lotus Case, France v. Turkey (1927), PCIJ Rep., Series A, No. 10, 18. 
143 Ferencz, (1992), 391-392; See also Saxer, (1992),601-602; Wright, (1994), 42-43. 
144 King, (1996), 136-137; Brand, supra n. 93, 1690. 
14Si.e. the nationality, the territoriality and the passive personality principles. See generally, 
Brownlie, (2003), 299-305. 
146 Whilst it is true that only situations can be referred to the ICC, the Court ultimately deals 
with individual cases and it is precisely this point that States had trouble with and would rather 
have control over the proceedings. 
147 On 26 March 1998, US Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, sent a letter to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright objecting on 
political grounds to the Court. He wrote: "I am unalterably opposed to the creation of a 
permanent UN criminal court because any permanent judiciary within the United Nations 
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concerned by the possibility that their own citizens could be brou,?-;ht before an 
international tribunal without state consent. Thus, the fear that the ICC would 
become a supranational entity led the ILC to seek ways to assuage their 
concerns l48 . It was then that complementarity was born as the result of a 
compromise achieved in the negotiations for the ICC. 
At this point, it should be noted that the complementarity provisions as they 
presently stand, require monitoring from the ICC to ensure the satisfactory 
operation of the principle. Ironically, one of the main reasons for the adoption 
of complementarity was the fear that the ICC would otherwise pass judgments 
on national authorities149• International supervision is indeed necessary for the 
full implementation of complementary jurisdiction, for State attempts at 
escaping jurisdiction will be inevitable 1 50. It would be interesting to see 
whether this formulation in the long run compromises the sovereignty of the 
States concerned more than an ICC based on primacy. 
Another factor which might have also led to the adoption of 
complementarity for the ICC may be the fact that the scope of its jurisdiction 
extends only to future crimes. Both Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs as well as the 
ICTY and the ICTR, were established after most of the crimes they related to 
had been committed. The ICC however, not having retrospective 
system would be totally inappropriate ... it would grant the UN a principal trapping of 
sovereignty. The UN is not now - nor will it ever be so log as 1 have breath in me - a sovereign 
entity ... Under this scenario, an American citizen could very well come under the jurisdiction 
of a UN criminal court, even over the express objection of the United States Government ... [I]f 
they manage to conclude a treaty establishing such a court without a clear U.S, veto, it will be 
dead-on-arrival at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee". 
148 Wexler, (1997), 221. 
149 Human Rights Watch: Recommendations for an Independent and Effective International 
Criminal Court, New York, London, 1998 available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/icc/jitbwh-07.htm 
ISO B 'b'd rown, I I ,supra n. 4, 431; Cassese, (1999), 159, 
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jurisdiction151 , deals with situations as they arise. States fearing that they w011ld 
no longer have control and that they would be involved in situations they cO'.11d 
not handle, were reluctant to set up a Court without ensuring that their inter(';3ts 
would be preserved. The only way to safeguard these interests was by denying 
primacy to the new Court. By accepting complementarity there is a "barrier" 
before the ICC may be seised of jurisdiction; that of domestic courts which can 
only be crossed if those courts are found to be insufficient. This way, control 
remains with able and willing States. 
Complementarity in the ICC Statute 
Complementarity can be found in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, as 
well as in Articles 1, 17 and 18, whereas its implications permeate the entire 
Statute. Some of these aspects will be examined in the chapters that follow. In 
examining jurisdiction, the ne bis in idem principle, found in Article 20 ICC 
Statute, will be discussed later in this chapter together with Article 10[9] of the 
ad hoc Tribunals. 
5.1 The Preamble to the Statute 
As with every international treaty, the Preamble to the Rome Statute 
indicates its aspirations. Although none of the drafts prior to the 1994 ILC 
Draft contained a Preamble, it has since been developed steadily, primarily in 
the negotiations at Rome, to acquire its present form. 
151 Article 11 ICC Statute. 
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Complementarity is first found in the tenth Preambular paragraph where it 
is stated: "Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under 
this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions,,152. 
Originally, the Preamble was meant to contain the main reference to 
complementarity which was first introduced by the 1994 Draft153. However, in 
the process of negotiations the possibility of it being moved to an Article in the 
main text of the treaty was explored I 54. It was feared that the inclusion of 
complementarity in the Preamble would make it weak, and in order to 
strengthen it, it should find its place in the Statute. 
Had complementarity been found solely in the Preamble, it would, 
arguably, not have been as strong as it could be, had it been mentioned in a 
separate Article in the body of the international instrument. In general treaty 
law, Article 31 VCLT provides for the interpretation of international treaties. 
According to its paragraph 2: "the context for the purpose of the interpretation 
of a treaty shall comprise in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
annexes ... ". The Preamble itself may thus not have normative language but 
reference to concepts found in Preambles have long been in the scope of 
international adjudication and can be found in jurisprudence I 55. 
152 In order to stress the complementary position of the new institution, reference should also 
be made to the 6th preambular paragraph which stipulates that" ... it is the duty of every State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes". See on that 
Lattanzi, (1999), 426. 
153 The preamble provided: " ... Emphasizing further that such a court is intended to be 
complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may 
not be available or may be ineffective". See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 2 May - 22 July 1994 (GA, 49th Sess., Supp. 
No. 10, Al49/10, 1994) at 43. 
154 1995 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an ICC G.A., 50th Sess., 
Supp. No. 22, Al50/22, 1995 at p. 7 
155 See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, ICJ Rep. 
1949, 174; See also Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case, IeJ Rep. 1962, 151; As to 
the legal function of the Preambles see Asylum Case, ICJ Rep. 1950, 282; Rights of Nationals 
of the United States of America in Morocco, Ie] Rep. 1952, 196. There have also been some 
arbitral awards on the issue. See Arbitral Decision Rendered in Conformity with the Special 
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In the drl\fts that followed the ILC Draft, complementarity was further 
elaborated so as to provide a greater understanding of its meaning l56. The 
Preamble of the ICC Statute as it stands, adopted the alternative reading of the 
final draft which was presented at the Rome conference l57 • This refers to 
complementarity without adding any characteristics, leaving those to the 
Articles that follow in the main part of the treaty. 
5.2 Article 1 of the Statute 
It was considerations of the legal implications of the placement of such an 
important concept in the Preamble of the Rome treaty that led its drafters to 
include complementarity in the main text. Hence, its inclusion in Article 1 of 
the final Rome text l58 • 
The historical development of this Article cannot be precisely 
reconstructed. It should be accepted though that in the process of negotiations 
several concepts began to take shape and found their way into the Statute. It is 
Agreement Concluded on December 17. 1930. between the Kingdom of Sweden and the United 
States of America Relating to the Arbitration of a Difference Concerning the Swedish Motor 
Ships Kronprins Gusta! Adolf and Pacific. Washington D. c.. July 18, 1932. reproduced in 26 
AJIL (1932). 834, at 846; See also Arbitration between Great Britain and Costa Rica. Opinion 
and Award of William H. Taft. Sole Arbitrator. Washington D.C.. October 18, 1923. 
reproduced in 18 AJIL (1924), 147 at 148; In the Matter of the Arbitration of the Boundary 
Dispute between the Republics of Costa Rica and Panama Provided for by the Convention 
between Costa Rica and Panama of March 17. 1910. Opinion and Decision of Edward 
Doug/ass White, Chief Justice of the United States. Acting in the Capacity of Arbitrator as 
Provided in the Treaty aforesaid. Washington D.C.. September 12, 1914, reprinted in 8 AJIL 
(1914), 913 at 924. On the character and effect of the preamble to a treaty see generally 
Fitzmaurice, (1957), 227-228. 
156 The Final Draft reads in the Preamble: "Emphasizing further that such a court is intended to 
be complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures 
may not be available or may be ineffective" See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft Statute and Draft Final Act (AlConf. 
183/2/Add. 1, 1998) at 10. Delegations have expressed their opposition to the wording of the 
third preambular paragraph and suggested the following instead: "Emphasizing further that 
such a court shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions". 
157 Ibid. at 10. 
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common in internationaJ treaties to stipulate in their first Article the generally 
agreed position. In the ICC treaty it is established that the ICC has jurisdiction 
over the most serious crimes and that it is complementary to national fora and 
this is certainly of primary importance. This explains the inclusion of 
complementarity in Article 1 of the Statute. 
The said Article does not add much to the substance of the principle, as it 
simply repeats verbatim the Preamble. Its specifics are left to the Articles 
which follow later in the Statute. 
5.3 Article 17 of the Statute 
The Court's complementary character is most clearly manifested in the 
provisions dealing with admissibility, namely, Articles 17 and 18. Article 17 
does something rather unusual in treaty practice, as it does not mention by 
name the concept it refers to. Article 17 does not contain the term 
complementarity. By referring to the Preamble and to Article 1, it stipulates the 
conditions upon which jurisdiction is conferred to the ICC in lieu of national 
courts. It constitutes therefore the most important provision on 
complementarity and its drafting history is fascinating159• Article 17 contains 
158 "An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. [ ... J and shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. [ ... J". 
159 Space does not permit a full exploration of the negotiations surrounding this provision. The 
Article on the admissibility has been considered as one of those provisions which should give 
clear expression to the principle of complementariZ. See the 1995 Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of an ICC, GA, 50 Sess., Supp. No. 22, Al50/22, 1995, at 
33. But see also relevant discussion at p. 8 of the report. Article 35, which eventually became 
Article 17 underwent a great deal of negotiations and political bargaining. The 1994 Draft 
contained the ILC's understanding of complementarity as to when a case should be considered 
inadmissible. (See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, 2 May - 22 July 1994 (GA, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Al49/1O, 1994) at 105). 
In the 1996 Preparatory Committee it was stated with regard to Article 35 that it was too 
narrow and perhaps it should be drafted differently so as to include other grounds of 
inadmissibility contained in other Articles and thus to become the main Article on 
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four grounds of inadmissibility: a) the case is being investigated or prosecuted 
at national level l60, b) the case has been investigated and the decision was 
made not to prosecutel61 , c) ne bis in idem162 and, d) the case is not of 
sufficient gravityl63. If one of those grounds is engaged, the Court is precluded 
from stepping in. However, the Court will be seised of jurisdiction if in a) and 
b) the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute, and in 
c), when the conditions for the exception to ne bis in idem applyl64. For the 
first three grounds of inadmissibility certain State action is required, whereas 
whether a case is of sufficient gravity so as to justify further action by the 
Court is not dependent on a particular State behaviour and goes to the heart of 
prosecutorial discretion 1 65. For the rest, their constituting elements will be 
examined in tum. Although some indication is given in the Statute as to their 
meaning, Article 17 largely remains a highly complicated provision with many 
of its elements remaining far from clear, which prompted Shabtai Rosenne to 
advocate an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ for clarification 166. 
complementarity. (See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Volume II, (Compilation of Proposals), GA, 51st Sess., Supp. 
No. 22, A/51/22, 1996, at 38). It serves better the aims of the Court to have the relevant 
provision in one, maybe two Articles, rather than scattered throughout the Statute, as this may 
lead to different approaches regarding the interpretation of the relevant provisions. However, 
the greatest development of the concept was achieved in 1997, when a Working Group on 
Complementarity and Trigger Mechanisms was created and the principle was discussed in 
length. Accordingly, the concepts of "inability" and "ineffectiveness", introduced in the 1994 
Draft, found their way into the 1997 Draft. 
160 Article 17(1)(a) ICC Statute. 
161 Article 17(1)(b) ibid. 
162 Article 17(1)(c) ibid. 
163 Article 17(1)( d) ibid. 
164 Article 20(3) ibid. 
165 See in particular Article 53(1)( c) ICC Statute. This is consistent also with Articles 1, 5 
whereby the Court exercises jurisdiction over the most serious crimes. 
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"The State" 
In both 17(1)(a) and (b), reference IS made to the State which either 
investigates or prosecutes or has investigated and decided not to prosecute. It is 
not clear from the Statute at this point whether the State refers to States parties, 
to States parties that have jurisdiction, to States parties that exercise a 
particular type of jurisdiction 167 (on the basis of territoriality or nationality for 
instance), or to all States, even third parties168. Which of the above will have to 
be unwilling or unable for the Court to be seised of jurisdiction? 
Clearly, the State referred to here is one which has jurisdiction 1 69. 
Moreover, it should be accepted that since Article 18, which deals with 
preliminary rulings, stipulates that all States, regardless of whether they are 
parties to the Statute or not, have to be notified of the beginning of an 
investigation 170, the same approach should be accepted here. Moreover, a 
possible conflict between two or more States exercising jurisdiction might 
arise. Articles 17 and 18 do not provide any rules as to how to resolve this 
"positive conflict of jurisdiction or competence,,171. This is certainly a very 
interesting question and the ICC Prosecutor will, in practice, have to wait and 
see which State(s) assumes jurisdiction before he or she examines whether 
admissibility even arises. In that sense, States have a principal role to play. 
166 Rosenne, (1999), 130. 
167 By virtue of territoriality or nationality for instance, in accordance with Article 12 ICC 
Statute. 
168 For and excellent analysis of issues involving third-parties, see Akande, (2003). 
169 Article 17(1)(a) and (b) ICC Statute. 
170 Article 18(1) ibid. 
171 See Cassese's contribution in the Public hearing of the OTP, 17-18 June 2003, the Hague, 
transcript available at www.icc-cpUntiotp/otp public hearing.html, who suggests resorting to 
Article 119(2) of the Statute and advises the Prosecutor to issue general guidelines on the issue. 
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"Investigated" 
Whenever a State carries out its investigations, even if it decides not to 
prosecute, the case will be inadmissible before the ICC "unless it could be 
shown that the national proceedings were a deliberate attempt to forestall 
international justice" 172. 
Quite clearly, if no State acts at all, then, the ICC would have 
jurisdiction to try a particular case, without having to prove unwillingness or 
inability. It is important to emphasise the "inaction scenario,,173 in that respect, 
as this would render the case admissible. 
When a State investigates, however, then complementarity will come 
into play. The problem of course is what happens when a States says it 
investigates and in fact it does notl74. It is important then to determine when a 
State fulfils its obligation to investigate. No indication is given in the Statute. 
Regarding the standards to be adopted, of particular relevance and indicative of 
what is generally accepted in international practice, are some of the Turkish 
cases before the European Court of Human Rights. In the <;akici v. Turkey 
Case l75 both the Commission and the Court emphasised the importance of 
accurate custody records and they went on to describe the range of records that 
172 See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Establishing an International Criminal Court; 
Major Umesolved Issues in the Draft Statute, International Criminal Court Briefing Series, 
Volume 1, No.1, 1998, <gopher: //igc.apc.org/OO/orgs/icc/ngodocs/rome/1chr_issues.598>. 
173 Informal expert paper: The principle of complementarity in practice, available at: www.icc-
cRi.intiotp/expconsult html. 
1 4 Cf. the argument put forward by Libya in the oral pleadings before the ICJ in the case 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) 1998, where it 
maintained that it has taken all the necessary steps towards the investigation and prosecution of 
the alleged crimes. Pleadings available at http://www.icj-
f ~ i i .0rglicjWWW/idocketlilukliluk2frame.htm. 
Judgment of8 July 1999, Application no 23657/94. 
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need to be kept. In the Ihlan v. Turkey Case l76 the Commission identified 
fourteen types of problems it had encountered in the conduct of domestic 
investigations. 
Along the same lines, in the Inter-American system, the luter-American 
Commission of Human Rights has on several occasions observed that 
investigations have not been conducted properly, considering undue delay as 
the principal reason for its findings 177. 
However, the use of human rights case-law cannot but be indicative of 
a possible interpretation of the above provisions and should not be relied upon 
exclusively, as the HR courts referred to have a totally different ambit and 
jurisdiction. Their case-law, however, remains ofinterest178• 
The beginning of an investigation might suffice for the ICC not to 
intervene. It would certainly be adequate for a "mini trial" under Article 18. 
The Prosecutor then has, once an investigation has been initiated, to examine 
whether he could justify an intervention based on "unwillingness" or 
"inability" under the Statute. 
"Decided not to Prosecute" 
It is clear from Article 17(1 )(b) that if a State has investigated and 
decided not to prosecute, then the ICC has no jurisdiction. As Klip rightly 
points out, this provision presumes that there will be a decision 179 not to 
176 Report (31) 23 April 1999, Application No 22277/93. 
177 S fi . ee or mstance Res. No. 14/89 Case 9641 (Ecuador), 12 Apr. 1989, Annual Report, 1988-9 
at 104-115; Res. No 1/88, Case 9755 (Chile), 12 Sept. 1988, Annual Report 1987-8 at 132-9. 
178 As both the contributions of Cassese, 19 and M0se, 179, in Bergsmo, (2003) demonstrate, 
both the ad hoc Tribunals have had recourse to HR instruments in their operation. 
179 Emphasis in the original. 
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prosecute and that this entails a risk of constituting a ground for inadmissibility 
in any case, even when the decision not to prosecute is due to lack of sufficient 
evidence, for instance180• This situation has to be distinguished however, from 
the above "inaction scenario", but it is not clear whether it would give 
jurisdiction to the Court, and if so, under which ground. 
"Unwilling" 
The mam purpose for including a prOVISIon on unwillingness is to 
preclude the possibility of a State shielding the culprits of crimes falling under 
the Court's jurisdiction. Article 17(2) provides some indication on the criteria 
to be used in order to determine unwillingness 181. There are three indications of 
unwillingness in the Statute. The wording of this provision excludes the 
application of additional criteria to prove unWillingness, but it also makes clear 
that their application is not cumulative and it is sufficient if only one is 
engaged 1 82. There are various constituting elements therein which will be 
examined in tum. 
Accordingly, unwillingness may be found if "the proceedings were or are 
being undertaken or the national decision was made for 'the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility" 183. 
180 Klip, in Association Internationale de Droit Penal (2004), 185. Klip categorises this scenario 
under "inability", whereas it could be examined under "unwillingness". 
181 Rule 51 RPE, however, allows the State in question to bring to the Court's attention 
information showing compliance with international standards of independence and impartiality 
when dealing with similar conduct,(emphasis added), or confirm in writing that a case is being 
investigated or prosecuted. For an a ~ a l y s i s s of this Rule, see Lindenmann, in Fischer, Krell, and 
Lilder (2001), 185. 
182 Article 17(2): "shall consider", "whether one, or more of the following exist". 
183 Article 17(2)(a) ICC Statute. 
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No indication is gIven as to the character of action which would be 
c o n ~ i d e r e d d as giving the right to the Court to determine that the is aiming at 
shielding the accused from criminal responsibility. It might be that this concept 
was included to ensure that the State engaging in investigation or prosecution 
may still be found to be unwilling in accordance with the Statute, if the 
intention is to undertake sham proceedings 184. 
Proving this will be a real challenge for the Prosecutor I 85. It is not clear 
what evidence could be used in this respect. In addition, a very real scenario 
might be the following: Assuming that a case is being investigated or 
prosecuted as an ordinary crime before domestic courts which, however, entails 
a more severe penalty than the one envisaged in the ICC Statute l86, would the 
State in question be unwilling in this particular case? Since no guidance is 
given in the Statute in that respect, and this scenario does not trigger the 
exception in Article 20, each case has to be examined in concreto. 
Holmes, in defending the seemingly high standards for the application of 
this provision, maintains that complementarity intended that the Court would 
not interfere "except in the most obvious cases .. 187• However, it is the less 
obvious cases that will be more problematic and will make it more difficult for 
the ICC to step in. And this is where applying this criterion will be a real 
challenge. However, a clearer indication of specific requirements would be 
damaging in terms of unnecessarily restricting the application of this provision. 
184 Arbour, and Bergsmo, in von Hebel, Lammers, and Schukking, (1999), 131 where it is 
stated that "the Prosecutor must prove a devious intent on the part of a State, contrary to its 
aPsparent actions". 
I 5 Cf. Young (2000), 318, who maintains that the burden rests with the States which would 
have the necessary evidence to prove the willingness of their domestic proceedings. This is 
certainly true, but unless the Prosecutor questions a State's intentions, complementarity is a 
mute point. 
186 Article 77 ICC Statute. 
187 H 1 . C ., 
o mes, 10 assese, Gaeta, and Jones (2002), 675. 
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It remains to ~ e e seen how complementarity will be exercised in practice in that 
respect. 
Moreover, another basis for allowing the ICC to establish its jurisdiction 
on the basis of unwillingness is "unjustified delay" shown by a particular State 
which is "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice,,188. Initially, the concept of delay was unqualified but in the 1997 
Working Group on Complementarity an additional criterion relating to delay 
was introduced and the concept of "undue delay" was selected. In Rome, the 
concept of "undue delay" was criticised as too low a threshold and was 
resolved by substituting the adverb "undue" with "unjustified". This change 
was broadly supported189. 
Nevertheless, it is still not clear what should be considered as justified 
delay. An examination of the State's normal procedures would be important in 
that respect. However, given the chapeau and reference to due process 
therein190, and since no indication of what constitutes such a delay is provided 
for in the Statute itself, or in the travaux preparatoires, it is helpful to examine 
the existence of the concept in other human rights instruments; namely, the 
European Convention of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights191 , again taking into account the possible 
limitations of such an exercise. It is one of the fundamental principles of 
criminal justice that the accused is entitled to trial within a reasonable time. 
From the jurisprudence of those instruments it can be concluded that 
"rendering justice without delay is important in order not to jeopardise its 
188 Article 17(2)(b) ICC Statute. 
189 Holmes, in Lee (1999), 54. 
100 See infra analysis of this issue. 
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effectiveness and credibility"I92. The delay in question must be attributable to 
the State l93 . Regarding the time beyond which the delay in the proceedings is 
considered to be unjustifiable it is to be noted that there is no absolute time 
limit as such I 94. Each case should be judged in concreto; this means that the 
reasonableness of the length of the proceedings in criminal cases depends on 
the particUlar circumstances of the case l95 . The same approach should be taken 
for the concept of "unjustified delay" in the ICC. It would have been unrealistic 
to determine a specific time span beyond which the delay would be unjustified. 
Considering also that most cases will arise in the aftermath of great instability 
in the States in question, the reasonabless has to be assessed in the view of the 
particular circumstances of the State concerned. 
Ultimately, delay was linked with a State's intent which has to be 
"inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice". It is not 
clear whether the latter requirement assists in determining that the national 
courts are unwilling, due to unjustified delay. Should the delay be unjustified, 
then the intent not to bring the person to justice is almost certainly fulfilled, as 
provided that such intent is present, then delays should not exist, and if they do, 
there has to be a goodjustification196• 
191 See also Article 6(1) ECHR ibid. supra n. 119; See also Article 14(3)(c) ICCPR, 999 UNTS 
171. 
192 See ECHR case, St6gmuller v. Austria A 9 (1969), 40. 
193 For the ECHR see for instance judgment of 20 February 1991, Vernillo, A 198, 13; 
Judgment of 27 February 1992, Pierazzini, A 231-C, 30. 
194 For the ICCPR, see inter alia Drescher Caldas case, No. 4311979 paras. 12.2, 13.4, 14; 
Pinkey v. Canada, No. 27/1978 paras. 10, 22, 25; Pratt. Morgan and Kelly v Jamaica, Nos. 
210/1986,225/1987 paras. 13.4, 13.5; No. 253/1987 paras. 5.12, 6; and Mukong v. Cameroon, 
~ a r a . . 6. For the IACHR see Case 11.245 (Argentina), 54, para. 112. 
95 See for the ECHR among many examples, Konig v. FRG, A 27 (1978), para. 99; Kemmache 
A 218, (1991), para. 60; Santilli, A 194-D, 61; MaJ, A 196-D, 43. 
196 Klip, ibid. supra n. 180, 182, convincingly asks the question: "Does this suppose that the 
relevant state will oppose the admissibility and will this justify unsuccessfully the delay in the 
proceedings?". He refrains however from giving an answer. 
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Finally, considerations of independence and impartiality come into 
play l97. Lack of independence or impartiality enables the ICC to be seised of 
jurisdiction since the national authorities are presumed to be acting 
inconsistently with an intent to bring the alleged perpetrators to justice. This 
provision was included by the 1997 Report where it was mentioned that 
although the protection of the accused permeates throughout the various 
provisions found elsewhere in the Statute, the question of independence and 
impartiality of the proceedings was raised and was included in the Article l98 . 
Again what constitutes lack of independence and impartiality was not 
further clarified in the negotiations. It is necessary to discern the meaning of 
those two concepts from their occurrence elsewhere in international law . 
In general, "independent" is construed as "independent of the executive 
and also of the parties,,199. In order to establish whether a body can be 
considered 'independent' "regard must be had, inter alia to the manner of 
appointment of its members and their term of office, to the existence of 
guarantees against outside pressures and to the question whether the body 
presents an appearance of independence,,2oo. The same standards for the 
independence of the proceedings should be upheld for the determination of the 
concept provided for in Article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
197 Originally, reference to the independence and impartiality of the proceedings was made in 
the provision for the inability but in the work of the 1997 Working Group on Complementarity 
it was suggested that it would be better linked to the unwillingness and should therefore be 
moved to the paragraph addressing this question. 
198 For an insight into the 1997 Working Group on Complementarity see Holmes, who served 
as the co-ordinator for the informal consultations, in Lee (1999), 45-51. 
199 See for the ECHR Ringeisen v. Austria A 13 para 95 (1971). Independence should also 
include the independence in relation to the legislative power (see Crociani v. Italy No 8603179, 
22 DR 147 at 221 (1980)) as well as in relation to political, economical and social pressure 
ftroups. 
00 See inter alia, Langborger v. Sweden A 155 (1989) para. 32; Campbell and Fell v. UK A 
80, (1984) para. 78. See also in the Inter-American system the Case 1l.006 (Peru) IACHR 
Annual Report 1994, 71 where the Commission upheld the Campbell and Fell findings. 
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Regarding the 'impartiality' of the proceedings, this entails the lack of 
"prejudice or bias,,20I. Proceedings are impartial if both a subjective and an 
objective test are satisfied. That is endeavouring to ascertain "the personal 
conviction of a particular judge in a given case"; and "determining whether he 
offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect", 
for the subjective and the objective tests respectivelY02. As with independence, 
in order to give meaning to the concept of impartiality enshrined in the ICC 
Statute, and taking into account that no indication of what its contemporary 
meaning in the field of international criminal law might be, application of the 
principle in other human rights instruments is of particular significance. 
Moreover, Article 17(2)(c) introduces another element to be examined in 
conjunction with independence and impartiality: namely that "the proceedings 
were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice". And, 
"bringing the person to justice" might be held to mean a conviction in this 
particular case. The wording of this provision makes it somewhat difficult to 
see how acquittals might fit within this formulation. 
201 See Piersack v. Belgium A 53 (1982). This however was the main criticism regarding the 
trial of Adolf Eichmann, 36 ILR 5 (1961), 5. See Papadatos, (1964),40-42. Cf Harris, (1998), 
292 who maintains that: "it is clear that Eichmann was given a scrupulously fair hearing". 
202 Piersack v. Belgium A 53 (1982), para. 30; De Cubber v. Belgium A 86 (1984), para. 24; 
Hauschildt v. Denmark A 154 (1989), para. 46; Demicoli v. Malta A 210 (1991), para. 40. Note 
also in this respect the English maxim "justice must not only be done: it must also be seen to be 
done". 
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"Having Regard to the Principles of Due Process Rec<'gnised by International 
Law" 
The chapeau of Article 17(2), contains a reference to international law 
principles of due process. In Rome, problems arose with the Article on 
admissibility. There was the view that the Court would have broad discretion in 
determining unwillingness. In that respect, a proposal for adding the phrase 
"having regard to the principles of due process recognised by international 
law" was broadly accepted and was included in the final Draft203. This was 
meant to inject some objectivity into the criteria of unwillingness204. No 
specific examples were given however of which principles would be 
considered to fall in this categorl°5. Reference to such principles however, 
represents an understanding of due process in international law, shared by 
States which is bound to be more objective than a domestic interpretation of 
due process. As such, this addition is welcome. 
203 See Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, Committee of the Whole, United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, AlConf. 183/C.lIL/76 and Add. 1 through Add. 14 (16 July 1998). 
204 Holmes, ibid. supra n. 189,54. 
20S See Broomhall, in Association Internationale de Droit Penal, (1999), 145. He maintains that 
such principles will include particularly those which are regarded as part of customary law and 
refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 9, 10, 11), the ICCPR (Articles 
4, 6, 9, 14, 15), the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Article 7), the ECHR 
(Articles 2, 5, 6, 7, 15; Protocol 6; Protocol 7, arts 2, 4), the Geneva Conventions 1949 
(common Article 3), the third Geneva Convention 1949 (Articles 84-88, 99, 100-107), the 
fourth GC 1949 (Articles 33,64-77), the 1997 Additional Protocol I (Article 75), the 1977 AP 
II (Article 6) and finally the standards found in the Statute (in particular in parts 5 and 6). The 
informal expert paper on complementarity, however, ibid. supra n.173, Annex 6, adopts a more 
restrictive approach and refers to sources relating specifically to due process and impunity. 
Either way, it is up to the Prosecutor to clarify which of the sources he utilises in a particular 
case. 
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As a general point, it is important to emphasise that nnwillingness 
should be decided, on the basis of the process employed, and not on the 
outcome of a particular case206. 
"Unable" 
Quite apart from unwillingness, the ICC may be seised of jurisdiction if 
the courts of a State are "unable". Some indication of what inability means can 
be found in Article 17(3). This was included to cover those cases where 
political upheaval, armed conflict or other circumstances result in total or 
substantial collapse of the judicial system, and was inserted to take account of 
situations which arose in various parts of the world. Such was the situation 
faced for example by Cambodia in the 70's, and Afghanistan, Liberia, Rwanda, 
Somalia or El Salvador more recently. 
Not surprisingly, there was wide acceptance regarding inability during 
the negotiations. To some States, the issue of a State being unable to prosecute 
the alleged criminals was largely self-evident. This could be the result of 
various reasons (with the most prominent being the collapse of the national 
judicial system) and should therefore give jurisdiction to the Court. However, 
the fear that the Court would have, under such an unqualified fonnulation, too 
wide a discretion led the drafters to insist on the definition of inability in the 
1997 Draft. 
Whilst total collapse was met with no objection, detennining what then 
was termed "partial" collapse was more controversial. This discussion occurred 
206 This point is also emphasised by the expert group ibid., 14. They also contain in Annex 4. a 
list of indicia that might assist the Prosecutor in finding unwillingness. 
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mainly in the 1997 Working Group on Complementarity, where it was 
eventually decided that no further definition of these two concepts was needed 
provided that an additional criterion be present - namely, the inability on the 
part of the State to obtain an accused or key evidence and testimonlo7• This 
had to be related to the total or partial collapse of its judicial system. The strict 
application of these two criteria was somewhat smoothed by the inclusion of 
the phrase "or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings". Nevertheless, in 
Rome, the issue was re-opened and it was argued that it was possible to have a 
partial collapse of the judicial system and the country could still undertake a 
bona fide prosecution. This is a reasonable argument but no change was 
decided208• The word "partial" though was changed to "substantial" which 
raises the threshold somewhat. 
It remains to be seen in practice though what criteria will be applied to 
identify substantial or total collapse of a State209• And it is the concept of 
substantial collapse that is expected to create more problems, as it may lead to 
debates on whether the situation in a given State reaches the threshold which 
would give rise to the Court's jurisdiction, or it is of a lesser standard, which 
would then preclude the ICC from acting. It is beyond doubt though that the 
so-called "failed state" phenomenon falls in the category of the quintessentially 
"unable" state. Certainly, though this is too high a threshold and therefore 
something less than the situation faced by, for example Somalia, should be 
considered appropriate for the ICC to determine the inability of the domestic 
proceedings. This would be desirable in order to give the ICC the possibility of 
207 Holmes, ibid. supra n. 189,49. 
208 Holmes, ibid. 55. 
209 The criteria put forward by the informal expert paper on complementarity, ibid. supra 
n.173, 15 and Annex 4, seem very reasonable. 
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adjlltiicating a greater number of cases where this is needed most. Arguably, 
the final part of 17(3)210 gives the ICC greater discretion to intervene on the 
basis of inability and would cover almost anything that falls beyond inability to 
obtain the accused and the necessary evidence or testimony that would still 
affect the ability of State21l • However, the criteria to be used in such a case 
have not been identified and any attempt to determine those cases might be 
considered somewhat arbitrary. 
"Genuinel y" 
Defining unwillingness and inability was very controversial. Although 
some States were arguing against the possibility of the Court operating as an 
appellate body, they were at the same time arguing for the application of 
SUbjective criteria. The word "genuinely" was put forward as the best choice in 
order to allow the Court certain leeway to make its decision, and at the same 
time to make the determination of whether a State carries out the investigation 
or prosecution212, objective213 . A bonafide investigation would be akin to the 
effect the adverb "genuinely" seeks to achieve, but it was thought that it was 
narrower214• Be that as it may, it entails a certain value judgment on behalf of 
2\0 " th· bl . di" or 0 efWlse una e to carry out Its procee ngs. 
211 Holmes, ibid. supra n. 187,678. McCormack, and Robertson, (1999), 645 have identified 
the following scenario: A State, which would in a hypothetical case otherwise have 
competence, has not introduced penal legislation covering one or more of the crimes falling 
under the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC. McCormack and Robertson maintain that the 
State would be typically genuinely "unable" to handle such a case. This might be the case, but 
this situation might also be evidence of "unwillingness", depending on whether the absence of 
le,islation is the result of an effort to shield the accused or not. 
21 That the term "genuinely" refers to the investigation and prosecution is clear from the 
drafting history of the provision. See informal expert paper, ibid. supra n.173, 8, fn. 8 in 
~ a r t i c u l a r . .
13 Holmes, ibid. supra n. 189, 50. 
214 Holmes, ibid. supra n. 187,674. 
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the Prosecutor on the motives behind the investigations or prosecutions215 . The 
lack of a comma following "unable" indicates that the adverb refers both to 
"unwilling" as well as to "unable", which are linked with the disjunctive "or". 
Interestingly, consensus on the adverb was reached before the criteria for 
determining unwillingness or inability had been determined. 
From the above analysis it is clear that an extremely complicated system 
has been put in place before the ICC may be seised of jurisdiction. Despite the 
fact that some indication of what "unwilling" and "unable" mean is provided 
for in the second and third paragraphs of Article 17, their content is rather 
vague and is expected to create problems in their application. Moreover, no 
indication is given as to the methods to be used in order to prove unwillingness 
and inability. The Statute provides the guiding principles, the application of 
which is left to the Court's practice. This does not mean, however, that it is free 
from doubt and that the solution adopted is the optimal one. In essence, the text 
adopted represents a compromise crafted to accommodate individual concerns. 
In any case, it seems very difficult for the ICC to gain access to information 
regarding the ''willingness'' and "ability" of State authorities which will 
inevitably lead to SUbjective assessments by the new Court. This in tum entails 
the danger of creating double standards for the States concerned. The Article 
on admissibility is the cornerstone provision for complementarity on which the 
entire edifice of the ICC is based. A cautious approach by the Prosecutor and 
215 The use of the adjective "genuinely" has been criticised heavily as permitting the state to 
"stop a case. from proceeding before the court by merely opening an investigation" and 
secondly as "creating ambiguities". It was suggested that the terms "unwilling" and "unable" 
"would perhaps have been clearer if the qualification of "genuineness" had been deleted". See 
Wexler, in Bassiouni, ibid. supra n. 100,676-677; Sadat, and Carden (2000), 418. 
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whole-hearted assistancp: by States involved would help to guarantee that 
complementarity is applied properly. 
5.4 Who Is to Decide on the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Court 
Detennining the adequacy of State fora is an issue which needs closer 
examination. Where the authority lies was discussed in the negotiating process 
and the views expressed there were contradictorrl6. There was a view which 
maintained that States themselves should have the power to detennine whether 
their domestic procedures are to be found adequate and thus competent to 
proceed with the adjudication of a particular case. This would, however, 
undennine the entire principle of complementarity and would in fact jeopardise 
the very justification for its existence in the Rome Statute. 
Having regard to Articles 19(1) and 17(1), by virtue of which the ICC 
decides on its jurisdiction and on whether a case is admissible, it is clear it 
would be the Court's prerogative to decide on whether national courts are 
unwilling or unable. This is necessary in order to guarantee that the institution 
will function properlr 17• In doing so, the complementarity regime on which 
the ICC is based is ultimately shifted closer to primacy since the national 
courts will not decide themselves on the conferral of jurisdiction to the Court. 
But it is the ICC itself which will be able to decide its own jurisdiction in a 
given case, in accordance with the Statute. This fonnulation does not 
216 See for instance the proceedings of the 1996 Preparatory Committee, ibid. supra n. 159,38. 
The views there varied form a proposed optional clause regime, to the Court being able to 
determine its own jurisdiction with or without any discretion from the part of the State. 
217 See on that the position of Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Establishing an 
International Criminal Court: Major Unresolved Issues in the Draft Statute, International 
Criminal Law Briefing Series, Volume 1, No.1, 1996 found in 
http://www.lchr.org/icc/paplsec3.htm. 
80 
Primacy & Complementarity 
undermine the principle of complp.mentarity but on the contrary it will give 
meaning to its context. Had a different approach been taken, the already limited 
jurisdiction of the ICC would have been further restricted with the very concept 
of "international" adjudication at stake. 
5.5 Article 18 of the Statute: A Mini Trial? 
Article 18 of the Statute is another provision which is relevant to 
complementarity. It embodies a compromise which was included in the Rome 
Statute in order to accommodate US concerns218• Under this Article the 
Prosecutor is required to notify all States parties to the Statute, as well as those 
which are not parties but would normally exercise jurisdiction, of his 
determination of a reasonable basis for the commencement of an 
investigation219• Within a month of receipt of notification, a State may inform 
the Court that it is investigating or has investigated the individuals concerned 
over crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Court and related to the 
information provided in the Prosecutor's notification. At this stage, the 
prosecutor will have to defer to the State's investigation, unless the Pre-Trial 
Chamber decides differentll20 • Should a case be deferred to a State, its 
investigation may be reviewed by the Prosecutor within six months after the 
date of deferral, on the basis of significant change of circumstances due to the 
State's unwillingness or inability to carry out the investigation221 • The ruling of 
218 See generally Arsanjani, in von Hebel, Lammers, and Schukking, (1999), 70-71. 
219 Article 18(1); Should the case involve a situation described in the second part of Article 
18( 1), the notification may occur on a confidential basis. 
220 Article 18(2); See also Article 18(5) according to which the Prosecutor may request from 
the State to provide periodical reports for the progress of its investigations. 
221 Article 18(3). 
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the Pre-Trial chamber may be subject to apneal in the Appeals Chamber by 
either the Prosecutor or the State against which the ruling is made. The appeal 
may be heard on an expedited basis in accordance with Article 82 of the 
Statute222 • Moreover, the challenge to the ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber does 
not preclude a challenge of admissibility of a case under Article 19 and on the 
basis of additional significant facts or significant change of circumstances. 
Finally, in case of deferral to a national court, the Prosecutor may -{)n an 
exceptional basis- seek authority from the Pre-Trial Chamber to take the 
necessary investigative steps for the preservation of evidence, where there is a 
unique opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is a significant risk 
that such evidence may not be subsequently available223 • 
Article 18, procedural as it may sound, is a very significant provision. It 
constitutes, in essence, a mini trial on complementarity. Arguably, all a State 
has to do in order to gain some time is to initiate an investigation. The effect of 
Article 18 had not been wholly foreseen in the negotiations. It is a more 
powerful provision than anticipated and is likely to delay the Court's dealing 
with a case. 
5.6 Complementarity and National Reconciliation Initiatives 
In its initial inception, complementarity was thought to encourage 
national responses tailor-made to a particular culture, needs and history of a 
State, to deal with the most serious of crimes falling within the Court's 
222 Article 18(4). 
223 Article 18(6). 
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jurisdiction224. In dealing with such crimes, several approaches may be taken, 
varying from granting amnesties to the perpetrators, to establishing Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs)225, and obviously holding trials226. Space 
does not permit an examination of the function and merits of each of the above 
in detail227, so inevitably the focus of this section will be the compatibility of 
such initiatives with the ICC's complementary nature. 
The Rome Statute does not contain a provision on amnesty, neither 
does it refer to TRCs. The possibility of taking into account national 
reconciliation initiatives, which entail legitimate offers of amnesty or 
internationally structured peace processes, had also been proposed within the 
realm of the principle of complementaritY28. However, this point was not 
further developed in the negotiations. 
It may be that the ICC statute does not provide explicitly that amnesty 
laws should not be taken into account. However, other international 
instruments do so explicitlY29. 
224 Dembowski, in Stromseth (2003), 135. 
225 Hayner, (1994), 597; 
226 Orentlicher, (1991), 2537; Scharf, (1996), 41. 
227 For a "checklist" on what trials and TRCs can do, see Shriver, in Villa-Vincencio, and 
Doxtader (2003), 61; For amnesties see Scharf, (1999), 507; For a middle way, see Dugard, 
(1999), 1001. See also Sadat, in Zimmermann (2003), 161; Bassiouni, (2002). 
228 • IA" See 1996 Report of the Preparatory Comnuttee, ibid. supra n. 159, 40. See a so rsanjam, 
in von Hebel, Lammers, and Schukking (1999), 75 who attributes the lack of reference to 
amnesties partly to pressure from HR groups. 
229 In Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, this duty is explicit. Article 18 of the Declaration 
on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance stipulates that persons 
responsible for acts of enforced disappearance "shall not benefit from any special amnesty law 
or similar measure that might have the effect of exempting them from any criminal proceedings 
or sanction", GA Res. 47/133 of December 18, 1992. See also the UN Human Rights 
Committee Commentary on the Report of Argentina, April 5, 1995, UN Doc. CCPRlC179/Add 
46, where it was held by the Committee that the Argentine amnesty law was incompatible with 
the requirements of the Covenant since the law promoted an atmosphere of impunity for the 
authors of human rights violations which were consequently undermined. Moreover the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has reported on the illegality of amnesty laws in 
Uruguay and Argentina. See Reports 28/92 and 29/92 respectively. Furthermore, a special 
rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities also opposed the application of amnesties to serious violations of human rights. See 
Report of June 21,1985, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/16/Rev.1. 
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National reconciliation initiatives should not be dismissen outright230 . 
The answer may be found in Prosecutorial discretion or in the application of ne 
his in idem, depending on the stage of the proceedings231 . The absence of an 
explicit provision in the Statute dealing with national reconciliab:m initiatives 
does not preclude the Prosecutor for exercising his discretion on the issue232 . It 
would be very interesting to see how the Court would react where it was faced 
with a situation where a person charged with crimes falling under its 
jurisdiction has been granted amnesty by its own State233 • The dilemma that the 
Court would have to face is whether to consider the granting of amnesty as 
evidence of the State's unwillingness to prosecute. Consequently the ICC 
would have to decide whether it could be seised of jurisdiction or not. A 
blanket amnesty would be more difficult to accepe34, but amnesty as part of a 
wider process, such as the South African TRC235 for instance, would be most 
probably adequate and would not trigger the Court's jurisdiction. Moreover, in 
case that amnesty is pronounced post conviction, Article 20 of the Statute 
dealing with ne his in idem may come into play. Despite the absence of an 
explicit provision therein, a purposive interpretation of "proceedings" in 20(3) 
might be necessary in order to allow action by the COurt236• 
Moreover, practical problems that might arise should not be 
disregarded. For instance, if a person has testified before a TRC and was not 
230 Informal expert consultation paper, ibid. supra n. 173, 23-24, where some critical factors for 
the evaluation of such proceedings are suggested. 
231 Dugard, in Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones (2002), 701, also refers also to action by the SC under 
Article 16, but dismisses it for obvious reasons. 
232 Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) ICC Statute. See also Cameron in McGoldrick. Rowe. Donnelly. 
(2004),91. 
233 Such would be the case of General Pinochet for instance. See generally, White, (1999), 127. 
234 See in that respect, Barrios Altos case (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru), 14 March 
2001, para. 43-44, which found that self-amnesties are incompatible with the Inter-American 
Convention of Human Rights. 
235 Sarkin, (1996), 617 
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found to be telling the truth, and was later to be prosecuted by the ICC tl1ere 
could be problems concerning admissibility of evidence or generally access to 
additional evidence based on his or her original testimonl37 . This creates a 
serious danger to the rights of the accused and should not be overlooked. 
In sum, amnesties and national reconciliation initiatives are relevant to 
complementarity and a great deal of caution is required in dealing with them. 
The Court's Prosecutor will have a very difficult task in assessing the situation 
at hand and deciding whether to initiate an investigation or not in a given 
situation. 
The Impunity Gap 
Reference should be made, at this point, to the possibility of a so-called 
"impunity gap". When the ICC asserts jurisdiction with regard to a particular 
situation, it will only try a handful of cases, particularly those that are thought 
to be representative of the situation at hand. The vast majority of cases arising 
out of the situation should be dealt with domestically. But this will not happen, 
as the national courts of the State in question will, by definition, be unwilling 
or unable to exercise jurisdiction, leading to an "impunity gap". This is yet 
another reason why the jurisdictional principles of the Court need to be applied 
in an effective way, and why the effort should be to strengthen domestic 
jurisdictions to an adequate standard, so that as many cases as possible can be 
236 See examination of Article 20, infra. See also Van den Wyngaert. and Ongena, in Cassese, 
Gaeta, and Jones (2002), 727. 
237 This is the case of Adrian Niewoudt for instance, currently on trial in South Africa, for 
crimes committed during the reign of the South African regime. 
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dea It with nationally. The impunity gap is an issue which will be central to the 
Prosecutor's approach to complementaritl38. 
The "Complementarity Paradox" 
The complementarity paradox cannot go unnoticed. As mentioned already, the 
ICC, under the principle of complementarity, will be seised of jurisdiction on 
the basis that national jurisdictions are proven to be genuinely unwilling or 
unable, but on the other hand, these unwilling and unable fora will have to co-
operate with the ICC in order to achieve an effective prosecution and triae39• 
This is one of the great paradoxes on which the entire edifice of international 
criminal law is based. What is even more important is that the system provided 
for in the Statute does not seem to acknowledge this discrepancy, let alone 
address it. Similarly, the Policy Paper only acknowledges this issue but does 
not provide a satisfactory answer grounded in the Rome Statute regime. 
Instead, emphasis is placed on the need for intervention of the international 
community to assist the Prosecutor in the exercise of its powers240. 
Ne bis in idem and International Criminal Justice 
As a direct result of concurrent jurisdiction between national courts and 
international criminal courts there is a danger that the accused may be tried 
238 Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003, available 
at: htm:llwww.icc-cpi.intJom/policy.php, 7. 
239 Benvenuti, in Lattanzi, and Schabas (1999),50. 
240 Ibid. supra n. 238, 6. 
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twice. The principle of non bis in idem241 aims at eliminating this risk. At a 
national level, this principle is fundamental -in some way or another- to all 
criminal law systems242 and provides that a person cannot be tried and 
punished twice for the same crime. It can be rationalised under the Latin 
. d b t b" d 243 M . maXIm nemo eelS vexarl pro una et ea em causa . oreover, expreSSIOn 
of the principle can be found in the German concept of Erledigungsprinzip 
meaning that a criminal claim can be used only once -with the exception of 
particular circumstances that may request different treatment- and is then 
extinguished244• Finally, the non bis in idem principle personifies the respect 
for the value of a decision reached in the past; the final judgment of an 
adjudicating body should be accepted by other courts. 
The said principle was originally conceived to prohibit de novo 
adjudication of cases which have been dealt with in the same national 
jurisdiction. However, the complexity of international crime along with the 
current organisation of the international community, dictate that ne bis in idem 
protection is provided at the international level as well. Because the domestic 
legislation of most countries does not always guarantee that the res judicata 
effect of foreign criminal judgments will be respected, efforts have been 
undertaken to create such an international system. Several attempts though in 
the past have not been particularly successfut245 , with the exception of the 
241 The principle is referred to as non his in idem in the Tribunals and as ne his in idem in the 
ICC, without any difference in its actual meaning. 
242 Slight differences may well apply. The principle is referred to as double jeopardy, autrefois 
acquit autrefois convict, or res judicata. See also Bassiouni, (1993), 288-289. 
243 No one should have to face more than one prosecution for the same offence. 
244 See Oehler, (1983). 573. 
245 See Articles 53-55 of the 1970 European Convention on the International Validity of 
Criminal Judgments; see also Articles 35-37 of the 1972 European COllvention on the Transfer 
of Proceedings in Criminal Matters. In 1987 the EC member States acting within the 
framework of European political co-operation concluded a convention specifically addressing 
the non his in idem principle. 
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Schengen treatl46 which seems to create a new regime. However, the 
application of the ne his in idem principle in the Schengen Convention differs 
substantially from the concept enshrined in the Tribunals or the ICC. The main 
difference lies with the fact that the former presupposes the existence of two or 
more States and the seizing of the same case in both States, whereas the latter 
attempts to regulate the relationship between a State and an international 
institution. At the international level, adequate justification for the application 
of the non his in idem principle may be equally found, since the protection of 
the individual is sought not only at the domestic but also at the international 
levee47• The principle can be found also in the ICCPR248, the ACHR249 and in 
Article 4(1) of Protocol No.7 to the ECHR25o• The protection offered to the 
individual therein is also limited to cases where the same jurisdiction is 
involved251 • With the establishment of the two ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC, 
the principle of ne his in idem is introduced in the international sphere in order 
to fulfil the need to protect the individual from being tried by both the national 
246 Convention of 19 June 1990, applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between 
the Governments of the States of Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the French Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 30 
ILM (1991), 84. Article 54 of the Schengen Convention stipulates: "A person who has been 
finally judged by a Contracting Party may not be prosecuted by another Contracting Party for 
the same offences provided that, where he is sentenced, the sentence has been served or is 
currently being served or can no longer be carried out under the sentencing laws of the 
Contracting Party". 
247 S 
ee Van Den Wyngaert, and Stessens, (1999), 781. 
248 Article 14(7). See also Article 86 of Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS, 135 which states that: "No prisoner of war 
may be punished more than once for the same act or on the same charge". 
249 Article 8(4) 
250 ETS 117, Strasbourg 22.x1.l984 
251 Whereas Article 4 of the 7th Protocol explicitly stipulates that it entails trials within the same 
State, Article 14(7) of the ICCPR has been interpreted accordingly by the Human Rights 
Committee. See in that respect the decision of 16 July 1986 in the case of A. P. v. Italy where it 
was held that the "provision prohibits double jeopardy only with regard to an offence 
adjudicated in a given state" (Communication No. 204/1986, CCPRlC/311D1204/1986, para. 
7.3). The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadic. Decision on Defence Motion on the Principle of non-
bis-in-idem, 14 November 1995, (IT-94-lIAR72). para. 8 upheld same view. See in general 
also the opinion of Advocate General Mayras before the ECJ in Boehringer v. Commission 
(1972) ECR 1297-1298. 
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and the international levels. There has therefore been a shift in the application 
of the principle. 
Be that as it may, it matters little whether or not the second prosecution 
or judgment takes place in the same jurisdiction as the first. Hence the 
application of the principle at the international level is a positive development 
since it guarantees greater protection for the individual. 
Both the Tribunals' Statutes have a provision which enshrines the 
above-mentioned principle252• Accordingly, the non bis in idem principle is 
binding upon them to the form and extent found in their Statutes. Moreover, 
the RPE provide for its application in practice253 • 
According to both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, should a person be 
tried by the Tribunals, subsequent action by national courts is precluded. 
However, a prior decision in national courts cannot preclude subsequent action 
by the Tribunals in exceptional cases. Those are the situations laid down in the 
second paragraph of Article 10 and 9 of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes 
respectively and involve the cases of "ordinary crimes" under national law, 
which can also constitute crimes in the Statutes. Moreover, in an attempt to 
tackle "sham proceedings" the Tribunals may try again persons who have not 
been diligently prosecuted, or where the trials are intended to shield the person 
from prosecution and/or punishment254• It is in the interests of justice that a 
252 Article 10 and 9 for the ICTY and ICTR respectively. This Article was drafted in the light 
of a Letter Dated 12 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General. at 7. UN Doc. S/25575 
(1993). 
253 Rule 13 RPE. 
254 At this point reference should also be made to Rule 9 ICTY RPE. The scope underlying the 
aforesaid Rule and Article 10 is the same. Note also the correspondence of the wording in the 
two provisions. 
89 
Primacy & Complementarity 
second trial of the same person for the same conduct255 must be allowed. 
However, in terms of the penalty to be imposed, the Tribunal has to take into 
account the sentence imposed by the national court. 
In the practice of the international \;riminal Tribunals, Tadic invoked 
the principle of non bis in idem in an attempt to challenge the ICTY's ability to 
prosecute him. The Trial Chamber after elaborating on the principle as this 
appears in the ICTY Statute256, rejected the defendant's contention, essentially 
because he had not been tried in Germany prior to his transfer to The Hague257 • 
It went further to hold that once the ICTY completed its proceedings, he could 
not be tried in Germany for the same alleged crimes since this is made clear by 
Article 10(1) of the Statute258 . 
Finally, Rule 12 stipulates that determinations of national courts are not 
binding on the Tribunal. However, the non his in idem principle applies unless 
the conditions of Article 10(2) are met. 
Turning to the ICC, Article 20 of the ICC Statute provides that the Court 
shall not try a person who has been convicted or acquitted by the Court 
itsel:r59. It is unlikely that the ICC would try a person again if it has already 
tried himlher for that crime. An explicit reference to this, however, helps 
clarify things260• Similarly, no other Court may try a person under the Statute 
for conduct for which he/she has already been convicted or acquitted261 , It is 
not clear whether reference to "other courts" is limited to the obvious case of 
255 Note the importance of defining the idem and the difference between conduct and crime. 
See Van den Wyngaert, and Ongena, in Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones (2002), 714-5. 
256 See Tadii: Case. ibid. supra n. 251, para 9. 
257 Ibid., para 10. 
258 Ibid., para 13. 
259 Article 20(1) ICC Statute. 
260 Note that there is no equivalent provision in the ad hoc Tribunals. 
261 Article 20(2) ICC Statute. 
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national courts of States parties, or whether it would lliso include the ad hoc 
Tribunals for instance or hybrid courts. 
The exception to the rule that no person can be t r i ~ d d twice can be found in 
Article 20(3). A comparison of this provision and Article 10[9](2) of the 
Tribunals reveals a significant difference. Although both provisions include 
problems of independence and impartiality as reasons for intervention, Article 
20(3) does not contain an exception based on "ordinary crimes". This is 
unfortunate, but not insurmountable. A link with the complementarity criteria 
would assist in this instance. If the characterisation of the crime as ordinary at 
the national level was made to shield the accused from criminal responsibility, 
then, Article 20(3)(a) would apply. Another difference, is that there is no 
provision in Article 20 for taking into account the penalty already served, in the 
case of conviction based on the exercise of the exception to the ne his in 
idem262 . However, despite this a reduction may not be precluded, based on 
Article 78(2) ICC Statute which provides for a deduction from the overall 
sentence of time previously spent in detention in relation to the same conduct. 
In sum, the protection of a person from being tried de novo, as laid down 
in the ICC Statute, is adequate. Perhaps an explicit reference to issues such as 
parole, pardon, amnesty and the Court's relationship to national reconciliation 
initiatives examined in a previous section, would have been welcome. This 
would have clarified the relationship between national proceedings and the 
international criminal justice institutions further. However, as with the 
Tribunals, it is important to stress that the incorporation of the principle of ne 
his in idem in the Tribunals' and Court's Statutes is necessary in order to 
protect the individual from the risk of being tried twice, albeit at different 
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levels. This is a great achievement of international criminal law, and 
constitutes evidence of the close relationship between the national and 
international legal orders. 
Conclusion 
The interaction between the courts of a State and institutions of 
international criminal justice is premised on a number of relationships, the 
most important of which involves the principles conferring jurisdiction to a 
competent forum. This is in the interest of both the Tribunals and the Court. 
The ICC, however, goes in a different direction from the ICTY and the ICTR. 
Instead of primacy, its relationship with domestic courts is based on 
complementarity. Primacy was chosen to deal with the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia, essentially an "unwilling" State, and Rwanda, an "unable" State. 
This is akin to complementarity, whose operation is based on these very 
concepts. The difference lies in the degree of State involvement in the process. 
Primacy, initially quite rigid and absolute, excluded States from action 
completely. Over the years however, primacy has transformed, and has 
softened to involve States more. The culmination of this is the very recent 
application of the use of Rule 11 bis, which brings international criminal justice 
back to the courts of the State concerned. Throughout the operation of primacy, 
one disadvantage stands out: primacy does not guarantee that the most suitable 
forum will actually try a particular case. 
After the creation of the ICC and the SLSC, primacy in its pure form 
has been abandoned and replaced with complementarity for the former, and 
262 This can be found in Article 10[9](3) of the Tribunals. 
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with a more restricted, targeted primacy for the latter. Complementarity too, 
intends to regulate the relationship between domestic courts and an 
international institution. However, the main difference with primacy is the ab 
initio involvement of national jurisdictions. The ICC will only intervene if 
national fora are unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out investigations or 
prosecutions. In other words, complementarity ensures that the case remains 
with the most appropriate forum, which, by contrast to primacy, is not 
presumed to be the international one. This does not mean, however, that 
complementarity is a panacea for international criminal justice. The exact 
parameters of the criteria for its application have still to crystallise. It will take 
a certain number of cases before the precise meaning of these criteria is clearly 
identified. Certainly, inability will be easier to establish than unwillingness. It 
is fortunate, in a way, that the self-referrals of Uganda and the DRC have taken 
place recently, which will allow the ICC Prosecutor to apply complementarity 
for the first time to situations where inability is more likely to be an issue. 
Moreover, the impunity gap and most importantly, the complementarity 
paradox, examined above, will hamper complementarity's application. 
To conclude, complementarity's best achievement is pre-emptive. 
States wishing to avoid the Court's involvement should strengthen their 
domestic processes. This is certainly the greatest merit complementarity has to 
offer, which was not the case with primacy. Primacy's odyssey is not yet over, 
and with complementarity, which is bound to go through an odyssey of its 
own, there is still a long way to go before reaching the much desired Ithaca of 
an effective international criminal justice regime. 
93 
Co-operation 
Chapter Three 
Unravelling Ariadne's Thread: Is There an Effective Co-
operation Regime at the End of the Labyrinth? 
Regardless of the principles of interaction between national and 
international jurisdictions, international criminal justice institutions with no 
suspects in custody and no evidence at their disposal could hardly claim to be 
effective. Primacy and complementarity are put to the test through co-
operation. For the international criminal justice system to function properly, 
co-operation is of great significance. This chapter focuses on the co-operation 
regimes of both the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC. 
1. The Lack of an Enforcement System in International Law 
Historically, crimes were committed within the territory of a single 
State and there was nonnally no need to request assistance from abroad. 
Enforcement of criminal law was traditionally accomplished without assistance 
from other States. The industrial revolution, advances in technology and 
transportation, meant that there has been a constant increase in requests for 
international assistance. Perpetrators frequently act in the territory of more than 
one States and/or find refuge in the territory of a State other than that of their 
nationality or where the criminal conduct occurred I. 
But this is again different from the co-operation required in respect of 
the international criminal justice institutions. When a crime occurs at the 
national level, regardless of the number of different jurisdictions involved, a 
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police force of some competence, would normally arrive at the scene to collect 
evidence, interview witnesses and secure the crime scene, whilst searching for 
the suspect. None of this is true for crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the 
international Tribunals and the ICC. Most of these crimes occur during armed 
conflicts or situations of grave tension. Due to their nature, magnitude and 
political repercussions, it might take years before such crimes are investigated 
and the alleged culprits are brought to justice2 • 
In addition, unlike national jurisdictions, within the UN system, with 
the exception of the Security Council in the realm of its mandate for the 
maintenance of the international peace and security, there is no centralised 
agency responsible for the enforcement of UN decisions3• The lack of an 
enforcement system in international law is a crucial issue for the effectiveness 
of international criminal law. 
In the eloquent words of the ICTY's first president, "the ICTY is very 
much like a giant without arms and legs - it needs artificial limbs to walk and 
work. And these artificial limbs are state authorities. If the co-operation of 
states is not forthcoming, they cannot fulfil their functions',4. It is not too much 
of a cliche to subscribe to this statement. Antonio Cassese said these words in 
relation to the Tribunals, but this statement is true also for the ICC. State co-
operation is crucial to the effectiveness of international criminal law and 
cannot be underestimated. 
Co-operation was not really a problem for the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
IMTs. The alleged criminals were largely in the territory then in the control of 
I Guffey-Landers, (1996),201-202. 
2 Harmon, and Gaynor, (2004), 405-408. 
3 For the enforcement powers of the SC, see inter alia Delbr6ck, and Heinz, (1995). 
4 Cassese, (1998), "Current Trends", 13. 
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the Allied powers (due to the military occupation) and the accused were in 
custody, and therefore present to stand trial5• This is not the case with the 
modem Tribunals and the ICC. From Nuremberg to Rwanda, there has been no 
international enforcement of international criminal law and this task has been 
left to the national sphere6. But unlike national courts, there is no law 
enforcement agency akin to a police force, and co-operation among States is 
the only way for these Tribunals and Court to achieve their goals 7• 
2. International Criminal Co-operation and Judicial Assistance: Horizontal v. 
Vertical Co-operation 
Co-operation with the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC entails a variety of 
specific measures. States are expected to provide assistance in a number of 
areas, including but not limited to, identification and location of persons, taking 
of testimony, production of evidence, service of documents, arrest/detention of 
persons, surrender/transfer of the accused to the Tribunals and the ICC. 
Moreover, States should facilitate the appearance of witnesses/experts, help in 
the examination of sites and execution of searches/seizures, as well as the 
protection of victims and witnesses and finally in the preservation of evidence. 
Although "international" co-operation may take place whenever there is 
a foreign element involved, co-operation with the Tribunals and the Courts 
differs greatly from co-operation between States. In the seminal Blaskii: case 
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY characterised as "horizontal" the co-
s First ICTY Annual Report, 29 August 1994, Al49/342-S/1994/1007. para. 84. See also inter 
alia Arbour, (1999).43; Cassese, ibid.; Harris and Kushen, (1997), 562; Jorda, (1999), 174. 
6 Crawford, (1997), 256. 
7 See for instance Cassese ibid. supra n. 4, 10, 12; Idem. (1999), 164; Kamavas, (1996), 23. 
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operation between States in criminal matters, as opposed to the "vertical" co-
operation between States and the ICTy8. This distinction, otherwise known as 
inter-state or supra-national co-operation9, has dominated discussions on the 
issue. Assistance to the International Tribunals and the ICC should be provided 
invariably, and as part of their obligations, by Members States of the UN and 
by States parties to the ICC, respectivelylO. The relationship of States with the 
ad hoc Tribunals is purely vertical, whereas their relationship with the ICC has 
traces of both vertical and horizontal elements. In the case of the ICC, despite 
its treaty basis, the co-operation regime is still not entirely horizontal, in the 
sense that this concept is used to describe relations among States, but rather an 
amalgam of principles found in a vertical relationship, infused with procedures 
borrowed from a horizontal system. Swart and Sluiter have correctly identified 
and categorised the various Articles of Part 9 depending on whether they fit the 
inter-state or the supranational models of co-operation 11. This distinction will 
become apparent in the course of the present discussion of the co-operation 
regime. 
Whether a vertical or horizontal system of co-operation exists is 
particularly relevant when it comes to transferring persons sought to 
international institutions12• Although surrender of persons to the Tribunals and 
the Court will be examined later in this chapter, it is important, in this section, 
to draw a distinction between transfer of an accused to international criminal 
courts and extradition to other States. It is clear that transfer is not extradition. 
8 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for 
Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, 29 October 1997, (IT-95-14-
ARI08bis), paras. 47, 54. 
9 Cassese, (1999), 164-165. 
\0 On the obligation to co-operate, see infra next section. 
II Swart, and Sluiter, in von Hebel, Lammers, and Schukking, (1999), 99-100. 
12 The tenns "transfer" and "surrender" in this section, are used interchangeably. 
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To equate this concept with extradition woulrl have been inappropriate13, ifnot 
unfortunate. For the Tribunals, this is clarified in Rule 58 of their respective 
RPE. For the ICC, Article 102 of the Statute provides a clear distinction by 
defining surrender and extradition in light ofL'1e purposes they serve. It was not 
the intention of the drafters of either Tribunal or the ICC, to craft the process of 
transfer of an accused to these institutions in tenns of standard extradition 
processes known to States through various bilateral treaties. However, when 
international criminal justice institutions think that this would benefit 
effectiveness, recourse is made to extradition processes, albeit with certain 
qualifications14• 
Extradition concerns relations between sovereign States and is a 
reflection of the principle of equality of States1S• This gives rise to a horizontal 
relationship between a State that has the accused in its custody and one that 
seeks his/her extradition. Surrender on the other hand, involves a relationship 
between a State and an international judicial body endowed with binding 
authority, and is therefore an expression of a vertical relationship. 
Extradition is based on reciprocity, whereas surrender involves State 
assistance to an international court, without such a fonnal requirement. 
Moreover, extradition is subject to the discretionary consent of the State from 
which extradition is sought. This is envisaged in bilateral extradition treaties. 
States opt for extradition treaties with other States in order to facilitate 
international co-operation in criminal matters. Even after the conclusion of 
13C "b'd assese, I I . supra n. 4. 
14 See Article 91(2)(c) ICC Statute. 
IS Lauterpacht, (1958), 297-400. 
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such treaties, they are not under an obligation to extradite the person soughtl6. 
They could instead prosecute themselves if they so wished 17. This is not the 
case with the international criminal justice institutions, which once they have 
established jurisdiction based on primacy and complementarity respectivelyl8, 
are the sole forum empowered to try the accused. 
In addition, traditional exceptions applying to extradition are of no 
relevance in the process of transfer to either of the Tribunals or the Court. 
Denying a request by invoking one of the many exceptions that are part of 
traditional bilateral extradition law and practice would not be consistent with a 
State's obligationsl9. Moreover, the exception in the extradition process 
relating to political or military character of the crimes, which constitutes 
another basis for refusing extradition, is not applicable when co-operating with 
the Tribunals or the Court. Arguably, all of the offences within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunals and the ICC could be considered as either having a political or 
a military character, were these terms to be interpreted expansively. Yet it was 
precisely such offences that the Tribunals were created to prosecute, and the 
obligation to surrender extends to them2o• Similarly, the timing and the double 
criminality requirements are also non-applicable21 , whereas ne his in idem has 
16 In fact, a State is free to extradite as a matter of comity. See United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.S. (1992) 655 at 666 where it was held that: "nations are authorised, 
notwithstanding the terms of an extradition treaty, to voluntarily render an individual to the 
other country on terms completely outside of those provided in the Treaty". 
17 This is the so-called aut dedere aut judicare principle. The said principle was invoked for 
instance by Libya in the Lockerbie Case before the ICl For a detailed analysis of the principle 
see Bassiouni, and Wise, (1995). 
18 S ee supra chapter 2. 
19 Harris and Kushen, ibid. supra n. 5, 570. See also infra obligation to co-operate. 
20 Ibid., 572. 
21 Ibid., 573. 
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a distinct meaning in international criminal law and its applicatiop is governed 
by the relevant Statute Articles22 . 
To summarise, none of the traditional grounds for refusfd to provide 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters apply3. The limited right to refuse 
execution of a co-operation request in the ICC does not extend to traditional 
extradition grounds of refusal, nor does it apply with regard to surrendering the 
requested persons to the Court. It is instead limited in scope and comes into 
play in strictly defined situations. The existence of grounds of refusal 
constitutes evidence of some horizontal elements which found their way into 
the Statute in the course of the negotiations24. 
Perhaps the most striking remnant of extradition is Article 101 of the 
ICC Statute which provides for the Rule of Speciality, which is common in 
extradition treaties. According to this rule, the person concerned cannot be 
tried for crimes other than the ones for which extradition has been granted25. 
Article 101 (1) stipulates that a person surrendered to the ICC shall only be 
subject to prosecution, punishment or detention for that conduct for which 
he/she has been surrendered. However, the inclusion of such a provision in the 
ICC Statute is somewhat unfortunate and should not be necessary since States 
have already accepted the Court's jurisdiction. An attempt to rectify this 
unfortunate provision is made in 101(2), whereby a waiver may be requested 
by State allowing the ICC to forego Article 101(1). Its effect though is limited 
by the fact that there is no obligation on States parties to provide this waiver26. 
22 See supra chapter 2. 
23 Kim, (1997), 165. 
24 See infra. 
25 S . C wart,1O assese, Gaeta, and Jones (2002), 1698. 
26 See infra chapter 5 on the incorporation of this provision. 
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If this provision represents perhaps the most clear evidence that the ICC 
operates in a horizontal relationship, its most prominent example of verticality 
is Article 99(4) of the Statute which allows direct taking of evidence by the 
Prosecutor in the territory of a State party to the Statute27 • 
The ICC therefore is a mixture of vertical and horizontal elements, in 
an attempt to create a functioning co-operation regime. 
It is beyond doubt that all the issues mentioned above are worthy of a 
detailed analysis. However, although the relevant Statute provisions will be 
mentioned in this chapter, a complete Article by Article analysis is not in the 
scope of this work and emphasis will be placed on specific areas only. 
3. An Obligation to Co-operate? 
The starting point in examining any co-operation regime is whether 
there is or indeed should be an obligation to co-operate. The importance of co-
operation for the emerging international criminal justice system may not be 
disregarded. However, the nature and extent of co-operation depends on the 
relevant players. The sections that follow address the various situations 
relevant to the obligation to co-operate with the Tribunals and the ICC. 
3.1 Co-operation of States 
Both the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC rely heavily on State co-operation 
for the performance of their functions. And this fundanlental obligation may be 
27 Note however the limits of this provision, which only allows execution of a request only 
when it is "necessary for the successful execution" of the request and the request "can be 
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found in their respective Statutes. Moreover, it is of interest to explore the 
potential co-operation of States that are not parties to the UN or to the ICC 
treaty. These issues will be examined in tum. 
Quite apart from the SG's report on the establishment of the ICTy28, some 
relevant SC Resolutions29,3o, GA Resolutions31 , as well as a reference in the 
Dayton Peace Agreemene2, the main reference to the obligation to co-operate 
with the Tribunals can be found in their Statutes. Article 29 of the ICTY 
Statute and Article 28 of its Rwandan counterpart, are the relevant provisions, 
supplemented also by the RPE33. Article 29[28](1) contains the general 
obligation to co-operate, whereas in the second paragraph of the above Article, 
a non-exhaustive list of potential assistance requests can be found. This Article 
is the sole provision referring to co-operation in the Tribunals' Statutes. The 
executed without any compulsory measures". Article 99(4) ICC Statute. 
28 See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 of3 May 1993, para. 125. 
29 SC Res. 827, UN Doc. SlRES/827 (1993), para. 4. Similarly, SC Res. 955 S/RES/955 
(I994), para. 2. Moreover, in the same paragraph, the SC added a provision which did not 
appear in the corresponding Yugoslav Tribunal Resolution, according to which States were 
requested to keep the Secretary General informed of measures taken under their domestic law 
to implement the provisions of the resolution and Statutes, including the obligations under 
Article 28. This is indicative of a closer monitoring procedure introduced for the ICTR in order 
to ensure perhaps better compliance by States. There is no real evidence to suggest that this 
addition has made any difference in practice. 
30 Moreover, in February 1995, the SG reiterated the obligation by urging all States to arrest 
and detain persons found within their territory against whom there is sufficient evidence that 
they were responsible for acts within the jurisdiction of the ICTR and to inform the SG and the 
Prosecutor of the details of such cases and to co-operate with the investigators for the Tribunal. 
See paragraphs 1-3 of SC Res. 978 of 27 February 1995 UN SCOR, 3504 th mtg. SIRES/978 
(1995). 
31 See with regard to the ICTR, GA Res. 206 of 23 December 1994, (UN GAOR, 49th Sess. 
Supp. No. 49, vol. I, at 227, UN Doc. Al49/49 (1995) and GA Res. 200 of 22 December 1995, 
(UN GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, vol. I at 266, UN Doc. Al50/49 (1996). See also GA Res 
114 of 12 December 1996, (UN GAOR, 51 st Sess., Supp. No. 49, vol I, at 263, UN Doc. 
Al51149 (1997). 
32 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reprinted in 35 ILM 
(1996), 75. The agreement was signed in Paris on 14th December 1995. Article X of Annex I-A 
of the said agreement provides that: "The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved 
in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the General Framework Agreement, 
or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, including the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia". See also id. Article IX, which refers to the 
general "obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war 
crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law". Another example although of 
lesser importance is Article IV of Annex 9. See generally Jones, (1996), 226-244. 
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obligation to co-operate is expressed in broad, unconditional and absolute 
terms34• This is explained by the fact that both Statutes were adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, therefore, the obligation to co-operate is a 
binding obligation35 . Failure to do so may entail severe consequences for the 
recalcitrant State36. 
The language of Article 29[28] suggests that it has been carefully chosen to 
demonstrate its mandatory nature. The use of the command verb "shall" in both 
paragraphs denotes an imperative act which leaves no room for subsequent 
interpretation by States. Non-compliance is not an option for the States 
concerned which are not allowed any discretion whatsoever by the Statute37 • 
Furthermore, a time element is inserted in the second paragraph of Article 
29[28]; assistance must come "without undue delay,,38. As no indication of 
what constitutes undue delay is given in the Article, action within a reasonable 
time is required. Each case will be examined in concreto. 
The equivalent provision for the ICC is Article 86 of the Rome Statute, 
which is the general provision on the obligation to co-operate. This provision is 
supplemented by a reminder of this obligation in Articles 89(1) and 93(1), 
which deal with arrest and surrender and other forms of co-operation 
respectively. 
33 Rule 56. 
34 See 1996 ICTY Yearbook, 225: "The establishment of the Tribunal as an enforcement 
measure of the Security Council, pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
imposes upon States various unprecedented binding international obligations. At the core of 
these obligations lies the duty of States to co-operate unconditionally and to comply with 
requests for assistance and orders of the Tribunal". 
35 By virtue of Article 25 of the UN Charter. 
36 Although no indication is given in the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals with regard to the 
measures to be taken in case of failure on behalf of a State to co-operate it should be noted that 
the creation of the Tribunals by SC Resolutions is crucial to that end since it enables the SC to 
take action. See infra section 8.1. 
37 The term 'request' in Article 29(2) might be taken to denote, according to one view, some 
discretion, which is misleading. See Henquet, (1999), 979. fn. 51 in particular. 
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A comparison of the wording of Article 86 with the equivalent provision in 
the ICTY IICTR Statutes is revealing. The former is not as imperative. Despite 
the use of the command verb "shall" in this provision as well, the time 
requirement, found in Article 29[28], is avoided. Instead, the adverb "fully,,39 
is preferred, which assists in highlighting further the obligation to co-operate. 
This seemingly absolute obligation is qualified, however, by the phrase "in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute" which precedes the general 
obligation to co-operate. As with every treaty, State parties are required to 
observe its terms and to act within its limitations. In that sense, co-operation 
should be provided to the Court in accordance with the Statute and in the 
manner prescribed therein. 
Article 86 differs from the relevant provision of the ad hoc Tribunals in 
another respect as well. Whereas Article 29[28] is an all-encompassing 
provision, and in fact, as mentioned already, the sole provision on co-
operation, Article 86 is simply the first of a total of seventeen provisions 
contained in Part 9 of the Statute. The general obligation to co-operate is 
further explained and elaborated upon in a number of provisions that follow, 
which cover different aspects of co-operation. 
State co-operation in the International Tribunals is judge-made. Their 
Statutes state the general obligation but the exact form the request will take is a 
matter left to the Tribunal to decide. For the ICC, however, a State-orientetf° 
approach has been adopted. Its treaty origins demand strict definition of the 
38 Note the slightly different wording in Rule 56 where States are required to act "promptly" to 
execute a co-operation request. 
39 There is the view which holds that the word "fully" refers to the principle of good faith. See 
KreB, in Trimerer, (1999), 1053. He further maintains that States parties "must act promptly 
and with all due diligence to ensure proper and effective execution of the Court's requests to 
comply with their obligations under Part 9". 
40 Cassese, (2003), 358. 
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relevant obligations and more guidance on what States may and may not do in 
the course of co-operation with the Court. Still, the exact manner in which co-
operation is to be effected between local authorities and the Tribunal remains, 
as with the Tribunals, unclear41 . 
Another relevant issue is whom the obligation to co-operate refers to. For 
the Tribunals, it is an obligation erga omnes42 and is not limited in its 
application to the former belligerents, i.e. States or entities of the former 
Yugoslavia43, and the States where the genocide had spread to, as well as 
Rwanda. It may be that co-operation is more significant for the States and 
entities of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda since these were the locus delicti 
of the crimes44, but it is equally strong for the rest of the States. For the ICC, 
however, co-operation is limited and opposable only to State parties to the 
Statute45 and to those States that have expressly accepted the Court's 
jurisdiction with regard to a particular case, or have signed a declaration to co-
operate46• 
41 See Dolenc, (1994), 464. There is a variety of specific measures which could be taken by 
States. See Grossman, McDonald, Specter and Weinstein, (1998), 1426. As will be seen in the 
final chapter, States in complying with a request to co-operate take different approaches in 
implementing the various Statute Articles. 
42 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, ibid. supra n. 8, para. 26. 
43 Indeed this was the argument made by one of the amici curiae, Professor Wedgwood in the 
Blaskic case. See amicus curiae brief submitted by R. Wedgwood, frosecutor v. Tihomir 
Blaskic, 15 September 1997, (IT-95-14-AR108bis), 3 et seq .. The Appeals Chamber of ICTY 
though dismissed the argument by making it clear in para. 29 of its judgment, ibid. supra n. 8, 
that the legal obligation stemming from Article 29 applies to all UN Member states, regardless 
of whether or not they are states of the ex- Yugoslavia. 
44 See the Appeals Decision in the Blaskic Case and particularly, paragraph 53 of the Judgment 
of 29 October 1997 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of 
Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, (IT-95-14-ARI08bis). 
See also, Sixth ICTY Annual Report, 25 August 1999, N54/187-S/1999/846, para. 90. 
45 Articles 34-8 YCLT, 8ILM(1969), 679. 
105 
Co-operation 
3.2 Co-operation of Non Member / Non Party States and Other Entities 
As mentioned already, the obligation to co-operate with the Tribunals is 
incumbent upon all UN members vis-a-vis their responsibilities arising from 
the UN Charter. That aside, it is important to examine the obligation to co-
operate for States which are not members of the UN. The issue is not very 
important in practice since the number of non-member States today is very 
small. However, the issue is of legal significance. There are several pertinent 
views on Article 2(6) UN Charter which is the relevant provision. The UN 
Charter, is, according to one view, nothing more than an international treaty 
and pursuant to the rule pacta tertiis nee noeent nee prosunt, Article 2(6) of the 
Charter cannot impose obligations to third parties without their consent. 
According to another view however, an international treaty such as the UN 
Charter indirectly obliges non-member States to obey the principles of Article 
247. It follows that sanctions on the basis of a SC decision can be applied to 
members and non-members alike. Another opinion holds that Article 2(6) has 
nothing but political charge and should not create legal obligations for States 
which are not members to the Organisation48• Yet a different view maintains 
that ula Charte va dans Ie sens autoritaire d'un gouvernement internationaf'49. 
The idea of the Charter being a constitution for the international community 
and as such binding the non-member States is not unknown to international 
46 See infra, Articles 12(3), 87(5). 
47 Kelsen, (1951),109. 
48 De Visscher, (1970), 287. Following this view, Combacau (1974),625, talks about "exces de 
pouvoir" on behalf of the Organisation should the States non-parties are considered as mere 
executives and not as "partners". 
49 Scelle, (1950-1951), 625. 
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law5o• Even though the majority of legal scholarship denies the possibility of a 
binding effect of Article 2(6) due to it being part of a treaty, it is accepted that 
insofar as the principles enshrined in it form part of cllstomary law, they are 
binding on non-members51 • 
In examining the relevance of this issue with regard to the ad hoc 
Tribunals, reference should be made Switzerland before it became a member of 
the UN in 2002. Was Switzerland bound to co-operate with the Tribunals? It is 
important to note that Switzerland had nonetheless enacted implementing 
legislation to facilitate its co-operation with the Tribunals52 indicating its 
commitment to international criminal law . It would have been interesting to see 
the reaction of the international community had Switzerland refused to co-
operate53• The ICTY in the Blaskic case has held that the enactment of 
legislation in the said case constitutes an express written acceptance of the 
obligations under the UN Charter with regard to the two ad hoc Tribunals54, in 
accordance with Article 35 VCLT. It seems therefore that the Tribunal accepts 
that the Charter is an international treaty which imposes no obligations on non-
member States. Be that as it may, the enactment of implementing legislation by 
Switzerland was very significant in practical terms, for the investigators did not 
need visas to enter the country which would otherwise be the case, except for 
States participating in the Schengen treaty. 
50 Fassbender, "UN Security Council Reform "(1998). See also idem., "United Nations Charter 
as Constitution", (1998),529-619; McDonald, in Schmitt (2000),263. 
51 Cahier, in Cassese, (1975). 
52 See Federal Order on Cooperation with the International Tribunals for the Prosecution of 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law of 21 December 1995. See generally 
Ziegler (1997),382-408. 
53 Although not a member to the UN then, Switzerland decided autonomously to participate in 
the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq by virtue of SC Res. 661(1990). This followed a 
similar approach in the case of Southern Rhodesia, SC Res. 409 (1977). 
54 See Appeals Chamber Subpoena Decision, ibid. supra n. 8, para. 26. 
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Another aspect which should be considered is whether there is an 
obligation to co-operate for entities that are not States. Neither the ICTY nor 
the ICTR Statutes mention co-operation with non-State entities. The same 
holds true for the relevant SC Resolutions which created the Tribunals. 
Notably, however, the RPE define the term "State" in a different way so as to 
comprise States which are not Members of the United Nations as well as de 
facto entities55• This is particularly relevant to the Republika Srpska since its 
status is ambiguous. It has to be noted though that pursuant to the Dayton 
Agreement and its Annexes, the de facto States such as the Republica Srpska 
and the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina are obliged to co-operate56• This has 
been upheld by the ICTy57• In reality, co-operation of the Republica Srpska 
has been generally poor58, with the exception of some limited assistance 
regarding the exhumation of graves and investigations against non-Serbs. 
Although much better than 1996, there are still some problems in relation to 
co-operation which are also linked to the refusal to arrest Republica Srpska's 
own nationals, many of whom surrender voluntarilY9. 
Turning now to the ICC, and emphasising that Article 86 is only binding on 
those States that have signed and ratified or acceded to the Rome Treaty, it 
remains to examine the possibility envisaged for non-parties to co-operate with 
the Court. Two possibilities are enshrined in the Statute. First, by means of a 
SS Cf. RPE and especially, Rule 2 which provides the definitions of the concepts found in the 
RPE. Accordingly, a State means: "A State Member of non-Member of the United Nations or a 
self-proclaimed entity de facto exercising governmental functions, whether recognised as a 
State or not". However, no such distinction is made in the Statute. 
S6 Article X, Annex I-A, ibid. supra n. 32. 
57 Prosecutor v. Karadiic & Mladic, Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, (IT-95-5-R61), paras. 98-101. With regard to 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Prosecutor v. Rajic, Review of the Indictment 
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 3 September 1996, (IT -95-12-
R61), paras. 62-70. 
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declaration accepting the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12(3) or 
second, by virtue of a special agreement to provide assistance to the Court 
under Article 87(5) of the Statute. In the unlikely event that a State non-ICC 
party accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to a particular crime60, it 
also agrees to co-operate in accordance with Part 9 of the Statute. This State 
would have the same rights and obligations with the rest of the States parties in 
that respect. In the case of Article 87(5), however, a State may voluntarill1 
enter into an ad hoc agreement with the Court in order to provide assistance. 
Given the optional basis of this agreement, it will essentially be up to this State 
to formulate the content of such an agreement. The State concerned possesses a 
degree of flexibility to decide the type, field and length of co-operation to be 
provided to the Court. This might be a problematic for the Court which is 
bound by its Statute and it will not be inclined to go beyond it to accommodate 
a third party's wishes. As Sluiter rightly observes, the ICC in such a case 
would face a difficult dilemma. It would either have to refuse assistance by a 
State or accept their conditions62• 
A third possibility, although not explicitly enshrined in the Statute, would 
be for the Council to request third party co-operation as a Chapter VII 
measure
63
• However unlikely this is to happen in practice, given the current US 
stance on the ICC, it would be interesting to see whether or not the Council 
would fonnulate its request in accordance with the Statute's co-operation 
S8 See for instance, Ninth ICTY Annual Report, 4 September 2002, Al57/379-S/2002/985, 
Eara.228. 
9 E.g. Zoran Zigic (Omarska camp). 
60 See also Rule 44 RPE. 
61 Indicative of this is the wording used: "The Court may invite ...... 
62 Sluiter, (2003), 610. 
63 Although SC referral is provided for in Article 13(b), no mention is made of co-operation ill 
this Article. The only reference to co-operation in cases of referral is Article 87(7) which deals 
with failure to co-operate following a SC referral. 
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regime64 • Nothing precludes the SC from disregarding the Statute provisions, 
wholly or partly, as it is not bound by them. In such a case, the obligation for 
UN ·Members, regardless of their being parties to the ICC Statute, would stem 
directly from the Charter, and as such65 it would prevail over the Rome 
Statute66 . Whether the ICC, as an institution, would be bound by this is a 
different matter altogether67 • 
Moreover, there is no provision in the Rome Statute regarding the co-
operation of entities which are not States, such as the Republika Srpska. 
However, as this is also the case with the ad hoc Tribunals, this issue could be 
addressed by other international instruments akin to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement that were relevant to a particular case. 
Given that the accused, or evidence regarding a crime within the Court's 
jurisdiction, may be located in the territory of a State(s) which are not 
Party(ies) to the ICC Statute, and would not conveniently be present on the 
territory of a State party able and willing to assist the Court in its functions, co-
operation of non-parties to the Court is indispensable. 
3.3 Co-operation of Intergovernmental Organisations 
That co-operation of intergovernmental organisations is important cannot 
be disregarded. As the Tribunals and the ICC operate in post-conflict 
64 The various possibilities are discussed in more detail by Sluiter, (2002), 71-72. 
6S Article 103 UN Charter. 
66 See Order With Regard To Request For the Indication of Provisional Measure In The Case 
Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
AriSing From The Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), 14 April 1992, 31 
ILM, 662 at 671 where the ICJ found that: that, "in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, 
the obligations of the parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other 
international agreement, including the Montreal Convention ... ". 
67 See infra chapter 4. 
110 
Co-operation 
situations, where the presence of multinational forces is likely, ensuring their 
co-operation on the ground would be beneficial. 
The nature of the obligation for such organisations to co-operate with the 
Tribunals remains controversial and will be discussed further when dealing 
with arrest. Despite the absence of an explicit provision in their Statutes, 
nothing precludes the Tribunals from soliciting the assistance of such 
international organisations and they have done so in practice68• 
Multinational forces have assisted the ICTY in a number of its functions. 
They have assisted for instance with ensuring the security of investigation 
teams working on the field, in exhumations projects, as well as with the 
execution of search warrants69• Finding and securing mass graves, and 
providing logistical support during exhumations was very important to the 
Tribunal's investigations in Kosov070• The UN Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Office of the UN High Representative, UNMIK, the OSCE 
and the EU mission in FYROM also provided assistance to the ICTy71 • 
The most important issue however is whether an international authority 
should be empowered to arrest those indicted by the International Tribunals. 
The issue arose in particular with respect to ICTY and involved the ability of 
68 Prosecutor v. Cement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Decision on the Motion for the 
Protection of Defence Witnesses, 6 October 1997, (ICTR-95-1-T). See also Prosecutor v. 
Simi/: et. al., Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others, 
(IT -95-9-PT), 18 October 2000, where the ICTY requested that SFOR disclose to the 
defendant a series of documents. The ICTY in para. 48 held: "A purposive construction of the 
Statute yields the conclusion that such an order should be applicable to collective enterprise of 
States as it is to individual States". For a comprehensive analysis which reaches the opposite 
conclusion, see Henquet in Boas and Schabas, (2003), 138-141. 
69 Third ICTY Annual Report, 16 August 1996, N511292-S/1996/665, para.75; Fourth ICTY 
Annual Report, 18 September 1997, A/52/375-S/1997/729, para. 69; Sixth ICTY Annual 
Report, ibid. supra n. 44, para. 134; Eighth ICTY Annual Report, 17 September 2001; Ninth 
ICTY Annual Report, ibid. supra n. 58, para. 230. 
70 Seventh ICTY Annual Report, 7 August 2000, A/55/273-S/20001777, para. 184; Eighth 
ICTY Annual Report, ibid.; Ninth ICTY Annual Report, ibid .. 
71 Tenth ICTY Annual Report, 20 August 2003, A/58/297-S/2003/829, para. 249. 
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NATO-led forces of SFOR (formerly IFOR)72 to effectuate arrest of indictees 
and to transfer them to The Hague. More specifically, there is an issue whether 
SFOR has the authorit/3 and, indeed, the duty to arrest an accused indicted by 
the ICTY and to transfer him to the Tribunal. Regarding the authority to arrest, 
although the General Framework Agreement does not provide explicitly for 
this right, it is accepted that a right to arrest emerges from various Articles in 
the Agreement. One argument for the acceptance of such a right is that IFOR, 
and now SFOR, have the power to use force to ensure compliance with the 
Agreemene4• And since the Agreement provides for co-operation with the 
ICTY 75, and the arrest of the accused is one of the most important aspects of 
co-operation, such an authorisation is inherent in the powers conferred upon 
72 The NATO-led multinational force, called the Implementation Force (IFOR) was created 
pursuant the SC Res. 1031 of 13 December 1995, UN SCaR, 3607th mtg., UN Doc. SIPV.3607 
(1995) by virtue of which NATO was given the mandate to implement the military aspects of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. Its mandate lasted one year and after that, it was agreed that 
NATO should organise a Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which was activated on 20 December 
1996, the date on which the mandate given to IFOR expired. Under SC Res. 1088 of 12 
December 1996, SFOR was authorised to implement the military aspects of the Peace 
Agreement. For a brief description of SFOR mandate, see NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 11, The 
NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 1997, available at 
http://www.nato.intldoculfacts/sfor.htm 
73 The day of the signing of the General Framework Agreement, a joint statement by the 
President of the Tribunal, Judge A. Cassese, and the Prosecutor, Justice R. Goldstone was 
issued which emphasised "The authority of the NATO Implementation Force to arrest any 
indicted war criminals it encounters or who interfere with its mission". See ICTY Press 
Release, "The Tribunal welcomes the parties' commitment to justice. Joint statement by the 
President and the Prosecutor", UN Doc. CCIPIO/027-E, 
The Hague, 24 November 1995. 
74 See Article I, para. 2(b), of Annex I-A which states that the parties " ... authorise the IFOR to 
take such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with 
this Annex ... ". 
75 See Article X of Annex I-A of the Agreement. See also the statements made by the 
representatives of United States, the United Kingdom and France at the time of the adoption of 
SC Res. 1031. Mrs Albright of the United States stated: "Let me emphasize that Annex I-A of 
the Dayton Agreement obligates the parties to cooperate fully with the International Tribunal. 
The North Atlantic Council can now underscore this obligation by explicitly authorizing IFOR 
to transfer indicted persons it comes across to the Tribunal and to detain such persons for that 
purpose. See SC Res. at 20. The UK representative mentioned: "Should it be decided that, in 
the execution of its assigned tasks, the Implementation Force should detain and transfer to the 
appropriate authorities any persons indicted by the Tribunal who come into contact with it in 
Bosnia, then the authority to do so is provided by the draft resolution before us, read together 
with the provisions of the Peace Agreement. See ibid. at 18. The French representative held 
that paragraph 5 "recognizes the role that IFOR may play to ensure proper cooperation" with 
the Tribunal. Ibid. at 21. 
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the Force and is, in any case, compatible with the obligation to ensure 
compliance with Article X of the Annex 76. However, this argument is not 
convincing in its entirety. The duty to co-operate with the Tribunal is a duty 
imposed on States, which suggests that there is no basis for the multinational 
force to replace them if they do not exercise their duty77. A more specific basis 
for such an authorisation to arrest can be found in Article VI, para. 4 of Annex 
I-A of the Agreement, which gives a right to the North Atlantic Council to 
"establish additional duties and responsibilities for the IFOR in implementing 
this Annex [Annex I_A],,78. If this formulation is accepted, then the 
multinational force has indeed the authority to arrest the indictees and to 
transfer them to the Tribunal79. However, the "additional duties and 
responsibilities" that the North Atlantic Council may grant to the multinational 
force on the basis of Article VI, paragraph 4 are not unlimited. They are 
significantly limited by virtue of the obligations undertaken by the parties in 
Annex I_A8o. 
76 See on this view, Jones, (1996), 238. According to this commentator, if the states do not 
make the arrests themselves, they are regarded to have conferred the authority to IFOR which 
is then authorised to do so on their behalf. See also Ambos, (1997), 887-888. 
77 See Gaeta, (1998), 177. Although there may be a separate duty for the multinational force to 
act where it is comprised of States who collectively owe such a duty. 
78 This seems to be the justification which is also accepted by NATO itself. See Basic Fact 
Sheet No. 11, available at: www.nato.int, where it is stated that: "The North Atlantic Council 
has authorised SFOR to detain and transfer to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes ...... 
79 But see Speech of the Representative of the Russian Federation to the Plenary Session of the 
United Nations Assembly on the Report of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (Item 49 of the Agenda), 4 November 1997 (unofficial translation) who maintains 
that the "planned actions for the armed capture of suspects" cannot be described "as 'co-
operation' with the Tribunal or as 'support' for the Tribunal's activities, particularly within the 
framework of the international peace-making operation which is being carried out in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina". He further maintained that "such deliberate actions are not in the mandate 
of the multinational stabilisation forces" as defined by the peace agreement and that "[e)ven 
during the talks on the conditions for Russia's participation, [Russia) objected to an 
interpretation of the mandate that would endow the multinational forces with police functions". 
80 Lamb, (1999), 192. 
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There is also the view that there is a duty to arrest indictees81 • It has 
been argued that the obligation to arrest indictees is part of the obligation to 
search and prosecute contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. According to 
this view, such an obligation is also applicable to the multinational forces 
operating in the field82 . However, it should be noted that even if the duty to 
respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions is part of customary 
international law83 this, in the opinion of this writer, does not extend to the 
power to arrest. And since there is no clear indication to those ends in the 
Agreement, it should be accepted that such a duty cannot be imposed on the 
Stabilisation Force84• 
Recognition of the significance of the role that international 
organisations may play for the ICC led to the inclusion of Article 87(6), which 
enables the Court to request assistance from intergovernmental organisations85• 
The emphasis on the provision of information or documents may be explained 
as this would be the most common form of assistance that these organisations 
would be able to provide to the Court. Other forms of co-operation, including, 
arguably, requests for arrest and surrender, are not precluded in Article 87(6) 
but should be seen in light of the organisation's constituent instrument and 
81 Jones supra n. 76,239. See also Figa-Talamanca, (1996), 171-175; Ambos, ibid. supra n. 76, 
888. 
82 See Sharp, (1997), 445-9. 
83 Such an argument could be based on the analysis provided from Condorelli, in Swinarski, 
(1984),17-35. 
84 As Scharf, (1999), "Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice", rightly stipulates at 
953: "Had the Council wished to explicitly give IFOR this responsibility, it could have used 
the phrase 'calls upon' rather than 'authorizes"'. Along the same lines see also Gaeta, ibid. 
supra n. 77, 180. See also Akhavan, (1996), 278. In addition see the memoires of the chief 
American negotiator Richard Holbrooke, (1999), 222 who attributes to John Shalikashvili, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that a compromise was accepted with regard to IFOR 
under which the force would "have the authority, but not the obligation to undertake additional 
tasks" upon completion of its mission. According to Holbrooke he explained that "[flor 
example, we [the military] do not wish to be obligated to arrest war criminals, but we will 
accept the authority to arrest them if we get the chance". 
114 
Co-operation 
certainly "in accordance with its competence or mandate". This is evidence that 
international organisations can only exercise the powers vested upon them86• 
The obligation to co-operate found in both the Tribunals and the ICC, is 
general, so as to cover all the possible players in the system. And in this 
system, co-operation of States plays a central part. By contrast to the Tribunals, 
where the specifics of the obligation are not laid down in their Statutes, the 
ICC Statute contains detailed provisions on the obligation to co-operate by all 
the entities likely to do so. 
4. Arrest and Surrender: The First Step towards Achieving Justice 
International criminal courts cannot operate without having the accused 
present for trial. Arresting the indictees has been a major problem for the 
Tribunals whose history has proven how difficult this issue is in practice87• It is 
also expected to be problematic for the ICC. 
Despite the significance of arrest, no indication of how this may be 
achieved is given either in the Statutes of the Tribunals or in the RPE. Rule 56 
of the RPE is the relevant Rule, which does not contain, however, the 
procedure to be followed. Instead, it is stated in a vague manner that a 
government which receives an arrest warrant from an International Tribunal 
shall act ''with all due diligence to ensure proper and effective execution 
thereof ... ". That government must act according to Joyner ''with such 
8S The Prosecutor may also request assistance for the initiation of an investigation from such 
organisations in accordance with Article 15(2). 
86 This is also reiterated in Article 54(3)(c) of the Statute. 
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sufficient perseverance, industry and assiduity that it can e x e c u t ~ ~ the arrest 
warrant in a manner that is adequate, proper and fit to meet t h ~ t t stipulated 
obligation,,88. But this does not clarify the exact content of tht: obligation. 
Failure to confOIm to this standard is a breach of Rule 56 which, in tum, 
triggers failure to co-operate. 
The ICTY held in the Dokmanovii: Case89 that the arrest is effected 
when, by physical restraint or conduct, or by words, an individual is made 
aware that he is not free to leave9o, and that a restraint upon a person's free 
movement is a necessary component of arrest, as vindicated both in 
internationallaw91 and in national legal systems92 • 
As to the standards to be followed while effectuating arrest, it is 
generally accepted that an international court should observe the highest human 
rights standards. Despite the lack of reference in the Statutes or in the RPE to 
that effect, it should nevertheless be accepted that the internationally 
recognised standards laid down for instance by Article 9(1),(2) and 14(3)(a) of 
the ICCPR93 and 5(2) of the ECHR94 would be applicable here. Accordingly, in 
the case of the arrest of a person indicted by the International Tribunals the 
87 For an excellent analysis of the issue of the arrest within the scope of the international 
tribunals see generally, Lamb, ibid. supra n. 80, 165-244. 
88 Joyner (1995),91. 
89 Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic, Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused 
Dokrnanovic, Trial Chamber 11,22 October 1997, (IT-95-13a-PT). 
90 Ibid., para 51. 
91 Ibid., para 28. 
92 Ibid., para 29. 
93 Article 9(1) reads: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law". Moreover, 9(2) 
states: "Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his 
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him". Furthermore, article 
14(3)(a) stipulates; "In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled to the following minimum guarantees in full equality: (a) to be informed promptly and 
in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him". 
94 Article 5(2) requires that everyone "who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in language 
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him". See in that 
respect, Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. UK, A 182, para. 40 (1990). 
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accused should be infonned in a language he/she understands of the reasons of 
the arrest, and of hislher rights, and any relevant documents should be handed 
over to himlher when apprehended. In practice, the Tribunals' OTP have thdr 
own internal procedure regarding the arrest of the persons indicted and 
emphasis is placed on the handing over to the accused of the relevant 
documents, such as a summary of the indictment, when apprehended. The OTP 
generally gives the indictees the documents in person. It is foreseeable that 
similar procedures will be followed by the ICC Prosecutor as well. 
Moreover, there is extensive dialogue between the Tribunals and the 
targeted State on all questions of co-operation and in particular on the issue of 
making requests. There is understanding and patience on behalf of the OTP to 
tailor requests in such a way so as to achieve the co-operation of the State in 
question. The Tribunals, when filing requests, aim at long-tenn co-operation 
with the authorities on the ground and therefore, although not denying the 
powers conferred to them by the SC Resolutions, have tended to avoid 
emphasising them, in order to secure the surrender of indictees. 
For the ICC, arrest and surrender is equally important. However, no 
definition can be found in its Statute either. Article 58 of the ICC Statute 
contains the conditions for issuance of an arrest warrant, which will not be 
examined in this study. For our purposes, it is important to stress that for an 
arrest to take place, an arrest warrant issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber is 
necessary. The practice adopted by the ICTY /ICTR RPE whereby, in urgent 
cases, a State is able to arrest a suspect without an arrest warrant following a 
request by the Prosecutor95, has not been taken up by the ICC and a warrant is 
95 Rule 40 RPE. 
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necessary at all times. However, provisional arrest is envisaged96• The 
conditions for issuance of an arrest warrant are strictly laid down in the Statute 
and arrest is requested with a view to ensuring the person's appearance at trial, 
preventing obstruction or endangering the investigation, or preventing 
continuing with the commission of a crime based on the same or related 
Article 89 is beyond doubt one of the fundamental provisions of the 
Statute as it deals with the surrender of the accused to the Court. In general, the 
Court will, according to Article 89(1), transmit a request for the arrest and 
surrender of a person to any State on the territory of which the accused may be 
found. At this stage, the Statute makes no distinction between States that are 
parties to the Rome Statute and States that are not, presumably because the 
Court has the power to transmit requests to all States. However, only State 
parties have the duty to comply with the Court's request as evidenced by the 
second sentence of paragraph 1. And this obligation is a very firm one, namely 
an obligation from which no derogation is allowed. 
The content of the request for arrest and surrender is enshrined in 
Article 91 ICC Statute. The said Article is a technical provision which 
regulates the practical aspects of surrender. To begin with, the request shall be 
made in writing98, whereas at the same time the possibility is given for the use 
of modem technology in urgent cases99• Furthermore, the different 
subparagraphs of paragraph 2, deal with the practical issues of identification of 
96 Article 92 ICC Statute. 
97 Article 58(1 )(b) ibid. 
98 Article 91 (1) ibid. 
99 Ibid.; However, there is a condition of conflrming the arrest through the proscribed (in 
Article 87(1)(a» channel. This seems to contradict the emerging practice that e.g. electronic 
signature is acceptable even for the conclusion of contracts. 
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the person in qnestion, the adequacy of a copy (instead of the original) of the 
warrant, and the relevant documents to be requested by the State for the 
surrender process 1 00. 
Upon receipt of the arrest, or provisional arrest and surrender, request a 
State "shall immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in 
accordance with its laws and the provisions of Part 9,,101. This provision 
obliges the requested State to act promptly towards arresting the person sought 
by the ICC. At the same time, emphasis is placed on the use of domestic 
procedures when effecting the arrest. This is stressed each step of the way in 
Part 9. Uniformity would have been better achieved had the Statute specified 
its own arrest procedure. However, the use of domestic procedures for arrest 
puts less strain on domestic legal systems allowing States more control over the 
process. In theory, this should work better than having to follow a "foreign" 
procedure when arresting a person. Nevertheless, this choice reflects the 
creation of the Court by an international treaty and the extent to which States 
were prepared to let go of their own procedures in favour of subscribing to a 
supra-national model of co-operation with its own distinct processes. 
Moreover, it also formalises existing practices used with regard to arrests in the 
context of the Tribunals, where no specific guidance was provided. The Statute 
in a sense, tries to anticipate rather than deal with problems as they arise. This 
balances out the lack of coercive powers. A dialectic relationship between the 
States and the Court in a path already pre-defined is central to the Statute's co-
operation regime. Despite some elements of supra-nationality, the Court's 
operation remains faithful to its treaty origins. State input is naturally 
100 Article 91(2)(a), (b) and (c) respectively. Moreover. surrender of a person already convicted 
is regulated in 91(3). 
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important. Traces of this can be found in various Articles in the Statute, but 
when dealing with arrest, Article 91(2)(c) springs immediately to mind. 
States are given the opportunity to request further documents from the 
Court in order to execute an arrest and surrender request in accordance with 
their domestic procedure 102. This leeway offers a possibility of greater co-
operation and avoidance of conflicts. The apparent freedom allowed by the 
Statute is actually not as wide-ranging as it initially seems. The State can only 
require evidence which is necessary to meet the surrender process in that State, 
and cannot go beyond what is required for the execution of an extradition 
request103• In fact, paragraph 2(c) of Article 91 makes clear that account should 
be taken of the "distinct nature of the Court". The aim of this provision is to 
integrate national courts as much as possible in the actual execution of the 
arrest and surrender requests without upsetting the existing judicial structure of 
a State. Whilst recognising that this is an important aspect, allowing, therefore, 
a State to use its own procedures and impose its own requirements, the 
underlying notion here is one of avoiding abuse. This is why the apparent 
freedom is restricted, with an extradition request as a reference point. The use 
of extradition standards as a comparator is not as striking as it may initially 
101 Article 59( 1). 
102 This was a difficult issue to overcome in the negotiations due to the different approach 
taken from civil and common law countries. The formula adopted however, which represents a 
compromise, limits the form of material to documents, statements or information. 
103 This view is reflected in a speech by the then US Ambassador for War Crimes, David 
Scheffer, "Deterrence", (1999), 7, who noted the US success in preserving "sovereign decision-
making" by rejecting proposals requiring States parties to co-operate automatically with the 
Court. He maintained that "our negotiators struggled, successfully, to preserve appropriate 
sovereign decision-making in connection with obligations to cooperate with the court. Some 
delegates were tempted to require unqualified cooperation by states parties with all court 
orders, notwithstanding national judicial procedures that would be involved in any event. Such 
obligations of unqualified cooperation were unrealistic and would have raised serious 
constitutional issues not only in the US but in many other jurisdictions. Part 9 of the statute 
represents hard-fought battles in this respect. The requirement that the actions of states parties 
be taken "in accordance with national procedural law" or similar language is pragmatic and 
legally essential for the successful operation of the court". 
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appear. The Statute takes great pains to convince the reader that surrender is 
not extradition 104. The comparison here is an understandable one and, in this 
instance, welcome. Extradition is the closest concept to what is being discussed 
in Article 91 of the Statute. Extradition is also a concept States have been 
comfortable with for many years and which has been accommodated within 
their domestic systems in the forms of standards and procedures in place. 
Arresting a person and transferring them to the Court is certainly a novel 
experience for many States. At most, they had to deal with similar requests 
made by the ad hoc Tribunals. The majority of States though would not have 
dealt with such a case previouslylO5. To allow for comparable standards with 
extradition is therefore appropriate. Besides, States are reminded that, when 
possible, requirements should be less burdensome. The nature of the Court as a 
court States have signed up to, is very different to subjecting a person to a 
foreign jurisdiction, which might be totally different to their own. States parties 
to the ICC treaty have a vested interest to see the Court functioning properly, 
and should not be intimidated by its proceedings given the input they had in its 
creation. Quite rightly then the procedures followed should be less onerous. 
Article 91(2)(c) is further complemented by Article 91(4). This 
provision is an interesting one as it introduces a consultation procedure 
between the requested State and the Court. At the heart of this provision lies 
the interest of the ICC to get the person sought before it. It is recognised in the 
Statute, as emphasised above, that some national law requirements might come 
into play. To avoid a stalemate in the proceedings, the ICC Statute introduces a 
104 Article 102 ICC Statute. 
\05 In the ICTY/ICTR the choice was clear. Several obstacles were removed simply because the 
ad hoc Tribunals were created by a Chapter VII SC Resolution. For the ICC, State sovereignty 
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consultation process during which the State party advises the Court of its 
national law requirements. This is a two-way process, where the feedback 
given by the State in question is taken into account by the Court, so as to 
safeguard both the person sought to be transferred to the ICC and the national 
law. 
The natural position of this provision should have been immediately 
after Article 91(2)(c), as 91(4) further clarifies the procedure to be used. It 
would have been more convincing had it been placed as (d) in Article 91, or, 
given the importance attributed to it, meriting a separate paragraph, had this 
paragraph followed 91(2)(c). Be that as it may, the important point here is that 
the consultation mechanism envisaged further strengthens the interaction 
between the national and the international levels. 
Going back to Article 89, in an uncontroversial provision, Article 89(3) 
regulates the transit of the accused from the territory of third States to the 
Court. It seems that the Statute attempts to foresee the possible complications 
that may arise with regard to flying over uninvolved States and landing in case 
of emergency. This provision follows the practice of common extradition 
treaties so as to facilitate the physical surrender of the accused. 
It may be that paragraph 3 did not create much controversy In the 
negotiating process. This is not so though for Article 89(4). The said paragraph 
was subject of considerable debate over its content in the negotiations. It deals 
with the case that the person for whom surrender is sought is being proceeded 
against or serves a sentence in the State in question. The issue is linked to the 
debate whether control is left with the State or with the Court. The question 
and consequently the intention of States to maintain control is evident throughout the Statute. 
And the provisions discussed under this heading are a manifestation of this approach. 
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arises only in respect of prosecution or service of sentence for a crime different 
from the one for which extradition is sought, since in another case, Articles 
89(2) and 17 et seq.106 come into play. Moreover, the .issue of consultation 
referred to in Article 89(4) should not be taken to imply that the State has in 
fact a discretion not to grant the request. Rather, it should be seen as a remnant 
from the negotiating process where the issue of refusal to comply had not yet 
been resolved107• 
It seems that the surrender regime of the ICC is crafted in considerable 
detail when contrasted with the equivalent transfer procedure of the ad hoc 
Tribunals. In the ICC there has been close scrutiny regarding the formulation 
of the Articles in order to avoid misunderstandings. This may be ascribed to the 
fact that the ICC is bereft of the primacy with which the Tribunals are 
endowed. The ICC approach should not be associated with realisation of the 
problems likely to arise due to the lack of a specific framework. Rather, it 
should be attributed to the enhanced role that States have. The relationship 
between the ICC and domestic authorities clearly shows that State party co-
operation will be crucial to the Court's effective functioning in practice J08 • 
With that in mind, it seems that the drafters have attempted to create a system 
with the view that almost every detail is regulated by the Statute. Remarkably, 
consultation with States has a prominent role to play. However, the formulation 
sought for in those provisions may be proven to be totally unworkable in 
practice for a variety of reasons attributed to the States parties or to the 
complexity of the provisions themselves. Be that as it may, it seems that the 
system is going to be far from expeditious. 
106 See supra in this section; see also chapter 2. 
107 KreB, and Prost, in TriffteTer, (1999), 1079. 
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4.1 Apprehension by Intergovernmental Organisations: Blessing or Curse? 
It has been established already that co-operation by international 
organisations is important. In a system where arrest by States is not always 
forthcoming, intergovernmental organisations are a valuable substitute. In 
essence, it is again State assistance under the guise of an international 
authority. Willing States undertake the role of those that are unwilling to 
perform their duties. A significant number of ICTY indictees have been 
arrested mainly by SFOR and some also by KFOR I09• Their attitude towards 
arrests has been far from clear. Initially, NATO was reluctant to accept such an 
authorityllO. IFOR did not want to appear to be doing "police work", by 
actively searching for war criminalslll . Moreover, fear of "mission creep" that 
would undermine NATO's military mission was in the minds of NATO's 
leadershipll2. Furthermore, memories of the death of eighteen American 
soldiers in Somalia while hunting a warlord were still fresh 113. This led to a 
number of instances where the multilateral forces could have arrested major 
figures, even Karadzic and Mladic, but did not, and actively avoided them 
In order to facilitate arrests by international forces such as the SFOR, 
the Judges of the ICTY adopted, at the Ninth Plenary Session on 17-18 January 
108 Pejic, (2000), 81. 
\09 See Appendix. 
110 As evidenced from the Fourth ICTY Annual Report, ibid. supra n. 69, para. 190: "[ ... J until 
very recently IFORISFOR has refrained form apprehending, or indeed encountering, indictees, 
stating that it did not intend to send out "posses" to arrest indictees but would only arrest them if:they came across them." (emphasis added). See also Maogoto, (2004), 157. 
II Ruxton, in van Dijk, and Hovens, (2001), 21. 
112 Leurdijk, ibid., 63. 
113 Akhavan, ibid. supra n. 84, 276. 
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1996, Rule 59bis of the RPE which clearly allows the transmission of warrant.;: 
and orders to international authorities. But the arrests did not come, until the 
arrest by the OTP with the co-operation of UNT AES of Slavku 
Dokmanovic l15 • As the feared reprisals did not materialise, NATO 
subsequently changed its position. This is partly attributable also to the change 
in its hierarchy and also in the political scene I 16. On the 10th of July 1997, 
Milan Kovacevic was the first person to be arrested by SFOR 117. This led to the 
arrest of a number of low-ranking officials since indicted by the Tribunal I 18 • In 
fact, at one time, accused were arriving in the Hague at the rate of one a 
month 119. NATO arrests have since dropped significantly though 120. 
In sum, assistance provided by Intergovernmental Organisations with 
regard to arresting indictees has been very significant for the functioning of the 
Tribunals. Several persons, who would otherwise be untouched either due to 
lack of political will of the State in which they reside, or simply due the 
inability to arrest them, have been transferred to the ICTY. However, the 
practice has so far showed that the arrested indictees are primarily low-level, 
114 Bass, (2000), 252. 
lIS See infra. In para. 37 of this case however, the ICTY held that: "once an arrest warrant has 
been transmitted to an international authority, an international body, or the Office of the 
Prosecutor, the accused person named therein may be taken into custody without the 
involvement of the State in which helshe was located". Moreover, pursuant to Rule 61 
proceedings (see infra), Rule 61(D} has been interpreted to comprise transmission of the 
international arrest warrant to be issued to the international authorities. 
116 Wesley Clark took command of NATO, and Tony Blair was elected the UK's prime 
minister. 
\11 Fourth ICTY Annual Report, ibid. supra n. 69, para. 133. 
118 See Appendix. Information is also available at http://www.nato.int/sfor/advisory/.Itis to be 
noted that in many of those Press Releases it is emphasised that "As the Secretary General of 
NATO affirmed again in a recent statement, NATO is determined to play its role in helping to 
bring indicted war criminals to justice. Those indicted war criminals who remain at large have 
no permanent hiding place. NATO will continue to detain them, as well as those that the Chief 
Prosecutor at the ICTY may indict in the future, SFOR advises all indicted war criminals to 
surrender immediately to the Tribunal". This is evident of the change in NATO's attitude. 
119 Wald, (2001), 87. 
120 Eighth ICTY Annual Report, ibid. supra n. 69, para. 195. Kerr, (2004), 167 suggests that 
this can be attributed to the deaths of Drjlaca and Gagovic and the injury of a number of SFOR 
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which is not what the Tribunals had hoped for. Arresting so many indictees has 
in the recent years been a cause for concern, since this impacts upon the 
already overloaded Court-time and renders the trials far from expeditious 121 • 
Other practical problems relate to the lack of facilities, in terms of 
infrastructure, in the ICTY, to accommodate those arrested. It would have been 
preferable had multinational forces focused their efforts in ensuring the 
presence of indictees accused of the most serious of crimes. 
4.2 Arrest by International Authorities for the ICC 
Arrests by international authorities will also be relevant to the 
functioning of the permanent Court. However, the different legal basis of its 
establishment is expected to influence the ability of peacekeeping operations 
and multi-national forces, similar to the NATO-led forces operating in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, to arrest indicted criminals. The same holds 
true for the proposed "European rapid reaction force" 1 22 , should it be mandated 
to act in the direction of arresting war criminals. 
It might be that recourse to international authorities in order to effect 
arrests will be greater a necessity for the ICC, particularly to tackle the 
"complementarity paradox" discussed in the previous chapter. However, it is 
difficult to perceive how this could materialise. Taking into consideration that 
not all States will automatically be parties to the ICC, such an attempt to 
engage international authorities in arresting indicted criminals may be ruled out 
troops in the process of arrest. Another possible reason is the impact of the Todorovic trial 
infra. 
121 Wald, ibid. supra n. 119,87, 101. 
122 See www.europa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/indexen.htm; 
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for practical reasons. The following hypothetical example can be used to 
demonstrate the case at hand. Suppose that a situation which triggers the ICC's 
jurisdiction takes place in State X. Moreover, the assistance of NATO-led force 
Y is sought, in order to bring the indictees for trial before the ICC, provided 
that the complementarity obstacle is removed. Suppose also that the US, 
maintains its current position towards the Court. In such a case, it is unlikely 
that they would participate in activities leading to arrest of ICC indictees and 
their surrender to the Court. Moreover, it is possible, due to the structure of 
NATO and its constituent treaty, which requires unanimity for action, that all 
similar operations restrict their field of operation due to the possibility that at 
some point they might be engaged in arresting people indicted by the ICC. The 
same conclusion can be reached in case of peacekeeping operations in general 
which would otherwise be willing to participate in missions to arrest the 
accused before the ICC. 
To summarise, it is evident by now, following the example of the ad 
hoc Tribunals and particularly that of the ICTY, that international authorities 
play an important role in relation to the issue of arrest of indictees. It is beyond 
doubt that the role of the international authorities in assisting the work of the 
ICC will be restricted considerably. The solution to the problem lies with the 
individual States and their willingness to assist. However, this is expected to be 
much more difficult in practice than it has been with ad hoc Tribunals, which 
in any case has not been easy. 
see also www.fco.gov.uklnew/newstext.asp?1795. 
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4.3 Voluntary Surrender: An Unforeseeable Tool 
In the inception of the ad hoc Tribunals, few people would have 
thought that voluntary surrender would be such an effective means of getting 
the alleged perpetrators to the Hague 123 • Although legally not very 
challenging, it seems that fear of being "detained" by SFOR led to a number of 
indictees surrendering voluntarilyl24. Ten individuals indicted in the Kordic 
and Kupreskiccases were the first people to do this125. Moreover, the change in 
the political scene on the groundl26, as well as political pressure exercised by 
certain governments 127, led to a number of voluntary surrenders. 
Whether voluntary surrenders will be the case for the ICC as well, 
remains to be seen. 
4.4 Irregularities of Arrest 
Inevitably, not all arrests will be problem-free. What the Tribunals and 
the ICC should do in case of irregularities of arrest, is examined in this section. 
The issue is not new, certainly with respect to domestic law. The position of 
the international community on the issue is far from clear. It is a well 
established concept in a number of domestic legal systems, that although the 
means used to effectuate custody of a person may not be in themselves lawful, 
the fact that this person is indicted and a warrant for hislher arrest is issued, is 
123 Appendix. 
124 Fifth ICTY Annual Report, 10 August 1998, Al53/219-S/19981737, para. 222; Hagan, 
(2003), 108, quoting an OTP legal advisor: "The accused got the message that there was an 
easy way and a hard way to come here". Particularly, after the death of Drjlaca's death and 
Kupre§kic' injury during their arrest. See also, Kerr, (2004), 170. 
125 Fifth ICTY Annual Report, ibid., para. 112. 
126 Kerr, ibid. supra n. 124. 
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enough for a post facto legitimisaticm of the conduct. Thus for those States, 
jurisdiction following an illegal abduction is not barred. The US!28, UK! 29, 
Australia130, France!3! and Israel132 have on various occasions accepted this 
proposition. The most prominent example is the case of Adolf Eichmann who 
was abducted in Argentina and was subsequently tried in Israel 133 . Another 
very well-known case is the case of Alvarez Machain 134. In those cases, the 
principle of male captus bene detentus comes into play!35. However, several 
States have recently overruled the above-mentioned principle and denied 
jurisdiction over illegally obtained criminals. UK!36, US137, South Africa!38, 
127 McDonald, (2004), 564, attests that voluntary surrenders were encouraged by the US. 
128 See Ker v. Illinois, 119 US 436, 444 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US 519, 661-662 
(1952). 
129 See inter alia Ex parte Susannah Scott (1829), 109 Eng Rep 166; R v. OIC Depot Battalion 
R.A.S.C. Colchester, Ex parte Eliot, (1949) 1 All E.R 373; R. v. Plymouth Justices. Ex parte 
Driver (1986) Q.B. 95; Liangsiriprasert v. United States (1991) 1 App. Cas. 225; In re Scmidt 
(1995) 1 App Cas. 339. 
130 Levinge v. Direstor of Custodial Services (1987), 9 NSWLR 546 
131 See inter alia Re: Argoud. Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), 4 June 1964 45 ILR 90; 
Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants et Patriotes and Others v. Barbie. 
Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), 20 December 1985,78 ILR 124. 
132 Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 ILR 5 (1961); Afouneh v. Attorney General, Ann. Dig. 
321 (No. 97). However, the Eichmann case should not be considered as a good example 
because of the crimes involved. 
133 Green, (1960), 514-5. The District Court of Jerusalem rejected the objection on jurisdiction 
raised by the counsel for Eichmann and held that "a person standing trial for an offence against 
the laws of a state may not oppose his being tried by reason of the illegality of his arrest, or of 
the mans whereby he was brought to the area of jurisdiction of the state". See Eichmann Case, 
36 ILR (1961), para. 41. 
134 United States v. Alvarez Machain, 504 U.S. (1992), p. 655 at 669 which found that United 
States Courts had jurisdiction to try an individual forcibly abducted from Mexico without his 
consent. 
I3S See inter alia, Scharf, (2000), 968-969; Choo (1994), 165; Warbrick, (2000),489. 
136 R. Horseferry Road Magistrates, Ex parte Bennett 3 All E.R. 138 where by a vote four to 
one, the Law Lords found that English courts have the discretion to stay the trial of a criminal 
defendant where English police have disregarded the protections of formal extradition and have 
had a defendant seized abroad by illegal means (id. at 139c). 
137 United States v Toscanino, 500 F 2d 267,275 (2d Cir. 1974), where the Court held: "[we] 
view due process as now requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a 
defendant where ti has been acquired as the result of the Government's deliberate unnecessary 
and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights". This approach was relied 
ufs0n in Prosecutor v. Dokmanovii:, ibid. supra n. 89, paras. 70-75. 
I 8 Decision of 26 February 1991 in State v. Ebrahim, 31 ILM (1992), 888. 
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Zimbabwe J39, Switzerland140 and Costa RicCl 141 all have case-law which 
represents this view. 
The issue of irregularities in the process of the arrest may also arise in 
the context of the International Tribunals. However, there is a significant 
difference here. The case involves a State and an international institution which 
is moreover endowed with primacy rather than two sovereign States. This 
might be enough to dictate dissimilar approaches to the issues at hand. 
In international criminal law there have been a few cases where 
violations have been alleged. In the Dokmanovic142 and Todorovic143 , the death 
of the former and the plea agreement of the latter did not allow for a full 
consideration of the issue before the ICTY. Nikolic was perhaps the clearest of 
all144• The lawfulness of arrest was raised in Milosevic145, whereas in Brdanin, 
his writ of habeas corpus was rejected as the Tribunal does not possess such 
139 State v. Beahan 1992 (1) SACR 307 (A). 
140 66 Blatter fur Zurcherische Rspr (1967) 248. 
141 The Supreme Court of Costa Rica unanimously censured the Alvarez-Machain decision of 
the US Supreme Court in its plenary session of June 25 1992. See statement quoted in Wilske, 
and Schiller, (1998), 229. 
142 Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic. ibid. supra n. 89. For a graphic description of 
DokmanoviC' arrest, see Hagan, ibid. supra n. 124, 101-105. 
143 Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovic, Decision Stating Reasons for Trial Chamber's Order of 4 
March 1999 on Defence Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on the Arrest of the Accused 
Todorovic, 25 March 1999, (IT-95-9). Allegedly the accused had been removed from the FRY 
by the SAS or the American Delta Unit. See also a separate document filed in support of the 
accused's Notice of motion, where it was alleged the "in September 1998 four individuals, 
unknown to the accused, by use of physical force and threats of bodily harm by firearm (sic), 
forced the Accused into a vehicle while still on the territory of the FRY", that the Accused, 
while so kidnapped and abducted, was "physically delivered to United Nations agents, servants 
or employees, or individuals acting under the auspices of the United Nations" and thereafter 
"delivered to the jurisdiction of the ICTY". See "Memorandum of Law in Further Support for 
an Evidentiary Hearing as to Abduction and Detention of Accused Todorovic", (D3163-
D3155), filed 1 March 1999; See article by Jon Swain in the Sunday Times of 23 July 2000 
entitled "Serb snatched by rogue Nato bounty hunter" where it is alleged that SFOR use bounty 
hunters to effectuate arrests, available at: 
http://www . the-times.co. uklnews/pages/stil2000/07 /23/stifgneur03003 .html 
144 Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of 
Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, 9 October 2002, (IT-94-AR72). See also Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikolic, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest,S June 2003, (IT-94-
2-AR73). 
145 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions, 8 November 2001, 
para. 38. 
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powers. The Tribunal asserted that it "has both the power and the procedure to 
resolve a challenge to the lawfulness of a detainee's detention,,146. 
First of all, it is beyond doubt that institutions such as the Tribunals and 
the ICC are bound by a firm commitment to human rights. Obtaining the 
custody of an accused by an international tribunal should ideally not be based 
on otherwise illegal conduct. The interests of justice dictate that effectiveness 
in arresting the indictees should not be enhanced. The principle ex injuria non 
oritur jus should be borne in mind. In the view presented here, it is taken for 
granted that violations of international law during arrest/surrender or detention 
should be addressed. 
There have been several attempts to rationalise the irregularities of the 
arrest in order to allow the case to be tried. According to one approach, which 
is the least appealing, the territorial integrity of a State in which the abduction 
or luring takes place, is not absolute and should the situation in that State 
amount to a threat to international peace, such action could be rationalised as 
exercise of the legitimate right to self-defenceI47. However, it is highly unlikely 
that the presence of an indictee, even one accused of the most heinous crimes 
in the territory of a State, constitutes in itself a threat to international peace and 
security. Accordingly, the exception of self-defence cannot be of use in that 
particular case 148 . 
There is also the view which links the entire issue with the legal basis 
of the establishment of the Tribunals. The Chapter VII basis of the Tribunals 
enables the argument to be made that the States concerned have ab initio given 
146 Prosecutor v. Radislav Brdanin. Decision on Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on 
Behalf of Radislav Brdanin, 8 December 1999, paras. 4-6. 
147 Scharf, "Dokmanovic", (1998), 377. 
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authorisation for action in their territory. And the arrest of the indictees falls 
within the realm of the action required by the Tribunals for the administration 
of justice in the light of its mandate. However, does this prevail over general 
international law which guarantees protection of a person's rights? This is a 
hard question to answer. 
Finally, the most compelling view seems to be the one which seeks to 
establish a balance between the irregularities of the arrest and the interests of 
justice. The so-called "Eichmann exception" then comes into play. Even strong 
critics of jurisdiction over abducted persons will allow for an exception for 
defendants who have committed heinous crimes l49 • So long as the offences 
allegedly committed by the accused are of sufficient gravity to be considered 
"universally condemned offences,,150, the issue of the abduction should be 
"decoupled,,151 in hislher subsequent trial. It follows that an adequate 
justification can be provided for the trial to go on regardless of the violation of 
international law and the rights of the accused. Under this formulation, the 
International Tribunals would be able to play the role allocated to them on the 
international scene. 
The merits of the above arguments will not be examined at present. Nor 
will the case-law of the Tribunals, as this has been competently done by 
148 Besides which, according to Article 51 UN Charter self-defence can only be undertaken in 
response to an "armed attack". 
149 Lowenfeld (1990), 490; Mann (1989).478-9; Higgins, (1994). 472; Shen, (1994), 52. The 
se though affirmed in the Eichmann case that non-consensual kidnapping by agents of another 
State violates international law, even when the victim of the kidnapping committed offences 
subject to universal jurisdiction. Consequently, the SC ordered Israel to make reparations to 
Argentina. See se Res. 138, UN seOR, 15 th Sess, 868th mtg at 4, UN Doc S/4349 (1960). 
ISO See apparent approval of this approach in Nikolic Appeal, ibid. supra n. 144, paras. 25-26. 
lSI See Higgins, ibid. supra n.149, 72. 
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others l52 • Instead of indulging on the arguments of the parties in each of the 
above cases, and the rulings of the Tribunals, a fonnula will be presented to 
address the issues involved. 
A first distinction should be made between violations that happened after the 
transfer of the person to the Tribunal. In this case the Barayagwisa precedent is 
pretty clear and would mean that a remedy should be provided which might 
amount even to decline jurisdiction, depending on the seriousness of the 
violation l53 • Each case should be judged in concreto l54 • A greater responsibility 
for the Tribunal is explained by the fact that it has control over the accused 
with their presence in the Hague/ Arusha. 
For violations that occurred before the person was brought to the 
custody of the Tribunal, the agency test should apply. Although the agency test 
argued for in Nikolic l55 is very appealing, it has to be recognised that it might 
be difficult for the Tribunals to have control lS6 over each and every arrest. 
Arguably, SFOR is made up of States, which are obliged to co-operate 
with the ICTY due to their UN Membership, and the obligation imposed on 
them by the SC. By the same token, the ICTY was created by the SC, so SFOR 
is bound and acts as an agent. Even if this is the case, co-ordination is a 
problem. SFOR is too remote from the "chain of command" as it were. The 
important point is that a remedy should be envisaged. It does not matter if this 
remedy comes from the State or from an international court. For the Tribunals, 
152 Henquet, ibid. supra n. 68, 113; 0lgen, (2003),441; Knoops, (2002), chapter VIII; van 
Sliedregt, in van Dijk, and Hovens, (2001), 73; Scharf, ibid. supra n. 147, 369; Sloan, 
"Todorovic", (2003), 85; Sloan, "Nikolic", (2003), 541. 
153 Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza. Decision, 3 November 1999, (ICTR-97-19-3), paras. 91-99, 
106. 
154 Soering Y. United Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment of 26 June 1989, para. 100. 
155 Ibid. supra n. 144. 
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it has to come from them, as the States on the ground have hardly had 
involvement in cases in which arrests were undertaken by international forces. 
But the agency test put forward here is stricter than the one argued for in 
Nikolii:157 • Accordingly, if the Tribunal's officials have been involved directly 
in making an arrest where the violations took place, then the Tribunal bears 
greater responsibility than if the arrest was carried out by a "non-agent". 
However, even in the latter case, does that mean that the person whose rights 
have been violated is not entitled to a remedy? A remedy ought to be available, 
but arguably, this could be raised before a national court and not necessarily 
before the Tribunal. However, at this point an examination of the type and 
degree of violation would be relevant. For instance, luring is not the same as 
abduction158• An egregious violation could also lead to the court not asserting 
jurisdiction l59, or alternatively, granting compensation if the person is 
acquitted, or a reduction in the sentence if convicted 160. 
In the ICC, however, this is a different matter altogether. For the ICC 
was created with direct input by States which will be the very same parties that 
will be called upon to carry out arrests. Going back to the agency test, it would 
be easily discernible in the ICC, as States parties to it will be the visible actors 
in arrests. If, however, the equivalent of SFOR were to assist, then the same 
solution as for the Tribunals would apply. 
1S6 The Nicaragua Case revolved around the issue of control. Military and Paramilitarv 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA). (Merits), [1986] ICJ Reps. 70, p a r a ~ . .
114-115. 
IS7 Ibid. surpa n.144. 
158 Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic. ibid. supra n. 142, para. 56. 
159 Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza. ibid. supra. n. 153, para. 74. See also Nikolic Appeal, ibid. 
s ~ r a , , 144, para. 29-30.. , . 
I Prosecutor v. Barayagwlza. Prosecutor s Request for ReView or Reconsideration, 31 March 
2000, (ICfR-97-19-AR72). See also Letters from the ICTY President to the SG, S/2000/904 
and S/2002/304. See Johnson, (2004), 374; Beresford, (2002), 628. 
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The ICC Statute, reacting perhaps to the Tribunals' case-law, includes a 
provision that deals with irregularities of arrest in tenns of providing 
compensation l61 • It should be examined whether the ICC should be the only 
forum where irregularities should be addressed or whether the individual 
concerned would be entitled to raise this issue before national courts as well. 
As will be seen in the final chapter, the approach of States in their 
implementing laws is far from clear. However, since irregularities of arrest do 
not constitute a reason for refusing surrender to the ICC, it should be accepted 
that surrender should take place anyway, and the ICC would be the exclusive 
forum to deal with such issues rather than States releasing the accused before 
surrender. However, apart from the ICC, would an accused, if his motion fails, 
be entitled to raise it before national courts? Arguably this is correct, 
depending on the domestic system. 
To conclude, the arrest of the indictees is a fundamental issue for the 
functioning of the Tribunals. The problems which arise in the course of arrests 
are likely to be raised in the subsequent trials. However. it is a question of 
balance between the genuine interest of the international community to have 
the alleged criminals arrested notwithstanding the procedure to be followed, 
and the rights of the accused in question, which should not in any case be 
violated. Addressing such violations either nationally or intemationally is 
therefore important. 
161 Article 85 ICC Statute. 
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5. Competing Requests 
In recognition of States' other obligations, besides those arising from 
the ICC Statute, competing requests are dealt with therein. Prioritising between 
competing requests is a daunting task even within a single State. When it 
comes to the Tribunals and the ICC however, this task is not likely to be 
simple. Unlike the ad hoc Tribunals which, because they are based on the 
Charter can afford to extend their coercive powers above and beyond arrest and 
surrender to ensure primacy over any competing requests, the ICC is not 
"immune" from such issues. 
Rule 58 of the ICTY and the ICTR RPE, assert, rather authoritatively, 
the prevalence of a Tribunal request over extradition, and could be used as a 
basis for dealing with competing extradition requests as well. 
For the ICC, Article 90 covers a range of different situations. The 
relationship between the Court, the requested State and the requesting State is 
complex, depending on the nature of the conduct, membership of the Court and 
the existence of an international obligation covering the extradition request. 
Undoubtedly, the issue of conflicting requests raised much controversy in the 
negotiation of the Rome Statute since it is reflective of the role the drafters 
were willing to grant the Court, i.e. whether or not the obligations towards it 
prevail over those towards States. In fact, this is largely dependent on whether 
the States involved are parties to the Statute or not and whether surrender and 
extradition are sought for the same person and for the very same crime. 
Needless to say, the issue is inextricably linked to the question of 
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complementarityJ62, and depends on the ruling of the Court on the admissibility 
of the case at hand. 
A requested State, which is a party to the ICC Statute, has different 
duties from a State which is not, depending on whether surrender and 
extradition involves the same conduct or not. And again, when a competing 
request involves the same conduct, sought both by the ICC and the requesting 
State, whether the requesting State is a State party to the Rome Statute or not is 
crucial. These different situations will be taken in tum to examine what the 
requested State ought to do in each case. The Statute in Article 90 maps out the 
different situations quite clearly. 
When competing requests involve the same conduct, the next step will 
be to examine whether the extradition request comes from a State party or not. 
In the former case, priority should be given to the ICC, if the case has been 
deemed to be admissible in accordance with Articles 18 and 19 of the 
StatuteJ63 • The solution reached in this instance is in line with the intention of 
the States that become parties to the Statute to subject themselves to the Court. 
However, if the Court has not yet ruled on the admissibility of the case the 
requested State has the right to continue to deal with the extradition request, 
though without, extraditing the accused to the other State before the 
determination of the admissibility by the Court 1 64. The adopted formula 
assuages both the concerns of States that are required under bilateral 
obligations or national law to proceed expeditiously with extradition requests, 
as well as those of States that did not want a State's request to supersede that of 
162 See supra chapter 2. 
163 Article 90(2)(a). 
164 Article 90(3). 
137 
Co-operation 
the Court. It is evident that this provision applies only to the State Parties to the 
Statute. 
In the case in which the requesting State is not a party to the ICC treaty, 
different approaches are adopted in Article 90, depending on the existence of 
. . I bl·· d· d·· 165 b h fl66 In th an mternatlOna 0 IgatlOn regar mg extra lhon , or a sence t ereo. e 
latter case, and provided that the case is admissible, the Court's request should 
be given priority by the requested State, as there is no international obligation 
to be fulfilled towards the non-State party, allowing the Court's request to 
prevail. However, this priority granted to the Court is limited only to cases that 
are admissible before it so as to safeguard its complementary nature. Should 
the admissibility of the case be still pending, discretion is allowed to the 
requested State to deal with the extradition requese 67. The solution provided in 
Article 90(5) is akin to the one found in paragraph 3 of the same Article. 
Provided that an international obligation exists between the requested 
and the requesting State, the decision to proceed with the execution of the 
Court's request or with the extradition lies with the requested State l68• The 
decision shall be made taking into account a number of relevant factors such as 
the date of the requests, the territoriality and nationality of the claims and the 
possibility of a subsequent surrender to the Court l69• This paragraph is 
indicative of a general approach followed in various extradition treaties in this 
respectl70. Since this situation involves two competing international obligations 
the decision is left to the State. This provision, however, places co-operation 
165 Article 90( 6}. 
166 Article 90(4}. 
167 Article 90(5). 
168 Article 90( 6}. 
169 ibid. 
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owed to the Court on an equal footing with an obligation towards a non - Party. 
Any different fonnulation would have been unfair for States that are not parties 
to the Statute171 . The list of factors enshrined in Article 90(6) of the Statute is 
not exhaustive. The emphasis is on the fact that the requested State should 
consider all the relevant factors of the particular case before granting the 
request to either the Court or the third State. 
Having examined conflicting requests regarding the same conduct, it 
remains to examine the possibility of competing requests relating to a conduct 
which does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. When the competing 
extradition request involves different conduct to the one for which surrender to 
the ICC is sought, Article 90(7) of the Statute does not distinguish between 
parties and non-parties to the Statute. Essentially, the provision adopts the 
same approach as when dealing with conflicting requests regarding the same 
conduct when the extradition request is made by a non-party to the ICC Statute. 
This is also evidenced by the language used, which is identical. Accordingly, in 
the absence of an extradition obligation, the Court's request shall prevail. In 
addition, Article 90(7)(b) repeats mutatis mutandis Article 90(6). However, the 
requested State has the discretion to decide in relation to a request from both a 
State Party and a non-State Party. The nature and gravity of the conduct should 
therefore be emphasised. 
An obligation to notify the Court can be found in two instances in 
Article 90172• First, when the requested State receives any competing requests, 
170 See for instance Article 17 of the European Convention on Extradition, 359 UNTS 273 and 
Article 16 of the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, UN Doc. 
AlCONF . 144/28/Rev .1 
171 Cf. Cassese (2003), 359 who advocates ICC primacy given it being a "universal criminal 
court", and due to the Statute's purpose to "administer international justice in the interest of 
r,eace" (emphasis in the original). 
72 See Article 90(1) and (8). 
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and second, at a much later stage of the proceedings, when the Court has 
determined the case is inadmissible and the extradition has been refused. In the 
case of 90( I) notification is necessary in order to alert the Court to the 
existence of competing requests, and to ensure that it deals with the 
admissibility question, where relevant, under its expedited procedure. 
Notification found in Article 90(8) may be explained since, even though the 
Court has declared the inadmissibility of the case, the request for extradition 
has failed. This might give another opportunity to the Court to perhaps 
reconsider the case and establish its admissibility, under Article 19( 10). 
The inclusion of competing requests helps to avoid conflicts and is part 
of the mechanism enshrined in the Statute attempting to strike a balance 
between States parties' obligations towards the Statute and third parties, and 
the quest for an effective co-operation regime. In other words, the Statute 
recognises that the Court operates in a mUlti-player, multilateral environment 
and that necessary concessions need to be made. 
6. Postponement of Co-operation 
Postponement of execution is another tool in the Court's annoury. 
Instead of an outright refusal, emphasis is placed on accommodating 
conflicting situations. Postponing the execution of a co-operation request is 
unique to the ICC Statute. Article 89(2), deals with the ne bis in idem 
principle)73. Notwithstanding the Court's ability to decide its own jurisdiction, 
the Statute recognises the possibility that individuals may also file applications 
relating to admissibility before national courts. In such a case, consultation 
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between the two courts should not be precluded. From that it follows that once 
the request is made and the case is admissible l7\ the national courts have to 
proceed with the execution of the request. This is not so, if the case is ruled by 
the Court as inadmissible and the Court has not subsequently withdrawn the 
request175• If, however, the issue of admissibility is not yet decided by the 
Court, the State is entitled to postpone the execution of the request until there is 
d .. 176 a eClSlon . 
An admissibility challenge before the ICC itself, also constitutes a 
reason for postponementl77 • It makes sense for the Court to establish its 
jurisdiction first, before a co-operation request is executed. 
Finally, Article 94 constitutes another concession to State authority. 
This time, postponement is sought when the execution of the request would 
interfere with ongoing investigation of a different case to the one before the 
ICC. Although reasonable, the possibility of a minor offence triggering 
postponement to the detriment of the case before the ICC, should not be 
disregarded. 
Postponement is unique to the ICC and has not been part of State co-
operation with the Tribunals. The inclusion of this provision for the ICC is 
reasonable and part of a wider mechanism to ultimately ensure co-operation. 
173 See supra chapter 2. 
174 Problems might arise if an initially admissible case is appealed in accordance with article 
19( 6) in conjunction with 82( 1)( a). 
175 In exceptional cases though the Court will uphold its request. See for instance Article 
SI(3)(c)(i) of the Statute. 
176 However, according to one view this should not be applied to an affirmative ruling by the 
Court which has subsequently been the object of appeal. See KreB, and Prost, ibid. supm 
n.107, 1076. 
177 Article 95 ICC Statute. 
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7. Grounds for Refusing Requests for Co-operation 
It has been established already that the Statutes of both the Tribunals 
and the ICC envisage an obligation to co-operate by States which seems to be 
quite powerful. However, in the case of the Tribunals, reasons for refusal have 
been raised in a number of instances, whereas in the ICC, specific grounds for 
denying the execution of a co-operation request can be found in its Statute. 
7.1 ICTY: de/acto Refusal to Execute Co-operation Requests 
In the Tribunals' practice, several grounds for denying co-operation 
have emerged. Invoked primarily by States in the former Yugoslavia, they have 
focused on the lack of domestic legislation to co-operate, the prohibition of 
extradition of nationals and national security. 
Although no specific provision to enact implementing legislation can be 
found in the Tribunals' Statutes, the obligation to do so derives from their 
primacy. Moreover, this does not mean that States can invoke the lack of such 
legislation in order to avoid co-operation178• In fact, the obligation to co-
operate with the Tribunals is so strong that any opposite conclusion would limit 
their primacy and overarching jurisdiction. Problems with implementing 
legislation arose also with regard to the US, in the case of surrender of 
178 See for instance position of FRY which refused co-operation on the grounds of failing to 
enact such legislation. Fourth ICTY Annual Report, ibid. supra n. 69, para. 150. 
142 
Co-operation 
Elizaphan Ntakimtimanal79, where it became clear that what matters IS co-
operation 180 and that there are no grounds for refusal. 
Moreover, domestic legal prohibitions against the extradition of a 
State's own nationals have been invoked as another reason to deny surrender of 
persons sought by the Tribunals. In civil law countries there is generally such a 
prohibition which is usually incorporated in the constitution l81 . This was also 
the case with Yugoslavia, which noted that the creation of the ICTY is contrary 
to the Constitution of FRY which prohibits extradition of nationals, and any 
decision of Security Council on this question would have to be approved by the 
Yugoslav Parliamene 82• Taking into consideration that most of the suspects of 
the crimes committed in the course of the Yugoslav conflict were nationals of 
the former Yugoslavia, should such a restriction be accepted, it would 
eviscerate any obligation on the states of the former Yugoslavia to surrender 
suspects l83 • This would thwart the purpose of international criminal justice 
179 For an analysis see inter alia, Coombs, (2000), 171; Murphy, (2000), 131; 
Alexandropoulos, (2000), 107; Schrnertz, and Meier, (1999), 99; Wallach, (1998), 59; Sluiter 
(1998),383; Sluiter (2000),459. 
180 See also in the UK, domestic debate over the enactment of co-operation legislation by 
means of an Order in Council. See Warbrick, (1996), 947; Fox, (1997),434. 
181 Dascalopoulou-Livada, in Koufa, (1997), 123. For an analysis of the issue with regard to 
German law see Oellers-Frahm, (1995), 307-308; for the Greek law see Vassilakakis (1995), 
1271-1272. For constitutional law questions regarding the transfer of M i l o ~ e v i c c to the ICTY. 
see Magliveras, (2002),661; idem, (2002), 198. 
182 See also the letter from the former UN Secretary - General Boutros Boutros - Ghali, to the 
Deputy Prime Minister and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) dated 27 April 1994, in reply to a letter from the latter in 
which he declined all co-operation by the FRY with the Tribunal. The Secretary - General's 
letter concludes: "It is therefore the position of the Secretary - General that the International 
Tribunal was established in full compliance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, 
and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, like all other States members of the United 
Nations, is bound to give effect to Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, and to comply to that end with any requests of the International Tribunal for 
assistance, including, in particular, a request for the transfer or surrender of an accused, 
regardless of his nationality. It is the hope of the Secretary - General and that of the Security 
Council that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will cooperate with the Tribunal in the spirit 
of Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) and the Statute of the International Tribunal" as 
cited by Jones, (1998), 205. 
183 Harris, Kushen, ibid. supra n. 5, 571. The issue of the constitutional prohibition of 
extradition or transfer of Yugoslav nationals was raised by M i l o ~ e v i c c himself. This was 
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since most of the accused would not have been brought before the international 
Tribunals. In any case this would not be considered as consistent with the SC's 
intention. 
In order to strengthen this conclusion, the Judges have devoted a Rule 
in the RPE which deals with this questionl84 . Rule 58 further elaborates the 
scope of obligations in Article 29 on the national government to co-operate. 
The said rule effectively codifies the principle of customary international law 
pursuant to which a State cannot adduce its constitution or its law as defence 
for failure to carry out its international obligations 185. Hence, the obligation to 
surrender the accused prevails over any legal impediment which may exist 
d . 11 186 un er natlOna aw . 
It should be noted that the "confusion" of transfer with extradition is 
not a genuine one. In the situation where States try to put forward arguments 
rejected by the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, ibid. supra n. 145. para. 
47. 
184 Rule 58. 
18S This is generally recognised position in international law which can be also found in 
decisions of the World Court. See inter alia. Polish Nationals in Danzig Case, where the 
Permanent Court of International Justice held that: "It should [ ... ] be observed that [ ... ] 
according to generally accepted principles [ ... ] a State cannot adduce as against another State 
its own constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international 
law or treaties in force" (PCIJ, Ser. AlB. no. 44, 1931, at p. 24). See also the Lockerbie Case, 
where the ICJ found in, 15 and 126 that in confonnity with Article 103 of the UN Charter, the 
obligations of the parties deriving therefrom prevailed over their obligations deriving from any 
other international agreement. Moreover, in the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations 
Advisory Opinion of21 February 1925, (Set. B, No. 10) the pel] emphasised in, 20 the "self-
evident principle according to which a State is bound to make in its legislation such 
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of a validly contracted international 
obligation". In the Georges Pinson case, brought before the France-Mexico Claims 
Commission, the umpire dismissed the view that in case of conflict between the Constitution of 
a State and international law, the former should prevail, by highlighting that this view was 
"absolutely contrary to the very axioms of international law (absolument contraire aux axiomes 
memes du droit international" (decision of 18 October 1928, in United Nations Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, vol. V., 393-394. See also Article 27, first sentence of the 
VCLT where it is clearly stated that: "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law 
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty". And, Third Restatement of the Law The 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, vol. I, (1987), para. 115b. ' 
186 ICTY Press Release: CCIPIO/030-E, 6 February 1996. Judge Jorda also maintained that 
"one conceivably would construe that A r t i ~ l e e 29 ~ r a c t i c a l 1 y y acts with the force of jus cogens 
and operates as a peremptory norm to ovemde natIonal laws and extradition treaties that might 
conflict with it". Ibid. supra n. 5, 91, fn 44. 
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which would normally be sound and produce results in common extradition 
cases, this should be attributed to the mere fact that politically it is convenient 
for the recalcitrant States to present the request in those terms. There is no 
genuine misunderstanding of the obligation of States. In the view of this 
author, the States are conscious of their obligations under Article 29 and 28 of 
the Statutes. However, in practice they dislike the fact that this obligation is a 
strenuous one and that they do not have control over the situation. 
Finally, another issue that has been raised in order to refuse co-operation 
relates to national security. The ICTY gave its unequivocal answer when it 
held in the Blafkit case187 : "To admit that a State holding such documents may 
unilaterally assert national security claims and refuse to surrender those 
documents could lead to the stultification of international criminal proceedings: 
those documents might prove crucial for deciding whether the accused is 
innocent or guilty. The very raison d'etre of the International Tribunal would 
then be undermined". 
From the above it is clear that although the Tribunals' Statutes are very 
clear regarding the obligation to co-operate, some States have often tried to 
avoid their jurisdiction. 
7.2 ICC: dejure Refusal to Execute Co-operation Requests 
In the ICC Statute, on the other hand, there are some provisions which 
allow a State party to refuse co-operation with the Court. The presence of these 
provisions is the outcome of a hard fought "battle" in the negotiation of the 
Statute. Since the regime the Statute represents is closer to a horizontal 
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approach, the existence of grounds for refusal to co-operate is to be expected. 
When control is left to States, such grounds are likely to be plentiful. The battle 
though in the Statute focuses at the same time on enabling an essentially 
horizontal system to become more vertical. A close look at the relevant 
provisions reveals that refusal is limited and the Statute seems to have 
addressed what was an issue in State co-operation with the Tribunals. The lack 
of national legislation is addressed in Article 88 ICC Statute. Refusal to 
surrender one's own nationals has been tackled by distinguishing surrender 
from extradition, in Article 102. Conversely, national security features 
prominently now as a reason for refusal and will be examined below. For the 
purposes of our analysis, the reasons for denial of co-operation will be 
categorised as "endogenous" or "exogenous". The fonner arise within the 
relationship of a State party and the ICC, whereas the latter constitute grounds 
for refusal to execute an ICC request, but stem from the impact of a State 
party's relationship with a third party. 
7.2.1 Endogenous Grounds for Refusal 
In the relationship between States parties and the ICC, refusal to co-
operate with the Court is limited to strictly defined situations. It is important to 
emphasise that the foreseen endogenous grounds for refusal do not apply to the 
execution of an arrest and surrender request, but relate only to other requests 
for co-operation contained in Article 93, where the grounds for refusal are also 
found. Article 93 contains, particularly in its first paragraph, a number forms of 
assistance that may be requested by a State. These provisions are very 
187 Ibid. supra n. 8, para. 65. 
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reasonable and although they merit greater exploration they will not be 
examined here. Instead, emphasis will be placed on the grounds for refusal. 
Article 93(1)(1), contains the first possibility for refusing such a request. 
Essentially, this provision was included to allow a potential request not 
included in 93(1) at the time of drafting. However, in line with using domestic 
procedures, and given the vagueness of this provision regarding its content, a 
State is given the possibility to deny execution of a request that is prohibited by 
its domestic law l88 . The practical applicability of this provision is questionable, 
since it is hard to imagine a co-operation request beyond what is already 
present in 93(1). In any case, this ground of refusal is understandable and least 
problematic. 
Of more concern IS Article 93(3) which represents a compromise 
solution and was inserted in the Statute instead of a broad category of grounds 
for refusal189. Pursuant to this provision, a State may refuse to execute a 
particular measure of assistance if execution of that measure is prohibited by 
the law of that State on the basis of "an existing fundamental legal principle of 
general application". Accordingly, the Article recognises that although the 
State must have incorporated the co-operation regime into the national sphere 
in accordance with Article 88 of the Statute, it may be that some particular 
measures requested by the Court are prohibited by nationallaw l90 . It should be 
188 It should be noted however, that this should not happen outright, as following Article 93(5), 
the possibility of considering providing the assistance in an alternative manner should be 
exhausted first. 
189 Article 90(2) of the Draft. Statute ~ C O N F F .183/2/ Add. 1 , .171 contained an option according 
to which a State would be 1 ~ . . a posItion to deny co-operatlon with the Court if according to 
subparagraph (b) the authoTltles of the requested State would be prohibited by national law 
from carrying out the requested action in similar circumstances. Moreover, subparagraph (c) 
allowed refusal where ordre public or other essential interests would be prejudiced. 
190 For instance, denial of a form of co-operation, e.g. compelling witnesses is not allowed. 
Under this Article though, in the specific circumstances, the measure is prohibited; e.g. 
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noted however, that not every legal principle under national law triggers the 
application of Article 93(3). It has to be a fundamental principle i.e. a principle 
which cannot be easily amended and, in addition, a principle of general 
application in the national legislation of the State in question191 • T h ~ ~ inclusion 
of this provision serves the concerns of the States to preserve the fundamental 
aspects of their legal systems and, at the same time, helps the Court to fulfil its 
goals since the obstacles otherwise found in the States are significantly limited. 
However, the fact that no examples are provided in the Statute as to what 
would fall under this category of principles might prove to be problematic in 
practice since some States are likely to adopt a wide reading of this provision 
·d .. h h C 192 in order to avOl co-operatIon WIt t e ourt . It would have been preferable 
to find some indication in the RPE or elsewhere in the Statute. 
Should Article 93(3) be applied, the State is not entitled to deny co-
operation with the Court ab initio. There is an obligation to enter into 
consultations with the Court. The aim is to try to find an acceptable way to 
overcome the problem. Again, it is evident from this provision that 
consultation has a very significant role to play. In fact, in a system where States 
have the leading role, it is essential to embrace methods which would tackle the 
(anticipated?) unwillingness to comply with the provisions of the Statute. 
Consultation then comes in as a substitute to fill in the gap which exists in the 
compelling a solicitor to testify about matters covered by the solicitor-client privilege. See 
Prost, and Schlunck, in Triffierer, (1999), 1111-1112. 
191 Obviously, the principle in question has to be present at the time the Court makes its 
request, because any different interpretation would unnecessarily expand the State's discretion 
to comply. 
192 The concept is reminiscent of Article 46 VCLT which enables a State to argue that its 
consent to a treaty violates internal law only where "that violation was manifest and concerned 
a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance". However, this is not of much assistance 
for the application of the concept in international criminal law. 
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system l93 . Finally, Article 93(3) provides for the modification of the request by 
the Court in order to be in accordance with the requirements laid down in the 
domestic legal system. This is again evidence of the lenience the Statute shows 
towards the State concerned in an effort to make the request successful. 
However, whereas most of the time this will be the case, the Statute does not 
address the case in which the request cannot be modified. In such a case, it 
should be accepted that the Court will not be in the position to pursue its 
request in the fonn sought. 
Another ground for denial, explicitly enshrined in the Statute, can be found 
in Article 93(4). Read together with Article 72, assistance may be denied on 
the basis of its impact on national security infonnation l94• What constitutes 
"national security" under Article 93(4) is essentially for the State concerned to 
decide. However, the three-step procedure described in Article 72 has to be 
followed before denying co-operation. Article 72, although influenced by the 
Blaskii: case l95 , reaches the opposite conclusion. Instead of obliging the State 
to co-operate, all the Court can do is to assess the denial of assistance and take 
the relevant measures in case of failure to co-operate 196. 
7.2.2 Exogenous Grounds for Refusal 
As the ICC operates in a multilateral system where not all States will be 
parties to it, it is important to allow for situations where a State party will have 
193 See also Article 97 ICC Statute. 
194 On Article 72, see Trimerer, in Roggemann, S a r ~ e v i c , , (2002), 53; Behrens, ibid., liS. 
195 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 1997, (IT-99-14-ARI08bis), paras. 
67-69. 
196 Pursuant to Article 87(7) ICC Statute. 
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to deny the execution of a co-operation request, because of another conflicting 
obligation owed to a third State. 
As seen already, this may arise for instance in case of a surrender request 
competing with an extradition request under certain circumstances l97 . A similar 
rationale applies to Article 93(9)(a) with regard to competing requests other 
than surrender l98 . A rather more interesting provision is Article 93(9)(b) which 
pertains to information, property or persons subject to the control of a third 
State or organisation. Essentially, the requested State shall deny execution of a 
request with regard to the above and shall infonn the Court of this fact, which 
will then redirect its request to the third State or organisation l99• Whether the 
"third State" is required to co-operate depends whether another State party 
would fall under the category of a third State with regard to this provision or 
Of yet more interest is Article 98 of the Statute, not least because the US 
has concentrated its efforts to bypass the Statute mainly on paragraph 2 of this 
provision2ol • Article 98(1) refers to requests which are inconsistent with the 
obligations of the state in question under international law or international 
agreements with respect to State or diplomatic immunitY02. Article 98( 1 ) 
197 See analysis of Article 90, supra section 5. 
198 This is evident from Article 93(9)(a)(ii) which explicitly refers to the procedure enshrined in 
Article 90. However, as 93(9)(a)(i) refers only to situations where there is an international 
obligation, it should be inferred that in instances where there is no international obligation, 
r.riority should be given to the Court. 
99 As Ciampi, in Cassese, Gaeta, Jones (2002), 1735, observes, the procedure in this provision 
is similar to Article 98 ICC Statute. 
200 Ciampi, ibid. 
201 For a comprehensive chart on the current developments regarding BIAs see: 
htlJ?:/ /www.iccnow.orgidocuments!otherissueS!impunityart98/BlAD B current. xis . ' 
202 Of relevance on the issue of immunities are the Pinochet and Yerodia Cases which discuss 
immunities with regard to international crimes. The latter in particular is of dubious value. See 
R v Bow Stipendiary Magistrate Ex P a r ~ e e Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) 
[No.3] [2000] 1 AC 147; C a ~ e e Concernmg the Arrest Warrant of April 11th 2000, (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v BelgIUm), 14 February 2002, 41 ILM (2002), 536. Cf. the SLSC 
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requires that the Court should not proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance if it recognises that this request conflicts with the State or diplomatic 
immunity of a person or property of a third State, under international law. In 
essence whenever the ICC has a person before it, immunities cannot be 
invoked203. However, because of possible immunities attached by non-parties, 
Article 98 contains a provision to deal with this issue. The obligation not to 
place the State in a position of conflict rests with the Court204. In fact the Court 
may either decide not to pursue the request or to engage in negotiations with 
that third State so as to waive the immunity. In the latter case, the waiver of 
immunity is sought by the Court before pursuing the request. It is possible, by 
virtue of Article 98, to have a bar to jurisdiction should waiver not be obtained. 
Moreover, Article 98(2)'s intention was to cover the specific 
relationship arising out of Status of Forces Agreements205, by virtue of which 
foreign troops remain in the jurisdiction of the sending State. Article 98 was 
meant to facilitate this relationship206. In an attempt to undermine the ICC the 
US has concluded bilateral immunity agreements whereby States parties to 
them undertake not to surrender any US citizens to the ICC. A detailed 
investigation into the lawfulness of these agreements as well as their impact on 
Decision in Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Tay/or, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 
31 May 2004, SCSL-2003-01-I. 
203 Article 27 ICC Statute. 
204 Cf. initial proposal by Singapore under which the Court would have been obliged to seek 
the consent of the third State. 
20S Under such agreements the members of the armed forces of a third State may be present on 
the territory of the requested State. 
206 See also Rule 195 RPE which was adopted with a specific mention that the Rule does not 
change Article 98 ICC Statute. For an interesting discussion regarding the background to the 
adoption of this Rule, see Harhoff, and Mochochoko in Lee, (2001). 664-669; see also Gartner 
in Fischer, KreJ3, and Liider (2001), 430-433. • 
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the Court are a matter of interest, but go beyond the scope of the present 
. 207 
sectIOn . 
The inclusion of this provision in the Statute as an exogenous ground 
for refusal had, as its purpose, the co-ordination of the conflicting obligations 
of States parties to the Court with obligations arising out of relationship with 
third States. It is clear, however, that this discretion has been abused by certain 
States to the detriment of the effective operation of the Court. 
From the above analysis it is clear that mostly the exogenous, but also 
some of the endogenous grounds for refusal to provide co-operation to the 
Court are premised on procedural rather than substantive issues. This in part is 
an achievement. However, the mere existence of such grounds, although 
inevitable due to the very nature of the new institution, is expected to be used 
widely by some States in order to escape compliance with the requests of the 
Court. 
8. Failure to Co-operate 
Co-operation with the Tribunals has not always been forthcoming. 
More often than not, States have failed to co-operate as evidenced by the 
number of accused still at large208• Non-co-operation has been a serious 
problem particularly for the IeTY. Some States of the former Yugoslavia have 
consistently refused to co-operate with the Tribunal. In Rwanda, co-operation 
207 For a very interesting discussion on this issue as well as the question of immunities and the 
relationship between Articles 27 and 98 ICC Statute see the excellent article by Akande, 
(2004),407. See also, idem., (2003), 618; Wirth (2001), 429; MeiBner, (2003), 119-134. 
208 See Appendix. 
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has been less problematic209• Co-operlltion with the ICC is also expected to be 
a cause for concern. All institutions lack coercive powers to enforce orders and 
authority to act against non-complying States. The ad hoc Tribunals therefore 
depend on the SC for such enforcement, whereas this task is left to the State 
parties to the ICC Statute in the case of the Court. This failure to secure State 
co-operation affects the overall effectiveness of the international criminal 
justice system. In this section, there will be an examination of how the Statutes 
of the Tribunals and the ICC deal with failure by States to co-operate. 
8.1 Failure to Co-operate with the ICTY and the ICTR: Emphasis on SC 
(In)action 
It would have been naIve to expect that co-operation would be secured 
on each and every occasion. Yet, the Tribunals' Statutes remain silent on the 
issue and do not contain a specific provision that deals with failure to co-
operate. It is again in the RPE where the sanction for non-co-operation can be 
found21O. Perhaps it was anticipated that, because the Tribunals were created by 
the SC, States would comply with requests made by its "offspring,,211. 
Although, in theory, failure to comply could entail the application of 
non-forcible measures under Article 41 UN Charter, no such use has ever been 
209 Ibid. Note how many different States have assisted with arresting persons indicted by the 
ICTR. See Appendix. See ICTR Fact Sheet No.6, available at: www.ictr.orgldefault.htm . 
210 Rules 11, 13,59,61 and most importantly Rule 7bis. RPE. Reference to this Rule was made 
in the Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoenae 
Duces Tecum in the Blaskic case (IT-95-14-PT), of 18 July 1997, in para 34 where it was held 
that ..... the adoption of Rule 7 bis is clearly to be regarded as falling within the authority of the 
International Tribunal". For a critical analysis see Mundis in May, Tolbert, Hocking, Roberts. 
Jia, Mundis, and Oosthuizen, (2001), 436-438. in particular. 
211 Klarin, (2004). 548 maintains that Cassese and other Judges admit that their expectations in 
the early stages of the ICTY's operation "were the fruit of 'terrible naivety' and 'sheer 
ignorance .... 
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made by the SC so far. All the SC has dope is to limit itself to issuing 
statements deploring/condemning failure to comply in the form of presidential 
statements212 . It has taken no binding decisions as yet against a State for failure 
to comply. The closest the SC came to condemning the lack of co-operation 
was Resolution 1207213 • 
The question is then what the Tribunal can do to tackle failure to co-
operate. In truth, not very much. A judicial body can only limit itself to judicial 
findings of non-eo-operation. This was summarised in the Blaskic subpoena 
case where the Appeals Chamber held that "the International Tribunal is not 
vested with any enforcement or sanctionary powers vis-a-vis States [ ... ]. 
However, the International Tribunal is endowed with the inherent power to 
make ajudicial finding concerning a State's failure to observe the provisions of 
the Statute or the Rules. It also has the power to report this judicial finding to 
the Security Council,,214. It went on to underline that "the finding by the 
International Tribunal must not include any recommendations or suggestions as 
the course of action the Security Council may wish to take as a consequence of 
that finding. [ ... ] [T]be International Tribunal may not encroach upon the 
sanctionary powers accruing to the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter,,215. It is therefore up to the SC to decide the fonn 
of action and the Tribunal cannot have any input in that respect. 
212 See Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN SCOR, 3663th mtg., UN Doc. 
SIPRST/1996/23 (1996); See also Statement by the President of the Security Council UN 
th ' SCOR,3687 mtg., UN Doc. SIPRST/1996/34 (1996) which condemn the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia's lack of co-operation with the Tribunal. 
213 SlRES/1207 (1998),17 November 1998. Paragraph 3 of this Resolution reads: "Condemns 
the failure to date of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to execute the arrest warrants issued 
by the Tribunal against the three individuals referred to in the letter of 8 September 1998 and 
demands the immediate and unconditional execution of those arrest warrants, i n c l u d i n ~ ~ the 
transfer to the custody ofthe Tribunal of those individuals". 
214 Prosecutor v Blaskic, ibid. supra n. 8, para. 33. 
215 Ibid., para. 36. 
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It is clear that there is a gap between the theoretic;:!Uy binding nature of 
the international Tribunals' orders and de facto limitation of co-operation to 
cases of voluntary State compliance. In fact, given the Tribunals' primacy, it 
would have been expected that it would be common for the SC to take action to 
tackle non-co-operation. The SC has so far abstained from using its powers to 
effectively deal with failure to co-operate with the Tribunals. Although the law 
allows wide-ranging means to tackle non-compliance, in practice, SC action, or 
rather inaction, hardly meets its potential, thus having a negative impact on the 
effectiveness of the system. 
It could be therefore argued that, in essence, the enforcement system of 
the ad hoc Tribunals could be equated with that of the ICC, notwithstanding 
their different legal basis. That is to say, that despite the Chapter VII basis of 
the Tribunals, compliance, at least in practice, is left to the States themselves, 
as is the case with the treaty-based ICC. Compliance in the Tribunals in 
practice is voluntary for both institutions. What matters then is which of the 
two has the procedures in place for the system to work. 
Given SC inaction, the ICTY had to devise other mechanisms to tackle 
State unwillingness to provide assistance to the Tribunal. There are two interim 
solutions which merit greater attention. First, the use of sealed indictments, and 
second, Rule 61 proceedings. 
8.1.1 Sealed Indictments: Catching the Indictees by Surprise 
The ICTY Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, dealt with the lack of arrests by 
introducing sealed indictments. Although this is the norm in domestic legal 
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systems, at the international level, it was certainly a change from the 
prosecutorial strategy of her predecessor216 . Arbour herself, although 
recognising that other factors contributed to the success of her policy, 
nevertheless was of the opinion that sealed indictments were critical for many 
of the arrests217. The main advantage of secret indictments is the element of 
surprise. By publicising the indictments, indictees were given a head start and 
time to flee the former Yugoslavia21S. Moreover, the use of sealed indictments 
means that control stays with the OTP to channel their resources the way they 
want, and they also have the ability to expose NATO's inefficiency m 
~ ~ . t 219 eflectuatmg arres s . 
Although the authority to issue secret indictment is not explicitly in the 
Statute220, the RPE provide the legal basis for non-disclosure221 • 
Sealed indictments have given the ICTY the impetus to arrest many of 
the accused. In 2003, most of the indictments were made public due to 
assurances given by the FRY and the Republika Srpska that they would arrest 
the accused, which, in the latter case have not been met222• 
The use of sealed indictments for the ICC might also be of assistance. 
However, the obligation to inform all States parties and States that would 
216 Goldstone's strategy was based on a public exercise. Throughout his term he travelled 
extensively to various countries to seek their co-operation with the ICTY. See Goldstone, 
(2004),380. Although necessary at the early stages of the Tribunal, it did not bear fruit. 
217 Arbour, (2004), 397. 
218 Arbour, (1999), 39, where she is very critical of public indictments. Moreover, in 41-42, she 
describes the application of sealed indictments to the ICTR, which received much less attention 
than the ICTY. With regard to the ICTR, see also Press Briefing by the Chief Prosecutor, 
ICTYIICTR, 21 July 1997, quoted in Morris, and Scharf, (1998), 482. 
219 Hagan, ibid. supra n. 124, 101. 
220 Retif, (2001), 240. 
22\ Rule 53. See also Vohrah in McDonald, and Swaak-Goldman, (2000), who maintains that 
Rule 53 could be used also beyond the pre-trial phase of proceedings. 
222 Ninth ICTY Annual Report, ibid. supra n. 69, para. 216. 
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normally exercise jurisdiction223 might significantly curtail the effectiveness of 
sealed indictments for the ICC. 
8.1.2 Rule 61 Proceedings: Judicial Antidote to State Non-compliance? 
Among the Tribunals' RPE, Rule 61 224 is definitely the most well 
known provision. Its legitimacy and effectiveness is controversial. Rule 61 was 
conceived as a means of tackling unwillingness to co-operate by certain States. 
Its application, however, has had ramifications for a variety of issues and gives 
rise to a set of questions which lie beyond the issue of the failure to co-
operate225 • 
The rationale of this judicial process is provided by Judge Sidhwa in his 
separate opinion in the Rajii: casi26: 
Rule 61 is basically an apology for this Tribunal's helplessness in not being 
able to effectively carry out its duties, because of the attitude of certain 
States that do not want to arrest or surrender accused persons, or even to 
recognise or co-operate with the Tribunal. In such circumstances, it is the 
International Tribunal's painful and regrettable duty to adopt the next 
effective procedure to inform the world, through open public hearings, of 
the terrible crimes with which the accused is charged and the evidence 
against the accused that would support his conviction at trial. 
The nature of a Rule 61 hearing is sui generis and of dubious 
procedural legality. On the one hand, it is not strictly speaking a proper trial, 
since no determination of guilt or innocence can be made, and subsequent trial 
223 Article 18(1) ICC Statute. 
224 On Rule 61 see inter alia, Thierhoff and Amley, (1998), 231-274; Quintal, (1998), 723-759; 
King, (1997),523-554; Hildreth, (1998), 499-524; Swaak-Goldman, (1997), 523-532; Maison, 
(1996),284-299. 
22S Channelling prosecutorial resources away from investigating more cases into preparing and 
presenting cases that might never materialise given the inability to arrest the accused is 
certainly a serious issue. 
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once the accused is arrested is not precluded. On the other, whilst the 
Prosecutor submits the indictment to the Trial Chamber in a public hearing and 
evidence is presented before the confirming judge, witnesses may be heard227 
and amicus curiae briefs submitted228 , the accused cannot be represented by 
229 counsel . 
The issue which then arises is whether Rule 61 proceedings introduce 
trials in absentia through the back door. Despite the absence of an express 
provision in the Tribunal's Statute, it is generally accepted that trials without 
the accused being present are not allowed23o• The ICTY has repeatedly stated 
that: "A Rule 61 proceeding is not a trial in absentia. There is no finding of 
226 See Prosecutor v. Rajii:, Rule 61 Decision, 13 September 1996, (IT-95-12-R61), per Judge 
Sidhwa, para. 7. 
227 Rule 61(B). 
228 See in the Karadiii: and Mladii: Case (IT-95-5-R61/IT-95-18-R61) Mrs. Elizabeth Rehn. 
Special Rapporteur for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and Mrs. Christine 
Cleiren, member of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), were invited to testify during the hearings. Nevertheless, other 
applications have been refused. See in the Karadiii: and Mladi/: Case (IT -95-5-R61 liT -95-18-
R61), Human Rights Watch was not allowed to submit an amicus curiae brief in the Rule 61 
proceedings on the basis that: "[ ... ] it does not appear necessary that a brief presenting the 
proceedings organised by virtue of this text, whose principles and merits cannot be legally 
challenged, should be submitted. (1/333)". Moreover, Croatia's request to be heard as a m i c u . ~ ~
curiae in the Raji/: Case (IT-95-12-R61) was rejected, notwithstanding however her ability to 
renew it at the time of the trial (3 rd Annual Report, para. 65). 
229 This may be considered a violation of the principle of equality of arms. See Rajit Case, IT-
95-12-R61, where counsel for the accused was informed in a Notice issued by the Registry that 
"Rule 61 proceedings are ex parte. You may observe the hearing from the public gallery". See 
also Prosecutor v. Karadiii: and Mladii:, Decision Partially Rejecting the Request by Mr 
Patelic, Counsel for KaradZic, ICTY IT-95-5-R61/IT-95-18-R61, 27 June 1996 where counsel 
was denied locus standi on the grounds that "[ ... ] Rule 61 Proceedings cannot be considered a 
trial". However, Trial Chamber I ordered the indictment to be read in the presence of counsel 
in open court. This seems to be though unusual in the practice of the Tribunal. 
230 This may be inferred by various provisions in the Statute, but most importantly, by Article 
21 where it is stated that the accused is entitled to be "tried in his presence". Moreover, 
Articles 20(2), 20(3) and 20( 1) assist in this conclusion. The prohibition of a trial in absentia is 
consistent with Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which stipulates the right of accused persons to be present at their trials. Moreover, para. 101 
of the SG's Report, ibid. supra n. 28 attests to this fact. Trials without the presence of the 
persons accused are not alien to the international practice. For instance, in the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, such trials were allowed (See Article 12 of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, Annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 280) when it was not possible to locate the accused 
or when that Tribunal found it necessary in the interests of justice. Indeed, Bormann was tried 
in his absence. Moreover, in the ECHR and under Article 6(1), trials without one's presence 
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guilt in this proceeding,,231. In the Nikolic Case232 they found that: "The Rule 
61 procedure [ ... ) cannot be considered a trial in absentia; it does not 
culminate in a verdict nor does it deprive the accused of the right to contest in 
person the charges brought against him before the Tribunal". 
The rationale behind Rule 61 proceedings was to provide the 
international community with a stronger affirmation of the indictment. Once 
the Trial Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged in the indictment, it 
makes a finding to that effect233. 
The Trial Chamber shall then issue an international arrest warrant to be 
transmitted to the international authorities234. The purpose of an international 
arrest warrant is to render the accused an "international fugitive,,235. 
Accordingly, a number of actions may be taken in order to arrest the accused 
and, moreover, to sanction the States that may be liable for the failure to arrest 
d236 the accuse . 
Perhaps the most useful function of such proceedings can be found in 
Rule 61 (E). Pursuant to this, the Trial Chamber shall certify that the failure to 
effect personal service of the indictment is attributed partially or totally to the 
failure or refusal of a State to co-operate with the Tribunal in accordance with 
have been allowed provided that certain conditions are met (See Colozza and Rubinat v. Italy, 
A 89 para 29 (1985». 
231 See Rajie Decision. ibid. supra n. 226. 
232 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61, 20 October 1995, (IT-
95-2-R61), para. 3. 
233 See Rule 61(C). 
234 See Rule 61(D). 
23S Prosecutor v. Nikolic, ibid. supra n. 232, para. 2, where Trial Chamber I held that: "In 
effect, all States in the international community will be bound, if the warrant is issued, to co-
operate in searching for and arresting the accused, who would in consequence become an 
international fugitive". 
236 To that end, Rule 61(0) provides for the possibility of ordering a State or States to adopt 
provisional measures to freeze the assets of the accused without prejudice to the rights of third 
parties. 
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Article 29. Subsequently, the President, after consulting the Presiding Judges 
of the Chambers, shall notify the Security Council of this refusal or failure to 
237 
co-operate . 
In an attempt to evaluate the significance of Rule 61 proceedings it 
should be noted that it was certainly a novelty. No international tribunal ever 
possessed similar powers. It is important to note that the said procedure has 
never been used in the ICTR, and most probably will not be used again by the 
ICTY. The procedure itself has not been problematic in practice. Theoretically 
Rule 61 proceedings could bring in trials in absentia although as mentioned 
above those are precluded. It seems that it did not lead to this result because it 
does not preclude a subsequent trial in the presence of the accused. It might be 
considered a poor substitute for trials in the absence of the accused, and as a 
compromise between the civil and the common law systems. It is hard to tell 
whether such proceedings were effective or not238 • Rule 61 was used 
particularly in the early stages of the Tribunal and was conceived as a means 
for effectuating the arrest of high ranking indicted criminals such as Karadfic 
and Mladic, who nevertheless remain at large. The greatest merit of a Rule 61 
decision should be considered to be the fact that following such proceedings an 
international arrest warrant is transmitted to every State whereas otherwise it is 
only transmitted to the parties concerned. This is perhaps why it has facilitated 
the arrest of several indictees. Given the workload of the Tribunal though, it 
could be validly argued that the need for Rule 61 has been fulfilled -i. e. to 
237 Accordingly, the following cases have been reported to the Security Council: The Bosnian 
Serb administration in Pale, in the Nikolic Case (UN Doc. S/1995/91 0) and in the Karadiic and 
Mladic Case (notification by a letter from the President, dated 11 July 1996); the FRY (Serbia 
and Montenegro) in the Prosecutor v. MskSit. Radii: and 81ijvacanin (Vukovar Hospital) (24 
April 1996) and Karadiic and Mladic Case (11 July 1996); the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the Rajic Case (16 September 1996, S/19961763); the Republic of Croatia in 
the Rajie Case, ibid. 
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provide the Tribunal with indictees. It would be therefore safe to contend that it 
is not going to be used again in the futme. 
8.2 Failure to Co-operate with the ICC. Deja Vu in a Treaty? 
In the ICC different remedies apply to tackle failure to co-operate 
depending on whether non-eo-operation involves State parties, non-party States 
that have undertaken an obligation to co-operate, intergovernmental 
. . 239 " f SC fi 1240 orgamsatIons , or non-eo-operatIon III case 0 re erra . 
Regarding State parties, upon non-compliance with a request to co-operate 
by the ICC, Article 87(7) of the Statute stipulates that the Court may inform 
either the Assembly of States Parties, or the SC if the case had originally been 
referred to the Court by the Council. The Article formalises the Blaskic 
decision241 in the sense that the ICC may make a finding, but at the same time, 
as with the Tribunals, it does not allow the Court to go beyond such finding 
and impose measures of some sort. 
The lack of a systematic approach is evident here. The general rule on 
failure to co-operate can be found in Article 87(7), whereas the more 
specialised issues of the failure to co-operate of non-parties to the Statute and 
intergovernmental organisations are dealt with in paragraphs which precede 
this general provision242• Article 87 is one of those provisions in the Statute 
which show that agreement on Part 9 was only reached at the very end of the 
238 For a very critical view of Rule 61 and its problems see, Niang (1999),395-400. 
239 For the obligation to co-operate in each of these cases, see supra section 3. 
240 A discussion of referral can be found infra chapter 4. 
241 Ibid. supra n. 214. 
242 Article 87(5) ICC Statute. 
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conference at Rome, and thus there is lack of cnherence. However, this should 
not be seen as hindering the regime created by the Statute. 
If failure to co-operate relates to a case based on a situation originally 
referred to the ICC by the SC, then the Court's finding may be referred to the 
Sc. The Council then may take action. This scenario would replicate the 
Tribunals' co-operation regime and enforcement would be in the hands of the 
UN, with all the problems this entails. 
In all other cases involving State parties, the organ responsible for dealing 
with non-compliance and deciding on the action to be taken, is the ASP243. The 
nature of the action is, as with the Tribunals, not specified in the Statute. This 
is surprising given the treaty basis of the Court where rights and obligations are 
specifically mapped out each step of the way. The drafters here missed an 
important opportunity to enhance judicial certainty. 
Reference to the ASP may also take place in the case of a non-party which 
has agreed to provide assistance under Article 87(5). In essence, the solution 
provided for in Article 87(5)(b) is identical to the one in 87(7). The only 
difference is that the Court cannot make a judicial finding but can only 
"inform,,244 the ASP or the SC of the non-eo-operation. 
Article 87 does not contain a paragraph to deal with failure to co-operate by 
a third State which has nevertheless accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC by 
virtue of Article 12(3). In the absence of a specific provision, and given that in 
this case the State abides by the provisions of the Statute for the purposes of a 
243 In that case, Article 112(2)(f) of the Statute comes into play. 
244 The choice of language is significant here. Stronger language is avoided so as not to 
impinge upon the rights of third parties which have chosen to provide assistance to the ICC. 
See Ciampi in Cassese, (2002), 1633. See also KreB, and Prost, ibid. supra n.107, 1063, who 
also raise the issue whether in case of SC referral the ASP may be informed alongside the SC 
of the third State's non-eo-operation, and correctly conclude that Article 12 of the UN Charter 
does not apply to the relationship between the ASP and the SC. Ibid. 
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particular case, its rights and duties are equated with thC'se of States parties. 
Article 87(7) then would come into play. 
With regard to intergovernmental organisations, the starting point, is that 
they are not under an obligation to co-operate and the parameters for their co-
operation discussed earlier in this chapter should not be disregarded245• The 
lack of reference in Article 112(2)( f) to such organisations should not be taken 
however to mean that once the organisation has undertaken an explicit 
obligation to co-operate it can somehow avoid this246 • 
Let us now turn to Article 112(2)(f) of the Statute, which provides the 
mechanism for dealing with non-co-operation. The ASP is entitled to request 
the compliance of the recalcitrant State and may condemn its failure to co-
operate. In that case, the adoption of countermeasures should not be 
precluded247• Failure to co-operate with the ICC entails international 
responsibility for the State concerned, as failure to co-operate with the Court 
amounts to a breach of an obligation arising out of an international treaty. Such 
a breach is an internationally wrongful act, which entails State responsibility in 
international law248 • A finding of State responsibility will not assist in securing 
co-operation with the Court in practice. The ICC is a criminal justice 
institution, which nevertheless has been created by a treaty. Breach of this 
treaty is unique in its own way, due to its criminal nature and the repercussions 
on issues of fairness for the accused for instance. 
245 See supra section 3.3. 
246 In that sense, the Blaskic decision, ibid. supra n. 214 at para. 33, could be used here as well. 
247 Countermeasures may take the form of economic sanctions. See White, and Abass, in Evans 
(2003),508 et.seq. 
248 See Articles 1 and 3 of Articles on State Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, adopted by the ILC on 10 August 2001: Report of the International Law 
Commission. Fifty-third Session, Al56/10, Chapter IV, annexed to GA Res 56/83 of 10 
December 2001. For a commentary on these Articles see Crawford, (2002), 74-90. 
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Termination of the treaty with regard to the non-complying S t ~ t e e would 
have been the normal penalty in treaty law249. KreB and Prost, however, note 
that this should not be an option "given [the Statute's] integral nature and its 
overall humanitarian goal,,25o. This is an interesting argument based on the fact 
that the Rome Statute, albeit an international treaty, has a distinct character and 
application from that of normal treaty rules. In a case involving non-co-
operation, it is in the interests of both the ICC and its parties to force the non-
complying State to fulfil its obligations under the treaty. And this cannot be 
achieved by terminating the treaty for the said party. 
An issue which then arises is whether and to what extent a State party is 
entitled to act individually to tackle failure to co-operate. Under 87(7) and 
112(2)(f), collective action has to play the most prominent role. It is not clear 
however if a State may engage in individual action if the ASP does not reach 
the majority necessary to take action against the non-co-operating State. 
Customary law would not preclude such action251 although the right to take 
counter-measures is generally confined to the "injured" State. The issue though 
which then arises is on what basis such action could be rationalised and no 
satisfactory solution can be put forward. 
Another issue is whether the SC could intervene and adopt measures to 
tackle the failure to co-operate by a particular State, in a case which did not 
originate from a SC referrae52. Although this possibility is not mentioned in 
the Statute, it is legally possible for the SC to step in when the situation 
249 Article 60 VeL T. 
250 Krell, and Prost, ibid. supra n. 244, 1068. 
251 There ,is also a view .which r e q u ~ s t s s ~ a t t the i n d i v i d ~ a l l . a ~ t i o n n does not go beyond the 
Assembly s recommendattons. Followmg thIS approach no mdlvldual action would be accepted 
should the Assembly of States make no recommendation to that effect. See Krell, and Prost, 
ibid. supra n. 250. 
252 This possibility is examined by Cassese, (2003), 360. 
164 
Co-operation 
amounts to a threat or breach of the peace. The chances of this happening in 
practice, however, given the SC inaction in the case of the Tribunals where SC 
intervention constitutes the only means of enforcing co-operation, are pretty 
small. 
Dealing with failure to co-operate in the ICC is not akin to the ICTY IICTR. 
This is mainly due to the treaty basis of the ICC. States are in both systems the 
key players. And no system can be complete as long as there is no direct 
enforcement agency. It is true that resorting to States is a defeat of the 
international criminal justice system since its effectiveness is undoubtedly 
impaired. However, of the two, the ICC is not any more crippled than the 
Tribunals, as ultimately they both depend on State willingness to co-operate. 
And perhaps, given the position the SC has taken to date, State co-operation 
with the ICC might even be more forthcoming than the ad hoc Tribunals. The 
limitations of State consent and the need for State co-operation though should 
not be disregarded in practice. 
9. Political Pressure 
Exerting pressure by diplomatic means is potentially another way of 
encouraging co-operation. In any case, the political efficacy of enforcement 
action imposed by the SC will be only as strong as UN member States permit it 
to be. This is the essence of political effectiveness. States must work together 
to make sanctions work well. In previous SC enforcement actions , 
governments have not co-operated in uniform, co-ordinated and consistent 
ways; sanctions have been rendered less effective as instruments of 
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international enforcement. Political will is beyond doubt the key to effectively 
enforcing the work of the Tribunals . 
. A possible solution to the situation faced by the International Tribunals 
could be first of all to link the sanctions regime imposed on the States to the 
issue of non-compliance and, more generally, to publicise widely the failure to 
co-operate. This would encourage other members of the international 
community to exercise pressure of their own in order to achieve compliance 
with the Tribunals' orders. To that end, the Tribunals themselves should make 
use of the powers they possess to make sure that an outcry against the 
recalcitrant States is achieved. Wider use of presidential statements253 and the 
statements of the Prosecutor254 should therefore be encouraged. Moreover, 
since it has been proven in practice that any sanctions regime cannot be 
workable unless the States want it to be, another means for encouraging 
compliance could be to link the failure to co-operate with other functions of the 
State in question in the international arena255 • For example, membership of an 
international organisation could be made conditional for the particular State on 
. .. h h T·b 1256 Its co-operatIOn Wit ten una . 
Political pressure might also be called upon at the ICC as well. Perhaps 
more so, as co-operation depends totally on the will of individual States. Using 
2S3 In fact, President McDonald has issued several statements calling on the co-operation with 
the Tribunals. 
2S4 See statement by Carla del Ponte of 6 October 2000 which touches upon issues of co-
0Reration with the ICTY (PRIP.I.S./532-e). 
2 S However, finding the right balance will always be a problem. From the deplorable pledging 
of aid by the US for the surrender of Slobodan M i l o ~ e v i c c to the "innocent" call by Cassese to 
ban former Yugoslavia from the Atlanta Olympics in 1996 (See Icry Press Release 
CCIPIO/088-E, 13 June 1996), there has to be a middle way. 
2S6 For instance, membership of Croatia to the Council of Europe could have been linked to the 
issue of its co-operation with the Tribunal. Or, even in the event of an application for 
membership to the European Union its co-operation record could be examined. 
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political pressure appropriately might have the desired effects. However, the 
risk of abuse should not be disregarded. 
Conclusion 
Co-operation is important for both the Tribunals and the ICC. An 
examination of their respective Statutes reveals that the regimes differ 
significantly, at least in principle. From the absolute obligation to co-operate in 
the Tribunals, to the equally strong obligation for State parties, materialised in 
a somewhat more accommodating procedure, in the ICC, State co-operation is 
crucial for the effectiveness of the evolving international criminal justice 
system. 
In a way the co-operation regimes of the relevant institutions replicate the 
principles of jurisdiction they are premised upon. Similar to the operation of 
the primacy principle, no guidance is given as to the specific steps that need to 
be taken by States to achieve co-operation with the Tribunals. State input is 
minimal in that respect, as the obligation is rigid and absolute. For the ICC, 
however, akin to complementarity, control is left almost exclusively to States. 
States are the main actors in both regimes and their willingness to offer co-
operation is key to their overall efficiency. In order to achieve this, the ICTY 
and the IeTR have adopted a coercive system, which should work better. This 
is not so in practice. Despite the system's rigidity, States have consistently tried 
to evade co-operation, making the Tribunals adopt half measures. The ICC 
regime, bereft of SC authority, may appear weaker. However, its stratified co-
operation, whereby competing requests are accommodated, postponement is 
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envisaged and ultimately rf'fusal to co-operate in limited circumstances, might 
be beneficial in practice. At least States parties to it undertake an obligation to 
co-operate with the Court at the moment they choose to be bound by its 
Statute. This does not mean that co-operation will always be forthcoming, 
particularly from genuinely unwilling States. 
In essence, both regimes are similar in the problems they face despite 
their different constitutional bases. Also the effectiveness of both regimes is 
comparable. What differs is the emphasis on State action. In the ICC 
consultation has replaced confrontation, which was the approach taken in the 
Tribunals. 
Like Theseus, who inside the labyrinth was guided by Ariadne's thread 
to find his way out after his encounter with the mythical Minotaur, States are 
guided by the Statutes and the RPE towards achieving an effective co-
operation regime. Whether jubilation awaits at the other end, is a hard question 
to answer. The pointers are present in the Statutes, but it all depends on the 
States themselves to achieve the desired effect and give meaning to the 
provisions of the law. 
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Chapter Four 
Propitiating Zeus: States, International Criminal Courts and 
the Security Council 
International criminal justice is founded on a number of relationships, 
one of which involves the Security Council (SC). The focus so far has been on 
how States interact with the Tribunals and the Court. The present chapter aims 
to demonstrate that the relationship between the SC and the Tribunals or the 
ICC influences the interface between national and international legal orders. 
The SC, apart from being the principal organ of the United Nations entrusted 
with the maintenance of international peace and security I , is also a factor 
capable of changing the dynamics of international criminal adjudication, as it 
may replace, supplement or negate State volition. 
In international criminal justice, the SC serves as a catalyst between 
States and institutions. First, because the SC has played an important role in the 
establishment of the Tribunals, or in the case of the ICC, because the Statute 
envisages a significant role for the SC, which will affect the Court's 
functioning. In both instances, State interaction with the institutions is affected 
by SC action in the field of international criminal justice. 
This is not the appropriate forum to examine the structure of the SC and 
its division of power, but mention of the politics in the Council will be made in 
those instances where it has clearly affected or is likely to affect the approach 
taken with regard to the Tribunals and/or the ICC. Moreover, wider collective 
security issues, although fascinating, will not be discussed in this chapter. The 
SC's role largety revolves around three major axes: (i) involvement in the 
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creation or termination of some of the i n ~ t i t u t i o n s , , (ii) possibility of 
intervention in their operation, and (iii) enhancement of State co-operation. The 
latter has already been dealt with in the previous chapter. In any case, the 
relationship between the SC and the Tribunals and the Court will be seen under 
the prism of the impact the SC has on the inter-relationship between national 
legal orders and the international criminal justice system, which is the main 
relationship examined in this thesis. 
1. Peace v. Justice? Or Peace through Justice? 
The first issue that merits some attention is the relationship between 
peace and justice, not least because of UN involvement in the field of justice2• 
In order to appreciate the interaction between national and international orders, 
it is important to emphasise that both the Tribunals and the Court do not 
operate in a vacuum. They co-exist with national courts. Moreover, they 
operate in situations where peace has been disrupted. In such situations, the SC 
would most certainly have taken action as well. More importantly, the UN 
itself has moved towards the direction of justice. 
In the case of the Tribunals, the link between peace and justice can be 
traced back to their establishmene. According to the Tribunals' first 
I Article 24 UN Charter. 
2 White, (2002), 48-58. 
3 The representative of Hungary noted in the discussion of SC Res. 808: "The way the 
international conununity deals with questions relating to the events in the former Yugoslavia 
will leave a profound mark on the future of that part of Europe, and beyond. It will make either 
easier or more painful, or even impossible, the healing of the psychological wounds the 
conflict has inflicted upon peoples, who for centuries have lived together in harmony and good 
neighbourliness, regardless of what we may hear today from certain parties to the conflict. We 
cannot forget that the peoples, the ethnic conununities and the national minorities of Central 
and Eastern Europe are watching us and following our work with close attention". (Provisional 
Verbatim Record of22 February 1993, UN SCOR, 48 th Sess., 317Sth mtg. at 8, 19-20, UN Doc. 
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Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, the decision for their creatlon "was necessarily 
founded upon the recognition of a direct link between peace and justice,,4. Of 
relevance is also the link between the life of the Tribunal and the restoration of 
peace in the former Yugoslavia5. For the ICC, reference to peace and justice 
can be found in the preamble6 and arguably, in the provisions describing the 
relationship with the SC 7• 
There are several reasons put forward in favour of the proposition that 
justice leads to an enduring peace8• First, trials help purge threatening leaders 
and rehabilitate renegade States9• In the former case, so long as the leaders 
remain in power they are likely to cause instability. In the latter however, the 
value of trials should be seen only as part of the social process of reformation 
of a rogue State. 
Second, and quite significantly, through justice, gUilt IS 
individualised 10. It is important, as Meron puts it, to put the blame on 
individual perpetrators, instead of an entire nation, "if there is to be any real 
S/PV.3175). Moreover, Slovenia maintained that "[T]he establishment of such a tribunal is a 
necessary and very important step, given the fact that those responsible for such crimes would 
be judged by an impartial judicial body as well as the fact that it could also contribute 
positively to the fmding of solutions for the restoration of peace in the above-mentioned 
regions". (Letter from the Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the United Nations, to the 
SG, UN Doc. S/25652 (22 April 1993». 
4 Goldstone, (1996), 486. 
S Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 
UN SCOR, 42d Sess., UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), para. 28: "As an enforcement measure under 
Chapter VII, however, the life span of the international tribunal would be linked to the 
restoration and maintenance of international peace and the security in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia, and Security Council decisions related thereto". Note, however, how 
tenuous this link is in SC Res. 1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004) which outline the Tribunals' 
completion. strategy. Reference to the T r i b ~ a l s ' ' contribution to lasting peace and security is 
made only 10 the Preamble and not the operative parts of the Resolutions. 
6 See Preambular para. 3. 
7 See infra. 
8 For a critical view see ~ e i ~ m a n , , ~ 1 . 9 9 8 ) , , 46: " ~ e e w a r ~ ~ in former Yugoslavia provide acutely 
painful examples of the hmited uhhty of war cnmes tribunals for stopping wars and making 
reace". 
Bass, (2000), 287-289, 295-296. 
10 Goldstone, ibid. supra n. 4, 488. 
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hope of defusing ethnic tensions in th[e] region"lI. However, the prohlem with 
this approach, is where to draw the circle of guilt l2 and some selectivity is 
inevitable. In practical terms that could range from a handful of people to a 
substantial number, all depending on a wide or narrow interpretation of whom 
to indict. 
Third, public and official acknowledgement is brought to the victims 
assisting their healing process\3. This "catharsis,,14 is perhaps the most obvious 
of the reasons presented here. 
Fourth, an accurate record of the history is achieved 1 5. Few, for 
instance, would dismiss that the Holocaust ever occurred, for the Nuremberg 
Trials provide a comprehensive exposition of the facts and an accurate telling 
of the truth. And this can be applied also in the context of the ad hoc Tribunals 
and the Court. Inevitably, however, the historical record can only be accurate 
within the limitations of the particular case before the Court. 
Fifth, criminal conduct is better controlled through policing and able 
criminal justice l6• Just like domestic criminal law, the same holds true for the 
commission of international crimes. 
And this leads to the final point, which is deterrence 17. And deterrence 
involves two aspects: specific deterrence, which refers to the perpetrators of 
certain crimes and aims at deterring them from repeating the crimes they have 
already committed and general deterrence, which aims at discouraging criminal 
II Meron, (1993), 134. For a critical view on the issue of individualisation of guilt see Alvarez, 
(1998),2032-2035 and 2082-2089. 
12 Bass, ibid. supra n. 9, 297. 
13 Goldstone, ibid. supra n. 4, 489. 
14 Williams, and Scharf, (2002), 20-21. 
IS Goldstone, Ibid. supra n. 13. 
16 Ibid., 490. 
17 Ibid. 
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behaviour of the society at large l8 . However, it is difficult to affinn that the 
Tribunals or the Court have or will have a deterrent effect since there can be no 
empirical evidence to support a claim that a crime has not been committed due 
to the existence of the said institutions. 
The above justifications are by no means exhaustive. Nor can all of 
them be verified in practice. They should be treated as indications on the wider 
question of the interplay between peace and justice. 
Having explored some justifications behind the notion that justice 
brings peace, it is worth succinctly examining whether negotiating peace and 
justice are either mutually exclusive or, in fact, complementary. The problem 
which arises is how to reconcile the two. No peace without justice is certainly 
an appealing idea. However, in the context of complex peace negotiations it is 
important sometimes to delay justice for peace l9• This does not mean that 
justice is denied altogether. It is simply postponed to a slightly later point in 
time. 
Of the possible examples of peace and justice, the case of Yugoslavia is 
most indicative. Gennany could have been another example, where this 
premise could have been tested. But, in the aftennath of WWII Gennany was a 
defeated country and the link between the Nuremberg trials and peace is not 
that evident. To the extent that Nuremberg has helped to build Gennany as it is 
today, it could be argued that the link is present20• The Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which followed the establishment of the Tribunal, provides a 
clearer indication of the link between peace in the making and accountability. 
In this case, persons indictable by the Tribunal were the key players in the 
18 Akhavan, (1998), 746. 
19 Anonymous, (1996), 256-258. 
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negotiating process21 • It was soon realised that no viable peace could be 
achieved without their participation and, at least at that stage, peace seemed 
more important than justice22• 
A somewhat different view suggests that the Tribunal could be used as 
a bargaining chip in order for peace negotiations to succeed23 • This position 
though is likely to undermine the aims of the Tribunals and compromise their 
success. Whatever the answer to this question, it is worth emphasising that 
justice should be at the forefront. It may be delayed, but should not be forever 
postponed. No lasting peace may be achieved without justice. 
Coming back to the former Yugoslavia, it may be argued that the 
Tribunals failed to bring peace on the ground because at least two of the most 
serious events in the Yugoslav conflict occurred even though the ICTY was up 
and running. The Srebrenica massacre and the human rights abuses in Kosovo 
took place despite the operation of the Tribunal. This argument, although 
factually correct, should not be seen as evidence that the ICTY has failed in 
that respect. The return of peace is definitely a process and, arguably, a long 
one. And during this period, possible backlashes are unavoidable. Even 
incidents of the scale and intensity of the ones just described should not be 
considered as proof that international criminal justice does not work. In any 
way, it is very difficult to measure the success or failure of the Tribunals in this 
area. The merits of the Tribunals, on which their success can be identified, 
should be seen as a whole, and not fragmented to the various aspects of their 
20 Cf. Reisman, ibid. supra n. 8,49. 
21 And it would have been unrealistic to expect that they would agree to a treaty providing for 
their surrender to the Tribunal. 
22 Shuett, (1997), 101. 
23 D'Amato, (1994), 500; cr. Ferencz, (1994), 715; Akhavan, (1995), 92; See also Mak. 
(1995),556. 
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operation. In the Quest for peace through justice, there is no method to be 
followed which would give results, and it is up to the historian of the future to 
judge the efficacy of the measures taken. The division of peace into negative, 
that is the absence of war, and positive peace, that is a more sophisticated 
notion of peace tackling underlying problems24, is helpful in the case of the 
Tribunals. The Tribunals have succeeded in bringing negative peace to the 
former Yugoslavia. As to positive peace, international criminal justice 
instruments should not be seen as a deus ex machina that would instantly lead 
to peace but as part of a process which, if it works, will provide the 
international community with lasting results in the long term. 
Interestingly, but also quite pragmatically, the first president of the 
ICTY, gave his own frank assessment of the Tribunal's ten year operation on 
the issue of peace and justice. His view merits full quotation: "The ICTY has 
met the challenge. True, it has not deterred persons from committing further 
crimes (in July 1995, when the Srebrenica massacre occurred, the Tribunal had 
already been in existence for 21 months). Nor has it significantly contributed to 
restoring peace or to reconciling the opposing ethnic and religious groups. It 
has, nevertheless, fulfilled at least the hope that so many persons had pinned on 
. d' . ,,25 It: to 0 Justtce . 
24 On the notion of positive peace see White, ibid. supra n. 2, 48-51. 
25 Cassese, (2004), 596-597. 
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2. Laying the Foundations for Interaction: The Creation of International 
Judicial Institutions 
The first broad aspect of SC involvement in international criminal law 
can be found in the creation of international criminal courts, which is a newly 
assumed responsibility by the SC. Examining the creation of such institutions 
is important, as this is the first step towards exploring the SC's role in the area 
of justice, which, in tum, affects the interaction between States and the said 
institutions. Without SC involvement in this area, the relationship between 
national and international jurisdictions would not exist, at least with regard to 
some of the institutions. 
2.1 Creating ad hoc Tribunals: A SC Prerogative? 
The creation of both the ICTY and the ICTR constitutes, beyond doubt, 
an unprecedented function performed by the SC. Before examining the ability 
of the SC to proceed with the Tribunals' establishment and the lawfulness of 
their creation, the issue of whether the UN General Assembly would have been 
the most appropriate forum for such action has first to be addressed26• The GA 
is, beyond doubt, the most representative body within the UN family. A 
democratic sentiment towards the creation of a Tribunal would require the 
GA's active participation in the process27• However, there are inherent 
26 In support of the view that issues of justice are best dealt with by the GA see Koskenniemi. 
(1995),325. 
27 It comes of no surprise that Slobodan M i l o ~ e v i c c in his initial appearance before the ICTY on 
3 July 2001 invoked the fact that the Tribunal was not created by the GA as a reason for not 
being legally established. He maintained: "I consider this Tribunal a false Tribunal and the 
indictment a false indictment. It is illegal being not appointed by the UN General Assembly [ ... J". See transcript of Milosevic et al. Case, (IT-99-37), 2. 
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disadvantages in involving the GA l.n the creation of Tribunals, the most 
important being the fact that the GA can only make recommendations, which 
are not binding on the Member States28• Perhaps to assuage concerns towards 
non-participation in the Tribunals' creation, the role of the GA was not 
disregarded. The election of the Tribunals' judges and the approval of their 
budgets29 as well as review of their Annual Reports are left to the GA30. 
However, one cannot fail to notice that those functions are declaratory rather 
than substantial. The most important aspects of the operation of the Tribunals 
are left to the SC. 
It would have been interesting to examine the relationship between 
domestic and international legal orders had the Tribunals been created by the 
GA. Although this is a purely hypothetical issue, it is possible that a more 
consensual system, lacking the coercive element the SC brings into the 
relationship between the two regimes, would have been chosen, which would 
perhaps have been closer to the one envisaged for the ICC. 
28 Article 10 UN Charter. 
29 This particular issue has cause problems in practice. Article 32 of the Statute provides that 
the expenses of the Tribunal "shall be borne by the regular budget of the United Nations in 
accordance with Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations", Moreover, the SG stated in 
his Report supra n. 5 that ''this provision is without prejudice to the role of the General 
Assembly in the administrative and budgetary aspects of the question of establishing the 
Tribunal (8/25704, para. 21). However, a note by the UN Secretariat to the GA concerning the 
issue provides: "In the view of the Secretary-GeneraL .. there was no legal bar to the Security 
Council reaching its own conclusions as to the appropriate financing of the International 
Tribunal and including a provision on the matter in the Statute which it adopted. Nevertheless 
such conclusions are without prejudice to the authority of the General Assembly under t h ~ ~
Charter to consider and approve the budget of the Organization and to apportion the expenses 
of the Organization among its members". (Al47/1002, para. 12). The GA voiced its discontent 
when it: "[e]xpress[ed] concern that advice given to the Security Council by the Secretariat on 
the nature of the financing of the International Tribunal did not respect the role of the General 
Assembly as set out in Article 17 of the Charter". (Al57/1014, para. 3). 
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2.2 The Legality of the Tribunals' Establishment 
The interaction between States and the Tribunals would have been 
potentially different had the latter not been established legally. It would have 
been doubtful whether States would have to comply, for instance, with 
Tribunals' orders, had they been based on a questionable authority. The 
lawfulness of the Tribunals' establishment should therefore be examined, 
before exploring their operation on the international scene. 
It is suggested that the creation of the two Tribunals by the means of 
Chapter VII Resolutions be accepted as lawful. As mentioned already, the SC 
has primacy in dealing with situations that threaten international peace and 
security. Should a threat or breach of peace occur, the SC may decide which of 
the measures prescribed in Chapter VII of the UN Charter have to be taken in 
order to tackle the situation effectively. Among the possible responses, Article 
41 of the Charter which deals with measures short of the use of force, is of 
particular significance. 
The situations taking place m the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
amounted to threats to international peace and security. The SC determined that 
widespread violations of humanitarian law, including reports on mass killings 
and the practice of ethnic cleansing amounted to a threat to the international 
peace and security in the former Yugoslavia3!. In Rwanda, the Council 
explicitly mentioned in its Resolution 95532 that the genocide and other 
30 See Articles 13,32,34 and 12,30,32 of the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes respectively. 
31 SIRES/SOS (1993), 22 February 2003, recital 7. cr. Brownlie, (2003), 575 who maintains 
that t ~ e . . creation o ~ ~ the ~ C T Y Y "was a s s o c i a t ~ d d w i ~ h h a speci.alized political campaign to 
destablhze the multl-ethmc State of YugoslaVia, With the ultunate aim of bringing about 
'regime change' in Serbia". 
32 SIRES/9S5 (1994), 8 November 1994, recitalS. 
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systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian 
law taking place in Rwanda constituted a threat to international peace and 
security. It follows that the SC was entitled to take measures for the restoration 
of the endangered peace. 
The creation of the two ad hoc Tribunals could be justified under the 
provision of Article 41 of the UN Charter as constituting a measure short of the 
use of armed force. This has been acknowledged by both the Report produced 
by the sa, which led to the creation of the ICTy33, and the Appeals Chamber 
in the Tadic Case34• Although there is no explicit authorisation to create a 
Tribunal in the above-mentioned provision, it has to be accepted that such a 
possibility is not ruled out in order for the SC to fulfil its goals. This is 
evidenced from the fact that the list of measures in Article 41 is not exhaustive. 
Had the drafters envisaged that the measures in Article 41 were exhaustive, the 
language of the said Article would have been different, specifically providing 
for exclusivity of the measures therein35• Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
the discretion of the Security Council is unlimited. Any action pursuant to 
Article 41 of the Charter has to be consistent with Article 2436• However, the 
only real limitation is that the measures taken should not involve the use of 
force. 
33 "The International Tribunal should be established by a decision of the Security Council on 
the basis of Chapter VII ... Such a decision would constitute a measure to maintain or restore 
international peace and security, following the requisite determination of the existence of a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" ibid. supra n. 5, 7. 
34 Prosecutor v. radii:. Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, (IT -94-1-AR 72), para. 36: "The establishment of the 
International Tribunal falls squarely within the powers of the Security Council under Article 
41 ". 
35 Cf. Sapru, (1997), 340 who maintains that the context of Article 41 should be seen as 
exclusive which when read together with Article 39 should provide for a limitation -by means 
of the specific measures, to the otherwise unrestricted SC power. 
36 This has been interpreted to mean that the SC cannot in principle, act arbitrarily and 
unfettered by any restraints and "in violation of peremptory norms of the laws of war and lor 
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Under this premIse, it has been accepted that the creatiC'n of the 
Tribunals may be rationalised. A comparison though of the SC action between 
creating international Tribunals and imposing sanctions under Article 41 
should be attempted. It may be that they both have the same legal basis i.e. 
Article 41 of the UN Charter. However, they differ substantially in their 
effects. Economic sanctions, when inflicted upon a State, are binding in 
international law on the basis of UN law. This means that the State in question 
has to take action in order to be consistent with the obligations it has 
undertaken when entering the UN system37 • There is a view according to which 
the wording of the Article, namely the fact that the Security Council may call 
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures, suggests that 
it is within the discretion of the State to comply or noes. 
This in tum may lead to the argument that economic sanctions do not 
have direct effect before national courts. This point precisely depends on the 
I . . 39 nationallega system In questIon . 
human rights" and that "its actions must generally be proportionate to the aims sought". See 
Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council" (1996). 17. 
37 See the first edition of Goodrich, and Hambro, (1946). where it is stated in 246-247 that "[Ile 
mot inviter [call upon], parait [ ... ] etre employe dans Ie meme sens qu' a l' article 40, a savoir 
se1ui d'une injonction. Le principe sur lequel se fondent les dispositions de la Charte, relatives 
ala securite, en tant qu' e1les se distinguent de ceUes du Pacte de la Societe des Nations, serait 
reduit a neant si, une fois prise la decision du Conseil de Securite de mettre a execution des 
mesures n' impliquant pas l'emploi de la force armee, on s' en remettait a la discretion des 
membres de l' Organisation libres d' appliquer ou non ces mesures. A I' appui de cette 
interpretation, vient aussi Ie fait que l'article 41 constitue une application du principe general 
cnonce a l'article 39, en vertu duquel Ie Conseil de Securite a Ie pouvoir de decider queUes 
mesures seront prises connformement aux articles 41 et 42 pour maintenir ou retablir 1a paix et 
la sccurite intemationales". 
38 Cot, and Pellet, (1991). 695 who maintain that such measures are mandatory by virtue of 
Articles 25, 48 and 49 of the Charter. 
39 As Frowein, and Krisch point out in their contribution in Simma (2002), 747, the United 
States had enacted laws which violated the embargo against Rhodesia and national courts 
applied them despite the binding SC Resolutions, stipulating at the same time that no 
individual rights. result f r o ~ . .Article 41. ~ i m i l a r l y , , they r e ~ e r r also to Australia and Germany 
which both require domestic Implementation for SC ResolutiOns to become part of the national 
legal system. Ibid. 
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However, this is not the case with the Tribunals and their primacy, 
which is the external function of their creation by means of SC Resolutions. 
National courts have a duty to defer once such a request is made to the 
International Tribunals. Compliance with primacy is, therefore, non-
discretionary. At this point, an objection could be raised as to whether the SC 
can take action which directly involves individuals4o• It is accepted that 
situations involving individuals may also threaten international peace and 
security41. As to the nature of the "direct effect" the Tribunals' primacy entails, 
an analogy may be attempted with a system where direct effect is prominent; 
that of the EU42• The objective of direct effect in EC Law was to promote 
uniform application and enforcement43 • Arguably, this is also the case in 
international criminal law, embodied in the adoption of primacy. However, in 
the European system the invocability of direct effect rests with the individual 
and no discretion is reserved for the courts44• This is not the case when 
applying primacy. As seen already in chapter two, the Tribunals decide 
themselves in which cases they choose to assert their primacy and no discretion 
is left to States, let alone to individuals who, apart from being defendants, do 
not otherwise participate in the process. Although the primacy of the 
international Tribunals differs in kind from other measures which the Council 
may take in pursuance of its tasks under Article 41, it does not have direct 
40 For the both the ICTY and the ICTR deal with crimes committed by individuals and not by 
States. 
41 Morris, and Scharf, (1998). 86, where it is stated that similar situations arose in Haiti, Libya, 
South Africa. 
42 On the direct effect in the European Law see generally Craig, and De Burca, (2003), 178-
211. 
43 This can be easily seen through the EC directives whereby the Union is trying to create a 
level playing field by setting minimum standards among the member states. 
44 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Beiastingen (Case 26/62) [1963] ECR 
1; Van Duyn v. Home Office (Case 41171) [1974] ECR 1337; Defrenne v. SABENA (Case 
43175) [1976] ECR 455. 
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effect akin to the one perceived in more refined systems such as the EU. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that although States are obliged to 
comply with an assertion of primacy, the practical application of primacy in the 
domestic sphere is left to States which have to enact implementing legislation 
to enable the execution of a request based on the Tribunals' primacy45. In that 
sense, although primacy is directly applicable, it is not directly effective. 
Sanctions, in general, not only differ from the creation of the two ad 
hoc Tribunals in kind, but also in their effects in practice. Other forms of 
sanctions are fundamentally different in terms of direct applicability and, more 
generally, in terms of legal effect despite having the same legal foundation. 
Having established that creating a Tribunal falls within the measures 
allowed under Article 41 of the Charter, the creation of the Tribunals by the SC 
as subsidiary organs, and the problems which arise therefrom, should be 
examined. The Charter provides on two occasions for the establishment of 
subsidiary organs. Namely, in Article 7(2) there is the general authority to 
establish subsidiary organs and in Article 29 the specific authority for the 
purpose of carrying out the functions of the Council. In order for a subsidiary 
organ to be established, the principal organ has to delegate to it certain powers, 
which the principal organ possesses. Those powers have to be express or 
implied. Some question the power of the SC to create a Tribunal which 
possesses judicial powers that the SC itself does not have46 , The SC, being a 
political body, could not itself have tried the alleged perpetrators for the 
atrocities that occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It therefore 
proceeded with creating the ad hoc Tribunals. Even if the SC does not have 
45 Benvenuti, in Lattanzi, and Schabas, (1999), 34-36. 
46 Kolodkin, (1994), 393. 
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these powers, it noes, nevertheless, possess the implied power to create a 
subsidiary organ which would be "necessary for the effective exercise by the 
principal of powers in the area which it operates", i.e. the maintenance of 
international p e a c ~ ~ and securit/7• This has been recognised by the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadii: Case as follows48: 
The establishment of the International Tribunal by the Security Council 
does not signify, however, that the Security Council has delegated to it 
some of its own functions or the exercize of some of its own powers. Nor 
does it mean, in reverse, that the Security Council was usurping for itself 
part of a judicial function which does not belong to it but to other organs 
of the United Nations according to the Charter. The Security Council has 
resorted to the establishment of a judicial organ in the form of an 
international criminal tribunal as an instrument for the exercize of its own 
principal function of the maintenance of peace and security, i.e., as a 
measure contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the 
former Yugoslavia. 
In the recent past, the SC established subsidiary organs in accordance 
with Article 29 of the UN Charter, using Chapter VII Resolutions with regard 
to restoring and maintaining the international peace and securit/9• The same 
legal basis is used for the Tribunals' creation5o. According to one view, 
however, since the SC does not itself possess judicial powers, the creation of 
47 Sarooshi, (1999), 94. 
48 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, ibid. supra n. 34, para. 38. 
49 The SG makes explicit reference to SC Res. 687 (1991), concerning the situation between 
Iraq and Kuwait, by which (1) the Boundary Demarcation COmmission, (2) the Special 
Commission and (3) the Compensation Commission were created. Moreover, a number of 
quasi-judicial bodies have been established in the same way in many other cases known as 
"sanctions committees" which render interpretations of SC sanctions resolutions on a case-by-
case basis. Ibid. supra n. 5,8. See Scharfand Dorosin, (1993), 771. 
so For the ICTY it is stated: "In this particular case, the . S ~ c u r i t y y Council would be establishing, 
as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII, a SubSidiary organ within the terms of Article 
29 of the Charter, but one of a judicial nature". (S/25704, 8). See similar approach for the 
ICTR in S/19995/134, para. 8. 
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the Tribunals has been pursuant to the general authority enshrined in Article 
7(2) and not in Article 2951 • 
The International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Effect of 
Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative 
Tribuna/52 confirmed the power of a principal organ of the United Nations to 
establish "an independent and truly judicial body". In this case the Ie] 
confirmed that the UN GA had the power to establish a judicial organ endowed 
with judicial functions in order to regulate staff relations. And all this, despite 
the absence of any express provision in the Charter and despite the fact the 
principal organ cannot itself perform judicial functions, and notwithstanding 
that the GA could, in fact, abolish the judicial body by revoking its Statute at 
some point in the future53 • Furthermore, in the Application for Review Case54 , 
the World Court found that the GA possessed the power to act in the field of 
staff administration and was therefore competent to establish a body with 
judicial functions which it could not itself exercise under the Charter55 . 
However, the invocation of these two cases, is not free of doubt. It is important 
to note that the above cases relate to the creation of an internal body. By 
contrast, the two Tribunals do not deal with issues internal to the United 
SI Sarooshi, ibid. supra n. 47,98. According to this author the SO seems to have overlooked 
this slight difference when in his report reference is made to Article 29 for the creation of the 
Tribunals. Or, more accurately, the SG might simply have intended to underline the difference 
of this particular Tribunal from the other judicial organs established pursuant to Article 7(2), in 
the sense that the ad hoc Tribunals are "an Article 29-type subsidiary organ of the Council". 
Ibid. fn. 58. 
S2 IeJ Reps. 1954,47. 
S3 Ibid., 53, 56 and 61. 
S4 ICJ Reps. 1973, 166. 
S5 Note however the dissenting opinions: per Judge Alvarez, ibidem., 70; per Judge Hackworth 
ibidem., 78-9; per Judge Onyeama, ibidem., 226; perJudge Morozov, ibidem., 298. 
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Nations; they have external competf'nce instead, since their jurisdictional 
primacy affects each and every State56. 
Immediately after the issuing of the SG's report, the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) questioned the Council's authority to 
establish an international Tribunal, by sending a letter to the SG57 • In 
particular, the focus was on the fact that according to its view, the SC could not 
establish the Yugoslav Tribunal under Article 29 of the Charter as a subsidiary 
organ58. In the case of the ICTR, unlike the FRY, Rwanda did not challenge the 
legality of its establishment. On the contrary, it requested the creation of such a 
Tribunal59• In the end, however, Rwanda, which happened to be a member of 
the SC at the time, voted against the adoption of SC Resolution 955 for 
different reasons. Moreover, at the time of the adoption oflCTR's Statute, two 
of the members of the SC expressed doubts on the lawfulness of the Tribunal60• 
56 See Greenwood, (1998), 103-104. 
57 Letter Dated 19 May 1993 from the Charge d' affaires, a.i., of the Permanent Mission of 
Yugoslavia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. AJ48/170-
S/25801* (*reissued for technical reasons) (1993). 
58 "No independent tribunal, can be subsidiary organ of any body, including the Security 
Council"; Ibid., 3. 
59 Such a request was contained in a Letter Dated 18 September 1994 from the Permanent 
Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council. 4, UN Doc. S/1995/1115 (1995) requesting "the international community to reinforce 
government efforts by: ... (c) Setting up as soon as possible an international tribunal to try the 
criminals" . 
60 The representative of Brazil stated the following: 
" ... Brazil is not convinced that the competence to establish and/or to exercise an international 
criminal jurisdiction is among the constitutional powers of the Security CounciL.. The 
authority of the Security Council is not self-constructed. It originates from the delegation of 
powers conferred upon it by the whole membership of the Organisation under Article 14(1) of 
the Charter. For that very reason, the Council's powers and responsibilities under the Charter 
should be strictly construed, and cannot be created, recreated or reinterpreted by decisions of 
the Council itself ... 
The Security Council's responsibilities lie not in the judicial or institution-building field, but in 
the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, the invocation of Chapter VB 
of the Charter for the purpose of establishing an international tribunal goes, in our view 
beyond the competence of the Council as clearly defmed in the Charter". (See Provisionai 
Verbatim Record of the Security Council, Forty-Ninth Year, 3453d Mtg., pg. 9, SIPV/3453 (8 
Nov. 1994), 11. 
Moreover, China stated that "people still have doubts and worries about the way in which an 
international ~ b ~ a l l is. established ?y a ~ e c u r i t y y ~ o u n c i l l Resolution under Chapter VII .... In 
principle, China IS not m favour of mvokmg at will Chapter VII of the Charter to establish an 
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In addition, the issue of the constitutional1ty of the two Tribunals is also 
reflected in their jurisprudence. The first time the issue of the SC's legal 
authority to establish the Tribunal arose, was when the first case was brought 
before the ICTY - that of Dusko Tadic61 • He challenged the validity of the 
Tribunal on various grounds62• Among those grounds, the challenge that the 
Tribunal has not been "established by law" stands out. The Appeals Chamber, 
held that this requirement was relevant only to national courts and not to 
international courts because a legislature does not exist in the latter case63 . 
Moreover, it maintained that "established by law" might refer to the creation 
by a non-legislative body which has a limited power to take binding 
decisions64• Neither ofthe two responses given seems entirely convincing. The 
former assumes that the standards used in international law are different to 
those used in national law and the latter in fact gives an answer by using what 
is contested, i.e. whether the SC is authorised to create ad hoc Tribunals. 
The legality of the establishment of the ICTR was also raised in the 
course of the proceedings with regard to Joseph Kanyabashi6s. Trial Chamber 
II decided to discuss the motion even though it had been filed after the deadline 
for such motions66. It maintained that some of the issues raised had been dealt 
with by the ICTY's Appeals Chamber in the Tadii: Case and upheld the 
international tribunal through the adoption of a Security Council resolution. That position, 
which we stated last year ... remains unchanged". Ibid., 8. 
61 Prosecutor v. Tadii:. Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion: Jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, 10 August 1995, (IT-94-1-T); Prosecutor v. Tadii:. ibid. supra n. 34. 
62 Decision of the Trial Chamber ibid., para. 2. Some of those grounds have been addressed 
throughout the chapter in the relevant sections and do not need to be repeated here. 
63 Tadic Appeal, ibid. supra n. 34, para. 43. 
64 Ibid., para. 44. 
6S Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi. Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, 
18 June 1997, (lCTR-96-15-T), 4. 
66 Ibid. at 3. 
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position taken there by rejecting the arguments put forward by the defence 
67 
counsel . 
Moreover, the issue of whether the SC possessed the legal powers to 
create an ad hoc international criminal Tribunal arose b e f o r ~ ~ national courts in 
relation to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a seventy-one year old Rwandan Hutu 
living in the United States, who was accused of organising the 1994 slaughter 
of five to ten thousand Tutsis68• When he was indicted by the ICTR, and a 
transfer request was made to the Texan authorities, his counsel argued that the 
ICTR was not properly formed since the SC acted ultra vires with regard to 
Chapter VII of the Charter when establishing it69• After three years of legal 
procedures, the American Secretary of State Ms Albright signed the decision 
authorising Ntakirutimana' s transfer to the Tribuna17o• 
Despite the above challenges, it is clear that there is enough support for 
the view that the Tribunals have been legally created. The foundations of their 
relationship with national courts are sound. 
2.3 The Creation of the Sierra Leone Special Court 
Although an examination of the SLSC is not in the scope of this study, 
a brief reference to the SC's role leading to the creation of this unique court is 
67 It stated that it "respects the persuasive authority of the decision of the Appeals Chamber of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and has taken careful note or the 
decision rendered by the Appeals chamber in the Tadic case"; Ibid. at 4. 
68 See also supra chapter 3. 
69 Memorandum in Opposition to Surrender of Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, In Re the 
Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutirnana, Misc. No. L-96-005 (S.D. Texas), 5 March 1997 at 20-
24; Second Memorandum in Opposition to Surrender of Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutiman; In Re 
The Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Misc. No. L-96-005 (S.D. Texas), 5 May 1997. at 
1-6; The US ~ o v e r n m e n t t attorneys contested. the above ~ e n t i o n e d d arguments. See Reply 
Memorandum 10 Support of the Surrender of Ehzaphan Ntakuutimana. In Re The Surrender of 
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Misc. No. L-96-005 (S.D. Texas). April 1997. at 8-9. 
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essential as a it constitutes a stepping stone to the ICC. The SLsr differs 
significantly from the ad hoc Tribunals mainly because of its sui generis 
nature, which combines elements of both a national and an international 
Court7!. 
The SLSC was created following a request for assistance from the 
Sierra Leonean government to the SG of the UN72 which led to the adoption of 
Resolution 1315 by the SC. By virtue of this Resolution, and by linking 
accountability for the atrocities occurred in Sierra Leone with peace, the SC 
asked the SO to produce a report which eventually led to an agreement that 
73 
created the SLSC . 
The SC has therefore played a major role in the stages before the 
establishment of the SLSC. Quite similarly to the ad hoc Tribunals, it linked 
peace to justice and suggested the creation of a Special Court. The difference 
though lies in the role ofthe Sierra Leonean government in the Special Court's 
establishment. Besides having actively requested that a court be established, 
which is reminiscent of the Rwandan position at least at the outset, 
consultations with the government were central in the process of its 
establishment. This element of explicit consent, is the one which mainly 
differentiates the SLSC from its ad hoc counterparts and brings it closer to the 
ICC. And since it was created after the Statute was complete, it is evidence of 
the impact the ICC Statute had on the SLSC. 
70 See ICTRIINFO-9-2-225EN, Arusha, 25 March 2000. 
71 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/915, Annex and Enclosure. 
72 S/2000/786. 
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2.4 The Creation of the ICC 
The SC had no direct involvement in the creation of the ICC, as it is a 
product of an international treaty which was concluded at a conference 
convened by the UN in Rome in 1998. As a result of this conference, the ICC 
Treaty was concluded on the 1 i h of July of that year74. 
2.5 Appraisal 
It is evident from the above that the SC played a greater role in the 
creation ofthe ICTY and the ICTR, rather than the institutions which followed. 
The link between the creation of the ad hoc Tribunals and the restoration of 
peace in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was conducive to 
the SC having an enhanced role. In the SLSC, the SC's role seems to be 
slightly "curved", in the sense that it is not as absolute as in the two Tribunals, 
since the relevant State contributed to the process. In the ICC, the SC played no 
active role in the formation of the new Court. This process might be indicative 
of a transformation in the international scene. From the "hegemony" of the se, 
to co-operation with the national sphere in the fonn of consultation, to the 
"emancipation" of States, the Council's role has changed significantly in terms 
of its involvement in the international criminal justice system. Its active role 
seems to be subject to a more consensual system, manifested primarily by the 
creation of the permanent ICC. 
73 Cryer, (2001),436. 
74 A/Conf.138/9, 1998,37 ILM(1998), 999. 
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3. The Intervention of the SC in the Operation of the International Criminal 
Justice System 
Another broad aspect of the SC's role is its potential intervention in the 
operation of the Tribunals and the Court. Depending on the degree of SC 
intervention, this aspect of its function has potentially a greater impact on the 
relationship between national and international orders. 
3.1 The SC and the ad hoc Tribunals 
Before proceeding with an examination of the everyday operation of the 
Tribunals and possible SC intervention, their independence, in abstracto, 
deserves a closer look. It is important to explore whether the Tribunals, 
because of their nature as subsidiary organs, are permanently controlled by 
their parent organ, i.e. the SC. Because the Tribunals exercise judicial 
functions, which the SC does not itself possess, they have a degree of 
independence which precludes interference by the Council7s• However, this 
independence is not unlimited, and is within certain boundaries allowed by the 
SC within the field of restoration of peace and security76. In that respect, 
75 Sarooshi, ibid. supra n. 51, 103. The same author though later in his book contradicts 
himself by mentioning that "[t]his [the intention by the Council that the Tribunal is terminated] 
does not, however, impinge on the Council's prerogative to decide to abolish the Tribunal or to 
exclude from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal a whole range of cases (thereby granting in effect 
immunity to persons falling within a specified category). Ibid., 133. However, the above view 
is partly correct. SC intervention varies. Termination, as will be seen in section 4 infra, is the 
prerogative of the SC. Whether it would be acceptable to exclude certain cases, is a different 
matter altogether and would constitute intervention. 
76 Cf. Alvarez, ibid. supra n. 36, 11 who maintains that "[a]s the Tribunal's decisions issued to 
date suggest, in at least some of these instances the body is "subsidiary" in name only and can 
render final judgments that even the Council is not authorized to disturb - and that in turn can 
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several questions mse. Whether for instance the Council would be free to 
expand or contract the jurisdiction of the Tribunals without limit, or tum them 
into a de facto permanent criminal court 77. And in such a case, and provided 
that the Tribunals disagree with such a SC decision, could they declare it to be 
null and void78? Arguably, those issues are linked with the question of whether 
the Tribunals possess the power to review SC Resolutions79• 
Coming back to the intervention of the SC in practice, both the S080 
and the Tribunals themselves81 have on various occasions expressed their 
disturb the Council by suggesting limits on its powers". It is one thing to say that the Tribunals 
judgments are final and the SC should not intervene, for instance, to amend a judgment, -which 
is something the Council has abstained from doing so far, but it is quite another to suggest that 
the Tribunals can limit the powers the SC has under the Charter. This would be beyond what is 
expected of the Tribunals. 
77 Alvarez, (1996), "Nuremberg Revisited" 250. 
78 These and other interesting questions are succinctly dealt with by Alvarez, (1998), 2078, 
especially fn 185. 
79 The question of review, although interesting, will not be discussed in this chapter, as it does 
not affect the inter-relationship between national and international orders directly. See, 
however, the Tadic Case. ibid. supra n. 61, where the Trial Chamber declared that the Tribunal 
"is not a constitutional court" (para. 5) and the Appeals Chamber ibid. supra n. 34, held that 
"[t]here is no question, of course, of the International Tribunal acting as a constitutional 
tribunal, reviewing the acts of the other organs of the United Nations, particularly those of the 
Security Council, its own 'creator'" (para. 20). Despite these pronouncements, the Tribunal 
went on to review the decision of the Council to create an international Tribunal as a response 
to a breach of international peace and security and found that the Tribunal was lawfully 
established by the SC (para. 40). 
80 See 8G's Report ibid. supra n. 5: "that [the Tribunal] should perform its functions 
independently of political considerations and not be subject to the authority or control of the 
Council with regard to the perfonnance of its judicial functions. 8/25705 and Add. 1. In the 
case ofICTR he maintained that "[t]he International Tribunal for Rwanda is a subsidiary organ 
of the Security Council. ., .As such, it is dependent in administrative and financial matters on 
various United Nations organs; as a judicial body, however, it is independent of anyone 
particular State or group of States, including its parent body, the Security Council. 
(8/1995/134, para. 8). 
81 Prosecutor v. radii, ibid. supra n. 34, para. 15: "To assume that the jurisdiction of the 
International Tribunal is absolutely limited to what the Security Council 'intended' to entrust it 
with, is to envisage the International Tribunal exclusively as a 'subsidiary organ' of the 
Security Council... a 'creation' totally fashioned to the smallest detail by its 'creator' and 
remaining totally in its power and at its mercy. But the Security Council not only decided to 
establish a subsidiary organ (the only legal means available to it for setting up such a body), it 
also clearly intended to establish a special kind of 'subsidiary organ': a tribunal. See also, 
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic. Decision on the Objection of the RepUblic of Croatia to the 
I s s u a n c ~ ~ ~ f 8 u b p o e ~ a a Duces Tecum, 18 J u l ~ ~ 1997, (IT-95-14-PT), 11: "As a subsidiary organ 
of a judICIal nature, It canoot be overemphaSIZed that a fundamental prerequisite for its fair and 
effective functioning is its capacity to act autonomously. The Security Council does not 
perform judicial f u n c t i ~ ~ s , , a l t h o u g ~ ~ it has t h ~ ~ authority to e ~ t a b l i s h h a judicial body. This serves 
to illustrate that a subSidiary organ IS not an Integral part of Its creator but rather a satellite of it 
complete and of independent character". ' 
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conviction that the Tribunals are truly independent. However, mere 
proclamations do not necessarily mean that they are actually independent. 
With the exception of the co-operation regime82, there is no provision in 
either of the Tribunals' Statutes that would provide for direct SC involvement 
in the Tribunals' modus operandi. The SC has no power, for instance, to refer a 
particular case to the Tribunals83• This power is exercised by the ICTY and the 
ICTR Prosecutors. It may be that the SC does not, at least officially, instruct 
the Tribunals as to whom to prosecute, for instance, but it should be examined 
whether it somehow impacts on their operation indirectly. 
Although institutionally the SC does not seem to intervene too much in 
the functioning of the Tribunals, it could be expected, in practice, that certain 
States have some influence. Arguably, this is a different kind of interaction 
which is not the focus of this thesis. It could be argued that countries which 
contribute generously on the Tribunals' budgets influence their work84 • In fact, 
the Permanent Members of the SC are also likely to have some input in the 
way the Tribunals work, since the Tribunal depends on their will8S. The fact 
that most of the accused brought before the ICTY are of Serbian origin, and 
those of Croatian or Muslim origin are indicted in smaller numbers, is, 
according to one view, evidence of the political pressure exercised by the P-5, 
and the US in particular86• The indictment of Slobodan Milosevic for crimes 
committed in relation to Kosovo where the western powers (represented in the 
82 See supra chapter 3. 
83 This should be contrasted to the ICC, where the SC although it cannot refer a particular case 
to the Court, it can nevertheless refer a situation under Article 13(b) of the Statute. See infra. 
84 E.g. by seconding staff from particular jurisdictions for instance. 
85 Cassese, (2004), 591, fn. 9, describes an incident in 1995 where Russia approached the 
Tribunal in order to "freeze" arrest warrants against KaradZic and Mladic, but the interference 
was rejected by both the then President Cassese and the Prosecutor. 
86 Fatic, (2000), 48·51; Hinic, in Hasse, Muller, and Schneider (200 1), 420; Cf. Vohrah, 
(2004),390,394. 
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SC) had active involvement and not, initially at least, for crimes committed 
during the conflict in Bosnia, may suggest that the Tribunal is somehow 
influenced in its work by the sc. In any case, it should be taken into 
consideration that the Tribunals' orders and judgments affect equally the P-5 
and the rest of the world which is an issue likely to be taken into consideration 
by the Permanent Members when taking action in relation to the Tribunals87 • 
Perhaps the most disputable incident, which is referred to by some as the 
product of SC intervention, is the decision not to prosecute in the case of 
NATO bombing88. The above instances, however, are not sufficient to assert 
that the Tribunals are not independent in their operation as a whole. 
Moreover, the President of each Tribunal has to report yearly to the 
SC89• It could be argued that this would indirectly conflict with their 
independent functioning provided that the report is a means of controlling their 
operation. However, an examination of the reports so far shows that they are of 
a factual nature rather than detailed analysis of the Tribunals' operation90• 
Co-operation with the Tribunals is very important. However, this has 
been dealt with in the previous chapter and will not be examined here. It 
suffices to emphasise, however, that SC intervention in the field of co-
operation could not be characterised as decisive, since it has abstained so far 
from imposing sanctions to tackle the lack of co-operation 91. 
To sum up, although it would have been foreseeable for the SC to play 
an active role in the Tribunals' operation because of their nature, the practice 
87 Tomuschat, (1994).246. 
88 For an analysis of the decision, see generally, Cottier, in Fischer, KreB, and Lilder, (200 I). 
505. 
89 Articles 34 and 32 of the ICTY and ICTR respectively. 
90 See Annual Reports available at http://www.un.orglicty/pub.htm and http://www.ictr.org 
9\ See supra chapter 3. 
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seems to suggest otherwise. However, the limited intervention taking place to 
date, does not seem to have caused concern for the effective and independent 
functioning of the Tribunals, and falls into what is considered to be acceptable 
in international politics. Consequently, and in tenus of affecting the interplay 
between national and international levels, the SC's role in the operation of the 
Tribunals is no greater than any other coercive action taken by the SC. 
3.2 The SC and the ICC 
The Court is independent in the performance of its functions 92. Its 
relationship with the SC is a complicated one. Balancing this independence 
with the operation of the SC, is not going to be easy. The relevant provisions in 
the ICC Statute were notoriously difficult to negotiate, and an acceptable 
solution was only reached at the very end of the Rome Conference and as part 
of the so-called "package deal". Moreover, the solution adopted does not 
resemble the original 1994 ILC Draft. As it is not the aim here to provide an 
account of the different stages of the negotiation and the evolution of the 
relevant provisions. the problems these provisions might cause on the 
interaction between States and the Court will be identified and discussed. 
The role envisaged for the SC in the ICC involves a three-pronged 
relationship touching upon aggression, referral and finally deferral of situations 
to the Court. The SC may also play a part in the co-operation regime of the 
92 This independence is safeguarded in the Statute. See Article 4, which refers to the Court as a 
whole, and Articles 40 and 42 which specifically mention the independence of the judges and 
the Prosecutor respectively. Moreover, this independence is recognised by the UN in the 
Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations, adopted by the ASP on the 10th of September 2004, and signed at the UN on the 41h of 
October 2004, in recital 4 of its Preamble and Article 2. For the text of the Agreement see ICC-
ASP/3/15*, 13 August 2004, 7. 
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ICC, particularly in cases of enforcement of requests arising from SC referrals. 
This issue has already been dealt with already93. There are three players in this 
interaction: the SC, the ICC and State parties to the Court, which have to relate 
to both the ICC and the Council. The effect the SC has on State interaction 
with the ICC will be examined in each of the SC's functions above. 
Although the SC had no actual role in the establishment of the 
permanent ICC, it was made clear from the beginning that some role should be 
envisaged for the Council in the operation of the Court. And this, since the ICC 
has jurisdiction over the most serious of crimes, which are also likely to 
constitute threats or breaches of the peace, is the SC's main responsibility. The 
rationale, therefore, behind the Council's intervention is the same with the ad 
hoc Tribunals; providing assistance in restoring peace and security. 
3.2.l The SC and Aggression 
Coming to the first aspect of the SC's intervention, the SC will have a 
role with regard to the crime of aggression. As no agreement defining 
aggression has been reached yet, the crime of aggression and, consequently, the 
SC's role in its determination will not be in the scope of this study. The 
original ILC proposal, according to which prior to any prosecution, the SC 
would have to determine the commission of aggression, has been dropped. By 
virtue of the Statute as it stands today, the Court can deal with a case, 
regardless of a finding of aggression. Most importantly, the crime of 
aggression remains to be defined in order to fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. The role of the SC with respect to aggression will then have to be 
93 Ibid. supra n. 91. 
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clarified in a manner "consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations", i.e. with Article 39 of the Charter94 . Once aggression is 
included, State interaction with the ICC on the issue will involve 
. 95 
complementanty . 
For the time being though, and in the absence of a definition of 
aggression for the purposes of the ICC Statute, examination of SC role will 
focus on the issues of referral and deferral. 
3.2.2 SC Referrals - Article l3(b) ofthe Statute 
SC referrals pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Statute fall within the so-
called "trigger mechanisms" of the Court's jurisdiction. This particular aspect 
of the Statute caused much controversy in negotiations which preceded the 
Rome Conference as well as those during the Conference. The views were 
divided. Some States consistently opposed any role for the SC96, whereas 
others felt that such a role should be recognised. 
There is no equivalent of referrals in the ad hoc Tribunals. Nor are they 
envisaged in the Statute of the International Court of lustice97 . SC referrals 
pursuant to an explicit reference in the Statute are the prerogative of the ICC 
and affect the relationship between States and the Court. 
94 See on that Wilmshurst, in Politi, and Nesi, (2001), 41. 
9S A very recent proposal on the issue emerged in advance of the ASP meeting in the Hague in 
September 2004. See ICC-ASP/3/SWGCAlINF.I, 7. 
96 Mainly India, supported by Mexico. See AlCONF.183/C.11L.81, 15 july 1998. 
97 In the ICJ, and in the Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania). Preliminary Objection, ICI Rep. 
1948, 15. the UK sought to establish the jurisdiction of the Court inter alia on a 
r e c o n u n e n ~ a ~ i o ~ ~ ~ y y the SC to the parties to refer the. case to the Court, by holding that this 
conferred JUflsdlctlOn to the ICI. The Court however dId not deal with this argument but seven 
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3.2.3 Are SC Referrals Desirable? 
Several justifications may be put forward for the inclusion of referrals 
in the Statute98• It has been argued that referrals are necessary in order to 
acknowledge the proper role of the UN Security Council99• Given that the SC is 
the principal organ of the United Nations entrusted with the maintenance of 
international peace and security, this responsibility ought to be acknowledged 
by the ICC, which operates in situations where peace and security have been 
disrupted. This does not mean, however, that the only way to achieve 
acknowledgement for the SC's role would be by actually including SC referrals 
in the ICC Statute. In order to strengthen the argument put forward here, the 
following hypothesis should be examined. Although the issue is hypothetical, 
given the presence of Article 13(b) in the Statute, it is worth considering 
whether the SC would have been able to refer situations to the Court even 
without the inclusion of Article 13(b) in the Statute1OO• The SC could decide 
freely on the measures to be taken to tackle a situation threatening international 
peace and security and that could include referral to the ICC. The legal basis of 
this would be Article 41. Such measures would be subject to Articles 25 and 
103 of the UN Charter, by virtue of which the decisions of the SC must be 
carried out by the Members of the Organisation and obligations under the 
Charter prevaU101 • 
judges rejected it by reference to the word "recommendation" which is not mandatory and saw 
it as an attempt to introduce "a new case of compulsory jurisdiction" Ibid., 31-32. 
98 The Stanley Foundation, (1998), 21-22. 
99 Ibid., 21. 
100 Indeed, the SC has previously used its powers to create ad hoc Tribunals. See supra. 
101 In the L o c k e r ~ i ~ ~ Case. the ICJ ~ e l d d both ~ i ? y a a and the UK. were "obliged to accept and 
carry out the deCISIOns of the SecurIty Councd III accordance WIth Article 25 of the Charter; 
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Moreover, it has been suggested that the SC, by referring a situation to 
the ICC, would secure the necessary political support for the prosecution, as 
such an indictment would carry more political weight than one arising from a 
State referral 102. This argument seems to place SC referrals in a higher position. 
Although this is not enshrined in the Statute, in the reality of international 
politics it is likely that a SC referral will be of greater importance 103. As long as 
this assists in strengthening State compliance with the ICC regime, this is not 
necessarily deplorable. 
Furthermore, another view maintains that a right for SC referrals would 
"help to foster harmony by avoiding ambiguities .. 104• Eliminating statutory 
ambiguities was thought to enhance SC-ICC relations. However, despite the 
existence of a referral provision in the Statute, problems in the relationship 
between the Court and the Council may still arise and this is something that 
will be dealt with in practice and in the UN-ICC Agreement lOs• 
One more convincing argument for the desirability of SC referrals is 
that referrals will eliminate the incentive of the SC to create other ad hoc 
[ ... ] and whereas, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the Parties 
in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement, including 
the Montreal Convention". Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 197 J Montreal 
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahariya v. United 
States of America), ICJ Rep. 1992, para. 39. 
102 Ibid. supra n. 98. 
103 Along the same lines India, in explaining its vote in the final session of the Plenary of the 
Conference made the following statement: "The power to refer is now unnecessary. The 
Security Council set up ad hoc tribunals because no judicial mechanism then existed to try the 
extraordinary crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Now, however, the 
ICC would exist and the States Parties would have the right to refer cases to it. The Security 
Council does not need to refer cases, unless the right given to it is predicated on two 
assumptions. First, that the Council's referral would be more binding on the Court than other 
referrals; this would clearly be an attempt to influence justice. Second, it would imply that 
some members of the Council do not plan to accede to the ICC, will not accept the obligations 
imposed by the Statute, but want the privilege to refer cases to it. This too is unacceptable". 
Cited in Bergsmo, (1998), 353. 
104 Ibid. supra n. 98. 
lOS See text of the Agreement, ibid. supra n. 92. 
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Tribunals l06, or to use the ICC in an ad hoc way, disregarding some of its 
provisions. The SC created the ad hoc Tribunals due to the lack of a penn anent 
international criminal court. With the creation of the ICC, the SC should be 
less inclined to proceed with the creation of further ad hoc Tribunals. An 
explicit provision for referral in the ICC Statute would achieve this. It should 
be noted, however, that this does not preclude the SC from creating such 
Tribunals despite the existence of the ICC. Should this occur, significant 
political problems would arise l07 . Whether or not this is likely to happen in 
practice, it would depend on the relationship between the SC and the ICC as 
well as the particular situation in question. Provided that their interaction is 
harmonious, the possibility of creating new Tribunals would most likely be 
obviated. This would be desirable from the perspective of State parties to the 
Court, as the ICC operates on the basis of its treaty, agreed upon by the State 
parties to it. Nevertheless, should disagreements on whether to refer or not 
arise, reflected in the majority needed under Article 27 of the Charter l08 , it 
should be expected that the SC would not be precluded from establishing new 
Tribunals. In such an instance, UN Members will have to comply with the 
Council's actions. 
Along the same lines, another justification for SC referrals could be a 
purely logistical issue of securing funding for the new Court 109, as the UN will 
fund the investigation and prosecutions that would arise from a SC referral of a 
situation to the Court 11 0. And UN funding would, in any case, be most 
106 Ibid., 22. 
107 Bergsmo, (2000), 110. 
108 In the case in which, for instance, the necessary majority for a SC referral to the ICC is not 
achieved, whereas it is present for the creation of a new ad hoc Tribunal. 
109 Ibid. supra n. 98. 
110 Article 115 ICC Statute. See also Article 13 UN-ICC Agreement. 
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welcome, since the UN wOllld guarantee the material resources that would 
enable the examination of the referred casellI, allowing the ICC to operate 
without relying exclusively on State contributions. 
Article 13(b) referrals apply primarily, and beyond doubt, to States 
which are members of the UN and which are also parties to the ICC Statute. In 
this case of course, either another State, or the Prosecutor himself could initiate 
proceedings as well112• Most importantly, however, and for many, more 
controversially, the provision allowing for SC referrals could apply in relation 
to States which are UN Members but are not parties to the ICC Statute. 
Accordingly, SC referrals assist in expanding access to the Court I 13 • Had the 
SC not been allowed to refer cases to the ICC, the Court would only have been 
able to be seised of jurisdiction through State referral or proprio motu action by 
the Prosecutor. Given the Court's lack of universal jurisdiction 114, the fact that 
a SC referral will not have to go through the jurisdictional hurdles of Article 12 
of the Statute might give the Court new impetus to perfonn its functions. 
Although this was not discussed in the negotiation of the Rome Statute, an 
examination of Article 12 in conjunction with Article 13(b) attests to this fact. 
Since the application of Article 13(b) is not made conditional on the presence 
of the preconditions in Article 12(2) and (3), it may be concluded that the SC 
would be able to refer to the ICC any situation relating to crimes within the 
Court's Statute. And this, regardless of whether a State is party to it, or has 
III Bergsmo, ibid. supra n. 107, 110. 
112 In accordance with Article 13(a) and 13(c) ICC Statute, respectively. 
113 Ibid. supra n. 98. 
114 Universal jurisdiction is absent from Article 12 ICC Statute as a basis for the Court's 
jurisdiction. During the negotiations at Rome it was suggested that the Court have universal 
jurisdiction for genocide, crimes a g a ~ s t t ~ u m a n i t y y and war crimes. However, this suggestion 
did not go very far. For an exanunatIon of States' unwillingness to include universal 
jurisdiction in the Statute, and therefore reject a German Proposal on the issue, see generally 
Kaul, and KreB (1999), 143. 
200 
States, Institutions & the Security Council 
accepted the Court's jurisdiction on an rId hoc basis. This would be a welcome 
development for international criminal justice generally, for reasons discussed 
below. 
As with the Tribunals' remit over non-UN Members1J5, an interesting 
question is whether the SC could refer a situation to the Court concerning a 
State, non-UN Member. Arguendo that the UN Charter may in fact bind non-
member States on some occasions 1 16, the SC could then refer a situation to the 
Prosecutor of the Court. 
On the other hand, this process would allow the SC to intervene in a 
purely consensual institution such as the ICC, and transform it into a non-
consensual mechanism for justice. The new Court then is expected to operate 
in a quasi ad hoc manner to tackle situations which otherwise would not have 
been within its ambit. It is unrealistic to expect that rogue States, where most of 
the crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Court are likely to be committed, 
will become parties to the ICC treaty. In such cases, the contribution of the SC 
in ending impunity, although arguably selective, would be invaluable. This 
intervention, however, in an otherwise consensual system, seems to impinge 
upon the freedom each State possesses to decide whether to become party or 
not to a particular international regime established by a treaty. For States, 
which are not parties to the ICC, such SC action, however, would be consistent 
with coercive SC action generally and as such it would have to be complied 
with. 
Of particular relevance are also the criticisms which surround SC 
referrals. Opposite views maintain that referrals subject the operation of the 
liS Supra chapter 3. 
116 Vitzthurn, in Sirnrna. ibid. supra n. 39, 140-147. 
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Court to the decisions of a political body al'd, therefore, undennine its 
independence and credibility ll7. However plausible this argument may sound, 
it should be noted that the SC is not empowered to intervene as much as it 
would be allowed to in the case of the ad hoc Tribunals. As will be evidenced 
from an examination of the preconditions in the next section, the decision to 
proceed or not with a particular situation and indict the alleged perpetrators, 
rests with the ICC. In that respect, the Court's independence is not impaired. 
Of greater merit though is the view that maintains that SC referrals will mainly 
involve non-Permanent-Members of the SC because of the use of the veto 
power1l8. It would have been unrealistic to expect that the P-5 would vote in 
favour of referring a situation to the ICC in which they themselves are 
involved, leaving thus the non-Pennanent Members of the SC and the rest of 
the States "vulnerable" to such SC action. Arguably, this would alter the 
interface between States and the Court as it selectively submits most States to 
the Court's scrutiny, while sparing the privileged few. This is a real danger for 
international criminal justice which cannot, however, be altered, save for a re-
organisation of the UN system. It should not be perceived, however, that P-5 
are immune from the ICC's jurisdiction altogether, provided that they sign up 
to it and the preconditions for exercising jurisdiction are met lJ9• In any case, 
the legitimacy of referrals will be undennined if the P-5 do not ratify the ICC 
Statute. 
To conclude, SC referrals raIse interesting questions of interaction 
between national and international jurisdictions. Despite some shortcomings, 
117 Vee, in Lee, (1999),146. 
118/bid.,147. 
119 The Court in relation to the P-5 is more likely to suffer from the use of Article 16 rather the 
present provision. See infra. 
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they will not necessarily be more burdensome than existing SC action under 
Chapter VII, similar to that taken with regard to the Tribunals. In that sense, 
SC referrals have a supplementary role. They enhance State interaction with 
the Court, stepping in to complement the system. 
3.2.4 Preconditions for Referring a Situation to the Court 
Coming to the specifics of Article 13(b), the first observation is that the 
SC can only refer a "situation" to the ICC. This term was the subject of much 
discussion. Already in the 1994 ILC Draft it was noted that the SC "would not 
normally refer to the court a "case" in the sense of an allegation against named 
individuals" I 20. The ILC members had suggested the term "matter" which 
would allude to a situation to which Chapter VII applies 121. In the 1995 and 
1996 PrepComs the options were still open and the terms "matters", "cases", 
and "situations" were examined. The term "cases" was eventually dropped 
before the Rome Conference l22 • At the same time, "matters" was thought to be 
too specific by a number of delegations, whereas the term "situations", too 
broad by the rest l23 . The choice of the term "situation" is in line with the 
language used generally in the Charterl24 and, in Chapter VII, in particular, to 
which referral is directly linked. In addition, it is also found in Article l3(a), 
which provides for referrals. 
120 See Conunentary to the 1994 ILC draft, Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 
1994, para. 2. 
121 Ibid. 
J22 Yee, ibid. supra n. 117, 149. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Similar debates for instance occurred also in the case of Article 34 UN Charter. 
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Once the SC refers a situation to the Prosecutor, the Counc;l cannot 
influence the conduct of individual criminal prosecutions that may result from 
this referral 1 25 • The Prosecutor is the one who will individualise the case. Any 
opposite solution would impact on the Court's independence in the 
performance of its functions. In any case, the ICC's Prosecutor enjoys 
prosecutorial discretion. It would be in the hands of the Prosecutor to decide 
whether to initiate an investigation or not following a referral. Prosecutorial 
discretion is a fundamental aspect of the ICC regime l26 . It is therefore clear 
from Article 53(1) of the Statute read together with Article 53(2) that the 
Prosecutor can, in accordance with the Statute, conclude either to initiate an 
investigation or that there is not a sufficient basis to prosecute. Article 53(3) 
further provides the opportunity for the SC to request the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
review the Prosecutor's decision and request him to reconsider his decision. 
This is a significant provision, because it submits the decision of one person to 
. b b d 127 a reVIew y a 0 y . 
It needs to be noted that no reference is made in either Article 53 or 
Article 13 to the fonnal requirements of the decision to request review and 
reconsideration on behalf of the Council. It should be inferred, however, that 
the SC decision for review must be made under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Since the original referral decision, as will be seen shortly, requires Chapter 
VII action, it would be logical if the decision to request a review based on the 
outcome of the original decision, be made by the SC acting under Chapter VII 
as well. Article 53, however, is the only provision in the Statute which, whilst 
125 Williams, in Triffterer, (1999), 349. Cf. Scheffer, (2001-2002), 90. 
126 See generally, Marston Danner (2003), 510; Ntanda Nsereko (2004); Gallavin, (2003), 179; 
Arbour, Eser, Ambos, and Sanders, (2000), 141-144; Brubacher, (2004). 71. 
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finding application also in the relationship between the Court and the SC, does 
not explicitly refer to Chapter vn128. 
The second condition for referrals is that the SC must be "acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations". And this Chapter is devoted 
to the maintenance and restoration of international peace. 
The link between Chapter VII and consequently peace, with the Court, 
which is concerned with justice, signifies that the drafters of the ICC Statute 
had in mind the link between peace and justice129. The Court is a step towards 
achieving peace; hence the wording in this Article. 
Moving to the specifics of this second precondition for referral, the 
wording of the provision is significant. "Acting under Chapter VII", is at first 
sight, different from the somewhat akin provision of "a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII" found in Article 16 ICC Statute. On a closer examination 
though, this does not seem to create a particular problem. The SC does not 
have to take measures under Articles 41 or 42 of the Charter in order for a 
referral to be in accordance with the provision of the Statute 130. Using the 
phrase "acting under Chapter VII" before referring to the Court, and a 
determination that a threat or breach of the peace has indeed occurred, in 
accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, would suffice. This would be in line 
with the SC practice so far where, when acting under Chapter VII, it does not 
usually specify the exact Article of the Charter under which it acts and eVen the 
127 For potential problems on this approach see, Sarooshi, in McGoldrick, Rowe, and Donnelly. 
(2004),99-100. 
128 Oosthuizen, (1999),327 and also fn. 53 ibid. 
129 See supra section 1. 
130 It is important to note also that when the SC established the ad hoc Tribunals it asserted that 
it was acting under Chapter VII without citing any particular provision of this Chapter. 
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mere language of Article 39 is sufficient131 . Moreover, once the decision to 
refer is made at the SC, it will be transmitted to the Court via the SG132. 
Theoretically, at least, there is the question whether the UN General 
Assembly could refer a case to the ICC, acting under the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution133. There is no specific mention of such a possibility in the ICC 
Statute nor was it discussed in the negotiations which preceded its adoption. 
Could it be argued that, failing to reach a decision, that the SC's power to make 
referrals is transferred to the GA? Although extremely unlikely to occur in 
practice, it could be suggested that since the power to deal with situations that 
threaten peace is, exceptionally, granted to the GA, the power to refer a 
situation to the Court would not contravene the aims of Article 13(b) 134. 
3.2.5 SC Referrals and Complementarity 
Another interesting question is how SC referrals would affect the 
application of complementarity135. What would happen for instance if a State 
genuinely investigates or prosecutes, in accordance with the principle of 
complementarity, and the SC refers the same situation to the Court? As 
mentioned in chapter 2. complementarity constitutes the basis on which the 
international criminal justice system. established by the Rome Statute, is 
131 SC Res. 598, demanding the mandatory cease-fire in the 1980-8 Iran/Iraq conflict, was 
unusual in that it expressly stated that the SC was acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the 
Charter. 
132 Article 17( 1) UN-ICC Agreement. 
J33 GA Res',377 A (V), 3 November 1 9 5 ~ , , para, A(l) .. The adoption of this resolution by the 
GA allows It to take measures for the mamtenance of mternational peace and security where 
there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and in the 
event in which the SC is blocked due to lack of unanimity. 
134 Although discussion was made in ~ h e e I ~ C C in order to include in the Statute a provision 
which would enable the GA to refer a sltuahon to the Prosecutor on its own and along with the 
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founded. National Courts take precedence in dealing with crimes falling within 
the jurisdiction of the Court. Assuming, therefore, that a case is being dealt 
with by the national courts of State X, and provided that this State is not proven 
"genuinely unwilling or unable" to investigate or prosecute136, the ICC would 
not have jurisdiction. However, in the case where the SC refers a situation 
pertaining to the commission of the same crimes, then the ICC will, prima 
jacie, be seised of jurisdiction. In that case, the very same situation would have 
been declared inadmissible had the Court had been seised of jurisdiction 
following a State referral. Yet, when the SC refers the situation to the 
Prosecutor, could the approach be any different? For the purposes of coherent 
administration of justice it would be preferable if the Prosecutor finds the case 
to be inadmissible by virtue of the complementarity principle. In that respect, 
Article 53(2) mentioned above could also be of assistance. The Prosecutor may 
declare the case inadmissible under Article 17 and inform the SC of his 
decision. Pursuant to Article 17, it is left to the Court to decide its own 
jurisdiction137• This is in accordance with the widely recognised principle of fa 
competence de la competence. 
It should be noted, however, that the concept of complementarity is 
linked to State action and not to SC action. In other words, it governs the 
relationship of the States with the Court and not the relationship between the 
SC and the Court. 
If, however, the SC asks States by a SC Resolution not to prosecute, 
then these States have an obligation under Article 25 of the UN Charter not to 
SC, this was dropped at an early stage. See para. 5 of the ILC Draft Commentary. Ibid. supra 
n.120. 
135 For an examination of complementarity. see chapter 2. 
136 In accordance with Article 17 ICC Statute. 
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prosecute. Nevertheless, thls does not preclude the Court from seizing 
jurisdiction in accordance with complementarityl38. Although States would be 
clearly bound to comply with the SC Resolution by virtue of Article 103 UN 
Charter, the question which then arises is whether the ICC would also be bound 
by Article 103139. Although such an analogy would have facilitated unity of 
approach, practice does not support such an argumentl40. On the other hand, 
had Article 103 been accepted as binding on the Court as well, it would have 
unduly restricted the independence on which this institution is premised, and 
which is recognised by the UN141 . 
If the SC wished to undennine the ICC, it would have to adopt 
Resolutions obliging States to oppose the ICC. However, the fact that the ICC 
is a separate institution, which is distinct from the States, signifies that Article 
103 will not be of assistance to the Council in case it wanted to control the 
Court directly. 
Article 13(b) is certainly one of those provisions which could render the 
Council one of the Court's partners. In the words of Sir Franklin Bennan "the 
powers of the Court are brought into play when the [SC] makes a reference to 
it, in other words to empower the Court, not the Council" 142 . It gives the 
opportunity for the ICC to overcome the weaknesses of the Statute in the 
jurisdictional regime enshrined therein and to play an important role in the 
administration of international justice. 
137 Article 19(1) ICC Statute. 
138 Condorelli, and Villalpando, in Cassese, (2002), 640. 
139 For an informed analysis of the many aspects this issue entails, see Sarooshi, ibid. supra n. 
127, 106-109 who answers the question in the negative. 
140 Bernhardt, in Simma ibid. supra n. 39, 1298-1299. 
141 Article 4 ICC Statute; Article 2 UN-ICC Agreement. 
142 Berman, in von Hebel, Lammers, and Schukking, (1999), 174. 
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3.2.6 SC Deferrals - Article 16 ('fthe Statute 
A rather more invasive role for the SC is envisaged in Article 16 of the 
Statute entitled "Deferral143 of investigation or prosecution". According to this 
provision, the SC is empowered to stop the Court's handling of a particular 
case for a limited period, should the SC believe that the action taken by the 
Court is likely to hamper the Council's efforts to maintain international peace 
and securityl44. Article 16 encompasses another aspect of the relationship 
between the ICC and the SC, which is going to affect the functioning of the 
new institution. The presence of the said provision in the Statute caused much 
controversy and was the subject oflengthy negotiations l45 . On the one hand, it 
explains the close link between collective security and international criminal 
justice but, on the other, it totally subjects the operation of the Court to the will 
f 1·· I 146 o a po lhca organ . 
Supporters of this provision maintained throughout the negotiations that 
it would prevent the ICC from interfering in the maintenance of international 
peace and security which is the primary responsibility of the SC147. There 
seems to be an oxymoron here. Although the SC's creation of the Tribunals 
seems to suggest that justice leads to peace -positive peace that is, in the case 
143 Note the use of the term "Deferral" in this Article as opposed to Articles 9 and 8 of the 
ICTY and the ICTR Statutes respectively, examined in chapter 2. 
144 Cf. Cassese, (1999), 163 who maintains that the SC "may request the Prosecutor to defer his 
activity only if it explicitly decides that continuation of his investigation or prosecution may 
amount to a threat to the peace". 
145 Kirsch, and Holmes, (1999),8. 
146 India, in explaining its vote in the final session of the Conference stated: "The power to 
block is i ~ ~ s o ~ e e ways even h a r d ~ r r to understand or to acce?t. On the one hand, it is argued that 
the I C ~ ~ IS bemg set ~ p p to tIJ.: cnmes of the gravest ~ g D l ~ d e . . On the other, it is argued that 
the rnamtenance of mtematlonal peace and secunty IDlght require that those who have 
committed these crimes should be permitted to escape justice, if the Council so decrees. The 
m o m e n ~ ~ thi.s a r g u ~ e n t t is conceded, the. C ~ n f e r e ? c e e ~ c c e p t s s the proposition that justice could 
underrnme 1OtematlOnal peace and security As Cited 10 Bergsmo, ibid. supra n. 103 at 358. 
147 Vee, in Lee, (1999), 150. 
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of the ICC, it is thought that, occasionally, peace and justice are mutually 
exclusive and, in that respect, the operation of the Court must temporarily be 
put on hold. The origins of Article 16 can be traced back to Article 23(3) of the 
ILC Draft. However, the said Article, did not allow for the commencement of a 
prosecution unless the SC decided otherwise148• This approach was eventually 
dropped during the negotiating process giving more independence to the ICC 
and to its constituent States. Had it been accepted, it would have been akin to 
the provision of Article 12 of the UN Charter. However, Article 12 refers only 
to the General Assembly and not to the International Court of Justice, whose 
function is thought to be complementary. To borrow a phrase used by Rosenne, 
there is a "functional parallelism" between political and judicial organs of the 
UN149• And this has been manifested in a number of cases when the IC] was 
faced with the question whether it could look into a case already before the 
SC150• An equivalent provision to deferrals is not found either in the case of the 
ad hoc Tribunals, despite their creation by SC Resolutions where the inclusion 
of a similar provision could perhaps have been expected due to the basis of 
their creation. Despite the shift away from the ILC Draft following the so-
called 'Singapore Compromise' 151, it is still striking that a political organ has 
the power to make a political decision and impose it on the Court152 • 
148 Article 23(3) ILC Draft ibid. supra n. 120. 
149 Rosenne, (1997), 127·138. 
ISO See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, (Greece v. Turkey) (Provisional Measures), Order, 
1976, IC] Rep. 3, at 12; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Tehran (United States 
of America v. Iran), 1980 IC] Rep. 7 at 21·22; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 
1984 ICJ Rep. 392, at 431·433 where the Court said at 433434: "The fact that a matter is 
before the Security Council should not prevent it being dealt with by the Court and that both 
~ r o c e e d i n g s s could be pursued pari passu" . 
51 Singapore put forward a proposal in the August 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee 
AlAC.249IWP.51 by which it reversed the ILC Draft, but it was not until the UK support i ~ ~
December 1997 that this proposal shaped Article 16 as it stands today. 
152 On the relationship between political and judicial organs in the ICC regime, see Gowlland. 
Debbas, in Boisson de Chazournes, Romano and Mackenzie, (2002), 212-217. 
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Two points need to be made with regard to Article 16 and the 
relationship between States and the ICC. Article 16 allows the SC to bypass 
State consent, expressed in creating the Court. In that respect, the SC, not only 
alters State interaction with the Court, but it negates it altogether. In addition, 
the ICC's judicial independence might then be infringed by this provision. 
Conversely, in an attempt to minimise the impact of this, perhaps the 
most striking feature of the ICC treaty is that it places a legal framework on the 
Security Council. Most importantly, this framework is devised without all of 
the Council's P-5 having consented to it. The Statute contains preconditions for 
the exercise of Article 16, which potentially impose limitations on the Council. 
In this sense, it is important for the interaction of State parties with the ICC, as, 
provided that these preconditions are accepted by the Council, their interaction 
with the Court is channelled through an agreed position. And State consent is 
potentially less restricted by the Council than it could have been without the 
presence of Article 16 conditions. 
However, it is important to emphasise, that in terms of United Nations 
law, Article 16 may be ignored by the Council, which could override the 
conditions laid down therein. Resolution 142i53 and its successor 1487154 are 
examples of this. These Resolutions, part of the US offensive against the Court. 
go beyond Article 16. Even though the language used therein purports to 
respect Article 16 of the Statute, by referring, for instance, to Chapter VII, and 
by complying with the twelve-month period found in this Article l55, in essence, 
it disregards Article 16 completely. Article 16 was introduced in the Statute to 
ensure that the Court does not, by its investigations or prosecutions, harm the 
153 SlRES/1422 (2002), 12 July 2002. 
154 SlRES/1487 (2003), 12 June 2003. 
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SC's efforts in restoring peace and security. For a referral to be made, there is a 
prerequisite that such a situation, exists. In the context of SC Res. 1422 and 
1487, there was no specific situation examined by the Court, which would 
hinder the SC from the performance of its mandate l56 . Rather, the above 
Resolutions constituted an unprecedented, wide-ranging and totally 
unnecessary intervention in a purely consensual system, and were nothing less 
than an assault on the COurt157• In June 2004, Res. 1487 was not renewed, 
amidst concerns about the treatment of Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison 
in Baghdad, restoring some faith in the SC and its role in international criminal 
justice and allowing State parties to the ICC to continue to enjoy protection by 
its treaty. 
3.2.7 The Preconditions for Deferral 
Having examined the context for the application of Article 16 in the 
relationship between States and the ICC, let us now turn to the preconditions 
for deferral. First, it is of interest to see what the terms "investigation or 
prosecution" used in the Article entail. Neither investigation nor prosecution 
are defined in the Statute. However, it could be said that an investigation 
consists of the total number of actions taken by the Prosecutor in order to 
ISS For an analysis of the preconditions for deferral see the section that follows. 
156 Operative paragraph 1 of SC Res. 1422 is revealing: "Requests, consistent with the 
provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or 
former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over 
acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a 
twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or 
prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise". See also 
~ e r a t i v e e paragraph 1 ofSC Res. 1487, which is verbatim. 
IS For an analysis of the wider issues surrounding Res. 1422, see Cryer, and White, (2002), 
143. See also Stahn, (2003), 85; Lavalle, (2003), 195; Sarooshi, ibid supra n. 127, 115-120; 
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con finn the charges against an alleged perpetrator regarding crimes falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Court l58 • The prosecution phase would entail all 
actions following the confirmation of the charges in accordance with Article 
61 159 . In any case, since both investigations and prosecutions are subjected to 
Article 16, it would make no difference in practice to define which starts 
In addition, following an Article 16 decision, an investigation which 
has "commenced or proceeded with" must be stopped. A crucial issue is first of 
all, when an investigation or prosecution "commenced". If the starting point of 
an investigation is specified, the next step is to proceed with it and continue 
with the prosecution. This may be inferred by Article 53(3) of the Statute and 
is so regardless of how the jurisdiction ofthe Court is triggered. It follows from 
this provision that the investigation commences when the Prosecutor finds a 
"reasonable basis to proceed". Another relevant point is how the SC is going to 
be infonned about the commencement of an investigation 161. This is a practical 
issue rather than a legal requirement and it would suffice to say that the SC 
consists of States some of which would have the necessary information l62 . 
Staying investigations and prosecutions will entail serious problems 
regarding the gathering and preservation of evidence, examination of 
Zappala, (2003), 114; El Zeidy, (2002), 1503. Res. 1422 raises interesting issues of collective 
security which go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
158 See Bergsmo, and Pejic, in Trimerer, (1999), 378. 
159 Ibid., 379. See also another possible reading according to which prosecution consists of the 
actions taken after the issuance by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a warrant of arrest or a summons 
to appear by virtue of Article 58. Ibid. 
160 It should be noted that the preliminary examination of a case under Article 15(6) of the 
Statute does ~ o t t constitute part ~ f t h e e i n v e ~ t ~ g a t i o n n ~ n d d is therefore unaffected by Article 16. 
161 Note for Instance ~ a t t there IS no p r o v l s l ~ n n eqUIvalent to Article 18( 1) which would oblige 
the Prosecutor to notIfy the Sc. Moreover, 10 the UN-ICC Agreement, provision is made only 
regarding the procedure to inform the Court post the adoption by the SC of a Resolution 
pursuant to Article 16, and not for the Court to inform the SC before such Resolution. (Article 
17(2) UN-ICC Agreement). 
162 Bergsmo, Pejic, ibid. supra n. 158,380. 
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witnessec;, and arrest of the accused163 . Unfortunately, the Statute does not 
provide for ways to handle these issues l64 . Provided that the SC does not 
instruct the Court on how to act with regard to these issues, the evidentiary 
problems likely to arise could be dealt with under Article 54(3)(f). However, 
when the question of setting the accused free arises, it would be significantly 
more complicated to find a solution. It would, first of all, depend on who had 
arrested the accused and in whose custody he/she is at the time of deferral. In 
any case though, it would be contrary to international human rights standards 
to keep the alleged perpetrator in custody for as long as the situation is handled 
by the Sc. On the other hand, setting himlher free does not seem desirable 
since hislher de novo arrest might be problematic and not always forthcoming. 
Depending on the stage of the proceedings, however, issues of ne bis in idem 
. 165 
may also anse . 
The twelve-month time limit found in Article 16, first appeared in the 
Preparatory Committee following a Canadian proposal in August 1997 166, and 
was since retained in the Article. Arguably, the period for which the SC 
requests a deferral does not have to be twelve months. It would not create any 
problems should it be shorter. An interesting problem would arise, however, 
should the SC decide to impose an interruption of the Court's function, for a 
period longer than twelve months. The SC would be free to do this. Under 
Article 103 UN Charter, States would be bound by its decision provided that 
the relevant SC Resolutions are made under Chapter VII. This is not the same 
163 Ibid. at 380-381; Oosthuizen, ibid. supra n. 128, at 337. 
164 Article 16 makes no reference to this. There was a Belgian proposal at the Rome 
Conference and a nota bene was included in the last draft of the then Article 10 option 1 
suggesting the need for "further discussion" of the issues pertaining to the p r e s e ~ a t i o n n of 
evidence. See Bureau's proposal of 10 July 1998, UN Doc. AJCONF.183/C.I/L.59, 13. 
165 See supra chapter 2. 
166 Bergsmo, and Pejic, ibid. supra n. 158,375. 
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for the Courtl67. On this issue, Gowlland-Debbas observes that States do not 
impose conditions on the Council, as such. Instead, they are at liberty to devise 
a framework in a treaty they have consented to. If the SC does not observe 
these conditions, then the Court will not be restricted in the exercise of its 
j urisdictionl 68. Although this position seems very appealing, from the 
perspective of States, it disregards the practicalities of its application, given 
that States would be bound by Article 103 to follow the SC determination. It 
may be that the Court is not bound by such Resolution, but, depending on its 
content, it may make the Court's task impossible, given the latter's dependence 
on State co-operation. 
One other issue would be what is meant with the phrase "acting under 
Chapter VII"169. The requirement of a Chapter VII Resolution was among the 
last points to be inserted into the Statute in order to insure that there is a formal 
vote for the deferral 170. A determination that a situation falls within Article 39 
of the Charter is necessary. Occasionally, political reasons may preclude a 
finding under Article 39 of Chapter VII. This does not mean though that a 
binding resolution cannot be producedI7 }. This determination would suffice and 
no measures taken pursuant to Articles 41 and 42 are needed. 
The type of vote required for deferral is also relevant. It cannot but fall 
within the ambit of the substantive decisions, as procedural matters involve 
167 For the dichotomy between States and the ICC on the application of Article 103, see supra 
fn. 139-140 and corresponding text. See also Sur, (1999), 44-45. 
168 Gowlland-Debbas, ibid. supra n. 152,205, fn. 27. 
169 Note the difference in wording between this provision and Article 13(b). There is nothing in 
the Statute or in the Preparatory work to suggest however that there should be a difference in 
the approach. This phrasal i n c . o ~ s i s t e n c y y could be attributed to the nature of the negotiating 
process. The fact that the provIsions h a v ~ ~ not been drafted together and as a single entity and 
were inserted in the body of the text at different stages of the negotiations might have had its 
bearing on the language used in the various Articles. 
170 Bergsmo, Pejic, ibid. supra n. 158,381 
171 White, (1997),63. See generally Higgins, (1972),275-284. 
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issues such as inclusion of items in the agenda, for instance 172. In order to 
suspend the investigation or prosecution before the ICC, agreement of the 
Permanent Members of the SC is needed. In the case, however, that a 
Permanent Member has voted against, the Court is free to proceed with the 
case. This has been characterised as the "only positive function of the veto 
power,,173 and is indeed of great importance. 
The last issue to be considered is the issue of renewal of a deferral 
request. Article 16 provides that the same conditions apply for renewal, as with 
the initial deferral. That means that renewals would also have to be requested 
pursuant to a Chapter VII Resolution. As for the length of the renewal this 
time, it cannot be longer than twelve monthsl74. Article 16 does not limit the 
right to defer proceedings to the SC which would mean that the deferral could 
be renewed indefinitely. This might be detrimental for the process, creating 
judicial uncertainty. 
Since both investigations and prosecutions are the responsibility of the 
OTp175, it seems that this would be the addressee in Article 16 when reference 
is made to "the Court" 176. 
However unlikely in practice, it would be interesting, to see whether 
Article 16 would also apply to situations referred to the Court by the SC itself. 
This should not be precluded as an option, since no provision to the contrary is 
made in Article 16. However, it seems rather unlikely that the SC will request 
the deferral of the situation itself had referred to the Court in the first place, 
\72 Bailey: ~ n d d Daws, .(1998),225-.226. cr. Vee, ~ b ~ d . . ~ u p r a . . n. 147, 150, who implies, although 
without gIvmg a speCIfic legal baSIS, that the deCISIon IS procedural. 
173 Lattanzi, (1999), 443. 
174 Bergsmo, Pejic, ibid. supra n. 158,382. 
175 Article 42(1) ICC Statute. 
176 See Cassese, ibid. supra n. 144. cr. Oosthuizen, ibid. supra n. 128, who maintains that both 
the Prosecutor and the relevant Chamber are the addressees. 
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unless the balance of powers within the SC or the situation at hand has changed 
in the meantime. 
Unfortunately, the implications of deferral have not been considered in 
any systematic manner in the Rome Statute, the RPE or the UN-ICC 
Agreement177. If this provision is used, it is expected to create many problems 
in the functioning of the ICC 17s. In particular, Article 16 might raise problems 
of selectivity or even abuse of the Council's prerogative. The SC could use this 
mechanism to come to assistance of a State which, although party to the Rome 
Statute, would like to avoid a finding by the Court concerning crimes 
committed in its territory179. And this could most probably happen with regard 
to the P-5 or their close allies 1 so. 
Article 16 is a powerful tool at the disposal of the SC and its use and 
potential abuse in practice will be interesting to follow. In terms of interaction, 
Article 16 may negate the interface between States and the ICC. In other 
words, it overrides the consensual system created by the ICC Statute. On the 
other hand, by including Article 16 States attempt to submit SC action to a 
particular set of rules; to restrict, in other words, the seemingly unlimited 
function of the Council. This raises very interesting questions of collective 
security which will not be discussed here. In any case, this provision 
demonstrates how the interaction between national and international legal 
orders may be affected by an external factor, the SC. 
177 The RPE for instance, do not contain any reference to Article 16. 
178 For an examination of some of the foreseeable problems see Condorelli, and Villalpando, 
ibid. supra n. 138, 652. 
179 Lattanzi, ibid. supra n. 173,443. 
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3.3 Appraisal 
The SC's role in the operation of the international criminal justice 
institutions is noticeable. It seems that although it would have been expected to 
play a more active role in the two Tribunals - due to their establishment 
directly by the Council - in reality, a more interventionist role is envisaged for 
the ICC, where the SC, due to the Court's constituent basis, should, in 
principle, have no involvement. Through referrals, the potential expansion of 
the Court's jurisdiction, is counterbalanced by allowing the Council to change 
a purely consensual system into a coercive one. With regard to deferrals, 
however, State interaction with the Court is negated and the Court itself may be 
unnecessarily prevented from exercising its functions under the Statute. 
4. The Role of the SC in Terminating International Criminal Justice Institutions 
Turning, finally, to the issue of termination, the SC has an important 
role to play in the ad hoc Tribunals. In the case of the ICC, there is no role 
envisaged for the SC regarding termination, as its treaty basis means that the 
law of treaties and the provisions on termination come into play l81. 
Accordingly, reference in this section will be made only to the ICTY and the 
ICTR whose termination is controlled by the Council. 
Given that the Tribunals are subsidiary organs created by the SC, the 
latter will also be the organ that will terminate their operation. The subsidiary 
180 Bergsmo, ibid. supra n. 107, 111. 
181 On termination of treaties see Aust, (2000), 224-251. 
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organ must be terminated following the same procedure used for its creation182 • 
Since the two Tribunals were created by SC Resolutions, it will also take SC 
Resolutions under Chapter VII to terminate their function. Implied termination 
will, therefore, not be acceptable183 • Accordingly, even if the Tribunals had 
completed all the cases pending before them, they would not be able to 
terminate their operation themselves without a prior SC Resolution. 
As to the time of termination, it is important to note that the Tribunals 
were created, as noted earlier, with the view to restoring peace in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and their existence is linked to this 184• 
However, despite the fact that peace has returned to those two regions of the 
world, the Tribunals have not ceased to exist. Instead, a detailed strategy has 
been devised to complete the Tribunals' operation. According to their 
completion strategy, all investigations will be completed by the 31 sl of 
December 2004, trials at first instance by the end of 2008 and appeals in 
Arguably, it would be within the power of the se to terminate the 
Tribunals' operation before the completion of their tasks l86• Even though the 
Tribunals possess some degree of independence from the se, necessary to 
adequately perform their judicial functions, it has to be accepted that were this 
premature termination to occur, they would have no choice other than comply 
182 Cot, and Pellet, (1991) 216: "[I]es conditions de suppression d'un organe subsidaire sont 
symetriques des conditions de creation: la suppression resulte d 'une manifestation de volonte 
de I' organe principal createur". 
183 Sarooshi, ibid. supra n. 51, 131. 
184 Ibid. supra section 1. 
185 See SC Res. 1503, para. 7 and SC Res. 1534, para. 3. For some interesting practical 
~ u e s t i o n s s on the issue, see Del Ponte, (2004), 518. 
I 6 Greenwood, ibid. supra n. 56, 106. 
219 
States, Institutions & the Security Council 
with the SC's decision l87 . The SC has the residual authority to amend the 
Tribunals' Statutes and even terminate their operation. And that will occur 
following a finding of a threat of peace and a judgment that this would be the 
appropriate measure to tackle the situation. 
A potential problem with this is what Caron calls the "reverse veto", by 
virtue of which one or more of the P-5 could use their veto not to prevent the 
authorisation of a certain action, but to actually block termination or 
amendment of action already taken l88 . Conceivably, this might be a problem 
with the Tribunals as well. If, for instance, Karadzic, Mladic and Gotovina are 
still at large by 2008, then there might be an argument according to which it 
would be a failure for the Tribunal to complete its work without these 
prominent indictees before it189• In such a situation, unless the SC adopts a 
Resolution modifying the Tribunals' completion strategy, it is foreseeable that 
the power to veto might be used by certain P-5s to block the Tribunals' 
termination. 
Despite the existence of a completion strategy, it is possible that, at a 
specific point in time, the Tribunals may not have completed all of their 
procedures l90• Undoubtedly, there will be outstanding arrest warrants, perhaps 
187 This has been confirmed by the Trial Chamber in the Tadic case, ibid. supra n. 61, where in 
para. 20 it was held that: "In argument the spectre was raised of interference by the Security 
Council in the proceedings of the International Tribunal, for instance, by the abolition of the 
International Tribunal, in midstream as it were, for wholly political reasons. No doubt this 
would be within the power of the Security Council, but so too is like action in a national 
context. National legislatures, with greater or lesser ease, depending upon their powers under 
their respective constitutions or governing laws, may abolish courts previously created but this 
in no way detracts from the status of those courts as entities established by law". 
188 Caron, (1993), 577 et seq., who discusses the reverse veto in respect of sanctions in Iraq. 
189 This position was also advocated by the ICTY's president, in his address to the UN GA, 10 
October 2003, JLIP.I.S./789-e. 
190 In terms of procedure, it should be accepted that those cases for which jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal has been established should be considered before the termination of the Tribunal. This 
will be in accordance with the position taken by the ICJ in the Lockerbie Case, Preliminary 
Objections Phase, 27 February 1998, where it was stated that: "[I]n accordance with its 
established jurisprudence, if the Court had jurisdiction on that date, it continues to do so; the 
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also cases before the Trial or the Appeals Chamber, and certainly, even in the 
absence of the above, prisoners serving sentences. This last category appears to 
be more problematic. The Tribunals' lives will not be extended until each and 
every convicted person has completed hislher sentence. No provision is made 
for those issues in the Statute of either the Tribunals. The SC will obviously 
have to address these questions in due course. Among the options that they 
might consider would be to provide for the transfer of the prisoners to the 
facilities of the ICC. Even if this option seems to be the closest to the 
international criminal justice model the Tribunals serve, it is not free of 
concern. The ICC is product of a consensual regime, and might not be an 
appropriate forum for prisoners originally from countries which have not 
signed up to the Court. If, however, the SC specifically provides for this 
option, there is an obligation of compliance. In any case, an international 
option should be put forward, by allowing some very limited form of the 
Tribunals to continue to exist, that would supervise the serving of sentences in 
countries that have accepted prisoners. Sending the accused back to their own 
countries to serve the remainder of their sentences is another option, which 
would not necessarily involve international supervision. Were this to be the 
case, it could be rationalised on similar grounds as in the use of Rule Ilbis 
examined in chapter two. However, the difference is that in the case of I1bis, 
. 
the person involved is tried exclusively by domestic courts and has not been 
subject to an exercise of deferral already, and neither has he/she been 
subsequently tried at the international level. 
subsequent coming into existence of the above-mentioned [Security Council] resolutions 
cannot affect its jurisdiction once ~ s t a b l i s h e d " . . cr. Nottebohm. Preliminary Objection. 
Judgment, IC] Rep. 1953, 122; RIght of Passage over Indian Territory. p,.eliminary 
Objections. Judgment, IC] Rep. 1957, 142. 
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It is clear that, although the SC possesses the residual authority to 
abolish the Tribunals, it should be emphasised that "ending the life of a judicial 
body is a process rather than a single action"191. Careful consideration of all the 
possible issues arising should be taken before proceeding with the termination 
ofthose institutions. As far as State interaction with the Tribunals is concerned, 
States shall remain passive at the termination stage, and will have to comply 
with the SC. Given that this falls within the remit of the SC, State exclusion 
from the process is no more burdensome than normal SC action. 
Conclusion 
The emphasis in the previous chapters was on the instruments that 
govern the operation of both the Tribunals and the ICC, and on the principles 
governing the relationship between national and international legal orders. It is 
clear that State interaction with the institutions is outlined in the Statutes and, 
provided that States abide by the rules enshrined therein, the interaction should 
work. In this chapter, the emphasis shifted to the examination of an external 
factor, the Security Council. Undoubtedly, the_ SC holds a very important 
position in the international sphere and its involvement in international 
criminal justice is likely to affect State interaction with the relevant courts as 
well. 
The role the SC plays differs between the Tribunals and the ICC, and 
also varies in its intensity, depending on the stage of intervention. In the 
Tribunals, the Council has an exclusive role in their creation and termination, 
191 See Senior Legal Advisor in the ICTY Gavin Ruxton, as quoted by Shuett, ibid. sIIpra n. 22. 
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and a very much diminished role in their everyday operation. State interface 
with the ad hoc Tribunals is controlled by the Council and its limits are defined 
by it. The SC replaced the then absent State volition, and stepped in to create 
ad hoc Tribunals to tackle threats to the peace. In the operation of the 
Tribunals, however, the SC plays no greater role in terms of interaction than 
any other action normally undertaken by the Council. In the Tribunals' 
termination, the SC will take the lead again, excluding State input. 
In the ICC, SC involvement is limited to the operation of the Court, due 
to its creation by a treaty. However, the role envisaged there is significant, as it 
may supplement State consent and expand the limited jurisdiction of the ICC, 
or may negate State initiative and significantly curtail the Court's operation. 
On the other hand, the consensual system devised by States may have some 
influence on the Council itself. A partnership is emerging between the SC and 
the Court, which although not a full partnership, is crucial for the interaction 
between States and the ICC. 
The SC, like a modem Zeus, is able to make important decisions that 
affect the entire international community. In mythology, Zeus was the 
personification of fairness and would intervene to restore the system, in fact, 
his very own system, for the benefit of the people. The SC, in its function in 
the field of international criminal justice, intervenes and affects the interplay 
between States and institutions. However, the parameters are different. From 
the hegemony of the SC in the Tribunals, to the appeasement of the Council in 
the ICC, SC involvement in international criminal justice has moved from 
absolute control to the beginnings of a partnership with States. If absolute 
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control gives its way to a structured partnership, it will be beneficial to the 
emerging international criminal justice system as a whole. 
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Chapter Five 
States' Argonautic Expedition to Bring the ICC Home 
This study would not have been complete, had the reaction of States to 
their relationship with international criminal courts not been examined. States 
participate by enacting legislation which enables them to prosecute the most 
serious of international crimes domestically and also to co-operate with 
international criminal justice institutions. This thesis focuses on the 
relationship between the international and the national orders in the field of 
international criminal law. The main concepts on which this interaction is 
based and their practical operation through State co-operation have been 
examined in the chapters preceding this. The role of the Security Council as an 
external factor affecting this interplay has received equal treatment. It is 
evident that the effectiveness ofthe system depends greatly on the stance States 
take in implementing these fundamental international criminal law concepts. 
Implementation serves manifold purposes. It is an important way of 
giving meaning to the principles of primacy and complementarity. In order to 
achieve effective prosecution of the most serious international crimes before 
national Courts, States are encouraged to implement the Statutes. This is 
particularly important with regard to the ICC, as it will also assist in bridging 
the "impunity gap"l. Moreover, national implementing legislation ensures that 
States play their part in providing their support to the evolving international 
criminal justice system. In fact, the effectiveness of the system depends heavily 
1 See supra chapter 2. 
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on the quality of the said legislation and the ability of a State to co-operate 
fully with the Tribunals and the Court. 
In addition, through implementation States may also assist in rectifying 
the inherent difficulties faced by ventures such as international criminal courts 
and make a difference in their operation. Overcoming some of the Statutes' 
problems would assist the process greatly. The Statutes do not provide much 
guidance as to the content and manner of the provisions that need to be 
incorporated2• 
Additionally, States might wish to contribute to the work of the 
international institutions by making their own mark on issues of concern or by 
a particular incorporation approach. That implementation is not dictated in a 
particular manner assists in achieving this. States are given the opportunity to 
comply with their international obligations whilst respecting their own national 
law and procedures. National implementation of international concepts is 
therefore quite important. 
With regard to the ICC, this function is of yet greater significance. As 
the ICC's first Prosecutor said, upon taking up his position in June 2003, "the 
absence of trials before [the International Criminal Court], as a consequence of 
the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major success". This 
statement makes it clear that, despite its importance, the ICC is not intended to 
prosecute every single case that falls within its remit. Its role is residual, 
intervening only where States are "unwilling or unable" genuinely to 
investigate or prosecute3. An additional, and by no means less important 
function of the Court is to promote effective domestic accountability efforts. 
2 With the exception perhaps of the ICC co-operation regime where the broad objective is 
stated. See infra. 
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Although the Court will achieve greater legitimacy by being c;een to prosecute 
major international criminals fairly, it will be most successful if it normalises 
the prosecution of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity at the 
national level. In the two years of the ICC's operation there is already evidence 
that the Statute is being invoked in domestic proceedings4. 
1. Aim of the Chapter and Methodology 
1.1 Aim 
It is not the aim of this chapter to provide a complete analysis of 
various pieces of implementing legislation. Rather, the modest aim of this work 
is to record some emerging principles within a limited field of application. 
The first role State parties play is in implementing certain aspects of the 
Statute. A distinction should be drawn between those aspects where there is an 
obligation to implement and those areas where States have discretion as to 
whether to incorporate aspects of the Statutes. For each of these areas, States 
are free to choose the manner of implementation. This leads to the second role 
that States play, that of influencing international criminal proceedings through 
the enactment of appropriate legislation. In tum, such legislation serves to 
complement the Statute and potentially to rectify its omissions. This is 
certainly not an easy task. Nor is it likely that States will actively pursue this 
3 See supra chapter 2. 
4 See for example Jones, Milling, Olditch, Pritchard and Richards v Gloucester Crown 
Prosecution Services, [2004] EWCA Crim 1981. 
S See infra section 2.4. 
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role. However, good pieces of implementing legislation will also have an effect 
in enhancing international criminal justice. 
Each of these roles is fundamental to the overall effectiveness of the 
emerging international criminal justice system. How States react to the 
incorporation challenge and what lessons, if any, may be learnt from existing 
pieces of implementing legislation is central to this chapter. This will allow 
some understanding of how international criminal law is developing as a 
distinct discipline within international law and what the problems may arise in 
practice. 
1.2 Methodology 
This chapter does not deal with a large number of implementation 
pieces in any detail, nor does it constitute a comparative study of any sort. The 
aim of this chapter, as set above, is to serve as an indication of State responses 
to international criminal justice and, where appropriate, to trace some elements 
of harmonisation. 
The various pieces of legislation will be seen only as evidence of State 
practice. That national laws constitute State practice (capable, if coupled with 
opinio juris, of becoming customary law) has long been recognisedb• This 
thesis strives, as far as possible, to provide an accurate portrayal of the 
domestic legislation. 
The inherent limitations of this project are very important and should 
not be disregarded when assessing its overall value. Access to the necessary 
information has definitely been the greatest challenge of all in this effort. States 
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may have implementing legislation but, on many occasions, this is not 
publicised widely nor is it easily accessible7• This problem is aggravated by the 
language barrier. Most of the implementing legislation pieces are available in 
the original language only8. As a practical point, to avoid lengthy references to 
the text of the domestic provisions, it was decided not to provide the actual text 
in footnotes. Moreover, reference is made to enacted legislation only and not to 
proposed bills, to guarantee accuracy. The various pieces of implementing 
legislation for the ICC used in this study as well as a complete set of 
implementation pieces available to date, are available on the CD-ROM 
provided. Due to the scarcity of secondary materials on this topic, the analysis 
is predominantly based on primary sources. 
In addition, the choice was made to focus on implementation for the 
ICC only. This does not mean that implementation of the Tribunals is problem-
free9• However, given the complexity of the Court's regime combined with the 
Tribunals' completion strategies, it was thought that within the restraints of a 
thesis such as this, it would be timely to provide an examination of a particular 
aspect of the ICC Statute. 
Instead of providing a comprehensive analysis of every single piece of 
legislation discussed here, the focus of the chapter will be on examining the 
most controversial Articles of Part 9 of the ICC Statute which deals with co-
6 Jennings, and Watts, (1992), 26. 
7 The author benefited greatly in this respect from a research period spent over two consecutive 
years at the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, in Freiburg, 
Germany, where she gained access to various pieces of information not available elsewhere. 
Thanks are owed to all those who contributed in making this stay possible and indeed 
worthwhile. 
8 The author worked with the original language of the texts used apart from the Dutch Act, 
where the translation provided by the. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs was used. With regard 
to the German piece, although notIce has been taken of the original, the wording in the 
unofficial English t r a n s l a t i o ~ ~ formed ~ e e ~ a s i s s of the analysis. Finally, as no English translation 
is available for the French pIece, the ongmal text was used exclusively. 
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operation The choice of co-operation can be explained in tenns of structure 
and content of this thesis, but also because, despite its complexitylO, academic 
focus has been on implementation of the substantive part of the Statute)). 
Arguably, the relationship between international criminal justice and national 
legal orders can be manifested in a number of areas which are prominent when 
implementing the Statutes of the Tribunals and the Court, such as the 
incorporation of the crimes or defences into domestic law. Co-operation, 
however, has been central throughout this thesis and is an issue which merits a 
greater examination from the perspective of national legal orders, as 
enforcement of international obligations relies heavily, if not exclusively, on 
co-operation by States. Co-operation is important for another reason as well. 
Even though national incorporation of the Statutes is desirable, a distinction 
should be made between "obligations" and "choices". Since co-operation stems 
from a legal obligation imposed on States, its implementation is mandatory as 
opposed to optional, which is the case with the crimes enshrined in the Statute 
or with the defences available to them 12. 
Even though the approach this chapter follows is a thematic one, a 
decision had to be made as to the order in which the various themes are 
presented. Such order does not imply judgment on their particular importance. 
A number of options were available. Either a distinction could be made 
between important and less important concepts, or the chronological sequence 
of issues arising before the ICC or before domestic courts could be followed. 
9 See on ICTY implementation Josipovic (1998), 35; idem., (2000). 
10 Cf. Turns in McGoldrick, Rowe, and Donnelly, (2004), 337, who maintains that 
implementation of the co-operation regime is "fairly uncontroversial on the whole". 
II Neuner, (2003); Cassese, and Delmas-Marty, (2002). 
12 ~ o r r .the o b l i g ~ ~ i o n n to ~ o - o p e r a t e e s ~ e e supra chapter 3: The .enactment of implementing 
legIslatIOn to faCIlItate the ImplementatIon of the co-operation regIme is founded on Article 88 
ICC Statute. 
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The approach taken here follows the order the provisions appear in the Statute 
and does not attempt to prioritise some over others. However unorthodox this 
might seem, it has a distinct advantage. It allows the reader to identify which 
Statute Articles have been properly implemented by States and which have not. 
It may be that the order followed in the Statute is not entirely logical or 
appropriate, as various issues might arise in different stages in practice. 
Nevertheless, the approach taken is also dictated by the fact that there is no 
uniform approach adopted by States in that respect. Some pieces follow the 
Statute, whereas some take the issues as they are likely to arise in practice or as 
they would have arisen, had this been an entirely domestic procedure. It is 
hoped, however, that the present approach will not discourage discussion of the 
relevant issues in considerable detail. For the Articles examined, some key 
points have been summarised and placed in italics for greater ease of 
understanding. 
The countries chosen for this study are the following: Australia 13, 
Canadal4, Francel5 , Germany16, the Netherlands17 and the UKI8. This chapter 
does not follow a regional approach, but rather each country was chosen 
because of a particular implementation approach. Australia was chosen because 
its lengthy Act covers every aspect of co-operation in a distinct way. Canada 
was chosen because of its strong commitment to international criminal justice 
13 International Criminal Court Act 2002, No. 41, 2002. See Boas, (2004), 179. 
14 Extradition Act, 1999, c. 18. See Oosterveld, Perry, and McManus, (2002), 767. 
IS LOI no 2002-268 du 26 fevrier 2002 relative Ii la cooperation avec la Cour penale 
internationale. 
16 Gesetz zur Ausfiihrung des Romischen Statuts des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes vom 
17. Juli 1998 Vom 21. Juni 2002. See MacLean, (2002), 260; MeiSner, (2002), 35. 
17 314 Kingdom Act of 20 June 2002 to implement the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court in relation to cooperation with and the provision of assistance to the International 
Criminal Court and the enforcement of its decisions (International Criminal Court 
Implementation Act). 
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and because it amended its exic;;ting extradition Act instead of adopting a stand-
alone piece. France, because it incorporates the co-operation regime in its 
criminal procedure code, and the relevant provisions are very brief. Gennany, 
because of its unique codification tradition, and the UK, as it represents a good 
implementation approach which follows the Statute faithfully. The absence of 
any African country is explained because not enough representative pieces 
have been adopted to date. South Africa's Act19, does not present any particular 
problems and does not fonn part of this study, as it is, in fact, very good on the 
whole. Moreover, at the time of writing, no other African country had enacted 
I . I . 20 egis atton . 
The choice of these countries IS inevitably selective and hardly 
representative of the trends in ICC implementation. Needless to say, not every 
State is referred to in the analysis of each Article, but a selection is made 
among the most interesting approaches. The value of this work is to shed some 
light on what is expected to be incorporated by virtue of the Statute and the 
responses of a handful of States to these challenges. Ultimately, some guiding 
principles emerge and these will be summarised at the end. 
Looking at different pieces of legislation or even different areas of the 
same piece would reveal more and, perhaps also, different trends and problems. 
Had another area been selected, the results would, in all probability, vary. 
However, this does not undennine the value of this study, as indication and 
18 International Criminal Court Act, 2001. Cryer (2002), 733. For the purposes of this study 
reference will be made to England and Wales only. • 
19 Act No 27 of 2002, Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act, 2002. See Du Plessis, (2003), 1. 
20 Uganda and the DRC both have draft implementing legislation. The author (together with S. 
Shah) is currently ~ n g a g e d d in research on A ~ i c a a ~ n d d ICC implementation, funded by the 
MacArthur Foundatton. A report and an acadenuc artIcle are currently in preparation. 
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analysis of a limited area of internation"l criminal law and its implementation 
remains significant. 
2. ICC Implementation: Some General Observations 
Before proceeding with an examination of the various implementation pieces, 
it is of interest to examine some general questions States face when they are 
considering implementation. This will hopefully shed some light on the 
approach taken when they ultimately implement the Statute. 
2.1 Why implement? 
By stark contrast to the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda where implementation was perhaps, to some 
extent, not necessary, the ICC regime, given its weaker constitutive basis, 
needs to be incorporated into domestic law. The Tribunals' creation by means 
of SC Resolutions signifies that there is a duty, based on the UN Charter, 
incumbent upon every State to co-operate with the Tribunals21 • Such duty 
prevails, in principle, over any contrary domestic law. However, the 
application of this in practice has been problematic22• 
Also, the Tribunals' limited scope focusing on specific situations and 
not having, like the ICC, potentially universal ambit, meant that there was no 
immediate need to incorporate certain aspects of their Statutes, particularly the 
crimes within the Tribunals' jurisdiction. Moreover, this approach was assisted 
21 Supra chapter 3. 
22 Ibid. 
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by the principle of primacy and its operation. As ~ e e n n already23, when it is in 
the interests of justice, the ICTY or the ICTR may request that a case be 
transferred from national courts to the Hague or Arusha respectively, in 
accordance with the process of deferral. Taking this argument further, it would 
not be extreme to argue that the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were the only 
countries where implementing legislation to incorporate the crimes in the 
Tribunals' Statutes was really necessary. And even in those instances, it would 
not matter in practice whether they have done so, since the Tribunals may 
assert jurisdiction when they see fit. However, with regard to co-operation, the 
situation is somewhat different. It may be that the Tribunals base their 
authority on the UN Charter, which in any case prevails. However, executing a 
co-operation request needs some authority in domestic law. The technicalities, 
therefore, of arrest, transfer and collection of evidence for the Tribunals have to 
be dealt with in practice using domestic laws passed to that effect. Several 
States, albeit not as many as it would have been hoped, have opted for that 
route, therefore assisting co-operation with the Tribunals24 • 
When comparing the implementation efforts undertaken with regard to 
the Tribunals with those of the Court, it is immediately obvious that their 
different constituent basis has an effect on the incorporation stage as well. The 
ICC, being a product of an international treaty, contains obligations that have 
to be balanced against other international obligations State parties have, as well 
as requirements of domestic law, particularly of national constitutions. Despite 
23 Supra chapter 2. 
24 See www.un.org/icty; Similar information is not available through the ICTR's website. Most 
States that opt to implement however, also implement the ICTR Statute at the same time. See 
h!tl':llwww.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsflWebLA W2?OpenView&Start=I&Count-1S0&Expand 15#1 ~ . .
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its importance, the Rome Statute does not enjoy an elevated status similar to 
the UN Charter; and this makes implementation imperative. 
2.2 The Timing of Implementation 
The first question a State is faced with, when considering enacting 
legislation to implement the ICC Statute, is whether implementation should 
take place before or after ratifying the Statute. 
The advantages of enacting implementing legislation before ratification 
may be summarised as giving the State concerned the time needed to review 
conflicting provisions and to make the necessary amendments. It is important 
to note that once ratification is complete, the State in question is bound by the 
Statute and could be caught by its provisions. More specifically, States that had 
ratified and not implemented before the entry into force of the ICC Statute on 
the 151 of July 2002, risked being found unable to fully comply with a request to 
co-operate made by the Court, or in some cases, satisfying the complementarity 
threshold, which enables the Court to be seized of the matter. In practice, most 
States ratify first and deal with the implementation process afterwards. This is 
evidenced from the relatively few pieces of implementing legislation that have 
emerged at the time of writing, despite the ninety-seven State parties to the 
Statute25 • This tendency may be explained by the fact that implementation, 
however good a State's intentions may be, takes time. It may also be that a 
State, anxious to provide its support for the Court internationally, proceeds 
with the ratification, whereas implementation, being an entirely domestic 
affair, is another victim of the usual red tape inherent in such processes. 
235 
National Implementation 
2.3 The Manner of Incorporation 
Regarding the form incorporating legislation may take, it is totally 
dependent on the stance a State wishes to maintain on the issue. Some States 
have opted for one, or more stand-alone Acts26 • Germany comes directly to 
mind as an example of the latter, as it has adopted a complete "international 
criminal code" dealing with the substantive part of the ICC Statute and a 
separate co-operation law to implement the co-operation regime. However, 
neither of the two instruments is incorporated within existing pieces of 
legislation. Rather, they mirror the existence of a domestic criminal code and 
of a code of criminal procedure. This approach is definitely thorough, in the 
best of the codification traditions, and allows for a complete analysis of the 
possible issues that may arise when dealing with international criminal law 
before domestic courts. 
Some other States have opted for amendment of only those provisions, 
which are affected by the ratification of the ICC Statute. France for instance, 
incorporates the co-operation provisions into its criminal procedure code27 • 
This approach has the distinct advantage that the applicable provisions can be 
found in a single document, allowing for better access and understanding of the 
procedures and their interaction with the rest of criminal law and criminal 
procedure law. The above approach is particularly appealing to civil law 
countries, where codes are the cornerstone of the system. It entails, 
nonetheless, the danger that the many aspects of the Statute which need to be 
2S See www.icc-cpi.intlstatesparties.html. 
26 For instance, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand. 
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incorporated in a particular manner have to be contracted to fit the style of the 
domestic code. On the other hand, such an approach shows the significance 
attached to the ICC and renders it part of a State's own procedure, incorporated 
alongside the rest of the country's criminal legislation, and is not treated as 
"foreign law", but as part of the judicial system of the State. 
The third approach is a combination of the two approaches described 
above. Namely, there is both a free-standing act, but also the provisions in 
other pieces of legislation that are affected are amended accordingly. This 
approach was followed primarily by Canada, although even in the UK's case 
there has been some amendment of other pieces of legislation affected by the 
ICC Act. 
Moreover, the place of co-operation within the particular 
implementation piece of a State needs to be considered. Some States opt for a 
separate piece of legislation dealing with co-operation issues whereas others 
implement the co-operation regime in the same piece of legislation as the 
substantive crimes. In such a case the placement of the co-operation regime 
needs to be examined. Whereas generally co-operation follows the 
incorporation of the crimes, in the case of the UK, for instance, the co-
operation provisions precede the substantive part. This is not at all problematic. 
as a State is free to choose the order it arranges its materials, but it might be 
worth considering why the UK has opted for this. Perhaps this represents a 
realisation that co-operation with the Court will most likely be required in the 
first instance, regardless of what the position is concerning the crimes. This 
also may stem from the fact that the UK, as with many other countries, does 
not really foresee that the ICC would be dealing with situations involving this 
27 Article 1. 
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State. Of course, such a claim can only be implicit, but it is nevertheless 
present. However realistic this assumption may be, the possibility of the ICC 
having jurisdiction over a State should not be completely disregarded with 
regard to any State. It remains true, however, with regard to certain States, that 
co-operation with the Court will be at the forefront and as such it merits special 
attention. 
2.4 Areas of Implementation 
It has been mentioned already that there are "obligations" and "options" 
when it comes to which areas need to be incorporated into domestic law. 
Quite clearly, a State party to the Statute is under an obligation to co-
operate fully with the Court. This is evidenced from Article 86 of the Statute 
which enshrines the unequivocal obligation to co-operate. Moreover, by virtue 
of Article 88 of the ICC Statute, States are required "to ensure that there are 
procedures available under their national law for all of the fonns of co-
operation". Under this provision it is clear that a State party is under a legal 
obligation to incorporate the ICC's co-operation regime. However, Article 88 
neither specifies the exact procedures to be put in place, nor does it contain any 
guidance on how these procedures have to be implemented. Article 88 of the 
Statute contains the aim that needs to be achieved, leaving the means to the 
State concerned. It is akin, therefore, to an ED Directive in that respect28• On 
both occasions, what matters is the attainment of the goal, regardless of the 
manner of incorporation. As with a Directive, Article 88 sets the target and it is 
up to States to choose the means, without departing from the goal. 
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An equivalent obligation cannot be found in the Statute to incorporate 
the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction into national criminal law. The 
reference in the preamble does not create a legal obligation, as according to the 
VCTL the preamble to an international treaty is not binding29 . Further the 
argument that the preambular paragraph codifies existing customary law which 
obliges implementation is no more convincing30• Had this been the case, a 
strong obligation to incorporate the crimes would have found its place in the 
main body of the treaty. Despite the importance and desirability of 
incorporating the substantive part of international criminal law into domestic 
law, such an act remains discretionary. 
States decide to incorporate the crimes, primarily to enable prosecutions 
before domestic courts. This is certainly a wise choice as it is the first step in 
ensuring that the complementarity threshold of the ICC will not be met3 ! . 
For States, a decision to include the crimes as part of their incorporation 
is crucial, since it enables prosecutions in that forum. This is of equal or 
perhaps even greater importance to them than simply ensuring full compliance 
with a co-operation request by the Court. 
States that have incorporated the ICC crimes into domestic law have 
largely followed two approaches. They have either adopted them as they are 
found in the Statute, or have departed from the wording of the Statute and have 
opted for a wider or narrower approach. Canada32 is a good example of a wider 
approach. It allows for prosecution before Canadian courts of crimes under 
28 Article 249(3) EC Treaty. 
29 See fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs. On the legal status of the preamble see supra 
chapter 2. 
30 Kleffner, (2003), 90-94. 
31 However the possibility of inadequate implementation of the crimes leading to the ICC 
seizing j u r i s d i c t i ~ n n ~ n . . the .basis .of c o m p . l e m e n t a r i ~ ~ ~ h o u . l d d not be disregarded. Moreover, 
unwillingness or mablhty mtght still come mto play glVlng flse to the Court's jurisdiction. 
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customary law. Given that not all the cnmes m the Statute constitute 
codification of customary law. Canada's approach is wider than the scope of 
the Statute in that respect. Moreover, Germany adopts a holistic approach, 
which through the enactment of the V6lkerstra!gezetsbuch 33 encapsulates an 
exercise in restructuring domestic prosecution of crimes falling under the 
ICC's jurisdiction which is much broader than the incorporation envisaged by 
the Statute. Such an approach, when done properly, is worthwhile and certainly 
welcome. 
The most common approach among States, which incorporate the ICC 
crimes, is to reproduce in their domestic laws definitions of crimes as they are 
found in the Rome Statute34• This approach is less complicated, and may be 
undertaken by any State wishing to incorporate the crimes regardless of 
particular expertise or available resources. It has the distinct advantage that, in 
any case, the domestic law will be consistent with the Statute, whose wording 
is followed to the letter. This, in tum, means that the possibility of 
complementarity coming into play owing to lack of, or inaccurate, application 
of the definitions is the Statute is minimised, if not totally eliminated. 
Apart from the offences, a State may wish to incorporate the general 
principles of criminal law and the defences under the Statute. With regard to 
the defences in particular, it should be noted that States generally include 
various defences in their domestic criminal laws. Compatibility of these 
defences with the defences pennitted under the Statute needs to be assessed by 
32 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24, Sections 4,6. 
33 Gesetz zur Einftihrung des Volkerstrafgesetzbuches, 26. Juni 2002, BGBI. 2002, I, S. 22254. 
See Eser, and Kreicker, (2003); Zimmermann, in Vohrah, Pocar, Featherstone, Fourmy, 
Graham, Hocking and Robson (2003), 977; Werle, and Jessberger, (2002), 191. 
34 eg the UK. 
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the States concerned, as a wider or narrower defence system might give rise to 
the Court's complementary jurisdiction35 . 
Finally, the possibility of using domestic criminal justice procedures in 
dealing with the ICC should not be disregarded. The necessity of incorporating 
ICC procedures concerning trials in absentia for instance, or plea bargaining or 
the right to silence is crucial. Even though there is no obligation to implement 
such areas, there might be points of conflict between the ICC and existing laws 
which might need to be reviewed before they arise when dealing with the 
Court. 
In this respect, the difference between a timid approach taken by most 
States, which is epitomised in the incorporation of the minimum required, i.e. 
the co-operation regime, and another, more confident, approach hopefully 
shared by more States in the future, which includes more aspects of the Rome 
Statute, is noticeable. The former approach could be characterised as reactive, 
whereas the latter as proactive. Both serve a useful purpose, namely, 
completing the edifice of international criminal justice; each of them has 
different merits and challenges. 
3. Factors that May Shape the Decision to Implement 
Having examined some general issues, it is of interest to see whether 
there are some factors that dictate a particular implementation approach. 
35 See Robinson, in Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones, (2002), 1864-1866. 
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3.1 The System: Monism v. Dualism 
Whether a State follows the monist or dualist tradition becomes 
relevant at the implementation stage36• Monism and dualism not only have 
important theoretical underpinnings37 but they also have significance in 
practice38 • The system a State follows may dictate particular approaches with 
regard to the status of international law in domestic law and incorporation 
thereof. Under dualism, treaty obligations must be separately incorporated into 
domestic law in order to gain effect domestically. Dualist States, therefore, 
require an incorporating Act which would give effect to an international treaty 
at the domestic level. This is true even when SC Resolutions are concerned, for 
which implementation is required in order to gain effect in the national 
sphere39• On the other hand, under monism, international law prevails and 
applies directly into domestic law. 
When it comes to the ICC, it is important to distinguish between monist 
and dualist approaches in order to consider whether incorporation of the ICC 
treaty into domestic law is in fact necessary, or whether such a treaty is capable 
of having "direct effect". In the latter case, incorporation would not be strictly 
necessary. The argument in a purely monist country would, therefore, be that 
implementing legislation is altogether unnecessary since the Rome Statute 
would be directly applicable in the domestic sphere and would prevail over any 
conflicting piece of legislation. However appealing this argument may sound 
36 See Brownlie, (2003), 31-33; Ferrari-Bravo, in Macdonald, Johnston, (1986), 715. 
37 Starke, (1936), 66. 
38 Morgenstern, (1950),42. 
39 See Tharcisse Muvunyi v Bow Street Magistrate. In this case, the opinion of the FCC was 
that it was necessary to implement the SC Resolution under which the (CTR was created in 
order to enable the transfer of the Muvunyi to the Tribunal. See excerpt of the opinion in, 71 
BrIL (2000), 544. 
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for practical reasons, given that any existing legislation conflicting with the 
ICC Statute would automatically be set aside, is not entirely convincing. For it 
disregards the importance of the constitutional legal order in a particular 
country. It is indeed a State's constitutional order that influences the 
application of either monism or dualism in practice, as it takes a domestic, as 
opposed to an international, decision to decide whether an international 
obligation will be implemented or not. With that in mind, an examination of 
the two systems in the light of constitutional legitimacy is necessary. Under 
monism, international law fonns part of a single legal order and national 
constitutional law finds itself below international law, whereas under dualism. 
the two systems are kept distinctly separate and a State detennines the 
importance attached to a particular international law treaty through 
incorporation40• States have adopted varying approaches on the issue, ranging 
across the spectrum from monism to dualism, with the detennining factor being 
the importance attached to the role of the national parliament41 • It is true to say, 
however, that monism and dualism largely represent the two extremes and 
most States would find themselves somewhere in-between42• 
Incorporating the ICC Statute therefore depends on the constitutional 
approach with regard to monism or dualism43• As most States do not share 
Paraguay's approach partly explained by the country's history, by virtue of 
which the country "accepts a supranational legal system that would guarantee 
the enforcement of human rights, peace, justice, and cooperation, as well as 
40 Denza, in Evans (2003), 421. 
41 Ibid. pp. 422-428 where the system in six countries is examined. 
42 For a detailed discussion of the various approaches, see generally Jacobs. and Roberts. 
(1987). See also, Seidl-Hohenveldem, (1963), 101 et seq .. 
43 For a very comprehensive analysis of the challenges monism and dualism pose on 
constitutional legitimacy, see Feldman, (1999), lOS. 
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political, socioeconomic, and cultural development'.44, certain constitutional 
amendments might be necessary to clarify the position of the ICC Statute into 
domestic law. The reality of incorporation, therefore, dictates that rega;:dless of 
the whether a country is monist or dualist in principle, a close examination of 
the constitution is necessary to allow compliance with the Statute45. In any 
case, even by looking at the ICC Statute it is not easily discernible how this 
treaty could be applied without specific legislative authority in the domestic 
sphere. Accepting the prevalence of international law and its direct application 
might be true with regard to the substantive aspects of the ICC Statute. 
However, the same would not be true with regard to the co-operation regime. 
Although, in principle, the obligation to arrest, for instance, could be found in 
the Statute, the authority to empower the domestic police to execute such a 
request and the manner of execution would need to be specifically 
implemented if a State wishes to comply fully with the Court. 
In order to fully appreciate the potential problems of implementing the 
ICC Statute as a treaty the theory of self-executing treaties requires some 
consideration. The importance of this issue lies in the fact that regardless of the 
method of incorporation, it is necessary to establish whether a treaty could 
have direct effect and subsequently whether the treaty confers rights to 
individuals either directly or indirectly which may, in tum, be invoked before 
domestic courts. According to the theory of self-executing treaties, certain 
international treaties are directly applicable, as if they were the law of the land, 
44 Art. 145 Constitucion de La Republica del Paraguay, available at: 
http://www . georgetown. edulpdbaiConstitutionslParaguay/para 1 992.html 
45 Although specific constitutional issues are dealt with in the next section, it is important to 
emphasise here that some States have opted to amend their constitutions to facilitate full 
c o m p l i ~ n c e e with the I C ~ ' s s p r o ~ i s i ~ n s . . In that ~ e . s p e c t t see, most prominently, France, following 
a deciSIOn of the Consed ConstItutJonnel (DeCISIon No. 98-408 DC, 19991.0. (20) 1317. For a 
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and do not require further implementation46. The doctrine has been the subject 
of much legal scholarship in the US47, given the so-called "supremacy clause" 
in the US Constitution48 • The primary objection to the direct effect of such 
treaties has been their essentially political nature. A similar enquiry into 
whether the ICC Statute could be characterised as a self-executing treaty, 
however appealing, would be difficult to sustain. And this is not only due to the 
potential political nature of the ICC Statute, but primarily because the Statute 
contains many technical provisions, particularly in its co-operation part which 
require implementation. The strongest argument against can be found in Article 
88 of the Statute which provides the legal basis for further action which is 
necessary for the effective functioning ofthe Court. 
It is clear that regardless of the system followed by a particular State, 
and regardless of the nature of a treaty as self-executing or not, the 
constitutional order of a particular State will dictate the approach to be taken. 
When it comes to the ICC however, it is equally clear that implementation is 
essential and lies in the fact that without legislation to that effect, a State would 
be unable to execute a request made by the Court. 
commentary on this decision see Rudolf(2000), 391. See amended text of Art. 53.2 of the 
French Constitution, available at: www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
46 Aust, (2000), 158. 
47Evans, (1953), 178; Paust, (1988), 760.; V a s q u ~ z , , ~ 1 9 9 5 ) , , 695: ~ u t t also see comparatively: 
Preuss, (1953), 1117. For non-self-executmg treaties 10 the same JUrisdiction see: Sloss, (1999), 
129, idem., (2002), 1. 
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3.2 National Constitutions and Their Relationship with the Rome Statute 
A major stumbling block in a State's compliance with the Rome Statute 
may be the national constitution of a State49• The various constitutional 
problems that may arise when a State ratifies the Rome Statute have been 
identified by the Venice Commission in a report published in 2001 so. These 
problems may arise when it comes to the incorporation of the Statute, 
depending on the stance a State takes with regard to its Constitution and its 
effect on compliance with a co-operation request. 
There are three areas that have been identified where the Constitution 
might be inconsistent with the Statute: First, the issue of extradition of 
nationals; second, issues relating to sentencing; and third immunities. 
Unfortunately, space does not permit an examination of those but a 
States, when implementing, would need to review their constitutional 
instruments and adopt an approach which is in line with the StatuteS I. 
4. Setting the Standards for Implementation: Some General Issues 
The quality of implementing legislation depends solely on the State 
concerned. The Statute does not provide much guidance, if any, as to how 
States may proceed with its implementation. Several issues arise in that respect 
for both the implementing States and the ICC itself. 
48 Article VI, clause 2, US 
http://www .house.gov /ConstitutioniConstitution. html 
49 See generally on the issue, Duffy. (2001), 5. 
50 Venice Commission, (2000). 
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For the States, a need to balance their international obligations with the 
rest of their domestic laws and their responsibility towards their own people is 
at the forefront of their concerns. For the ICC, a need to ensure that 
complementarity works and that the Court's requests for co-operation are 
complied with, is equally important. 
States incorporating the Statute need to set aside time, effort and 
expertise. The Rome Statute is not a treaty like so many others, where 
ratification suffices. Some delicate procedures must be put in place and this 
requires special attention. Developed States are not going to be the ones that 
are in need of most help. They have an army of lawyers and funds available to 
build up the requisite expertise, when this is not present already. Developing 
countries do not have similar capacity. The pressing needs of implementation 
are likely to affect those countries more, and it is in those countries where 
conflicts are more likely arise, and crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the 
Court are likely to be committed. 
For the ICC too, implementing legislation is likely to pose a few 
challenges. The position the Court will take with regard to a State's 
implementing legislation is not yet clear. A distinction should be made between 
implementing legislation pertaining to the co-operation regime and to the 
substantive aspects of the Statute. With regard to co-operation, the ICC will 
have to deal with, essentially, the failure of a State to execute a particular task 
requested by the Court. In such an instance, the failure to comply will be 
examined on its own merits. With the exception of situations where a State 
refuses to co-operate by invoking the relevant Statute provisions, all other 
cases of failure to co-operate, due to lack or inadequacy of domestic 
51 For the options available, see Robinson, ibid. supra n. 35, 1853-4. 
247 
National Implementation 
legislation, will in all likelih00d be straightforward and the ICC will make a 
finding to that effect. 
More interesting, and potentially more challenging for the Court, will 
be to assert its jurisdiction on the basis of complementarity in cases where 
national courts are proven to be unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or 
prosecute due to lack of adequate legislation. In such cases, the ICC will 
necessarily have to pass judgment on the particular piece of legislation. The 
question which then arises is whether such a judgment by the Court will cover 
all future cases arising out of a particular situation, or whether each case should 
be judged in concreto. The latter approach seems to be more convincing, as the 
ICC would have to establish jurisdiction in each case. This is also consistent 
with complementarity and its application, as the ICC will have to establish the 
admissibility of each case and will not exclude a cluster of cases based on a 
finding on a previous case. 
A related question concerns the timing of such an intervention by the 
ICC. It might be worth exploring whether it would be possible for the Court to 
intervene and examine a State's implementing legislation long before a case 
arises before it. The ICC could provide a "safety check" of such implementing 
efforts so as to minimise triggering the Court's jurisdiction when it is least 
necessary. Admittedly, the majority of cases will not arise following this route. 
And given the restricted resources the ICC has at its disposal, it is unlikely that 
such an initiative is, in fact, practicable. 
Consistent with the principle of complementarity, the ICC will decide 
on the adequacy of national implementing legislation. Any opposite view 
would defy the principle itself. The real problem, however, is not so much the 
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authority of the ICC to decide, but what c;tandards should be employed for the 
Court to make this decision. No guidance is provided for in the Statute. 
Essentially, the question is what a particular piece of legislation should be 
judged against, for example, the Statute, or perhaps the State's own resources? 
And in such a case, should ICC implementing legislation be compared to the 
rest of the State's own legislation? Or even, should there be a comparison with 
other implementation pieces adopted by other State parties to the Rome 
Statute? 
Answering these questions is not easy. However, the answer to most of 
the above questions should be in the negative. Clearly, the Court is bound by 
the Statute, which created it. Hence, the Court will act as the guardian of the 
Treaty, and consequently, will also be guided by it for its jurisdiction and 
operation. Compliance of implementing legislation with the Statute is, 
therefore, essential. Certainly, the ICC cannot and should not embark on an 
examination of every piece of implementing legislation and how each measures 
against the rest of the pieces of implementing legislation. This would be a futile 
exercise, as there is no obligation for harmonisation in the Statute. It could be 
that the implementation process may well result in some co-ordination, if 
States adopt similar approaches, but this is not stated in the Statute and is not 
an immediate aim of the ICC. Of more interest is the case where a State has 
very limited resources at its disposal and cannot reach adequate standards in its 
legislation. In the case of a State that has undertaken a bona fide 
implementation, which is however not of the requisite quality, the ICC would 
potentially have jurisdiction. The issue of limited resources and its impact on 
the quality of implementing legislation at an early stage after ratification 
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should perhaps be explored. And this is an argument that might be put forward 
by the affected States. However appealing, the ICC should not succumb to a 
"two speed", or culturally different implementation. First, the criminal nature 
of the Court means that maintaining high standards is important. Second, 
creating double standards will not help the Court's primary mission which is 
combating impunity. 
Advocating differing standards will not be unique to the ICC. It seems, 
however, that international practice militates against such a proposition. In 
Kalashnikov v Russia52 the European Court of Human Rights dismissed 
Russia's claim that the conditions complained of "did not differ from or were 
no worse than, those of most detainees in Russian53 and found a violation of 
Article 3 of the ECHR, upholding the internationally recognised standards on 
detention conditions54• Moreover, the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission 
dismissed the contention in that camp guards and staff lived in the same 
conditions as the POWS55 and defended the provisions in Geneva Convention 
11156 . Maintaining the treaty's high standards ensures uniformity? 
So long the same standards are employed by both the ICC and the 
States concerned, regardless of whether they are rich or poor, or whether they 
have adequate or inadequate legislation, it is practically irrelevant where the 
person will be tried. The aim is not to let the CUlprits go unpunished. 
Convergence between the ICC's standards and those of the national courts is 
52 ECtHR, Application no. 47095/99, Judgment of 15 July 2002. 
53 Ibid. para. 93. 
54 Ibid. para. 103. 
55 E r i t r ~ a a v :-ederal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Partial Award, Prisoners of War. 
Eritrea s Claim 17, 1 July 2003, para. 24. 
56 Ibid. para. 101. See Articles 13, 21-29 GeIII according to which detention of POWs must 
not seriously endanger the health of those POW s. 
57 Cf. evidence of concessions regarding standards may be found in CPT's general comments. 
See Birtles, (2001), 82. 
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inevitable if complementarity is applied properly. If a State does not meet the 
requisite standards of investigation or prosecution, the ICC will step in to deal 
with the case. From the point of view of the Court, it does not matter where the 
person is tried, so long he/she gets a fair trial for the crimes as enshrined in 
Article 5 of the Statute, and an appropriate punishment is imposed when the 
person is found guilty. For the individual concerned, there might be an issue of 
preference, but legally, all that matters is that the most serious of crimes are 
dealt with properly, either at the national or the international levels. For the 
State though, it might be an issue of pride, if it is deemed not to be willing or 
able to deal with a case. Particularly where the State genuinely endeavours to 
apply the Statute but is let down by its actual implementation. In such cases, 
the ICC ought to uphold its own standards, and assert jurisdiction on the basis 
of complementarity. Not only will this guarantee uniform application of the 
law, but it will also provide the impetus for greater compliance with the 
Statute. 
From the above it is clear that setting the Court's standards is crucial. It 
is very difficult at this stage of the ICC's operation to speculate on the 
standards it will employ in informing its decision on implementing legislation. 
It would take a couple of cases and the Court's response in practice to have a 
clear picture of the direction the Court is likely to take. To a civil lawyer's 
horror, this might, in fact, be a case where the common law approach. in its 
most basic expression of making the law as the Court goes along, might be 
preferable. At this point, it is important to note that in any case, the Court 
should have as its guide two fundamental principles: that the implementing 
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legislation should assist its operation, and that the human rights of the ::tccused 
are respected throughout the process of co-operation. 
In the meantime, it would be helpful if the ICC published some 
guidelines to assist States wishing to implement the Statute. These guidelines, 
in the form of general principles, would be divided into areas of incorporation, 
raising specific problems and attempting to provide concrete solutions, could 
be of assistance to States. The limitations of this approach though are obvious. 
Such a document would not be binding and will only serve as guidance for 
States wishing to use it. The main problem is, however, that implementation 
cannot be done in the abstract and a generic approach cannot work. This is 
because no two legal systems are entirely identical and different needs 
therefore arise. Perhaps the best option would be to allow for greater 
interaction between the ICC and the State concerned with concrete advice 
given on behalf of the Court at the implementation stage and before a situation 
giving rise to the Court's jurisdiction occurs. Alternatively, and given the 
limited resources the Court has at its disposal, tailor-made assistance provided 
to a particular country or region wishing to incorporate the Statute may fill this 
gap. In the meantime, an examination of various pieces of legislation IS 
interesting and useful in highlighting strengths and failures. 
5. Article 86 ICC Statute: A Duty to Co-operate Fully 
Article 86 contains the basic obligation of a State party to the Statute; to 
co-operate fully with the ICC in its investigations and prosecutions. This 
provision does not, as such, contain any specific implementation obligations. 
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There are no specific steps a State needs to take in order to incorporate this 
provision. Rather, it is a catch-all provision, which sets the benchmark for 
implementing legislation, as it constitutes a rule of general application. The key 
element is "full" co-operation of a State. And in order for a State to co-operate 
"fully", it needs to have implementing legislation which meets the requisite 
standards. 
Irrespective, therefore, of the manner of incorporation, States that 
enact implementing legislation should ensure that this legislation enables them 
to co-operate "fully" with the ICC. 
Some States prefer to state this as an objective of their relevant piece of 
legislation58, but others do not. The criterion of course, is not whether a State 
perceives that it complies with the ICC Statute, but whether it actually does so 
in practice. 
6. Article 87 ICC Statute: The Practicalities of Co-operation 
Article 87 comprises the general provisions with regard to requests for 
co-operation made by the ICC. It is clear from paragraph 1 that each State 
should designate the authority to receive these requests by the Court. It is 
suggested that primarily the diplomatic channel will be used to this effect. but 
it does not preclude the use of other appropriate channels of co-operation. As 
this has to be determined by the State party at the implementation stage. upon 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, it would suffice to provide the 
requisite procedures upon receipt of the request by the designated channel. 
Also, the possibility that the ICC can use the International Criminal Police 
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Organisation or any other regional organisation to transmit its request is set out 
in Article 87(1)(b). A State may thus wish to provide in its implementing 
legislation for this possibility. 
6.1 Article 87(3), (4): Confidentiality and Safety 
Confidentiality of the proceedings is guaranteed through Article 87(3) 
of the Statute. The requested State is required to disclose any information only 
insofar it is necessary for the execution of the request. States are, therefore, 
required in their implementation to guarantee the confidentiality of the co-
operation request and of any supporting documentation. In most States, such 
execution will in any way be dealt with in confidence. Moreover, with regard 
to Article 87(4), the safety, physical and psychological well-being of victims, 
potential witnesses and their families should be taken into account when 
dealing with information provided by the requested State to the Court. It may 
be that according to a particular State's procedure this is already covered, 
which in turn means that it might not be necessary to provide specifically for 
this paragraph in domestic legislation. Reinforcing the confidentiality aspect, 
however, would guarantee careful handling of sensitive information. 
Australia devotes an entire Section on confidentiality and implements 
both 87(3) and (4) very accurately, by incorporating such an obligation in its 
domestic law and by turning the abstract obligation into a specific one for the 
person handling the Court's requestS9 • 
58 Section 3(1). 
59 Section 13. 
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6.2 Article 87(5),(6),(7): Third Countries, lOs and Failure to Co-operate 
Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of Article 87 of the Statute concern primarily the 
ICC itself, rather than the requested State. They will not therefore be examined 
under this section. Article 87(7) deals with the possibility of a failure to co-
operate and has already been discussed elsewhere6o. Needless to say that a 
State should, through its implementing legislation, ensure that this provision is 
never invoked. Failure to co-operate due to poor legislation is unacceptable 
under the Statute and every step should be taken to eliminate this possibility. 
The above provision does not call for implementation as it constitutes a 
measure which the Court may have recourse to in order to tackle the lack of co-
operation. Australia however, in its Section 15 reiterates Article 87(7). The said 
provision operates as a reminder to the domestic jurisdiction of the 
consequences to be incurred in case of non-eo-operation. This provision may 
also act as an incentive for the Attorney-General to ensure that, in most cases, 
co-operation will be guaranteed so as to avoid the sanction of referral of 
Australia to the ASP61. As such, this rather unique provision is helpful and 
might assist in Australia's greater compliance with the Statute. It also 
emphasises the importance Australia places on co-operation with the Court. 
France does not go through Article 87 implementing each and every 
aspect of it the way a common law country would do. Instead, Article 627-1 of 
the French Law constitutes an overarching provision which refers directly to 
Article 87 of the Statute and which presumably allows for its direct application 
in France. Article 627-1 is facilitative as it allows for transmission of a request 
60 See supra chapter 3. 
61 Article 112(2)(f). 
255 
National Implementation 
by any means possible in casp. of emergency. The said provision could also be 
construed to cover Article 91 ofthe Statute as we1l62• 
7. Article 89 ICC Statute: Surrendering Persons to the Court 
The procedure regarding surrender of a person to the Court is outlined 
in Article 89 of the Rome Statute. Some States are familiar with the challenges 
of incorporating the obligation to arrest and surrender a person to an 
international criminal court, as they had a similar obligation with regard to the 
ad hoc Tribunals. However, the limited number of States that enacted 
implementing legislation with regard to the above Tribunals, as well as the role 
of the SC which, at least in principle in cases of non-co-operation, makes the 
application of this provision different to the equivalent obligation in the 
Tribunals. In any case, the essence of the obligation remains the same. States 
need to ensure that persons sought by the Court are arrested and transferred. 
This would give a meaning to the principles covering the interaction between 
the domestic and the international spheres. 
Article 89(1) contains a reminder of the general obligation to co-operate 
with a request to arrest and surrender a person to the Court. This Article 
follows the same pattern with other Articles in the ICC treaty. It states the 
obligation, in this case, to arrest and surrender, but the execution of this 
62 See infra. It should be observed that Article 627-1 is broader than the above Article, as it 
allows transmission of the request using any possible measure, which presumably includes a 
medium not capable of delivering a written record. (Cf. Article 91(2) ICC Statute). Article 627-
2 provides the procedure for the co-operation with the ICC. By virtue of the Article the 
Prosec.ut?r of t ~ e e R e p u b ~ i ~ ~ or the .instruction judge of P a ~ s s execute the request. I n t e r e s t i ~ g l y . .
and thIS IS a.umque p ~ o v l s l o n , , A r t ~ c l e e 627-2 second and t h l f ~ ~ paragraphs, includes a procedure 
for transfemng ~ e e mmutes t a k e ~ ~ m the course of the execution of a co-operation request to the 
Court itself. ThIS may be explamed by the fact that France, as any civil law country, places a 
lot of emphasis on written evidence. 
256 
National Implementation 
obligation is left to the States, which will use their domestic laws. This is 
understandable since it would have been impossible for the ICC Statute to 
provide for a generic approach to be followed by all State parties to the Statute. 
This means that the exact procedure on the ground is, to a large extent, 
irrelevant for the Court, as long as the State in question complies with the 
arrest and surrender request, in accordance with Article 89. Allowing the 
practical application to be regulated by the relevant State has the advantage of 
providing greater flexibility in the execution of the Court's request, which, in 
tum, signifies the potential for greater compliance with the Court's request, at 
least in principle. 
In accordance with the final sentence of Article 89(1). in implementing 
this paragraph. a State should specifically provide for the arrest and surrender 
of a person to the Court in its domestic law. complying with the ICC co-
operation regime. National law is to be employed in that respect. 
Even though domestic procedures apply with regard to effectuating 
arrest and surrender, it should be emphasised that a common characteristic of 
such procedures should be expediency and effectiveness. For it is in the 
interests of the Court to have the person before it as soon as practicable. 
All States examined here deal with Article 89 in their domestic 
legislation. And all provide somewhat similar procedures. In this section 
reference will be made to the most interesting aspects of those, without 
analysing each step of the process. Article 89 of the Statute is complemented 
by Article 91 and some of the issues of interest will be dealt with there. 
As a general observation, States in using their normal criminal justice 
proceedings when dealing with arrest and surrender to the ICC, adjust the 
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relevant provisions to suit the aIm of achieving the arrest and surrender, 
without putting in place special procedures generally to deal with a request 
from the ICC. 
7.1 Permissibility of the Surrender 
A reccurring theme seems to be an investigation into the pennissibility 
of the surrender. To satisfy procedural legality in domestic law, a State is 
entitled to look into the permissibility of the surrender request. However, such 
examination should focus on procedural fonnality and should not extend to an 
investigation into the substance of the request. In other words, an examination 
into the formal elements of the request, whether for instance all the necessary 
documents63 are present, is acceptable, but no examination into the legality of 
issuance of the ICC's warrant for instance, should be permitted. The Statute 
does not provide for this possibility and, in any case, surrender to the Court, 
unlike extradition, does not impinge on the sovereignty of the requested State, 
as consent has already been given when signing up to the ICC treaty. 
France64, Germanl5 and the UK66, distinguish between an investigation 
into the formal requirements of the request and a substantive one. In the 
63 Stipulated in Article 91 ICC Statute. 
64 Article 627-4. 
65 Section 6. The procedure to be followed can be found in Sections 20 el seq .. Moreover. the 
decision on permissibility is made by virtue of Section 22. This provision does not state the 
criteria on the basis of which the Higher Regional court is going to reach a decision on the 
pennissibility of the request. More crucially, no mention is made to the applicability of the 
potential grounds for refusal of a request in the course of such proceedings. It seems that an 
appeal procedure as such is not envisaged. However, the procedure of Section 23 comes close 
to that, if only in a limited manner since it only is engaged when new circumstances arise after 
the initial decision has been made. A different type of appeal is envisaged before the Federal 
Supreme Court (Section 33) open only to the Higher Regional Court, when it considers that a 
decision of the Federal Supreme court is "necessary to clarify a legal question of fundamental 
importance or it seeks to deviate from a decision of the Federal Supreme Court or a decision of 
a different Higher Regional Court regarding a legal question on surrender issues with the ICC". 
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Netherlands, however, a more detailed procedure is envisaged. Section 24 of 
the Dutch Act enables the District Court to make a finding on permissibility on 
the ICC's request. In this regard, the public prosecutor expresses an opinion67 , 
the person sought is entitled to make recommendations68 and witnesses or 
expert may be called to contribute to their proceedings69 • This provision may 
prove to be problematic in practice. It is not clear what criteria the domestic 
court will employ to establish whether this case is permissible whereas it is 
doubtful whether a clear right to determine permissibility even exists. As 
surrender of persons does not fall within the category of measures of assistance 
that may conflict with national securitlO, or with a fundamental legal principle 
of general application71 , the only possible scenario where discussion of the 
request at the national level is relevant is that of Article 90. In particular, when 
the surrender request conflicts with a request for extradition relating to the 
same conduct where there is a pre-existing international obligation to 
extradite72 • However, examining permissibility would not be appropriate in 
such a situation as a case of conflicting request involves an entirely different 
procedure73 • Looking into the permissibility of a case implies an examination 
This appeal procedure does not operate as the highest domestic remedy available against the 
decision of the Higher Regional Court regarding the execution of a request for surrender, but 
constitutes a mechanism for guaranteeing consistency within the German Federal system. 
Of interest however is Section 23(5) which provides the Higher Regional Court with the option 
of postponement of surrender when discussing the permissibility of surrender in the 
circumstances described in Section 23. This postponement is not linked to Articles 94 and 95 
of the Statute which are implemented by Section 48 discussed infra. 
66 Section 5(5). According to this provision, an examination into the legality of issuance of the 
ICC's warrant or into the evidence that led essentially to the indictment of the subject of the 
surrender order is of no concern to the UK court. 
67 Section 24(2). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Section 24(3). 
70 Article 93(4) ICC Statute. 
71 Article 93(3) ibid. 
72 Taking into account the factors found in Article 90(6) ibid. 
73 See on this issue Section 31, which provides further indication that an examination of the 
admissibility of the request is entirely different. 
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of particular conditions that have to be met. As there is an obligation to f!xecute 
the request for arrest/surrender as evidenced by Article 86 and more 
specifically Article 89(1), any examination of the admissibility of the request 
that leads to refusal of execution74 would be unfortunate and as such should be 
avoided. In essence, the hands of the District Court are tied as to a finding of 
impermissibility not based on the Statute, which will lead to refusal of the 
request by the Minister of Justice75 and will in tum signify failure to co-operate 
with the ICC76. Be that as it may, no legal remedy against the District Court's 
ruling is envisaged77 • So long the request is made in the requisite form under 
91(2) and (3), there is no reason to refuse permissibility. 
7.2 Executing a Request for Surrender 
In France the request is integrated into the French system providing the 
legitimacy of the procedures necessary to satisfy the proper administration of 
criminal justice. An expedited procedure is envisaged in France, which 
involves appearance before the relevant Prosecutor78, and transfer to a prison in 
the competence of the Court of Appeal of Paris, appearance before the 
"Chambre d' instruction,,79 before finally being surrendered to the ICC within a 
month of the day the decision becomes fina180. 
74 The consequence of a finding of inadmissibility is refusal of execution of the request as 
evidenced from Section 30(4). 
75 See infra Section 30(4). 
76 Article 87(7). 
77 Section 27(4). 
78 Article 627-5. This Article also stipulates that the person is assisted by a lawyer. 
79 Article 627-7. 
80 Article.627-10. In order for the decision ~ o o become final under normal criminal procedure, 
the deadhne. f ~ r r appeal ~ u s t t ~ v e e l a p s e ~ ~ W l t ~ o u t t a n ~ ~ of the parties entitled to appeal having 
done so. T h ~ s s IS not s p e c I f i ~ d d m the ArtIcle m q ~ e s t 1 o n , , but this is probably the case here as 
well. ExtenSIOn can be proVIded for however, by vIrtue of Article 627-13. 
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A unique provision can be found in the French code. When surrender is 
finally ordered, the Instruction Chamber has to be satisfied, in accordance with 
Article 627-8 that there is no obvious mistake. Bizarrely, the lack of obvious 
mistake appears again in the second paragraph of Article 627-13. This is a 
rather confusing provision, as it is not clear what would constitute an "erreur 
evidente". Besides a mistake regarding the identity of the person sought, it is 
difficult to conceive much else that would fall within the typology of an 
obvious mistake and would merit, as such, reference in this provision. Given, 
however, that the identity of the accused has already been verified at an earlier 
stage, it is unclear as to the circumstances in which this provision could be 
used. Unless this provision is there to allow the possibility of a last minute 
check for something blatantly obvious which would render the surrender 
unnecessary, it should be disregarded. So long as this provision is not used as a 
mechanism to review the ICC's request and is not, moreover, abused in order 
to deny execution of the request either by disagreeing with the Court or by 
using national law exceptions, its presence in Article 627-8 and 627-13 is 
unobjectionable. 
The general obligation to surrender a person to the ICC, enshrined in 
Article 89 of the Statute, is incorporated in Section 11 (1) of the Dutch Act, 
which specifies that a person shall be surrendered to the ICC for either 
prosecution and trial or enforcement of an ICC imposed sentence. Although 
Article 89(1) of the Statute does not specify that surrender is sought with these 
two objectives in mind, it is evident from Article 91(2) and (3), which includes 
the contents of a request for arrest and surrender, that surrender may only take 
place for the above reasons. Section 11(1) of the Dutch Act is therefore a clear 
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example of the scope of surrender within the ICC framework. The procedure 
before the Dutch District Court to authorise surrender can be found in Sections 
21-29 of the Law8l • The Netherlands adopts an expedited procedure to deal 
with the request for surrender82 • 
The decision to execute the request for surrender lies ultimately with 
the Minister of Justice of the Netherlands who, provided that the request is 
permissible83 and he/she does not consider that they need further information 
from the ICC8\ shall order the surrender85 . If, however, the request has been 
found by the District Court to be impermissible, then surrender is refused86 and 
compensation is awarded to the person who was the subject of the surrender 
request for the deprivation of his/her libertl7• Although making provision for 
compensation is certainly a good thing, the possibility of declaring the request 
impermissible without any clearly defined rules emanating from the Statute sits 
uncomfortably with the rest of the provisions in the Dutch Act which 
appropriately replicate the obligations deriving from the Statute. 
The common law approach on surrender envisages a longer procedure 
before the actual surrender takes place88• A common characteristic of this 
81 These provisions cover a number of issues ranging from the rights of the requested person to 
the exact procedure to be used during the hearing of the surrender request. 
82 Section 22 stipulates that the date of the hearing will be determined '[ ... ] as far as possible as 
a matter ofpriority[ ... ]. 
83 See supra. 
84 Section 30(3). 
85 The practicalities of the surrender are covered by Sections 33-35. 
86 Section 30(4). 
87 Section 44. 
88 See Sections 16-18,29-33,38 of the Canadian Act, where the various steps in the process are 
envisaged. In England and Wales, once the court makes the delivery order, the procedure to be 
followed c ~ n n be found in S e ~ t i o n n 11. H o w e v e ~ , , in Section 8, the consequences of a competent 
court refusmg to make a dehvery order are dIscussed. Notably, no reasons are given why the 
court would refuse to make such an order. 
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process is provision for appeal, judicial review and habeas COrpUS89• Moreover, 
bail is also envisaged, albeit in exceptional circumstances9o• The process 
described above does not present any problems as it complies with the Court's 
requests. 
It is clear that States generally afford the same protection to the subject 
of the ICC's surrender request as they would to any person going through their 
domestic system. The effectiveness of the processes discussed will be tested in 
practice, by virtue of the expediency of the overall process. 
7.3 Dealing with Irregularities of Arrest and Procedural Defects 
Addressing issues of lawfulness of the arrest and respect for the rights 
of the subject of the surrender order is very important. For the purposes of this 
section, the approaches followed by France and the UK will be examined, as 
they represent two diametrically opposite views. 
In France, if the person does not appear before the Prosecutor of the 
Court of Appeal within five days, this has the effect of immediate releasing the 
apprehended person91 • Similarly, if the person is not transferred within a month 
from when the decision has become final the same remedy, that is, setting the 
89 Sections 49-56, 57 and 69 respectively of the Canadian Act; Sections 9 and 10 for appeals in 
England and Wales and Scotland respectively. For judicial review, see Section 12, and habeas 
corpus is dealt with in Section 12(2) of the UK. Act. 
90 Sections 16-18 UK Act. A consultation procedure is put forward. The court notifies the 
Secretary of State of the application for bail, who in turn consults with the ICC, which may 
make recommendations. In Section 18( 1)( c) it is stated that "bail shall not be granted without 
full consideration of any such recommendations". This provision has two potential problems: 
first, there is, no provision on ~ e e procedure to be f o l l o ~ e d d if the ICC does not make any 
r e c o m m e n d ~ t I o n s s and, s e c o n ~ , , l ~ ~ t h ~ ~ ICC makes a ~ e g a h v e e recommendation with regard to 
granting bad, there IS no mdicatlon that the natIonal court will, in fact, follow such 
r e c o m m e n d a t i ~ n " " This Section, ensure.s that ICC recommendations will be examined by the 
court. The cntena employed, 1D S e c ~ ~ n n 18(3), h o w e v ~ r , , should be considered adequate to 
enable the court to make the nght deCISIon. See also SectIon 24 Australian Act. 
91 Article 627-6. 
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person free, is envisaged92 • These provisions are of great interest. The issue 
which is at stake here is the human rights of the accused and the way in which 
their violation can be dealt with. There are two conflicting interests here. First, 
the presence of the accused before the ICC, and secondly. hislher human rights. 
Although the importance of protecting the person's human rights should be 
stressed, it should be accepted that in accordance with Article 85 of the Statute 
such an incident would give rise to a compensation claim before the ICC93 • 
Also, it might be possible to bring a separate action before the French courts to 
address this issue. Setting the transferee free should, therefore, not be the 
solution in this particular instance, despite the importance attached to following 
a specific procedure. 
In England and Wales, an application regarding abuse of the above 
processes may be made either by the court on its own motion or by the person 
arrested94 . In the former case the court "may" make a determination on these 
issues, whereas in the latter case it "shall". The difference of course is that 
when the person concerned considers that hislher rights have been violated, the 
State through its court system has a greater responsibility to react to this claim. 
The procedure to be applied, as well as the criteria for the above-
mentioned determination are, according to Section 5(7) of the UK Act, the 
same as with an application for judicial review. If the court finds in favour of 
the claim that the arrest has been unlawful or the person's rights have been 
breached, it makes a declaration to that effect under subsection 8. However. the 
court is precluded from granting any other reliefs. This is extremely useful as 
92 Article 627-10. 
93 See also supra chapter 3. 
94 Section 5( 6). 
95 Section 5(8). 
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it means that, effectively, the accused cannot be released, for instance, 
following irregularities in hislher arrest. Instead of discharging the person, the 
UK chooses to comply with the strong obligation to co-operate with the Court 
at the same time limiting the effects of a Section 5(8) declaration to the 
notification of the Secretary of State, who shall transmit it in tum to the ICC. 
This approach is entirely appropriate, as it gives the opportunity to the ICC to 
assess the allegations, and in the case in which they are upheld, to determine 
the appropriate mode of reparation. Although this position is most suitable to 
deal with issues of irregularities of the arrest and other human rights violations 
in the course of executing a request by the Court, it has not been followed by 
States in their implementing legislation. There is a tendency among law-
abiding States to prefer to deal with such issues themselves rather than to allow 
another body, albeit the ICC, to effectively pass judgment on the domestic 
system and deal with a particular failure to respect the person's rights while 
effectuating the arrest. States are also used to dealing with such issues in their 
domestic procedures and do not perhaps realise the importance of surrender to 
the ICC. This is not to say that it is acceptable to violate the person's rights in 
the name of arresting the alleged criminals sought. Rather, the principle has to 
be that remedies should be available, in consultation with the Court. 
7.4 Article 89(2): Ne his in idem Challenges 
Article 89(2) operates as a bridge between national jurisdictions and the 
ICC in terms of admissibility issues. In all probability, the person sought will 
raise an inadmissibility claim before national courts first, regarding a previous 
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acquittal or conviction. In such cases, the procedure to be followed is set out in 
this paragraph. A consultation procedure is chosen to address such issues and 
this procedure is the one that needs to be provided for in domestic laws. The 
national court before which the ne his in idem claim is made would then liaise 
with the ICC to decide the course of action. 
To implement Article 89(2) a State should allow for consultation 
procedure in case of a ne his in idem claim made before the national courts. 
The Netherlands refers to Article 89(2) in Section 7 of its Act which 
contains a number of instances where consultation will be used96• The Dutch 
approach is a helpful one as Section 7 ensures that consultation is ensured 
whenever granting the co-operation request would result in a "violation of the 
principle of ne his in idem". The issue that arises is whether the ne bis in idem 
challenge in Article 89(2) has to be brought before a national court of the State 
from which surrender is sought, or whether it would suffice had such a 
challenge been brought before the courts of any State which presumably has 
jurisdiction. The latter should be accepted as true as any different solution 
would jeopardise the correct application of the ne bis in idem principle, by 
restricting its ambit unnecessarily. 
Germany implements this possibility in Section 3 of its Law. Notably, 
such a challenge may be brought on the basis of conviction or acquittal before 
the ICC itself or a court in another State97• It is unclear from this Section 
whether conviction or acquittal before German Courts would also fall under the 
same Section. It is implicit in Section 3 that such a challenge may not be 
brought against proceedings before German courts. In one sense this may be 
96 See infra analysis of Article 97. 
97 Section 3. 
266 
National Implementation 
explained because no State wishes to be held "genuinely unwilling or unable" 
by virtue of complementarity. In fact, most States would think that this would 
apply with regard to other States and not themselves. This provision is 
evidence of this attitude. However improbable it is that Gennan courts will be 
proven to be unwilling or unable genuinely to deal with a case in accordance 
with Article 17 of the Statute, the possibility of this happening should 
nevertheless be incorporated into domestic law. Coming back to the German 
Section 3, it is interesting to see that the possibility enshrined in Article 89(2) 
to postpone the execution of a request pending a determination of admissibility 
by the Court, is translated into an obligation to postpone by the German law98• 
This is not necessarily wrong, nor does it imply failure to co-operate with the 
ICC. It simply connotes a higher threshold to be applied in case of an 
admissibility challenge instead of a lower one preferred by the Statute. 
7.5 Article 89(4) 
A different situation altogether is envisaged in Article 89(4) of the 
Statute. It is essentially a competing request but this request pertains to the 
requested State party and not to a third State. In case of the same person being 
proceeded against or serving sentence for a crime other than the one sought by 
the COurt99, Article 89(4) will come into play. This provision requires a 
consultation procedure to be in place after the requested State has made a 
decision to grant the request. 
98 Note the use of the command verb "shall" in the penultimate sentence of Section 3. 
99 Because if it is the same crime, then issues of admissibility arise. 
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To implement Article 89(4), a State is required to consult with the ICC 
after making its decision to grant the request. 
Germany implements the said provision m Section 27 of its Law. 
Instead of providing for a consultation process Germany opts for surrendering 
the person to the ICC "temporarily". In essence, precedence is given to the 
Court and this Section contains the procedure to be followed upon return of the 
100 Th" rt . I th t h't . th suspect. IS IS ce am y e correc approac as I recognises e 
significance of the surrender to the Court at the expense of domestic 
proceedings, which despite the importance of the crimes involved, might not 
necessarily be of a similar gravity to the ones for which surrender is sought. An 
interesting interaction might arise, however, if the same conduct gave rise to 
two different crimes 10 I since Article 89(4) refers to "crime" and not conduct. 
8. Article 90 ICC Statute: Dealing with Competing Requests 
Implementing competing requests involves a number of steps to be 
taken by a State depending on the nature of the request. Article 90 covers a 
range of different situations which need to be addressed in domestic law. 
The responsibilities of the requested State could be summarised as 
follows: First, provision should be made to notify the Court of the competing 
requests. Second, the distinction between the different cases within Article 90 
should be clear and consistent with the Statute. In particular, a distinction 
should be made between dealing with a request concerning the same and 
different conduct as well as between State parties and non-parties with 
100 The various possibilities are discussed in paragraphs 2-4 of Section 27. 
101 The obvious example being genocide and crimes against humanity for instance. 
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reference also to the admissibility of the case. Finally, although not spelt out 
clearly in the Rome Statute, granting precedence to the request by the Court 
over a competing extradition request could validly be an underlying concept in 
the incorporation of this provision into domestic law. This is due to the 
particular significance of the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
A brief examination of various pieces of implementing legislation 
reveals different approaches on the issues discussed above. Even though 
competing requests are expected to arise, France, for instance, does not provide 
for this at all in its code. Moreover, other States do not cover every aspect of 
Article 90, thus leaving gaps in its incorporation. 
The Netherlands on the other hand, deals with Article 90 in a very 
simple, yet effective, manner. In a two-line provision it is stated that competing 
requests will be dealt with by the Minister of Justice "having regard to article 
90 of the Statute" 1 02. Section 31 of the Dutch law renders Article 90 of the 
Statute directly applicable in the Netherlands and all the various possibilities 
enshrined therein will be dealt with in accordance with the Statute. In that way, 
inconsistencies in the application are avoided and the thorny issue of 
competing requests is addressed in the most appropriate manner. This approach 
is only second best to one that would confer priority to a request made by the 
ICC. whenever possible. 
Article 90 is implemented by Section 4 of the German Law. Section 
4(1) does not refer to the fact that a request for surrender and extradition 
respectively has to be made by both the Court and that other State and that 
these competing requests have to relate to the same conduct. The situation 
described in Section 4(1) involves a request for extradition made by a State and 
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the same conduct involved gives rise to the Court's jurisdiction. This situation 
is slightly different to the one described in Article 90 of the Statute and, in fact, 
wider than Article 90. It may be assumed that given the wording in Section 4 
any request for any conduct which gives rise to the Court's jurisdiction, would 
suffice to trigger Article 90. This is not the case. The purpose of Article 90 is to 
allocate conflicting requests to appropriate fora depending on the specific 
instances and by solving potential disputes that would otherwise arise. The 
requested State is required under Article 90(1) to notify the ICC of the 
conflicting extradition request. Section 4(1) does not do this explicitly. Instead, 
it provides for an additional function: it gives the ICC the opportunity to 
request and, upon consent of the requesting State and provided that this is not 
prohibited by an international agreement, to obtain a copy of the extradition 
request and the relevant documents. It is Section 4(2), which implements 
Article 90(1) appropriately, by providing for notification of the Court. 
Moreover, this Section ensures that the requesting State is also notified of the 
ICC's conflicting request. This is not found in the Statute which is only 
concerned with the Court's functions. However, notification of the requesting 
State is appropriate and Gennany opts for doing this in the same provision 
which is very logical. 
Germany does not follow the structure of Article 90. It chooses a 
consolidated treatment of the different situations that might arise. Section 4(3) 
is a good example of this approach. In a single paragraph. the Gennan law 
contains all the situations in which priority is given to the ICC's request in 
accordance with the Statute 1 03 • The principle adopted here is that extradition 
102 Section 31. 
103 Section 4(3), which refers to Article 90(2), (4) and (7Xa) of the Statute. 
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should be postponerl104 and that the Court's request should take precedence. 
What is unique about this paragraph is that it does not distinguish between the 
types of conduct for which surrender/extradition is sought. Instead, all the 
instances where, in accordance with the Statute, priority should in any case be 
given to the Court, are dealt with in a single provision. Section 4(3) is at first 
sight quite confusing. However, the relevant Articles of the Statute are 
mentioned explicitly in this Section and thus are directly applicable. 
Nonetheless, the emphasis is on whether prior approval of extradition has taken 
place when a request for surrender is received. A closer look at the Statute 
reveals that the approach is, in fact, an interesting one and consistent with the 
letter of Article 90. Despite not following the structure of Article 90, the 
attempted codification of the provisions discussed above works entirely 
satisfactorily as it represents a somewhat distilled version of the provisions 
granting precedence to the Court. Section 4(4) appears to be somewhat 
superfluous because it reiterates that extradition shall be postponed until a 
decision is made by the ICC on the proceedings that triggered the surrender 
request. To a large extent, this is evident from Section 4(3). All Section 4(4) 
does is to specify the outcome of the postponement of the extradition request. 
Moreover, it stipulates that this applies with regard to Article 90(5) and (6) as 
well, which are not dealt under Section 4(3) and, as such, it is useful. 
With regard to Article 90(5), there is a slight discrepancy III its 
incorporation by Section 4(5). Article 90(5) deals with the situation in which a 
case on which the surrender to the ICC is based has not been determined to be 
admissible. In such a case, this paragraph enables the requested State to 
104 That is if the request has not been granted already at the time of receipt of the Court's 
request for surrender. 
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proceed with the extradition request. By contrast to Section 4(6), the Statute 
does not include a specific time limit after the lapse of which the case is 
considered to be inadmissible. The German approach here makes sense as a 
State should not be obliged to wait indefinitely for the determination of the 
Court. However, unlike Article 90(3) where it is stated that such a 
determination "shall be made on an expedited basis", neither Article 90(5) nor 
the RPE include such a provision. Consequently, the two-month deadline found 
in the German Section 4(6) although reasonable, goes beyond the Statute. 
A conscious attempt is made to grant priority to the request made by the 
ICC, wherever possible, as evidenced by Section 4(6). This Section refers 
directly to Article 90(6) and 7(b) which encapsulate the two possibilities where 
the extradition request potentially prevails. Yet, in this case as well, Section 
4(6) strives to solve the issue in favour of the ICC, unless "the reasons of 
approving the extradition request are not clearly predominant". The approach 
taken here is clearly the preferred one and it shows clear commitment to 
assisting the ICC in the performance of its tasks by exercising the discretion 
founded in the Statute in the most appropriate way. 
Finally, Section 4(7) states the obvious: that the ICC should be notified of the 
outcome of dealing with the extradition request is beyond doubt the right 
procedure to be followed. 
Australia is another State that deals with competing requests at some 
length. Australia devotes a couple of lengthy provisions on the issue of 
competing requests, which are worthy of a more detailed examination. In the 
Australian Act, the possibility of competing requests from the ICC and a 
foreign country regarding the same conduct is examined in Section 37. This 
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Section operates as an introduction to Sections 38 and 39 which follow and 
deal with the issue in detail. Section 38 deals with requests made by parties to 
the Statute, whereas Section 39 with requests made by third parties. Section 37 
states that the AG must notify the ICC and the foreign country of the existence 
of conflicting requests before assessing them under sections 38 and 39. This is 
in accordance with Article 90(1). 
The structure of Section 38 is straightforward. Subsection (1) of Section 
38 contains the scope of application of this section. In Subsection 2, the 
conditions are examined where a request by the ICC must take precedence over 
a conflicting extradition request. Subsection 3 addresses the possibility of 
executing the extradition request. Finally, Subsection 4 contains a clause akin 
to a time restriction clause, the lapse of which, triggers the extradition process. 
Section 38(1) applies when a request by the Court conflicts with that of another 
State, which is an ICC party. 
For Australia to give priority to the surrender request made by the ICC, 
the Court must have determined the admissibility of the case pursuant to 
Articles 18 and 19 of the Statute. Moreover, this determination by the Court 
should take into account the "investigation or prosecution conducted by the 
foreign country in respect of its request for extradition". Alternatively, if the 
Court makes a determination of admissibility under Article 18 or 19 after 
receiving notification on the request for extradition from the foreign country, 
then Section 38(2)(b) gives priority to the Court's request. Subsection 2 is in 
accordance with the Statute, as it repeats almost verbatim Article 90(2) of the 
Statute. 
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Article 90(3) of the Statute is implemented by Australia in Section 
38(3). The Extradition Act 1988 then applies while dealing with the request, 
but the extradition cannot occur until the case is deemed inadmissible by the 
Court. This is in accordance with the Statute. The second section of Article 
90(3) is dealt with separately by the Australian Act. 
Section 38(4) has its basis in the second section of paragraph 3 of 
Article 90. The Statute mentions that the determination of the admissibility of a 
case in respect of a conflicting request will be made on an expedited basis. This 
element of Article 90(3) is echoed in Section 38(4). Australia does not specify 
what, in its view, would constitute an expedited determination and most 
importantly, what would not. In any case, it seems that such a determination is 
left to the Court. The Australian piece of legislation simply reiterates what the 
Statute promises. The Statute does not state the consequence of a non-
expedited finding. With an express reference to paragraph 3(b), Section 38(4) 
goes a little further than the Statute and implies that the extradition to the 
foreign country will go ahead in case of a delay by the Court. This is so, as 
Section 38(3)(b) is rendered inapplicable based on a hindrance in the Court's 
process. The fact that the Australian legislation devotes an entire subparagraph 
to this section constitutes evidence of the importance it attributes to this 
process. 
Similar structure to Section 38 is followed by Section 39 of the 
Australian Act. This is explained as Section 39 relates to the other possibility 
foreseeable when dealing with conflicting requests; namely, a request 
regarding the same conduct which comes from a foreign State, which is not a 
party to the Statute. This possibility is dealt with again in Article 90 of the 
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Rome Statute. The Statute recogmses the difference between a request 
originating from a State party and one which is not, however, it does not devote 
a separate Article to that, opting thus for unity of procedure. Australia does not 
follow the Statute's example but treats the two possibilities in two separate 
provisions. This approach may, in fact, be preferable, as it allows for a more 
complete treatment of potential problems, without running the risk of 
confusion arising from a single Article. 
Section 39(2) reiterates Article 90(4) of the Statute and is therefore 
unproblematic. The Court's request prevails over a conflicting request, should 
there be no international obligation to extradite to the foreign country and the 
ICC has determined the admissibility of the case. 
The discretion allowed in Article 90(5) is taken up by Subsection 3 of 
Section 39, which enables Australia to deal with the extradition request 105, 
provided that the ICC has not yet determined the admissibility of the case106• 
This provision is further enhanced by Subsection 4, which emphasises 
that the extradition, which in Australia would take place following the 
Extradition Act 1988 may not occur ''unless and until the ICC makes its 
determination on admissibility and detennines that the case is inadmissible". 
This provision is based on Article 90(5) of the Statute, which allows a State to 
proceed to deal with the request for extradition to the third State. Australia also 
includes Subsection (5) in its Act, which basically stipulates that the extradition 
may go ahead regardless of the detennination of the admissibility by the Court, 
if this detennination is not made on an expedited basis. This possibility is not 
found in the Statute. Hence, Australia goes beyond the Statute in that respect, 
lOS under (a). 
106 under (b). 
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allowing for a further possibility to execute the extradition request, 
notwithstanding a conflicting request by the Court. Given that there is no 
international obligation to grant precedence to the competing extradition 
request, Subsection (5), which is a reminder of Section 38(4) constitutes 
deviation from the Statute. Obviously, the Statute's intention is to encourage 
compliance with ICC's co-operation requests and it would be expected from 
State parties to facilitate this, whenever possible. 
An entirely different procedure is followed if the request comes from a 
country where extradition is required, on the basis of an international 
obligation. The AG is responsible for making the determination of whether 
priority will be given to the ICC or not lO7• In making his/her decision, the AG 
should take into account all relevant matters listed in a non-exhaustive manner 
in Section 39(7). The said subsection repeats faithfully Article 90(6) of the 
Statute and is trouble-free. Correctly, the dates the respective requests were 
received are relevant and indeed important. A pre-existing request by the Court 
provides a good reason for the requested State to refuse extradition, and to 
execute the request for surrender of a person to the ICC. Similarly, a request 
for extradition made prior to the Court's request for surrender should equally 
be executed, given the existence of an international obligation for its execution. 
The invocation of the nationality and territoriality principles in Section 
39(7)(b) is actually of particular importance, as it emphasises the basis of the 
Court's jurisdiction and respects these fundamental principles on which its 
jurisdiction is established, in accordance with Article 12 of the Statute. In fact 
this sub-paragraph goes beyond Article 12, as it lays emphasis also on the 
nationality of the victims, which Article 12 fails to do. A further criterion 
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which may be taken into account is whether the State which formulates the 
extradition request is likely to surrender the accused to the ICC. This would 
happen for instance if the said State accepts the Court's jurisdiction on an ad 
hoc basis108, or complementarity engages, or the State abstains from exercising 
jurisdiction. 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the list of factors enshrined in Article 90(6) 
of the Statute is not exhaustive. States implementing this provision could 
determine additional factors which will, in their view, be relevant when dealing 
with a competing request by the Court and an extradition partner. 
Moving to Article 90(7), Australia implements both its sub-paragraphs 
in Section 40. Subsection 1 contains the applicability of the Section. Clearly, 
the position differs between a request for which extradition is required 
following an international obligation and one where is not. Both options are 
implemented appropriately by Australia which in Subsections 2, 3 and 4 
basically repeats Article 90(7) of the Statute to the letter. 
As a general point, when implementing Article 90(7), a State could 
reiterate the procedure adopted with regard to Article 90(6) and even deal with 
the issue in a single provision, provided that the different situations are given 
appropriate consideration and are distinguished from each other. 
Finally, that the requested State should therefore provide for 
notification in its implementing law is very clear. Article 90(8) is incorporated 
into Australian law in Section 41. Subsection 1 precisely reiterates paragraph 8 
of Article 90 of the Statute, whereas Subsection 2 further clarifies the 
procedure, by specifying that there is an additional obligation the AG to 
107 Section 39(6). 
108 Article 12(3). 
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respond to the ICC's request, notwithstanding section 14 which contains a 
similar request to respond. No matter how unnecessary this provision might 
seem, it is quite helpful to avoid confusion. 
Unlike Australia, Canada is an example of a State which only partially 
implements Article 90 of the Statute. Competing requests are dealt with in 
Section 15(2). This provision stipulates that the Minister is the competent 
authority to decide which of the competing requests will be dealt with first. 
Without clarifying the possible situations that may arise when handling 
competing requests, it fails to set the rules for giving priority to requests made 
by the Court, when the competing request comes from a State party to the ICC 
treaty, or when there is no obligation to extradite to the State making the 
competing request. Moreover, no mention is made of competing requests 
where there is an obligation to extradite. In essence, Section 15(2) does not 
implement Article 90 of the Statute in a satisfactory way, unless the Canadian 
Minister will always give priority to the Court's requests, which cannot be 
found in the Section itself. The procedure for the authority to proceed can be 
found in section 15(3) and 15(4). 
The UK, on the other hand, adopts a very comprehensive procedure to 
deal with competing requests. Section 24(b) and Part 2 of Schedule 2 are 
devoted to handling such requests. Section 8 of Schedule 2, which is the main 
provision that deals with competing extradition requests lO9, does not follow 
Article 90 of the Statute religiously. It does not contain, for instance, the 
various scenarios found in Article 90. Nor does it spell out the instances where 
priority will be given to the ICC, or where the extradition request will be 
upheld. The Secretary of State is given wide discretion in deciding the course 
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of action. At the same time, however, the wording of Section 8 revet'ls a slight 
preference for ICC surrender, as the options therein are geared towards 
executing the delivery order and discontinue the extradition proceedings. 
The incorporation of Article 90 of the Statute into domestic law, 
therefore, differs significantly from State to State. Provided that the approach is 
consistent with the Statute and covers all the various possibilities, the form 
implementation takes in domestic law does not matter for the application of 
Article 90 in practice. 
9. Article 91 ICC Statute: Arrest and Surrender 
The contents of a request for arrest and surrender can be found in 
Article 91 of the Statute. Two elements of Article 91 are of interest. First, the 
provision for identification of a person in paragraph 2(a) and most importantly, 
paragraph 2(c). Paragraph 2(b) is not problematic at all, as it simply states that 
a copy of the warrant of arrest should be transferred to the State in question. 
When it comes to identifying the person sought, the wider issue that 
comes into play is not so much what information is needed in order to verify a 
person's identity, but what should happen if the wrong person has been 
arrested due to a mistake about his/her identity. An examination of the relevant 
provisions in the implementing legislation of a number of States reveals that 
this issue is addressed in most implementation pieces. From the point of view 
of the Court, it is in its interest to have the right person before them. There 
should be no objection when national courts deal with the issue themselves. 
However, the approach taken by various States is by no means uniform. 
109 Section 9 is the equivalent provision for proceedings in Scotland. 
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Whereas the verification of the identity is generally acknowledged to be 
crucial, States adopt different procedures and deal with the issue at different 
points in those procedures. Most problematic seems to be the remedy available 
to the person whose identity has been mistaken, particularly when it comes to 
which is the appropriate forum to claim compensation. 
Section 24 of the Dutch Act deals, in part, with the issue of verification 
of identity which is dealt with further in Section 25. Under Section 24( 1) the 
District Court is empowered to examine the identity of the person sought. 
Should the person brought before the Dutch court not be the one who is the 
subject of surrender, then a consultation procedure is envisaged in Section 
25(1) of the ActllO. In the Netherlands, the surrender request is not rejected 
straight away in case of a mistaken identity, but a consultation procedure is put 
in place to deal with the issue. This approach is welcome as the problem is 
dealt with domestically without putting a strain on the Court but, at the same 
time, in line with its views which will be communicated to the forum through 
the consultation process. The result of this consultation process can be found in 
Section 27(2). If there is a mistake regarding the identity of the subject of the 
request for surrender the District Court "shall declare the surrender to be 
inadmissible in its ruling". The wording of this Section is very clear and so it 
should be. However, it seems that Section 27 does not embrace fully the 
consultation process described in 25(1) above as it does not stipulate that the 
inadmissibility finding of the District Court shall be made after the ICC has 
been consulted on the matter. It should be accepted, however, that the correct 
interpretation of this provision should be one that takes into account the 
outcome of the consultation process with the Court. In essence, the wording of 
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Section 27 does not preclude this interpretation. It would have been preferable, 
however, had this been spelt out more clearly. 
Interestingly, France in its Criminal Procedure Code provides for a 
right for the person whose surrender is sought to be transferred to the ICC for 
the verification of his/her identity and generally for any act during the 
investigation stage, if he/she consents111 • There does not seem to be any legal 
objection to that as the consent is in any case present and the transfer is 
facilitated. However, from the Court's perspective, it would not be desirable if 
this provision were used very much, as the burden it is likely to impose on the 
Court would be hard to bear. The fact that the Justice Minister is the one to 
authorise the possibility enshrined in Article 627-15 though, might be an 
indication that this option is reserved for exceptional cases only. 
Having the correct person before it is certainly very important for the 
Court. The Canadian legislation tackles this issue appropriately, by establishing 
a double requirement. First, the name of the person before the court has to be 
similarl12 to the name enshrined in the documents submitted by the ICC and, 
the physical characteristics have to match. In Canada's view, physical 
characteristics are evidenced in "a photograph, fingerprint or other description 
of the person,,1l3. The use of the term "similar" and not "identical" allows for 
greater flexibility in the identification process. The fact that the name for 
instance, has not been spelt properly should not be a reason for not identifying 
the accused. As long as the elements described in Section 37 are akin enough 
I \0 See also Section 7(2)(i). 
III Article 627-15. 
112 i.e. not identical. 
113 Section 37(b). 
281 
National Implementation 
to the ones found in the infonnation provided by the Court, the identification of 
the person is achieved. 
States place some importance on the issue of verification of identity. In 
accordance with Article 59(2) of the Statute, the custodial State has to 
detennine that the warrant applies to the right person. In other words, the 
authority to embark on an inquiry regarding the person's identity is clear. As 
no further guidance is provided in the Statute, it should be accepted that in case 
of mistaken identity the person should be set free. Some co-operation with the 
ICC on the issue is also important, as the Court would need to be infonned of 
the outcome of such an inquiry. 
Article 91(2)(c) presents an implementation challenge. It is a good 
example of interaction with national systems in practice, where respect for 
domestic proceedings is important. 
Australia deals with issues of arrest and surrender in Part 3 of its Act. 
Division 2, in particular, deals with the relevant documentation to accompany a 
request by the ICC. The parts of Article 91 of the ICC Statute that deal with a 
request by the Court to arrest and surrender a person not yet convicted by the 
Court, are dealt with in Section 17 of the Australian Act. Although no mention 
is made in that Section of Article 91(1) it should be accepted that a request 
made pursuant to Article 91 will not present a problem for Australial14 • Article 
9l(2)(a) and (b) are incorporated word for word lls. This is not true though for 
Article 91(2)(c) of the Statute. Although documents necessary for the surrender 
114 In fact, Australia has got a Section as part of its general provisions in Part 2 of the 
Australian Act, (Section 9), w h i ~ h h aims .to deal with urgent requests. Section 9 replicates 
Article 91(1) but can be also used mother mstances, e.g. Article 92(1). 
liS Section 17(a),(b) and (c). 
282 
National Implementation 
are referred to in Section 17116 a crucial omission can be discerned. Australia 
fails to explicitly implement the part of 91(2)(c) that refers to favourable 
treatment of the Court, or at least treatment comparable to extradition 
proceedings. This mayor may not impact on Australia's co-operation with the 
Court. As with many other provisions, it is up to the actual implementation of 
this provision to decide whether it will be consistent with the Statute. Australia, 
by establishing such a detailed co-operation regime has already made its 
choices and attempts to satisfy the Statute's requests. It remains to be seen 
whether the practical application of Section 17(d), will be contrary to 91(2)(c). 
Article 91(3) deals with request for arrest and surrender of a person 
already convicted by the ICC for a crime falling under the Court's jurisdiction. 
The relevant documentation required is comparable to what is requested for the 
arrest or surrender of a person to be tried by the Court. The difference of course 
lies in the fact that special provisions should be made to take into account the 
fact that a person is already convicted. 
An equivalent to Article 91(2)(c) is not found when dealing with a 
person already convicted by the Court. This is explained because the ICC in 
such an instance will have reached its judgment and all the State has to do is to 
comply with its request. Less is at stake for the national judicial system. What 
would happen if the State would have some additional requirements is not 
entirely clear. The application of Article 91(2)(c) is specifically targeted at 
requests for arrest and surrender following an arrest warrant issued under 
Article 58 of the Statute. 
116 Section 17(d). 
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Article 91(3) is very straightforward when it comes to its 
implementation. Australia repeats the wording of this paragraph exactly in its 
Act!!7. 
The Netherlands devotes three Sections on the issue of arrest!!8, which 
implement largely Articles 55 and 59 of the Statute, but do not refer to Article 
91 at all. Even though it seems odd that in terms of procedural legality Dutch 
law does not seem to require that the request for arrest be accompanied by 
specific documents as per Article 91 of the Statute, the procedure laid down for 
arrest is simple, efficient and in accordance with the Statute! 19. 
Germany, in Section 2 of its Law incorporates the obligation to execute 
a request for surrender!20 and further specifies the two occasions for which 
surrender is sought, in accordance with Article 91(2) and (3). This provision 
states the principle which is then elaborated in other Sections of the German 
Act. Moreover, Section 2 further clarifies that surrender of a person convicted 
by the Court may take place directly to the State where the sentence will be 
served. This goes beyond what is required by Article 91 of the Statute but is, 
nevertheless, a very useful addition. Section 2 of the German Law, however, 
does not mention arrest at all. Similarly, Section 5, which implements Article 
91(2) and (3) in more detail does not refer to arrest either. There are two 
interesting points to be made about Section 5(1): first, the requirement that a 
document be provided by the Court describing the criminal act allegedly 
committed. This is not uncommon in domestic practice. States are entitled to 
117 Section 18. It is ~ o ~ . m e n t i ~ n i n g g t h a ~ ~ Austr.alia devotes an entire Section to Article 91(3) 
and does not deal WIth It 10 SectIOn 17 WIth whIch the rest of Article 91 is incorporated. This 
distinction makes sense as the two procedures, namely, requests for arrest and surrender of a 
person following a warrant of arrest and request for surrender of a person already convicted are 
very different to each other. 
118 Sections 18, 19 and 20. 
119 Section 20, for instance, implements Article 59(3) and (4) ICC Statute. 
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seek information on the offence the requested person is sought for. This may 
well be a remnant of extradition processes but it is well within the scope of 
Article 91 (2)(c) and it is by no means unreasonable, nor is it likely to be "more 
burdensome" than extradition requests. Interestingly, a document describing 
the alleged act would suffice and no arrest warrant for any additional acts is 
necessaryl2l. This cannot be found in Article 91 but, provided that no 
prosecution, detention or punishment for different conduct to that which the 
surrender relates, then it is consistent with the rule of speciality found in 
Article 101 of the Statute122• Section 5(1) also acknowledges the discretion 
enshrined in the Article 91 (2)( c) of the Statute. However, the final two 
sentences of Section 5(1) do not add much in tenns of specific requirements 
imposed by Germany. Without identifying the specific provisions to be 
employed, it is simply stated that ''the applicable provisions shall be set 
forth,,123. The Section goes on to effectively render the relevant aspects of the 
Statute directly applicable by reference to them. What this Section fails to do, 
however, is to incorporate Article 91(4) of the Statute which obliges a State 
Party to consult with the ICC on matters arising out of the application of 
Article 91(2)(c) which is the provision discussed here. No provision is made 
for such consultation by Gennany, which constitutes a serious omission. 
The implementation of Article 91(3) is more challenging in Gennany. 
On the one hand, Section 5(2) incorporates Article 91(3) directly into the 
Gennan legal order, but on the other it imposes further conditions which do not 
have a clear legal basis in the Statute. A certificate of enforcement and some 
120 By virtue of Article 89(1) of the Statute. 
121 Section 5(1). 
122 Article 101 is implemented in Section 25. 
123 Ibid. supra n. 121. 
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sort of assurance by the ICC that the Court agrees with the surrender of the 
person to the State of enforcement124 are not among the documents contained 
in Article 91(3). Moreover, although this possibility should not be precluded, it 
is not clear from Article 91(3) of the Statute that surrender of a convicted 
person shall take place directly to the State of enforcement. The German 
Section appears to contain an element of mistrust towards the Court and seeks 
assurances regarding the State of enforcement. It is hard to imagine that the 
ICC would request the surrender of a person already convicted without having 
ensured that an enforcement agreement is in place and that surrender of the 
German authorities to the enforcement State is sought. These two requirements, 
albeit perfectly logical, do not fall within the scope of Article 91(3). As 
mentioned already, Article 91(3) does not contain a sub-paragraph akin to 
Article 91 (2)(c), allowing the requested State to impose its own conditions, and 
as such, the German Section 5(2) might be considered to be beyond what is 
permitted under the Statute. 
Article 91(2) and (3) are incorporated into UK domestic law by Section 
2. With regard to Article 91(2) the UK Act stipulates that endorsement of the 
warrant accompanying the request shall be endorsed if the appropriate judicial 
officer is satisfied that "the warrant appears to have been issued by the ICC.,12S. 
Two observations may be made here. First, the UK does not require all the 
documents enshrined in Article 91(2) in order to endorse the warrant, and 
second, the standard set for endorsing it seems quite low. It suffices that the 
warrant appears to have been issued by the ICC. This may be explained since 
the ICC warrant would have been transmitted through the diplomatic route and 
124 As required by Section 5(2)(1) and (2) respectively. 
125 Section 2(3). 
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the possibility of the warrant not having been issued by the Court is limited. 
When the request relates to arrest and surrender of a person already convicted 
by the ICC 126, Section 2(4) applies, which reiterates the relevant Statute Article 
in a precise manner127 • Moreover, the effects of an endorsed warrant under 
Section 2 or a warrant issued following provisional arrest can be found in 
Section 14. This provision clarifies the position of such a warrant within the 
UK legal system. Although a useful provision, its natural place in the UK Act 
would have been together with the provisions dealing with 
endorsement/issuance of the said warrant. 
The approaches examined here show that the implementation of Article 
91 differs significantly from State to State. Article 91(2)(c), in particular, 
because of its nature allowing flexibility in its incorporation, is subject to 
different treatment by various States. The guidance the Statute provides, 
however, should be considered in every instance. 
10. Article 92 ICC Statute: Provisional Arrest 
The purpose of including provisional arrest in the Statute is to 
guarantee that an indictee is arrested and awaits transfer, pending presentation 
of the relevant documentation supporting a request for surrender. States 
126 Article 91(3). 
127 W' h th 'f ' t fi" f It e e x c e p t 1 ~ n n 0 a r e q u 1 f e ~ e n n , o ~ ~ a ,copy 0 any warrant of arrest for that person" 
which can be found 10 91 (3)(a). ThIs onusslOn IS not of any practical significance as a warrant 
of arrest shall be issued in the UK. 
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generally incorporate this provIsIOn into their domestic laws, albeit very 
differently128. 
Germany and Canada incorporate provisional arrest with processes 
which are similar to preventive measures under domestic law; that is even 
before the request has been received, provided that certain conditions are met 
which relate to the seriousness of the crimes, prevention ofa person's escape or 
commission of an offence, for instance 129. All the ICC Statute requires is 
urgency. Arguably, the Statute does not clarify what would constitute an urgent 
case, which is presumably left to the ICC to decide. The question which then 
arises is whether Germany and Canada adequately implement Article 92 of the 
Statute. For the field of application is, at first sight, different from the one in 
the Statute. Provisional arrest is justified in these two countries for reasons of 
public interest rather than urgency. However, a request for surrender in urgent 
cases would almost certainly be rationalised under protection of the public 
interest. Both Canada and Germany are, therefore, in compliance with the 
Statute. However, the subject of this order in Germany, cannot remain in 
128 The Netherlands implements Article 92(1) in Section 13(1), whereas Sections 13(2)-(4), 14, 
15, 15 and 17 lay down the procedures to be followed for the materialisation of provisional 
arrest. Although the Dutch Act devotes a couple of sections on this issue, none of them 
replicates Article 92 of the Statute in any detail. It is striking for instance that there is no 
mention of the documents required to accompany a request for provisional arrest. On the 
contrary, Australia implements 92( I) in a general provision (Section 9), which enables it to co-
operate with the ICC in urgent cases. The various elements of Article 92(2) can be found, with 
some minor grammatical amendments, almost verbatim in Section 19 of the Australian Act. 
Germany incorporates Article 92(1) in Section 11(1). The emphasis of this Section is on 
detention following p r o v i ~ i o n a l l arrest, bu! the e l ~ m e n t s s .of 92(2) are applicable by means of 
direct reference. The UK mcorporates ArtIcle 92 m Section 3, whereas Section 4 contains the 
procedure to be followed after. the person has been provisionally arrested. Apart from 
information on the probable locatIon of the person, the rest of the documents of Article 92(2) 
are not explicitly required under the UK Act. 
129 Section 11(2) contains the conditions for this in Germany, whereas Sections 12-13 are the 
relevant Canadian provision. 
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custody indefinitely, Section 11(3) sets out the procedure for lifting these 
130 
measures . 
Another element, found in the Canadian and the UK pieces, is the 
necessity of a link with the forum for provisional arrest to take place. Some 
indication of presence, actual or future is required. Although Article 92(2)(a) 
ICC Statute stipulates that information on the person's probable location is 
necessary, for provisional arrest, it seems that both Canada and the UK place 
greater emphasis on this issue, probably because, quite rightly, they do not 
wish to be involved in actively looking for a person who has no link with the 
country. 
The most important aspect of Article 92 that needs to be incorporated is 
setting the person free provided that the necessary documents have not be 
received within sixty days\31. Interestingly, however, provisional arrest does 
not preclude surrender to the ICC provided that the person provisionally held 
consents to that effect and such action is permitted by the law of the requested 
State. Reference to domestic law in this provision is important, as it allows 
some leeway for States to examine their own provisions and decide whether to 
incorporate this possibility or not. It would be advisable, if not prohibited by 
domestic law, to include this possibility as it ensures that the person is 
transferred to the ICC. Given that the coercive element is removed by requiring 
the consent of the person involved, it is difficult to see why a State would 
object to incorporating this provision. 
130 Quite rightly, preventive detention shall not. be continued if the ICC does not make a request 
or in any case shall not exceed one month wtthout a formal request for provisional arrest or 
arrest a s u r r ~ n d e r r having.been made b y . t h ~ ~ I ~ C , , in which case the normal procedure of Article 
92 and its ImplementatIon apply. ThIS IS In accordance with due process standards. The 
provision however does not mention the possibility of the German State prosecuting the 
alleged criminal themselves. 
131 In accordance with Rule 188 RPE. 
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All States examined provide for immediate release following the lapse 
of the sixty-day deadline 1 32. Abiding by the Statute deadlines is a good 
practice, as it allows for coherent administration of justice and eliminates the 
possibility of conflicting provisions. 
Canada's approach deserves closer scrutiny. Release of the person 
provisionally arrested is dealt with in Section 14. Section 14(1)(a) contains a 
purely procedural reason for release; namely, non-issuance of the authority to 
proceed. Section 14(1)(b) pertains to "extradition agreements" which contain a 
time limit in which the request must be made and the documents provided. The 
ICC Statute, albeit not an extradition agreement as such, contains a time-limit 
for the actual surrender request to be made 133. The same deadline can be found 
in 14(1)(b)(i) of the Canadian Act, which is therefore in line with the Statute. 
Section 14(I)(b)(ii) goes a step further. Provided both that the request has been 
made and the documents have been received, should the Minister not have 
acted according to Section 15 of the same Act and thirty days have lapsed from 
the expiry of the period specified under the RPE, then the person must be 
discharged. This time, the onus is on Canada to execute the request. The Court 
is presumed to have acted according to the Statute and its RPE, but Canada has 
not taken action. It is doubtful that this section could apply to the ICC as such 
an option is not based on Article 92. Conversely, if the ICC Statute is not 
considered to be an extradition agreement for the purposes of this provision. 
132 S e ~ ~ S e c t i ~ n n 25(1)(a) A ~ s t r a l i a n n Act; Article 627-1.4 French Law, which implements 
primanly Article 92(3); Section 15(5) Dutch Law; Section 11(1) German Law; Section 14 
Canadian Act. 
133 Article 92(3). 
290 
National Implementation 
Section 14(l)(c) would apply as the period specified therein is identical to the 
deadline enshrined in the Statute134• 
Section 14(2)(b) is important, as it allows for an extension of up to 
thirty days. The use of the verb "shall" denotes the significance attributed to 
the extension when the request comes from the ICC. This provision goes 
beyond requested from Canada and in the case of 14(1)(b)(i) it gives a further 
opportunity to the ICC to actually proceed with the request for surrender, 
whereas in the case of section 14(1 )(b )(ii) it rectifies the effect of this section, 
giving another chance for Canada to comply with the Court's request. 
Moreover, Section 14(3) allows for interim release of the person applicable 
only for the period of the extensionl35• This is reasonable, as it would be 
consistent with the domestic procedure and human rights provisions. Canada 
largely incorporates Article 92. 
Moreover, provision for consent to be given regarding surrender IS 
made in most implementation pieces136• In the UK, as far as consent IS 
concerned, the UK includes a general Section on consent which could be of use 
here as well l37 • By consenting to the surrender, the person consents to 
immediate delivery and forgoes protection afforded by domestic law. The 
apparent omission in the Canadian Section 14 regarding a procedure allowing 
the requested person to consent to the surrender, and for this to take place 
134 Section 14(1)(c)(ii) raises the same questions as 14(l)(b)(ii). 
135 It is evident from 92(3) that the person must be held in custody. 
136 In the Netherlands consent is provided for in Section 36(1). The rest of this Section as well 
as Sections 37-40 provide the procedure to be followed in such cases, outlining the various 
possibilities. Quite interestingly, Section 38 stipulates that in case of consent to the surrender 
request when the public prosecutor decides that the person will be surrendered to the ICC 
(presumably following a decision that such a consensual surrender would not contravene the 
law o f t h ~ ~ r e q u e s t ~ d d State in ~ c c o r d a n c ~ ~ with ~ c l e . 9 2 ( 3 ) ) of the ICC Statute) a hearing before 
the Distnct Court IS not a p ~ h c a b l e . . This may be. Justtfied by the fact that the legislator felt that 
a person who consents to hlslher surrender and In a sense foregoes hislher rights availed under 
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without delay, is rectified in a general Section dealing with consent \38. 
Gennany too widens the possibility of a streamlined surrender process to any 
situation where surrender has been requested by the ICC and where the person 
concerned consents to the surrender139• Providing for a less burdensome 
provision of surrender is welcome and the German approach in that respect is 
valuable. Australia does not mention the possibility of surrendering a person 
provisionally arrested to the ICC by virtue ofhisfher consent l40 • This omission 
is not crucial as the implementation of this provision is left to the particular 
States. It seems that this is a "softer" co-operation provision, when compared to 
the obligation to co-operate for instance, or the duty to surrender. Although 
Article 92(3) is covered by the general obligation to co-operate, it allows some 
leeway in its implementation, which has as a point of reference the domestic 
law of the State. 
The UK, however, is the only country where consent may be given not 
only by the person himself but also by the person acting on his behal f if there is 
a case of physical or mental incapacityl41. This provision has been evidently 
lifted from domestic procedures as it also refers to circumstances where it is 
inappropriate for a person to act for himself by reason of his youth. Given that 
minors cannot be tried by the ICC142 this provision is unnecessary. 
Finally, where the person has been released from custody following the 
lack of a surrender request within sixty days of the provisional arrest pursuant 
Dutch law and safeguarded by the Dutch courts, does not need the same protection when 
compared to a person who does not consent to their surrender to the ICC. 
137 Section 7. 
138 Section 70. This provision does not specifically refer to provisional arrest and surrender but 
is an overarching provision which could be applied with regard to any aspect of the surrender. 
139 Section 32. 
140 Section 25 simply refers to release from provisional arrest. 
141 Section 7(2). 
142 Article 26 ICC Statute. 
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to Article 92(3), he/she may be arrested a g ~ m m at a later date, when the 
surrender documents are delivered. The essence of this provision acts as a 
reminder, in the sense that it attempts to ensure that release due to a procedural 
technicality, in this case, presentation of the relevant documents within a given 
date, does not mean that the circumstances which have triggered the Court's 
jurisdiction and consequently the person's indictment, have ceased to exist. It 
implies that the State cannot rely on the person's release to refuse surrender 
once the necessary documents are presented. On the other hand, through this 
provision the significance placed on the correct procedure is emphasised. As 
such, Article 92(4) does not necessarily need to be incorporated into domestic 
law. 
Australia opts to include such a possibility in its domestic law l4J • 
Canada on the other hand, does not explicitly incorporate Article 92(4). In the 
UK letting the accused go free does not preclude de novo arrest, should the 
warrant be produced at a later stage l44• This is in line with Section 92(4). What 
matters is the protection of the person's rights while in custody. Having spent a 
maximum amount of time awaiting an arrest warrant, the person is set free, but 
this does not mean that he/she is exonerated from the suspicion of crimes 
allegedly committed. Future arrest, therefore, remains an option and provided 
the requirements of the Statute are met, it may take place. The rationale for 
having this provision is probably to rebut claims that a further arrest would 
constitute a violation of the ne his in idem since the person would have already 
been arrested and released. 
143 See Section 25(2). 
144 Section 4(7). 
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The relationship between the Court and national courts seems to be a 
balancing act between the international and the national norms, between the 
quest for an effective ICC and respect for the remaining State sovereignty. It is 
imperative that the ICC is flexible, however, this should not to be the detriment 
of fulfilling its aims. 
11. Article 93: Other Forms of Co-operation 
Apart from arrest and surrender, State parties are required to provide a 
number of co-operation acts to assist the ICC in its investigations or 
prosecutions. All the acts listed in Article 93(1) need to be provided for at the 
domestic level. The list of acts seems at first, exhaustive, but upon closer 
scrutiny, by virtue of 93(1)(1) it is actually broader, as it requests a State to 
provide "any type of assistance" not prohibited by its law in order to facilitate 
the Court's investigation or prosecution. Implementing Article 93( 1) is crucial 
for the effectiveness of the Court. 
Implementation of Article 93(1) involves a number of acts that need to 
be provided for in domestic law, with domestic procedures to facilitate 
execution of such requests, is advisable. States need to review their domestic 
procedures and examine for which of these acts they need to legislate. In such 
a case, paying close attention to the Statute is important. 
Australia in implementing Article 93(1) adopts wording which follows 
the Statute very closely. Section 7 reiterates the Statute almost verbatim l45 • In 
the incorporation of 93(1)(e), Australia broadens it to include every person 
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other than the prisoner, instead of witnesses and experts which is found in the 
ICC Statute146• This gives greater leeway to the Court to ask for any person to 
appear before it, and allows Australia to co-operate with such a request. 
Moreover, the non-inclusion of exhumation and examination of graves sites, in 
Section 7(l)(a)(viii) of the Australian Act, is not detrimental to the equivalent 
in Article 93(l)(g), since an examination of sites may plausibly include graves. 
This is further evidence of the attention paid by the Australian drafters to the 
Statute's wording. There is a genuine attempt to clarify and perhaps rectify its 
misconceptions. In addition, although not quite the same, "property [ ... ] assets 
and instrumentalities of crimes" for the purpose of eventual forfeiture are 
omitted, as this presumably would already be covered under proceeds of crimes 
in Australia, whereas mention of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court is 
Of more interest is the implementation of 93(1)(1). Section 7(1)(b) 
implements appropriately the above-mentioned ICC provision. In fact, it is 
wider, because it allows also enforcement of ICC orders post conviction. This 
is welcome, as it gives it further scope for application. However, although 
Article 93(1)(1) of the Statute is limited to "other fonns of co-operation", the 
same is not true for Section 7 of the Australian law, which comprises the 
obligation to arrest and surrender as well. 
France adopts a very different approach. To begin with, it does not 
specifically implement Article 93 as a stand-alone provision in its domestic 
law. Instead, it refers to it, presumably when there is an issue which needs to be 
145 The obvious change in the various elements of 7(1)(a) from "the Court" to "the ICC", is 
made in order to avoid ambiguities, and is of no consequence. Similarly, the change of 
r,reposition, from " u ~ d e r " " oath, to " ~ n " " oath, in Section 7(1)(a)(iii) is also unimportant. 
46 Section 7(1)(a)(vl) of the Austrahan Act. 
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regulated specifically. No reference is therefore made to Article 93( I) at all. 
apart from Article 93(1)(k)148. This provision stipulates the procedure to be 
followed in order to execute the "precautionary measures" enshrined in 
93(1 )(k). Accordingly, for these measures, French civil procedure law is takell 
into account and the cost is born by the Treasury149. Although Article 93(3)(k) 
does not provide a time-limit for the imposition of these measures, France 
imposes a limit of two years, allowing, however, a possibility of renewal in 
case in which the ICC so requests 150. This provision is typical of the dialectic 
relationship that should be encouraged between the Court and the requested 
State. The ICC's aim is to have these measures in place. The requested State 
implements this following, nevertheless, its own procedure, which in the case 
of France is to impose a time-limit of two years. This is a very reasonable 
deadline as, in all probability, these measures will not be necessary after two 
years. Should, however, it be still the case that the ICC requests co-operation in 
the form of these measures, then France has a procedure in place to renew the 
application of such measures. In this manner, both the aim of the ICC is 
achieved, and the domestic procedural rules of the requested State are 
observed. The crucial point of course is that domestic procedure should not be 
used with the view to refusing, or even delaying, the execution of the Court's 
request. This is not the case with regard to the French code in this particular 
instance. 
The Dutch approach is different yet again. Section 45 constitutes a 
catch-all provision which is framed in a general manner and does not refer to 
147 Section 7(1)(a)(xii) ibid. 
148 Article 927-3. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
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the particular sub-paragraphs of Article 93( 1) of the Statute. Instead, it 
provides that any request for co-operation referred to in Article 93 "shall, [ ... ] 
be executed in the desired manner"151. It would have been better, had this 
seemingly absolute provision not been qualified with the words "to the extent 
possible" found also in 45(1). It would have been preferable to adopt the 
wording of Article 93(1) which simply allows the requested State to use its 
own procedures to execute the request rather than the current wording which 
might be interpreted as leaving some doubt as to whether the request shall be 
executed wholly or partially. With regard to Article 93(1 )(1) the approach is 
entirely consistent with the Statute. Section 45(2) incorporates Article 93( I )(1) 
in a precise manner. 
Moreover, Section 46 further clarifies Section 45 in prescribing the 
manner of execution of a request. In essence, the Netherlands adopts the 
procedures laid down in the ICC Statute when dealing with an Article 93 
request. Moreover, Section 46(2) places an obligation on Dutch authorities to 
guarantee the safety of the persons concerned and, in that respect, conditions 
may be imposed relating to the manner of execution of the request. Even 
though this Section does not draw upon a particular paragraph of Article 93 it 
does not contradict it, as the safety of the persons involved in the execution of 
the request is or, in any case, should be at the forefront of the Court's efforts. 
Employing a particular manner of execution is consistent with the leeway 
allowed to States to use domestic procedures when executing a request made 
under Article 93 of the Statute. 
A special provision regarding the manner of serving of documents can 
be found in Section 47. This specific mention of documents can be perhaps 
151 Section 45(1). 
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explained by the enhanced role documents play generally in a civil law 
country. 
Gennany however devotes an entire part l52 to what it calls "additional 
mutual assistance". The provision which contains the principle implementing 
other fonns of co-operation is Section 47, which is framed in a very general 
manner. Separate provisions implement selectively specific aspects of Article 
93 of the Statute. Reference to Article 93(1 )(k) is made for instance in Section 
51 153 , whereas Section 53 relates partly to Article 93(l)(e). Although the 
Statute only talks about "voluntary appearance" of persons as witnesses or 
experts, Section 53 is limited to persons who are at large and are requested to 
appear as witnesses. The coercive procedure enshrined here does not 
contravene the Statute. Although appearance of witnesses before the ICC is 
voluntary, States may continue to provide for coercive power in their sphere of 
competence. With regard to 93(1 )0) Germany affords the same protection to 
victims and "protected persons,,154 as for proceedings before the German 
criminal system 155. However, Section 56 fails to address the issue of 
preservation of evidence referred to in the Statute. This might prove to be a 
crucial omission in practice. Without problem is the procedure envisaged for 
the service of documents dealt with in Section 57. Finally. apart from a 
reference in its title, no mention is made to Article 93(1)(1) in Section 59. This 
Section contains rules relating to the surveillance of telecommunications. 
Nothing similar is envisaged in Part 9 of the Statute. However, what this 
Section probably does is to interpret Article 93(1 )(1) as allowing any type of 
IS2 Part 5. 
IS3 Asset seizure is dealt with in Section 52. 
IS4 Which should be taken to include witnesses. 
ISS Section 56. 
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measure to be requested from Germany, except for telecommunications 
surveillance to which specific regime applies and is therefore laid down in 
Section 59. This Section is not an example of good drafting. A better approach 
would have been to reiterate Article 93(1 )(1) and, since telecommunications 
surveillance is a crucial issue for Germany, to make special provision for this 
type of assistance, subject to the conditions enshrined in Section 59. This 
would have been acceptable due to the wording of Article 93(1 )(1). The 
positive thing about the current structure is that, arguably, no possibility for 
refusing any other type of assistance is envisaged. 
In the UK, Article 93 is implemented in Part 3 of its Act. Identification 
of a person156 is incorporated in Section 34 and Schedule 4. Although no 
mention is made in the Statute of how to take fingerprints and DNA evidence. 
the UK has chosen to specifically incorporate this possibility, which requires 
coercive powers, and does so in the above provisions in a satisfactory way. As 
for Article 93(1 )(b) and (i) which relate to the taking of evidence and provision 
of records and documents, they are incorporated in Section 29 of the Act which 
enables domestic courts to have the same powers to require attendance of 
witnesses and the production of documents as in domestic court proceedings. 
This provision should be read in conjunction with Section 36 of the Act. With 
regard to 93(1)( c) the relevant provision is Section 28 whose main 
characteristic is that it does not provide for any form of compUlsion. This may 
be explained by the fact that individuals cannot be compelled to incriminate 
themselves by being subject to questioning. Section 31 incorporates Article 
93(1)(d) and is unproblematic. Moreover, Sections 33 and 3S implement 
Article 93(1)(g)(h) satisfactorily by providing the necessary authority for 
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exhumations and execution of searches and seizures. Article 93(1 )(j) is not 
specifically implemented in the UK Act, but is must be presumed that this can 
be done administratively. With regard to 93(1)(k), however, the powers 
enshrined in Section 37 and Schedule 5 as well as Section 38 and Schedule 6 
are very wide powers indeed, and guarantee compliance with the Statute. 
Finally, Article 93(1)(1) is not implemented at all in the UK. It should be 
accepted that in the unlikely event that a request not covered in Article 
93(l)(a)-(j) arises, the UK will have to deal with it in concreto, and possibly, 
administratively. 
11.1 Articles 93(2)-(6) 
Whereas Article 93(2) of the Statute does not require implementation, 
since it provides guidance to the ICC regarding the way witnesses or experts 
should be treated, the same is not true for the three paragraphs that follow. 
Articles 93(3), (4), (5) and (6) deal with the possibility of a State invoking its 
right to refuse co-operation. Although this possibility is fairly limited, a State 
party to the Statute should, in its implementing legislation, ensure that this is 
not abused. 
The first possibility for a State to refuse execution of a co-operation 
request is if this request conflicts with a fundamental principle of general 
application. Despite the difficulty in identifying such principles, in 
implementing Article 93(3), a State has to provide for a consultation procedure 
to deal with such a conflicting request. It is important to note that this provision 
156 Article 93(1 )(a). 
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should only be used in very exceptional cases and this fact must be reflected in 
the implementing legislation. 
When implementing this provision, a State should first, provide for 
consultation, and even more importantly, stipulate which of the principles it 
considers to have such an elevated status and are likely to conflict with a 
request by the Court. In any case, the scope of this provision is to be used in 
exceptional cases only and every precaution should be taken to minimise its 
applicability. The rule, therefore, remains that compliance with the Statute is 
strong, in accordance with Article 86. 
France specifically refers to Article 93(3) of the Statute in Article 627-
3, third paragraph. However, it fails to specify the situations in which France 
would invoke Article 93(3). This is not very helpful as it leaves room for abuse 
of the strictly mapped exception found in the Statute. All the third paragraph of 
Article 627-3 does is to ensure that consultation procedure has been followed 
in accordance with the Statute Article and failing that, "every difficulty'S7" 
relating to the execution of the request will be transferred by the Prosecutor of 
Paris to the competent authorities1S8• 
A similar approach should be taken with regard to Article 93(4). 
However, there is no obligation to hold consultations with the ICC with regard 
to this provision. The guiding principle should be again to avoid excessive 
invocation of Article 72. 
The Netherlands specifically refers to Article 72 of the Statute I 59. 
However, it does not provide outright refusal to execute the request and instead 
subjects the situation to consultation with the ICC. This approach is preferable 
157 See wording of Article 627-3, third paragraph. 
IS8 Meaning obviously the competent authority within the ICC. 
301 
National Implementation 
to denying the Court's request without consultation, as it might still be possible 
to agree a solution that would not put at stake the national security of the State. 
In the UK, the relevant provision with regard to national security is 
Section 39. This provision has to be read in light of Articles 93(4) and 72 of the 
Statute. The first point is that in order to detennine whether something is 
prejudicial to the security of the UK a certificate by the UK is necessary which 
constitutes conclusive evidence to that effect. The procedure envisaged 
involves a very lengthy consultation process with the ICC. The approach taken 
here is evidence of the UK's commitment to restricting the ground for refusal 
based on national security, as it effectively gives the requested State significant 
powers to deny the Court's request. 
Article 93(5) of the Statute refers back to Article 93(1)(1) and it obliges 
a State to consider whether any other type of assistance under the latter Article 
can be provided subject to conditions or in another date or manner which 
should be first accepted by the Court or its Prosecutor. The requested State 
should therefore provide for such consideration in its implementing legislation. 
Australia implements this provision appropriately, by adopting the 
exact wording of the Statute in that respect l60• 
Gennany refers to Article 93(3)-(5) as well as 9(b) in Section 48 which 
simply provides for postponement of executing the Court's request. This 
provision is not in contravention with the spirit of the Statute since it does not 
contain an outright refusal to co-operate but allows a possibility to resolve the 
matter in a way which would be in favour of the Court. However, judging from 
the wording of Section 48 no strict consultation procedure is put forward. A 
IS9 Section 7(2)(h). 
160 Section 11(2). 
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finn reference to the Statute161 should be enough to guarantee that the right 
procedures will be followed. 
Should all such efforts fail, and a State refuses to provide assistance to 
the Court, it ought to infonn the ICC promptly to that effect 1 62 • The domestic 
legislation ought to provide for such a possibility as well. Australia, in its Act 
incorporates this provision in Section 14. Although Article 93(6) only refers to 
refusal to co-operate, Australia uses this provision also in case of 
postponement163 or inabilityl64 to co-operate with the Court. In that sense, 
Section 14 is wider than 93(6). As far as 93(6) itself is concerned, it is 
incorporated fully. Section 14 nevertheless encompasses a more generic answer 
to the Court's requests, and comprises all the instances where Australia would 
have to respond to a request made by the ICC I6S • 
In Canada's Extradition Act there are a number of grounds of refusal 166, 
which by virtue of Section 47.1 do not apply when dealing with a request for 
surrender to the ICC. As such, no reason for refusal is pennitted under the 
Canadian Act. Section 45 however and particularly 45(1) comes to reinforce 
the prohibition of refusal to co-operate, as it is stated that "the absence of 
reasons for refusal [ ... ] prevail over sections 46 and 47". This is another 
indication of the Canadian commitment towards the Court. 
In implementing the limited right to refuse co-operation to the Court, a 
State should endeavour to limit the invocation of the relevant provisions to the 
161 "in accordance with the Rome Statute". 
162 Article 93(6). 
163 Section 14(2). 
164 Section 14(3). This section is framed in a rather general manner. As long as it is not used to 
deny the e x e c ~ t i o n n of a ~ e q u e s t t for c o ~ o p e r a t i o n n ~ d e e by the Court, above and beyond the 
limited exceptIOns f o ~ n d d 10 t h ~ ~ Statute, ~ t s s presence 10 the Act should not be problematic. 
165 Hence reference IS made 10 subsectIon (4) to urgent requests and in subsection (5) to the 
language documents or evidence should be provided to the Court. 
166 Sections 44, 46 and 47. 
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absolute minimum, and should ensure that the overarching obligation to co-
operate in accordance with Article 86 is not curtailed in any way. 
11.2 Article 93(7): Temporary Transfer 
Moving on Article 93(7), in case of a temporary transfer pursuant to 
Article 93(7), apart from the consent of the person involved, the requested 
State must also agree to the transfer and may attach conditions to which both it 
and the ICC may agree167• 
The Netherlands implements this Article in Section 48 of its Act. The 
only condition they seem to place is that should a person be serving a custodial 
sentence in the Netherlands at the time of the temporal transfer to the ICC, 
his/her time spent in custody there shall be deducted from hislher sentence. 
This makes sense and is not, strictly speaking, a condition on the execution of 
the request but rather an appropriate act in accordance with due process 
principles of domestic law. 
Germany incorporates Article 93(7) in Section S4 in a manner 
consistent with the Statute. Section 54(1) mentions that consent is necessary to 
effectuate this temporary transfer168, whereas 54(2)-(4) contains the various 
conditions attached by Germany in accordance with Article 93(a)(ii). 
Assurances are sought that the temporary transfer will not impact on the 
sentence already served in Germany and that no additional punishment or 
penalty of any sort will be imposed save for some exceptions specifically 
167 Article 93(7)(a)(i) and (ii). 
168 Article 93(7)(a)(i). 
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mentioned in the provision169. Moreover, in line with Article 93(7)(b), Section 
54(4) contains the obligation imposed on the ICC to return the person to the 
requested State. A prohibition on revoking the consent to the temporary 
transfer, as well as reference to Articles 70 and 71 of the Statute as exceptions 
to the conditions imposed by this Section, can also be found therein. The 
approach taken by Gennany is exemplary. Not only does it implement the 
Statute in this instance entirely appropriately, but thought has also been given 
to the possible interaction with other relevant provisions. 
Canada's temporary transfer is somewhat different to what is enshrined 
in the Statute. Temporary surrender in the Statute relates to "identification or 
for obtaining testimony or other assistance"17o, whereas in Canada it may take 
place so that the extradition partner may "prosecute the person or to ensure the 
person's presence in respect of appeal proceedings that affect the person,,17'. 
The scope of application of the Canadian provision is entirely different. Should 
it be accepted that ''prosecution'' includes preliminary acts such as 
identification and testimony then this provision, in the absence of a more 
specific one, might be of help in incorporating Article 93(7). In that case, 
another element mentioned in the Statute is lacking. Namely, that the person 
needs to consent to this transfer172, whereas the rest of the assurances would be 
acceptable mutatis mutandis under Article 93(7)(a)(ii). A clearer provision 
which would correspond to the temporary transfer enshrined in the Statute 
would have been welcome. 
169 Section 54(2) and (3). 
170 Article 93(7)(a) 
171 Section 66( 1). 
172 Article 93(7)(a)(i). 
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The UK implements 93(1)(f) and (7) in Section 32. Consent is the most 
important aspect of this provision which is incorporated 173 without any 
problems. 
11.3 Article 93(8): Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is safeguarded in Article 93(8). States may wish to 
transmit documents or information on a confidential basis which can be used 
by the Prosecutor to generate new evidence 1 74. These documents may be 
disclosed and used following Parts 5 and 6 of the Statute175• 
Australia incorporates Article 93(8) by authorising the AG to provide 
the necessary information or documents whilst undertaking to implement 
93(8)(c) as well l76 • Interestingly, Australia, in Section 11(3), and also in 
Subsection (4), attaches conditions to the provision of such assistance. without 
specifying the types of conditions. This is not provided for in Article 93(8) and 
thus the manner in which this provision will be applied in practice is crucial. 
Article 93(9) deals with competing requests which do not involve 
surrender to the Court or extradition to a third State by virtue of an 
international obligation and establishes a duty for the requested State to resolve 
the situation, in consultation with the Court. In the event that this effort fails. 
the general principles of Article 90 apply, in accordance with Article 93(a)(ii). 
The requested State should therefore include in its implementing 
legislation a duty to consult with the Court in the case 0/93(9). 
173 Section 32(4). 
174 Article 93(8)(b). 
17S Article 93(8)(c). 
176 Section 11(3) and (4) respectively. 
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This however does not apply in the case of 93(9)(b) and the requested 
State is only required to inform the ICC about the particular situation. This 
provision has not been taken up by States in their implementation. 
11.4 Article 93(10) 
Article 93(10) is a very interesting provision because it operates as a 
bridge between the international and the national systems. By empowering the 
ICC to assist with domestic proceedings upon request, States allow the Court to 
provide its expertise in dealing with cases falling under its jurisdiction. This 
would have the result of a more uniform approach to such cases and if used, 
will assist in reducing excess burden of the COurt l77 , particularly in States 
which do not quite meet the unwillingness and inability threshold of the 
Statute. 
Article 93(10) despite being in the co-operation part of the Statute, is 
not among the provisions that must necessarily be implemented into domestic 
law, as it would be for a State to decide whether or not it will request the 
Court's assistance. That said, however, States may wish to provide for such 
possibility. The Netherlands is an example of a State that provides for such a 
possibilityl78. Although this is a very interesting provision, it is not specified in 
the Dutch law whether such assistance may be requested for both investigation 
and trial. Neither are the crimes for which such a request may be made 
specified. From the general wording of Section 5 it should be assumed that 
Article 93(10) is incorporated in its entirety. Of interest is Section 5(2) which 
t77 Provided of course that the ICC have the facilities and available personnel to assist 
following such a request. 
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defines the probative value of the documents received by the ICC in the course 
oftheir assistance to the Netherlands. 
Despite its place in the co-operation part of the Statute and more 
specifically under "other forms of co-operation", Article 93(10) is construed as 
a much wider provision. According to this Article, assistance may be provided 
with respect to both investigation and trial for crimes falling under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, but interestingly, also with regard to "serious crimes 
under the national law of the requesting State". This provision, should not be 
seen as broadening the ambit of the Court's jurisdiction, but merely as an 
encompassing provision which would facilitate the provision of assistance even 
when the crimes falling under the Court's jurisdiction are not present in 
domestic law using the Statute's terminology. 
Section 64 of the German Law describes the form of a request under 
Article 93(10) rather than the possible use of this provision and as such is of 
limited interest. The final provision in Part 6 however is more rewarding. 
Section 67 states: "Conditions that the Court has tied to the mutual assistance 
shall be complied with". This overarching provision comes as a bit of a 
surprise at the end of a Part which is more likely to have little value in practice. 
In any case, it is consistent with the facilitative approach adopted generally by 
Germany. 
12. Article 94 ICC Statute: Postponement 
Should a request by the ICC interfere with an ongoing investigation or 
prosecution of conduct which is different from that to which the request relates 
178 Section 5. 
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to, then the requested State may postpone the execution of the Court's request 
for a mutually agreed period, in accordance with Article 94. 
In implementing Article 94 of the Statute, a State has to provide for a 
procedure to co-operate with the ICC for the postponement of the execution of 
the request, in accordance with Article 94 of the Statute. Bearing in mind that 
postponement is not refusal to co-operate, the procedure in place must reflect 
this and must allow for greater flexibility in ensuring co-operation with the 
Court. 
Australia provides for this possibility in its Act179• Section 34 applies 
when a request for surrender made by the ICC involves a person, who is the 
subject of an ongoing investigation or prosecution in Australia for different 
conduct to that sought by the ICC. Section 34(1) specifies the field of the 
application, whereas Subsection 2 describes the possible options. The 
Attorney-General, after consulting the ICC, may either proceed with the 
execution of the request for surrenderl80 or postpone it181 • Of interest is also 
subsection 3 of Section 34. 
It is important to stress that this provision is in general in accordance 
with Article 94 of the Statute. However, the possibility of giving precedence to 
dealing with conduct, which does not fall within the Court's jurisdiction and 
which could foreseeably be of much lower importance and gravity, is a bit 
troublesome. 
France does not refer specifically to Article 94 in its Criminal 
Procedure Code. However, Article 627-11 stipulates that the requested person 
is prosecuted or found guilty in France for crimes other than the ones for which 
179 Section 34. 
180 Section 34(2)(a). 
309 
National Implementation 
surrender is sought. In that respect, Article 627-11 is broader than Article 94 as 
it also covers situations where the person has been found guilty. In any case, 
this is of no consequence as France does not provide for the possibility of 
postponement in such an instance. Instead, the approach taken in France is that 
surrender must follow the same procedure as with a nonnal request for 
surrender, as evidenced by Article 627_11 182• 
The Netherlands on the other hand does not specifically refer to 
postponement of execution of a request. Instead, a request by the ICC which 
would conflict with an ongoing investigation or prosecution in a case other 
than that to which the request relates is dealt with by consulting the Court l83 • 
The Netherlands goes beyond the scope of Article 94 of the Statute as it allows 
consultation with the Court for a request which relates to the same act currently 
. .. h N th I d 184 H . in progress or In preparatIon In tee er an s . owever, since such a case 
may not be used as a reason for postponement of the execution of a request, 
and so long as a possible failure in the consultation process does not lead to 
refusal of executing the request for co-operation, the provision is not 
particularly problematic. Rather, it should be seen as a means of ensuring 
procedural legality for the purposes of domestic law, since the ICC is not a 
Court integrated into domestic system, representing a higher court in the 
judicial process found within this particular State. It might be necessary to 
181 Section 34(2)(b). 
182 It should be noted that the only difference in the procedure is that the person does not 
benefit from the possibility of release as with the case of Article 627-6, 627-9 and 627-10. This 
may be explained by the fact that the person in question has already been afforded such 
protection at the time helshe was the subject of investigation for these other crimes. Moreover 
Article 627-11 deals in. its last paragraph with the issue of suspension of prescription: 
Accordingly, the proceedmgs before the ICC suspend the prescription of a public action and of 
the sentence. !his p r ~ v i s i o n n is. appropriate as the French State would not be able to raise 
ftrescription WIth the vIew to objecting to the transfer of the person sought to the ICC. 
83 See the general consultation provision of Section 7(2)(g). 
\84 Ibid. Section 7(2)(f). 
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provide for such a procedure in order to facilitate the execution of the ICC's 
request. 
In Gennany, Article 94(1) is incorporated by Section 48 which covers a 
number of provisions l85 • Section 48, which does not distinguish between the 
various situations to which it applies, allows for postponement of the 
proceedings until a detennination is made on how to proceed with the Court's 
request. This provision does not incorporate the Articles it refers to by 
introducing specific conditions to be observed or otherwise, but it simply refers 
to them making them directly applicable. In that way, compliance with the 
Statute is guaranteed. 
Canada implements Article 94 in Section 64 of its Act. The part of the 
Section incorporated here is that relating to "a surrender order made in respect 
of a person accused of an offence within Canadian jurisdiction". In such a case 
postponement of the surrender is ordered by the Minister. Unlike the 
requirement in Article 94 to postpone for a period of time agreed with the 
Court, Section 64 states that postponement may take place until the person has 
been discharged186• Although not entirely in compliance with the Statute, this 
provision is not inappropriate as in all likelihood surrender will take place once 
a detennination of the situation before the domestic court takes place. It would 
have been preferable however to follow the Statute. Nevertheless, this caveat is 
rectified in the first part of the very first sentence of Section 64, which states 
"unless the Minister orders otherwise". The Minister of Justice is given 
discretion in this Section and when dealing with the ICC, the use of this 
discretion should be encouraged. It should be noted however that Section 64( 1 ) 
18S Article 93(3)-(5),(9)(b) and Article 95 are also implemented by Section 48. 
186 By acquittal, expiry of the sentence or otherwise. 
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does not distinguish between an offence sought by the Court in respect of the 
surrender request, and one which relates to a different crime than the one for 
which the person is prosecuted in Canada. This distinction is vital since, if tile 
request for surrender relates to a different case, then Article 94 is engaged and 
postponement might be possible. The satlle could not be said though if it 
. I th 187 mvo ves e same case . 
In England and Wales, Part I of Schedule 2 deals with this issue. 
Section 2 is the main provision which is very accommodating of the surrender 
request and implements Article 94 appropriately. The guiding principle is co-
operation with the ICC and consultation wherever necessary. The procedure 
put forward by the UK is very elaborate and attempts to foresee every possible 
scenario. Article 94 of the Statute refers to postponement of execution of a 
request in respect of an ongoing investigation or prosecution of a "case 
different from that to which the request relates". Section 2 fails to make this 
distinction and relates to any possible conflicting request. However, it goes 
beyond the Statute in the sense that discontinuation of proceedings is envisaged 
as well as opposed to postponement only. The effect however on custodial 
sentences can be found in Section 5. 
On the whole, postponement of an execution request follows the Statute 
and is not generally problematic when it comes to implementation. 
187 In the same Section, the possibility of postponing the surrender because of a sentence being 
served in Canada for an offence different to the one for which surrender to the ICC is sought is 
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13. Article 95 ICC Statute: Postponement due to an Inadmissibility Challenge 
When, in accordance with Articles 18 and 19, the Court considers an 
inadmissibility challenge, there is a possibility for the requested State to 
postpone the execution of a co-operation request until the ICC has determined 
the admissibility of the case before it. Article 95 of the Statute provides for this 
possibility which should in tum be acknowledged in the domestic 
implementing legislation. 
To comply with Article 95 a State should provide for postponement of 
co-operation pending an admissibility challenge before the ICC. 
Australia implements Article 95 in two different Sections of its Act t 88. 
Section 35 applies if the admissibility challenge pertains to Australia, whereas 
Section 36, to other such possible challenges. These two provisions will be 
examined in tum. Section 35 deals with the case in which Australia wishes to 
challenge the COurt'S involvement with a case currently under investigation or 
prosecution in Australia, or which has been dealt with and a decision was made 
not to prosecute. In fact, this Section relates to questioning the ICC's assertion 
of jurisdiction by virtue of complementarity, in accordance with Article 
19(2)(b) of the Statute. Because such a challenge is more perhaps more 
important or indeed interesting from the point of view of Australian domestic 
law, an entire Section is dedicated to it. The remainder of the admissibility 
challenges are dealt with in Section 36. Both Sections 35 and 36 adopt the 
same approach: the Attorney-General may postpone the execution of the co-
also explored. This pertains to Article 89(4) ICC Statute. 
188 Sections 35 and 36. 
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operation r e q u ~ s t t pending detennination of the admissibility of the Court 189, 
and depending on the outcome, he/she either refuses the surrenderl90, or if the 
case is deemed admissible, proceeds with the surrender provided that there is 
no other reason to postpone or refuse the execution of the request l91 • The 
Australian approach, whilst implementing the relevant Statute provision, 
allows for better interaction between the various provisions in the Statute. The 
Australian legislator has given a great deal of thought as to how the 
admissibility provisions interact with the co-operation regime and although 
their implementation is compatible with the Statute, the possibility is explored 
that regardless of the outcome of the admissibility challenge, other reasons 
which give rise to postponement or refusal of surrender may come into play. 
The Netherlands implements Article 95 in Section 8 of its Act. This 
Section embraces the spirit of Article 95, which allows a State to postpone the 
execution of a request in case of an admissibility challenge. The Dutch Section, 
however, contains much stronger wording in that a request relating to the case 
for the surrender of a person "shall" be suspended should an admissibility 
challenge be made and for the length of time this is being considered by the 
ICC. Section 8, therefore, renders the postponement of executing a request an 
obligation rather than a possibility which is what is envisaged in Article 95. It 
would have been preferable to have endorsed the wording of the Statute in that 
respect, which would have given flexibility to the requested State to evaluate 
the situation and decide whether to proceed with the execution of the request or 
189 Section 35(2) and 3 ~ ( 2 ) ) r e s p e ~ t i v e l y . . It is important to note that Australian in both those 
Sections adopt the wordmg of ArtIcle 9S and states that the Attorney General "may" (instead of 
a more rigid "shall") postpone. It leaves therefore room for surrender, regardless of a challenge 
~ e n d i n g g before the ICC. 
90 Section 35(3) and 36(3) respectively. 
191 Section 35(4) and 36(4) respectively. 
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otherwise postpone its execution. Section 8(2), however, incorporates the 
section of Article 95 which enables the ICC Prosecutor to proceed with the 
collection of evidence in accordance with Articles 18 and 19 of the Statute. The 
Dutch Section 8(2) is therefore in accordance with Article 95 of the ICC 
Statute. 
In Gennany, Section 48 applies to Article 95 as well, as above l92 • 
Canada deals with this issue in roundabout way. The relevant provision 
is Section 40(5) which allows for an extension of time193 to be granted to the 
Minister regarding hislher decision concerning the surrender provided that 
submissions have been made to the Minister in accordance with Section 43. 
Section 40(5)(a) stipulates that if these submissions relate to the admissibility 
of the case or the jurisdiction of the COurt l94, then the extension described 
above may be extended "for a period ending not more than 4S days after the 
Court's ruling on the issue". Although no mention is made of postponing the 
execution of a request195, the extension envisaged in this Section has exactly 
the same effect because in essence, the forty-five day extension applies after 
the Court's ruling, which means that until then the person may not be 
surrendered to the ICC. 
In the UK, challenges before the ICC on the basis of Articles 18 and 19 
are dealt with in a single paragraph in the Section which sets out the 
proceedings regarding the delivery order 1 96, By virtue of Section 5(4), 
adjournment of the proceedings may take place should such a challenge be 
brought before the Court. This incorporates Article 95 appropriately. However, 
192 See supra analysis of Section 48 with regard to Article 94( 1) of the Statute. 
193 Under Section 40( 1) the Minister may order the surrender of the person within ninety days 
194 Under Articles 18 and 19 of the Statute. . 
19S Postponement is mentioned for instance in Section 41. 
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no specific mention is made of the latter part of Article 95 which enables the 
Prosecutor to collect evidence in accordance with the Statute. This has not been 
taken up by other States, when implementing this Article. 
14. Article 96 ICC Statute: Contents of Request for Other Forms of Assistance 
Article 96 contains the form which a request for assistance other than 
arrest and surrender should take, and as such does not need to be implemented 
by a State. However, when such a request touches upon specific requirements 
under national law, the requested State shall consult with the ICC on these 
issues. 
A State should therefore provide for consultation to deal with requests 
enshrined in Article 93 to be made by the Court pursuant Article 96. 
15. Article 97 ICC Statute: Consultations 
The principle in Article 97 is that whatever the problem may be with a 
request made by the Court, the requested State should consult the ICC to 
identify ways of resolving the problem. To that effect consultation procedures 
must be in place to allow for such interaction between the State to which the 
co-operation request is addressed and the ICC. The Article goes on to provide 
for an indicative list of issues with regard to which consultation might arise. 
A State party, in implementing Article 97 shOUld avoid refusing the 
execution of the Court's request straight away and must enter in consultation 
with the Court without delay. It is imperative thus to provide for such a 
196 Section 5(4). 
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possibility in its domestic legislation, where emphasis should be given to 
finding solutions to possible problems. 
Australia adopts this very helpful approach and provides for 
consultations with the ICC in case of problems with the execution of a co-
operation request l97 . The Australian provision does not mirror the possible 
problems that might arise when a request is made, which can be found in 
Article 97. Given its non-exhaustive nature, this is not detrimental and the 
Australian view on this issue is entirely appropriate. What Australia has done 
is, in fact, to include a rather general provision 198, which stipulates that 
consultation must be sought for any reason likely to cause problems with the 
. f . t199 executIon 0 a co-operatIon reques . 
A somewhat similar, but also In many ways different, approach is 
adopted by the Netherlands. Section 7 of the Dutch law incorporates potential 
obstacles envisaged in executing the request for co-operation with the ICC. 
This provision contains the situations laid down in Article 97(a), (b) and (C)200. 
However, as with Australian Section 7, the Dutch provision is not limited to 
incorporating Article 97 only. Instead, the said provision contains a 
comprehensive list of many situations that may arise when dealing with a 
request to arrest and surrender a person to the ICC and consolidates the 
197 Section 11(1). 
198 Section 11. 
199 This also includes a request under 93(1)(1) and requires that before it is refused, it should be 
explored whether it could nevertheless be provided subject to the conditions laid down in 
Section 11(2) of the Australian Act. See supra. 
200 The Dutch Act however separates subsection (b) of Article 97 of the Statute into two 
subsections, namely, 7(2)(b) and (c). Although this has no impact whatsoever on the actual 
incoIporation of the obligation to enter consultations with the Court, it constitutes a better fonn 
of drafting as a.lthough both instances described in 97(b) deal with factual issues, they 
nevertheless ment equal, and therefore, separate attention. 
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necessity of consultation with the Court in a single provision201 • In this it 
differs greatly from Australia. The Dutch approach is methodologically 
preferable. All the possible instances where consultation with the ICC might be 
necessary, can be found in a single provision, rather than in various Sections of 
the Act. This enhances legal certainty as it is clear in which cases the 
possibility of refusing co-operation may be averted following consultation with 
the Court. 
Section 7(6) of the Dutch Act contains an additional provision for 
consultation which emanates from the unique position held by the Netherlands 
as the host State for the ICC. Accordingly, if a request addressed to the host 
State cannot be granted, the Netherlands by virtue of the said provision and in 
accordance with the headquarters agreement shall engage in consultation with 
the ICC. 
16. Article 98 ICC Statute: Immunities 
Although Article 98 has proven to be crucial in the way the US in 
particular has reacted to the coming into force of the Rome Statute, there is not 
much a State can do to implement this Article in its domestic legislation. 
Perhaps, mention should be made of the issue of immunities. A State, in 
accordance with Article 27 of the Statute should provide in its implementing 
legislation that official capacity is irrelevant when crimes falling under the 
jurisdiction of the Court are involved, allowing therefore for the prosecution of 
such crimes at least at an international level, if not at the national as well. 
201 The various other possibilities for consultation discussed in Section 7 are being dealt with in 
this chapter under the provisions they refer to. 
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Immunities have been dealt with in by most States in their substantive criminal 
law acts rather than their procedural acts dealing with co-operation and will not 
b . d h 202 e examme ere . 
17. Article 99 ICC Statute: Execution of requests under Articles 93 and 96 
Article 99 clearly stipulates that for the execution of requests for 
assistance, use shall be made of national procedures of the requested State. 
This, in tum, implies that the relevant procedures to facilitate such requests 
must be in place. There is no extra burden placed on the requested State, as 
evidenced from Article 99(3), where it is stated that States do not have an 
obligation to translate the documents into the two working languages of the 
Court, but shall submit the documents in the original form. In general, the spirit 
of this provision is to facilitate execution of the requests, without imposing 
unnecessarily burdensome provisions which will only delay the process, 
without affording greater protection for either the individual concerned, or the 
evidence involved. Article 99(4) is a significant provision. Allowing execution 
of the Court's requests directly on the territory of the State party, without even 
the presence of the State's authorities, is important for the effectiveness of the 
Court and is the most coercive provision in the Statute. As such, it should be 
implemented. This Article also provides for the possibility of execution of 
requests following consultations with the requested State Party. 
202 Mention should be made, however, of Section 16 of the International Crimes Act (Act 270 
of 19 June 2003), implementing the substantive provisions of the Statute in the Netherlands, 
which is unique in the sense that it affords immunity to "foreign heads of state, heads of 
government and ministers of foreign affairs, as long as they are in office, and other persons in 
so far as their immunity is recognised under customary international law", as well as "persons 
who have immunity under any Convention applicable within the Kingdom of the Netherlands". 
See also for a procedural approach to Article 98, Australian Section 12. 
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Few States have opted to implement this provision. Germany 
incorporates Article 99(1) in a rather generous manner allowing ample accesc; 
to members of the Court and their authorised representatives. Moreover, and 
certainly in practical terms more crucially, Germany implements Article 99(4) 
of the Statute. In its Section 62, a clear facilitative approach is taken to allow 
the Prosecutor and its staff to conduct on-site investigations in accordance with 
the Statute. The emphasis is on Article 99(4 )(b) without, however, imposing 
specific conditions ab initio. Moreover, the permissibility of on-site 
investigations is stressed provided that this is done without compulsory 
measures. Overall, the provision is in accordance with the Statute Article but 
does not go beyond what is expected. Given, however, that most States refrain 
from directly implementing Article 99(4), Germany's approach should be 
considered a success. 
18. Article 101 ICC Statute: Rule of Speciality 
The Rule of Speciality explained in chapter three is implemented by 
Australia in Section 48 of its Act. This Section replicates the Statute Article 
and as such incorporates the rule of speciality in Australia appropriately. 
Although no specific mention is made to the rule of specialty as this is 
found in Article 101 of the Statute, the Netherlands nevertheless in Section 
12(1) of its Act incorporates the rule in its domestic law. Section 12(1) is in 
accordance with Article 101(1). The situation with regard to 101(2) though is 
less clear. Section 12(1) does not explicitly provide for a waiver of the rule of 
speciality. What Section 12(1) does is to make surrender conditional on the 
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exprel\s consent of the Dutch Minster of Justice. As the translation of Section 
12(1) is not clear in that respect, the consent described here may be taken to 
amount to the requisite waiver found in the Statute. Section 12(2), however, is 
reminiscent of extradition procedures where normally such a clause is inserted 
to avoid extradition of a person to a third State following hislher extradition to 
the requesting State. The inclusion of Article 101 in the Statute is unfortunate. 
Even more unfortunate is, however, the inclusion of clauses traditionally used 
in extradition proceedings when it is clear from the Statute that the Court is not 
mandated to surrender a person to a third State for offences committed prior to 
the surrender to the ICC. It may be that Section 12(2) allows for such a 
surrender to take place following the consent of the Minster of Justice. It is 
unlikely though that such a situation will arise in practice. To add to the 
confusion, it is not clear which State would be considered a third State under 
the said provision. A third State is, potentially, any State besides the 
Netherlands. But is the concept of a third State in this instance limited to States 
parties to the Statute or does it go beyond these to include even non-ICC 
parties? Should this be the case, it is almost inconceivable that the ICC would 
surrender a person to a State which is not party to the Rome Statute. 
The reverse of the situation described in the Dutch Section 12(2) is 
envisaged in the Statute when considering the possibility of a competing 
request found in Article 90(6)203. 
Germany deals with the rule of speciality in its Section 25, which does 
not reiterate Article 101(1) but deals directly with Article 101(2). The principle 
enshrined in Section 25(1) is that the exception to the rule of speciality found 
in 101(2) will in essence always apply. The said Section does not explicitly 
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provide for a waiver of the rule of speciality. By reference, however, to Article 
101(2) in Section 25(1) this should be considered to be the procedure to be 
followed. Had this Section contained this paragraph only, it would have been 
the most appropriate application of a very badly drafted and unfortunate rule 
which is, nevertheless, present in the Statute. However, Paragraphs 2 and 3 add 
to the uncertainty surrounding the rule of speciality. Section 25(2) seems to add 
a condition on the ICC which has no legal basis in the Statute. 
On the one hand, Germany enables the ICC to prosecute cases beyond 
the barrier of the rule of speciality, and on the other, it imposes conditions 
which although trace back to the Statute, are not necessarily facilitative. 
Section 25(2), for instance, greatly resembles provisions found in extradition 
treaties which prohibit re-extradition once a person has been extradited to a 
particular State. A great deal of thought seems to have been given to this 
provision. Based on the complementarity provisions of the Statute the aim is to 
uphold this fundamental principle of the Statute as it was intended to be used, 
in favour of States which are willing and able to deal with a particular case. 
However, despite the fact that Section 25(2) contains a reference to the relevant 
Statute provisions, it is not up to Germany to impose such conditions on the 
ICC. The inclusion of the rule of specialty in the Statute is somewhat limited 
and does not go all the way, as the Statute is not an extradition treaty. The 
excellent German approach of Section 25(1) is significantly curtailed by the 
addition of the second paragraph to this Section. The same justification applies 
with regard to paragraph 3 of Section 2S. Again, there are very good reasons to 
uphold this approach, as extradition following surrender to the ICC should not 
be permitted. The solution here should be that the ICC itself would not further 
203 See supra implementation of Article 90 of the Statute. 
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"extradite" a person to any other State. As a matter of fact the ICC would not 
have basis in the Statute to proceed in such a way and, furthermore, it would 
not be in the interests of the Court nor would it be practicable to have recourse 
to such measures. When the ICC requests the surrender of a person it is for the 
purposes of prosecution or execution of sentence204• In other words, Section 25 
contains an automatic waiver in paragraph 1, which is then lifted in the 
circumstances provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3205. This does not contravene 
the Statute as Article 101 (2) does not contain a strict obligation to provide a 
waiver. However, nothing in the Statute obliges the ICC to comply with a 
request to return the surrendered person to Germany should the case arise. 
A related issue is discussed in Section 26, which has not been picked up 
by many countries. Conceivably, the ICC may request the surrender of a person 
who has previously been the subject of extradition. Under traditional 
extradition rules, surrender to the ICC would violate the principle of the 
prohibition of re-extradition. Germany, largely influenced by such proceedings 
devotes an entire Section to the issue and specifies the circumstances in which 
surrender would be allowed. This is not the place to examine this provision in 
detail. The ICC Statute is silent on the matter and it is difficult to see how 
Germany will enforce this provision on another State, and so influence that 
State's relationship with the ICC. 
Canada's incorporation of the rule of speciality can be found in Section 
40(3) of the Canadian Extradition Act. This provision allows Canada's 
Minister of Justice to seek assurances that the person will only be prosecuted or 
204 Article 91. 
205 Although no mention is made of Article 101(2) in Section 25, Section 68(7) states that a 
waiver in accordance with Article 101(2) shall be dealt with by the Federal Ministry of Justice 
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a sentence will be imposed or enforced for crimes referred to in the order for 
surrender. Again, this is particularly relevant for extradition cases. 
The possibility of non-extradition until the assurances or conditions set 
by the Minister are met by the extradition partner is found in Subsection 4 of 
Section 40. This is a purely procedural provision which, if invoked with regard 
to the ICC, should be dealt with in consultation with the Court. Of interest is 
also that a possibility of waiving the rule of speciality under Article 101 (2) of 
the Statute is not incorporated directly in the Canadian Act except for the 
provision in Section 72. This provision allows the requested person to "waive 
extradition". Reference to the rule of speciality is made in 72(2)(a). Under this 
provision the requested person and not the State may wave extradition. This is 
hardly similar to Article 101(2) ofthe Statute. 
Had the drafters of Article 101 intended to provide a fully-fledged rule 
of speciality, identical to the one found in extradition treaties, they would have 
done so. Since they included the rule in the Statute, they perhaps oUght to have 
done so. However, with the law as it stands on this issue, it is hard to see that 
extradition law analogies would work in that respect. 
19. Article 102 ICC Statute: Terminology 
It would not be necessary to incorporate the use of tenns found in 
Article 102 of the Statute into domestic law as long as the distinction between 
surrender an extradition is made clear and no confusion is made between these 
in agreement with the Federal Foreign Office. Dealing with this issue at the Federal level is 
evidence of the significance attributed to this provision. 
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terms. Similarly, there is no need to put aside extradition laws of States when 
co-operating with the ICC. 
There are examples of both approaches available. The Netherlands in 
Section 11(2) explicitly states that its Extradition Act is not applicable when 
surrendering a person to the ICC. This is interesting, as it is a good example of 
Article 102 being directly implemented in domestic law. However, compliance 
with Article 102 does not necessarily imply non-applicability of extradition 
law. Canada, for example, has successfully amended its Extradition Act to 
comply with a request for surrender of a person to the Court. No distinction is 
made between the use of terms extradition and surrender in the Canadian case. 
The justification for not having a distinct procedure is that "the extradition 
process has been tested by [Canada's] highest court and has been found to be 
constitutionally sound,,206. The use of extradition proceedings mutatits 
mutandis is not objectionable, but a distinction should be made between those 
processes which are suitable for executing co-operation requests and those 
which are not. For instance, in Part 2 of the Extradition Act, where the 
extraditable conduct is discussed, there is by virtue of 3( 1 )(b) a requirement for 
double criminality. This is not necessary for "surrender" to the Court generally. 
This is hypothetical in the case of Canada, as the legislation already exists207 
and the crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC are already punishable 
in Canada. It could foreseeably arise though, should implementation of the ICC 
crimes by Canada have been narrower than the Statute. Yet again, this will not 
arise in practice as the Canadian Act goes beyond what is requested by States 
when incorporating the core crimes into domestic law, as it defines the ICC 
206 Robertson, (2004), 9. 
207 ibid. supra n. 32. 
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crimes according to customary or conventional international law208. Section 
3(2) of the Canadian Act helpfully clarifies that it is irrelevant as to how the 
conduct is defined by the extradition partner09 and whether it is akin to 
Canada's approach. Presumably, this could apply to the ICC as well. 
As a general point, as is shown clearly by this examination of the 
various implementation pieces, what matters is the substance of the relevant 
piece and not the form it might take. 
20. Implementation: Some Guiding Principles 
Having examined State implementation efforts with regard to each of 
the Statute Articles dealing with co-operation, it is clear that each State has its 
own concerns and priorities and affords different treatment to each of the issues 
involved. 
The point of reference in the preceding analysis has been the ICC 
Statute. Mindful of the positions taken by States when implementing the ICC 
regime, in order to identify some guiding principles common to the various 
pieces of implementing legislation, the basis has to be the Statute. 
The guiding principles presented here are by no means unique. It 
certainly depends on the perspective on implementation; the approach would 
differ, had different parameters been examined. For instance, should the 
emphasis be on State interests, the approach would, perhaps, have been quite 
dissimilar. Since States have signed up to the Statute and have therefore to 
208 Ibid. Sections 4,6. 
209 The ICC is considered an "extradition partner" under the Act, Section 2. 
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undertake the obligations enshrined therein, they have to abide by the Statute 
and its standards. 
From the preceding Article-by-Article analysis, States should: 
1. Allow for full co-operation under the Statute. This in essence means respect 
for the Statute and facilitation of its co-operation regime. 
2. Strive for promptness and expediency when dealing with a co-operation 
request. 
3. Ensure that ICC implementing legislation is not more burdensome than 
other pieces of legislation, particularly extradition procedures. When 
possible, the ICC should be treated more favourably. 
4. Interpret dubious provisions in favour of the Statute. 
5. Minimise the possibility of refusing co-operation. 
6. Deal with procedural problems before the ICC and not 10 the State 
concerned. 
7. Facilitate consultation with the Court, in accordance with the Statute, either 
through a general clause empowering the State to enter consultations with 
the ICC, or through specific reference to consultation whilst implementing 
various Statute Articles. 
Conclusion 
An examination of the provisions of the Statute and State responses to 
their implementation reveals that the task of incorporating them into domestic 
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law is daunting. In the previous chapters, the role States played was examined 
from the perspective of the Statutes of the international criminal courts. In 
other words, the emphasis was on the international side. This chapter deals 
primarily with the domestic aspect of the inter-relationship. When it comes to 
implementation, States are required to play an active part to contribute to the 
interplay with the international criminal justice institutions. Incorporation of 
international criminal law into domestic law is the missing piece to complete 
the jigsaw of interaction between national and international legal orders. The 
system cannot become operational without State input. In the process of 
implementation, however, States face a number of challenges which they have 
to overcome in order to reap the benefits of international criminal justice. And 
in this quest for effectiveness of the system something has got to give. 
Similarly to Jason and the Argonauts who, in order to reach the golden fleece 
had to go through the clashing rocks costing them the stem of their mythical 
vessel, States have to make some hard choices, knowing that if they succeed in 
implementing the Statutes fully, their relationship with international criminal 
justice institutions is complete. 
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Conclusions 
International Criminal Justice at the Interface: Between Scylla 
and Charybdis? 
The main themes this work has examined revolve around the interplay 
between national and international legal orders in the field of international 
criminal justice. The present thesis explores the key concepts that regulate this 
relationship, as these are found in the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC. Moreover, it looks into their practical application, as well as into factors 
that influence this interaction and sheds some light on the reactions of the 
principal actors in the emerging international criminal justice system. An 
analysis of the dialectic relationship between national and international orders 
from the viewpoint of international law is at the centre of this thesis. 
The above relationship is based on a formalised interaction, governed 
by distinct principles to be found in the Statutes of the Tribunals and the Court. 
This thesis does not, to a large extent, question the inception of the 
international criminal justice order as a whole. Nor does it criticise the choice 
of concepts dealing with the inter-relationship. Instead, by deconstructing 
primacy and complementarity, and by exploring their strengths and weaknesses 
when applied in practice, it advocates, in essence, a model of what could be 
termed as 'functional or workable interaction'. And in this model States playa 
leading part. Their relationship with the international level is influenced by 
their own actions, but also by the actions of the principal organ of the United 
Nations, the Security Council. 
The main argument that permeates this work is that States play a 
fundamental role in the interaction between national and international courts. 
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Moreover, the effectiveness of the system is crucial for the success of the 
international criminal justice venture and largely depends on its players. The 
Statutes of both the ad hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal Court 
provide the guiding principles towards achieving a functioning international 
criminal justice regime, but States and the Security Council are to carry out 
what the Statutes promise: a functioning interplay. It is, therefore, up to them to 
give meaning to the relevant provisions which would be a dead letter 
otherwise. 
After exammmg State interaction with international adjudication 
systems in fields other than international criminal justice, the analysis shifted to 
the examination of the foundations of the interface in international criminal law 
and the concepts that regulate the role of States therein. As demonstrated 
already, the choice of concepts on which their relationship is premised is 
pivotal. The aim of both primacy and complementarity is neither to deprive 
national courts of jurisdiction, nor States from assuming their responsibility in 
dealing with the most heinous crimes. On the contrary, in the case of the 
Tribunals, emphasis is placed on their concurrent jurisdiction, whereas the ICC 
complements national courts and intervenes only when it is thought that this is 
the appropriate action to be taken. As it is not logistically possible, and would 
perhaps even be undesirable, to try at international level each and every person 
suspected of having committed war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
genocide, the principles devised strive to ensure that the interests of justice are 
served, and that each forum deals with the cases most suitable for it. And this is 
evidenced from the processes envisaged by which the Tribunals or the ICC are 
seised of jurisdiction. In the case of primacy, this role is fulfilled by deferral, 
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whereas in complementarity, it takes a finding that the national courts of a 
State are "genuinely unwilling or unable" to deal with a case. In essence, both 
principles achieve approximately the same results. The onus imposed on States, 
however, differs. In the ad hoc Tribunals, State jurisdiction is, in principle, 
supplanted by the international level, with the Tribunals having to prove that it 
is in the interests of justice to request deferral of a case. In the ICC, the burden 
of proof is reversed in favour of national courts. For a State to evade the 
application of complementarity, it would have to actively engage in 
investigations and prosecutions that are of a certain standard, which meets the 
thresholds enshrined in the Statute. In such a case, the ICC would not be able 
to be seised of jurisdiction. 
Primacy played an important part in building up the first truly 
international criminal Tribunals. It was a means of asserting international 
authority. Once this was achieved, and also due to changing needs, primacy has 
evolved to become a more targeted principle and recently aims to involve 
States more in the adjudication process. Complementarity constitutes a more 
refined principle, bestowing conditional primacy on national courts. In essence, 
it does not matter who exercises jurisdiction, as long as the appropriate forum 
is seised of the case at hand. Despite primacy's transformation over the years, 
it may not always lead to the best forum to exercise jurisdiction. 
Complementarity provides a better option in that respect, but the foreseeable 
problems in its application should not be disregarded. However, it is essentially 
up to States to comply with the Statute taking conditional precedence in 
dealing with a case, whilst the Court's Prosecutor adopts a more passive 
approach. 
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The interaction between States and international institutions is perhaps 
more clearly demonstrated in the field of co-operation. In the quest for an 
effective international criminal justice system, attention must be drawn to the 
obligations States have to perform, as well as the guidance the relevant Statutes 
provide. 
Full co-operation with the Tribunals or the ICC is never going to be 
achieved. There are always going to be States, other entities or 
intergovernmental organisations that, for one reason or another, will fail to 
observe the strict obligation to provide assistance to international criminal 
justice institutions. The system designed to deal with such instances of non-co-
operation is far from perfect. However, it has to be seen in the context of the 
relationship between States and such institutions. For the twin Tribunals, 
enforcement of the obligation to co-operate lies with the SC. The responsibility 
to see to this obligation complied with is removed from the ambit of the States 
immediately concerned and is placed with the executive organ of an 
international organisation. Despite membership of the UN, the above States do 
not have control over the type of action the SC might take, unless, of course, 
failure to co-operate comes from one of the Permanent Members of the SC. 
Compliance, therefore, comes as a threat from above. Once a breach has 
materialised, the threat may be transformed to concrete action. The 
mechanisms applicable to the Tribunals were designed to reflect the coercive 
nature of the system they form part of. In practice, it takes a lot more than the 
abstract threat of SC action to induce co-operation. Essentially, prosecutorial 
strategies and non-forcible judicial means have been relatively more successful 
than SC (in)action. The coercive powers the system is based upon have never, 
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to date, been put to the test. Instead, weaker means of enforcing co-operation 
have been used. 
Inevitably the ICC's different philosophy is reflected in its co-operation 
regime as well. States were the primary actors in the Court's creation. They are 
solely responsible for its operation and success. Failure to co-operate with the 
ICC is therefore dealt with by State parties to its treaty. However, due to its 
very nature, coercive powers are not envisaged, except for SC referrals. Several 
concessions have been made to States with a view to avoiding non-co-
operation with the Court. Consultation is the preferred means of dealing with 
disputes. Moreover, difficult provisions have been "watered down" to the 
liking of States. The Statute is careful to provide for postponement of co-
operation which is complemented by a limited right to refuse the execution of a 
request. 
No matter how weak the system seems in practice, it was argued earlier 
that it might be no less effective than the Tribunals. Given that the power to 
enforce co-operation remains with the States whose interests are at stake, it 
might stand a better chance overall than an abstract threat hanging over States 
from a centralised authority, which has never taken any action in similar 
situations. Instead, many of the problems which would normally give rise to 
non-eo-operation would be dealt with, already as mentioned above, in the 
course of the execution of a co-operation request. The system envisaged for the 
ICC is therefore less rigid and permits formulation of requests in such a 
manner so as to be agreeable to the States concerned. This flexibility which, in 
truth, gives more control to States, is based on an attitude of anticipation, rather 
than confrontation of the difficulties as and when they arise. 
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This is not to say that non-eo-operation will not be a problem. It will 
certainly be a major one. The ICC regime has the i n h ~ r e n t t limitations of a 
treaty. Moreover, it contains an in-built possibility of non-eo-operation. The 
"unwillingness", pursuant to which the Court may be seised of its jurisdiction, 
is likely to be a major stumbling block for the co-operation regime as well. It is 
unrealistic to expect that a State which has not had the will to investigate and 
prosecute itself and has actively engaged in shielding the accused from 
criminal responsibility, will co-operate "fully", as Article 86 puts it, with the 
ICC. The "complementarity paradox" will take its toll in this instance, and it is 
likely to be a heavy one. For the rest of the cases, however, the co-operation 
regime will not be weaker in practice than its Tribunals' counterpart. In any 
case, whatever additional steps are taken to enhance co-operation, they cannot 
substitute the will of the States which are the main actors in this respect. It is 
up to them to observe or disregard the obligation to co-operate with the 
Tribunals or the Court. Ensuring that State co-operation is achieved is crucial 
to the effectiveness of international criminal justice. 
Another facet of the interaction between States and international 
criminal courts involves an external factor capable of affecting the interplay; 
the UN Security Council. As demonstrated, the Council intervenes in di fferent 
ways, depending on the institution and on the stage of the process. The role the 
SC played in the creation of the ad hoc Tribunals is not replicated in the ICC, 
due to its different legal basis. The transition, since the initial SC involvement 
in the field of justice culminated in the creation of the ad hoc Tribunals, from 
the exclusion of State input, to a system, such as the ICC, where States play the 
leading part, is unprecedented. However, when it comes to the operation of the 
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ICC, State volition is either altered, through the possibility of a SC referral, or 
totally denied, through deferral. At best, a partnership between States and the 
Security Council emerges. However, the role of the Council remains strong, 
and the prospect of its assuming its original hegemonic stance should not be 
disregarded. The system devised in the Statutes of both Tribunals and the ICC 
would guarantee a workable interaction if all players adhered to their allocated 
roles. 
Finally, the most obvious contribution of States to the international 
criminal justice regime is observed is the field of implementation. Although the 
analysis in the present thesis focused primarily on questions arising out of the 
incorporation into domestic law of the ICC co-operation provisions, it is clear 
that State action is decisive in giving meaning to the interaction between States 
and institutions. National implementation of international criminal law in 
domestic legal orders not only enables co-operation with the international 
criminal courts at a practical level, but it also completes the relationship 
between States and institutions, as it constitutes the only means of empowering 
national jurisdictions to try war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
There is sufficient flexibility in the incorporation process for States to make 
their own mark on the international criminal justice scene through their 
implementing legislation. However, this latitude is not absolute and is 
restricted by the courts' Statute. 
Despite the importance of this aspect. it seems that not all State parties 
have yet risen to the challenge. Following the coming into force of the Rome 
Statute, the emphasis has shifted away from the ICC to other areas of 
intemationallaw. The current events on the international scene have assisted in 
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that respect. Terrorism and the "war" thereon currently dominate the 
discussions and the legal commentaries, whereas the ICC seems to be 
somewhat passe. The coming into force of the Rome Statute, a l t h o u g ~ 1 1
arguably a very important milestone, is certainly not the end of the road. In 
fact, the battle against impunity, a concept which was prevalent during the 
process that led to the creation of the Court, starts after the beginning of the 
Court's operation and, in reality, when the ICC interacts properly with 
accountability efforts, either at the international or at the national level, and 
most prominently, with national courts. The Statute provides the principles on 
which this interaction is based. It is up to the States to provide the means for it 
to materialise. And this can only be effectively done through implementation. 
The question which then follows is whether the relationship between 
national and international legal orders actually works. It is immediately 
obvious to the reader of this thesis that there is a tension between the principles 
governing this interplay and their application in practice. The concepts that 
regulate this relation represent perhaps ideals, which may, to an extent, be 
unattainable in practice. The reality and the problems that come with them are 
depicted in the practical application of the above concepts. A realisation that 
the system does not work as well as it was expected, or at least as it was hoped 
it would, is important in order to explore alternative avenues of enforcement, or 
simply practical ways of rectifying the problems with the existing framework. 
The approach taken in the present work has been one of scrutinising 
key aspects of the relationship between international criminal courts and 
national legal orders. As a starting point, a recognition that the above 
relationship is not unique to international criminal law is important, as it puts 
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the r ~ s e a r c h h hypothesis in perspective and assists in understanding the 
particular characteristics of this field. By examining the concepts on which 
international interaction with the national level is based, an evaluation of its 
foundations and of the inherent limitations is achieved. An inquiry into co-
operation allows for consideration of practical problems that may arise. 
Exploring the role of the Security Council in the field of international criminal 
justice sets the boundaries of the system and places States and institutions 
opposite the principal organ of the United Nations. Finally, an in-depth 
analysis of States' incorporation efforts regarding the ICC co-operation regime 
assists in highlighting some common approaches among the implementation 
pieces examined, and completes the exploration of the interface between the 
national and international regimes, at least up until the point of actual trials by 
the ICC. 
Overall, the effectiveness of the evolving international criminal justice 
system greatly relies upon how States, institutions and the SC interact with 
each other and what scope there is to overcome the foreseeable shortcomings 
and attain a workable relationship. The Statutes of both the ad hoc Tribunals 
and the ICC provide the framework within which the system operates. It is 
States, however, that bear the burden of turning it into an effective regime. 
Despite the difference in their constitution and jurisdictional principles, the 
Tribunals and the permanent Court face some very similar problems. Guided 
by the Statutes, States possess the ability to foster this interaction and, assisted 
by the Security Council, to contribute to a functioning international criminal 
justice system. Aiming for workable interaction means that the relationship 
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between international criminal courts and national legal orders will not be one 
between Scylla and Charybdis. 
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Graph 3: Apprehension by Intergovernmental Organisations 
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Breakdown of Arrests ICTR 
Graph 4: lntemational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Breakdown of Arrests 
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